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ABSTRACT OF THESIS
Recent research at Japanese manufacturers in the UK has tended to 
simply focus on their employee relations practices, arguing that 
where they operate effectively they result in a loyal and highly 
productive workforce. It often goes on to point out that there 
is a link between these practices and the companies' production 
systems, suggesting that employee relations practices are an 
integral part of the production system at a Japanese company. 
However, the research fails to adequately show the implications 
of this link. Its attempts to examine the issue have remained 
descriptive, devaluing its results and conclusions. This 
research remedies this deficiency.
The research's central argument and findings are that production 
systems vary considerably between Japanese manufacturers in the 
UK and that contrary to popular belief some of these companies' 
production systems display serious shortcomings. It argues that 
employment relations practices at these companies though an 
integral part of their production systems are only one of several 
sets of characteristics necessary to the successful operation of 
the company. It is also important to consider a company's 
organizational structure and managerial effectiveness.
Strengths and weaknesses in these other production system 
characteristics affect employee responses to a company's 
employment relations practices, impeding or assisting the 
intended improvement of individuals in the performance of their 
work. Either a vicious or virtuous circle can therefore emerge 
since employee responses to a company's employment relations 
practices will further contribute to its production performance.
Testing this argument involves the design and use of an 
innovative model that identifies the key characteristics 
necessary for the production system at a Japanese manufacturing 
transplant in the UK to perform efficiently. Identification of 
these characteristics allows the model to be used as a benchmark 
against which to compare the production systems of Japanese 
manufacturers.
The research applies the model to the production systems of nine 
Japanese companies in the UK's consumer electronics sector and 
identifies a number of differences in their production system 
characteristics. Two of these nine companies are then selected 
as case studies and their production systems are examined in 
detail. In addition, workforce reactions to the employee 
relations practices at these two companies are also measured 
using questionnaire and interview data. The results confirm the 
research's argument that the closer a company's manufacturing 
system comes to displaying the model's full set of production 
system characteristics, the more likely it is that its employee 
relations practices will elicit workforce attitudes and behaviour 
desired by the company.
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PART 1
GENERAL ISSUES SURROUNDING JAPANESE 
MANUFACTURING TRANSPLANTS IN THE UK.

CHAPTER 1
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS AT JAPANESE MANUFACTURERS IN THE UK
1) INTRODUCTION: EVIDENCE OF SERIOUS SHORTCOMINGS
As the scale of Japanese inward investment into the UK
has increased, so has the number of studies of employment
relations practices adopted at the resultant new Japanese 
enterprises, particularly manufacturing operations.
The Japanese approach to employment relations has
resulted in their manufacturing operations portrayed as being 
at the forefront of the implementation of New Industrial 
Relations (NIR) practices in the UK. These companies are
presented as exemplifying the successful use of new and 
innovative techniques in British industrial relations during 
the 1980s. (Bassett, 1986; Wickens, 1987; White & Trevor,
1983) Several commentators have further embellished the idea 
of Japanese manufacturers as the initiators of NIR practices in 
the UK, by arguing that many UK companies have been compelled 
to "Japanize" their management of production, in order to 
survive both the direct challenge of Japanese competitors and 
the economic climate of the 1980s. (Oliver & Wilkinson, 1988; 
Ackroyd et al, 1988.)
Definitions of NIR have been constructed around the basic 
premise that it attempts to change certain underlying employee 
attitudes deemed to restrict the ability of the production 
process to achieve its full potential for output. If
/ '
successful, it is expected to alter employee behaviour and 
actions at work and lead to a corresponding improvement in the 
performance of their production tasks.
This research does not dispute the generalisation that 
Japanese manufacturers are at the forefront of the 
implementation of NIR practices in the UK. However, it shows 
variability among Japanese manufacturers in the UK 
variability that affects the extent to which some are 
considerably more successful than others at altering employee 
attitudes to the benefit of their production processes. In 
identifying the key dimensions of this variance and their 
causes the research parts ways with earlier studies of 
employment relations at Japanese manufacturers in the UK.
Earlier studies have tended to simply focus on Japanese 
manufacturers' employment relations practices and their 
intended outcomes. They invariably, and not incorrectly, 
characterise employment relations strategies at these companies 
as a key element of management's overall production strategy. 
For example, Reitsperger notes that the Japanese desire to 
achieve "the ideal production situation", necessitates 
management practices that encourage the development of a 
reliable, dedicated, flexible and loyal workforce. 
(Reitsperger, 1986) Similarly, Takamiya and Thurley suggest 
that many Japanese manufacturers in the UK use a management 
style where the personnel function "... is not seen as an 
exclusive specialization, but rather as an integral part of the 
running of every department". This is in contrast to UK
- 18 -
management attitudes that "tend to see it as an additional 
overhead cost not related to the production process." (Takamiya 
& Thurley, 1985, p.139) However, though much of this earlier 
research points out the link between employment relations 
practices and the production process it is unable to 
adequately show its implications. Attempts to examine the 
issue have remained descriptive, devaluing their results and 
conclusions. The research presented here begins to remedy this 
deficiency.
The research shows that employment relations practices 
at Japanese transplants in the UK are an integral part of 
their production systems, but are only one of several sets of 
characteristics necessary to the successful operation of the 
company. It concludes that other production system
characteristics related to the management and organization of a 
company also affect workforce responses to the company's 
employment relations practices. They either impede or enhance 
the work performance of individuals and therefore the 
performance of the company overall.
Testing this argument has involved the design and use of 
an innovative model that identifies the specific
characteristics necessary for the production system at a 
Japanese manufacturing transplant in the UK to perform 
efficiently. This identification of these characteristics 
allows the model to be used as a benchmark against which to 
compare the production systems of Japanese manufacturers. In
short, the closer a company's production system comes to
/
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displaying the model's full set of characteristics, the more 
likely it is that its employment relations practices will 
elicit workforce attitudes and behaviour desired by the 
company.
2) THE CASE OF JAPANESE MANUFACTURERS IN THE UK CONSUMER 
ELECTRONICS SECTOR
The research that follows concentrates on employment 
relations practices adopted at Japanese manufacturing 
companies involved in the UK consumer electronics industry. 
The research's definition of this sector of industry includes 
both the manufacturers of end products and their components 
suppliers. Included in this definition are manufacturers whose 
principal product falls into one of the following three 
categories:
1) Consumer electronic goods. (Including power tools, 
microwave ovens, audio equipment, televisions and video 
cassette recorders.)
2) Office electrical goods. (Including telephones,
facsimile machines and photocopiers.)
3) Personal Computers and printers.
Suppliers whose principal product falls into one of the 
following four categories are also included in the research's 
definition of the UK consumer electronics sector:
1) Semiconductors. (Including associated components.)
2) Electrical components. (Including wire harnesses, 
printed circuit boards, switches and capacitors)
>
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3) Non electrical components. (Including plastic mouldings 
and precision metal fitments.)
4) Other suppliers. (Including special chemicals necessary 
for the production of consumer electronics components and 
final products.)
Companies included in the definition are required to fall 
into the category of "greenfield site". This means that when 
they first commence production management have the opportunity 
to implement an innovatory industrial relations strategy and 
associated set of work practices. Such plants are often located 
away from major manufacturing centres. (Beaumont & Townley, 
1985; TUG, 1988.)
The definition does not include the following:
- Manufacturers of heavy electrical machinery and other 
non consumer electronic products in the engineering 
sector.
- Suppliers whose principal product is for manufacturers 
outside of the research's stated definition of the
consumer electronics industry.
- Joint venture companies financed with a mixture of
local and Japanese capital. (This does not exclude
companies where the share of stock is distributed between 
two or more Japanese companies.)
Existing local companies taken over by Japanese
companies.
All further references to Japanese companies in the UK 
consumer electronics industry are based on this definition 
unless otherwise specified. The production systems of 
Japanese firms within this particular sector of UK industry
have been selected for study because, as this chapter will 
demonstrate, they make up a significant block of Japanese 
direct investment in UK manufacturing industry. This is most 
apparent when comparing the total number of all Japanese 
manufacturing operations in the UK to those confined to the 
consumer electronics industry.
Figures released by the Japanese External Trade 
Organisation (JETRO), and those collated by the Anglo-Japanese 
Economic Institute (AJEI), show that at the end of August 1991 
there were 205 Japanese manufacturing enterprises in the UK 
employing 83,899 UK workers. If existing UK companies taken 
over by the Japanese, research and development operations and 
joint ventures with local companies are excluded, the totals 
drop considerably. (For example, ICL now jointly owned by 
Fujitsu and Northern Telecom and AVX, owned by Kyocera 
Corporation, employ 23,611 UK workers between them.) The 
revised figures produce a total of 167 manufacturing operations 
employing a total of 49,316. Just over a third of these 
companies (56) fall within the research's definition of 
consumer electronics manufacturers and suppliers. They employ 
a total of 21,557 UK workers. This represents 43.7% of local 
workers employed at the 167 Japanese manufacturing operations 
in the UK.
Table 1.1 lists these 56 companies and the number of 
local workers they each employ. It clearly indicates that 
Japanese companies in the UK consumer electronics sector are
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r&BLE 1.1 JAPANESE OOMP»U*I 
COMPANY NAME
ES IN THE UK CONSUMER ELEC 
PRODUCT
STARTED
HANOFACTURXNG
OPERATIONS UNIONISED
NUMBER OF 
LOCAL EMPTjOYEES
scxmjuTD
Manufacturers JVC Manufacturing TVs and Monitors 1988 670
Mitslbushl Electric (UK)
Ltd TVs VTRs 1979 1200
Okl (UK) Ltd Computer Printers 1987 425
Seiko Instruments (UK) Ltd Micro Thermal Printers 1990 50
Alps Electric"(Scotland)
Ltd TVs VCRs 1991 240
Apricot Computers Ltd Computer Hardware 1990 . 422
Suppliers NEC Semi Conductors
(Europe) Ltd Circuit Manufacturers 1981 725
Shiln Etsu Hangotal
Europe Ltd Semi Conductor Wafers 1985 104
Tamura Hinckley Ltd Transformers and Power 1989 311
Supplies
Terasakl Circuit Breakers 1971 107
Tenma Plastic Components 1988 130
H.E. EXCUiro
Manufacturers Cltezen Manufacturing
(UK) Ltd Computer Printers 1987 EETPU 223
Pioneer Electronics
Technology (UK) Ltd Audio Equipment 1990 EETPU 70
Sanyo Electric Manufact­
uring (UK) Ltd Microwave Ovens 1988 EETPU 310
Suppliers Fujitsu Microelectronics
Ltd Semi Conductors 1990 1500
Mitsumi (UK) Ltd TV & VCR Components 1987 207
SMK (UK) Ltd Electronic Components 1988 167
Tabuchl Electric UK Ltd Transformers and Power
Supplies 1985 600
M.W. EMGUirO
Manufacturers TEC (UK) Ltd Weighing Machines. Cash
Registers & Typewriters 1988 10
HIDUUTDS INCL.
TELFORD am»
KII.TOH KEYNES
Manufacturers Epson Telford Ltd Printers and PCs 1988 650
Hitachi Power Tools Power Tools 1986 Figures Not
Maklta Manufacturing Available
Europe Ltd Power Tools 1991
NEC Technologies (UK) Ltd PCs, Printers and Mobile
Telephones 1988 724
Ricoh UK Products Ltd Office Automation and
Copiers 1984 650
Suppliers Accuromm UK Ltd Plastic Components for
Electronics 1988
Alps Electric (UK) Ltd Electrical Components 1985 600
Enplas (UK) Ltd Plastic Components for
Audio/Visual Industry 1988 35
Murasawa Telford Ltd Precision Metal Compon­
ents for Electronics
and Telecommunications
Equipment 1989 42
Omren Electronics (UK) Ltd Electrical Components 1988 85
Showpla UK (Ltd) Plastic Components 1989 150
Tamura Kaken Electro Chemicals for
PCBs 1981 15
WALES
Manufacturers Aiwa (UK) Ltd Audio Equipment 1980 CMB 500
Brother Industries (UK)
Ltd Consumer Electricals 1985 EETPU 634
Hitachi Consumer Products Consumer Electricals 1984 EETPU 1000
Kyushu Matsushita Electric Typewriters/Printers/
(UK) Ltd Telephone Systems 1987 EETPU 509
Matsushita Electric (UK)
Ltd Consumer Electricals 1974 CMB 1621
Orion Electric (UK) Ltd TVs and VCRs 1986 EETPU 550
Sharp Manufacturing Co of
the UK Ltd Consumer Electricals 1985 EETPU 1200
Sony Manufacturing Co of
the UK Ltd Consumer Electricals 1973 AEU 1800
Star Mlcronlcs Manufact­
uring (UK) Ltd Computer Printers 1988 CMB 360
Suppliers Dlaplastlcs Plastic Mouldings 1988 CMS 200
Electronic Harnesses Harnesses 1988 EETPU 110
Matsushita Electronic
Components Electrical Components 1988 EETPU 160
Matsushita Electric
Magnetron Corp (UK) Ltd Magnetrons 1990 EETPU 18
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TABLH 1.1 Conf d
œtfPAKT KMfE
STMtTED
MUIUFBCTTIS1>G
OPERATIONS DRiamSED
■OMBEK OF 
LOCAL EMPLOYEES
Optec DDI (UK) Ltd 
Tsuda (UK) Ltd
Magnetic Wire and 
Harnessing 
Precision Plastic 
Mouldings
1988
1988
165
170
EAST ARCLIA
Manufacturers Sansui Mission
Sanyo Industries (UK) Ltd
Hi-fi Equipment 
CTVs 1981 EETPU 598
S.V. EMCLAiro 
Manufacturers Clarion Shojl (UK) Ltd 
Tashlba Consumer Products 
(UK) Ltd
In-car Entertainment 
Consumer Electricals
1980
1981 EETPU
60
696
Suppliers Murata Manufacturing (UK) 
Ltd Capacitors 1990 65
S.E. EHCLANU
Manufacturers Matsushita Communicator 
Industrial (UK) Ltd 
Matsushita Graphic Commun­
ications Systems (UK) Ltd 
Nittan (UK) Ltd
Pulnix Europe Ltd
Cellular Telephones
Fax Machines 
Fire Alarm Systems and 
Electronic Circuit 
Boards 
Video Cameras and 
Optical Servers
1988
1990
1972
EETPU
EETPU
170
63
89
Figures Not 
Available
Suppliers Hosiden Bevon Ltd Telecommunications
Components 1990 393
Total Number of Companies * 56 No. Unionised 21 
% Unionised 37»
Sources; Anglo Japanese Economic Institute
JETRO. 1RS No. 442 1969. 1RS No. 470 1990, 
IBB
Does not include Japanese buy-outs of 
existing local companies e.g. AVX of 
Northern Ireland or ICL PLC.
Total No. of Employees • 21557
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crucial to any discussion related to Japanese inward 
investment in the UK, not least discussion concerning its 
impact on UK industrial relations.
The remainder of this introductory chapter discusses key 
issues related to Japanese inward investment while emphasising 
its presence in the UK consumer electronics industry. It is 
the intention of this first chapter to familiarise the reader 
with Japanese companies in this particular sector of UK 
industry since they form the sample from which the research 
draws its conclusions.
3) JAPANESE DIRECT INVESTMENT IN UK MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY
3.1) Levels of Japanese Direct Investment in the UK
In the late 1980s the scale of Japanese direct investment 
in the UK increased dramatically. The Japanese Ministry of 
Finance (MITI) reported that up until 1987 a cumulative total 
of US $4.1 billion had been invested in the UK representing 
just over 4% of total Japanese overseas investment. By
comparison, $2.4 billion Japanese investment was attracted to 
the UK in 1987 alone and by the end of 1990, the cumulative 
figure stood at $22.5 billion, representing over 7% of 
Japanese overseas investment. These figures include investment 
in both manufacturing and non manufacturing sectors of 
industry. As can be seen in Table 1.2, by 1989 the UK was 
established as second, behind the USA, in a league of top ten 
destinations for Japanese direct overseas investment.
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TABLE 1.2
Top Ten Destinations for Japanese Overseas Direct Investment in 1989.
Country Amount (US $m) % of Total Ranking 
in 1988
USA 32,640 48.2 1
UK 5,239 7.8 2
Netherlands 4,547 6.7 5
Australia 4,256 6.3 4
Panama 2,044 3.0 6
Singapore 1,902 2.8 9
Hong Kong 1,898 2.8 7
Caymen Islands 1,658 2.0 3
Canada 1,362 2.0 13
Thailand 1,276 1.9 8
Source: AJEJ
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Furthermore, Table 1.3 shows that the UK attracts more 
Japanese investment than any other European Community country.
In global terms the proportion of Japanese direct overseas 
investment devoted to manufacturing industry has tended to be 
significantly less than that allocated to other sectors. The 
cumulative total up until the end of 1990 for manufacturing 
industry was $81.6 billion as compared to $223.1 billion for 
other sectors. (See table 1.4) By far the largest amount of 
investment in manufacturing has been devoted to what MITI terms 
Electric Machinery. (Electrical related manufacturing sectors 
including consumer electronics.) The cumulative total for this 
sector of industry was $10.3 billion up until the end of 1990. 
This is nearly twice that of chemicals, the next largest 
sector. (See Table 1.4)
Japanese direct investment in the UK has mirrored this 
pattern. In 1989, Japanese manufacturing investment in the UK 
totalled US $1,174 million as compared to the US $4,065 
million devoted to other non-manufacturung industrial sectors. 
MITI figures do not allow identification of the proportion of 
manufacturing investment that is allocated to consumer 
electronics, nevertheless it is clear that Japanese 
investment in the UK consumer electronics sector has proceeded 
at an exceptional rate. In 1990, the Electronic Industries 
Association of Japan calculated that investment in the UK by 
Japanese electronics companies stood at a cumulative total of 
£1.3 billion and that it would rise to £1.7 billion by 1994.
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TABLE 1.3
Japanese Direct Investment in the EC.
Country For the Year 1989 Cumulative Total 
1951 - Sept 1990 (US $m)
UK 5,239 18,402
Denmark 24 50*
Germany 1,083 4,016
Greece 0 96*
France 1,136 3,617
Ireland 133 600
Italy 314 798
Netherlands 4,547 11,749
Belgium 326 1,468
Luxembourg 654 5,481
Spain 501 1,664
Portugal 74 160
TOTAL FOR EC 12 14,030 48,101
Sources: M IT I & AJEI 
*  To March 1990
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TABLE 1.4
Japanese Direct Overseas Investment by Industry
Industrial Sector Cumulative Total to end 
of 1990. (US $m)
MANUFACTURING
Food 4,085
Textiles 3,999
Lumber & Pulp 2,969
Chemicals 10,940
Ferrous & Non-Ferrous Metals 10,308
Machinery 7,932
Electric Machinery 20,360
Transport Machinery 10,880
Others 10,138
SUBTOTAL 81,613
NON-MANUFACTURING
Agriculture & Forestry 1,358
Fishery & Marine Industries 739
Mining 16,539
Construction 2,389
Commerce 31,315
Banking & Insurance 65,319
Services 34,667
Transportation 17,438
Real Estate 45,849
Others 7,523
SUBTOTAL 223,136
TOTAL 310.808
Source: M i t i
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(Independent 28.02.90) The cumulative figure had already 
reached over £1.5 billion by May 1991.
3.2) Reasons for the Attraction of Japanese Direct Investment 
to the UK
There appear to be many diverse factors which make the UK 
the first choice for Japanese direct investment in Europe. 
Manufacturing investment from the early 1970s to the present 
day can be divided into two separate periods using the mid 
1980s as a watershed.
The initial period of investment is discussed by Dunning. 
(Dunning, 1986) It is also characterised by factors highlighted 
at an AJEI conference on Japanese inward investment in 1988. 
Here management of several Japanese companies suggested that 
most, if not all, the following factors, also exposed by
Dunning, determined their decision to locate in the UK during 
this period. Firstly, the UK offered one of the largest 
domestic markets in Europe for their products and was, 
subsequent to the UK entry in to the EEC, seen as a
springboard for other European community markets. Secondly, 
the UK offered well developed transport and communications 
infrastructures. Thirdly, labour and operating costs, compared 
to those of other European countries, were, at this time,
highly competitive. Fourthly, overseas inward investors, not 
only Japanese, were enticed to the UK by the availability of 
investment incentives provided by national and local
government, especially in those regions which by the early
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1980s were experiencing high unemployment. Finally, Japan’s 
second language is English. (AJEI 1988.)
Factors relevant to the growth of Japanese inward 
investment up to the mid 1980s also apply up to the present 
day. However, the post 1985 period is distinguished by its 
incorporation of three other newly emerging factors. The first 
and most important of these concerns the Japanese desire to 
compete effectively in the EEC after the creation of a single 
market in 1992. The approach of 1992 led to an acceleration of 
Japanese inward investment in the EEC as a whole, of which the 
UK has been the major beneficiary. (See Table 1.3) In the 
consumer electronics sector approximately two thirds of those 
Japanese companies present in the UK at the end of August 1991 
arrived in the period 1986 onwards and just under half of those 
that arrived post 1985 arrived in 1988. (See Figures 1.1 &
1 .2 )
Japanese fears that the new market could be protectionist 
and that they needed to be established within it before 1992 
have been validated by recent policies emanating from the 
European Commission. For example, products made and sold in 
the EEC now need to achieve a target percentage of European 
component content to be regarded as non-imported goods. The 
percentage is based on the cost value of each component. In 
the case of, say, a compact disk player the target is 45% of 
component content.
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FIGURE 1.2
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The Commission’s policy on local sourcing of components 
has clearly contributed to a profusion of Japanese suppliers 
locating in the UK during the late 1980s. In the electronics 
sector the Commission has insisted that semiconductor chips 
must now be fully-fabricated rather than only assembled in the 
community or else they will not qualify as locally made. This 
would have a significant impact on end product local content 
assessment in the consumer electronics industry. Undoubtedly, 
Fujitsu's decision in 1989 to build a £57 million semiconductor 
plant in County Durham was influenced by this policy.
Another suggested reason for the sudden increase of 
Japanese suppliers locating to the UK is the belief that local 
suppliers may have failed to meet stringent Japanese 
requirements regarding quality and delivery. The inevitable 
result is that large Japanese manufacturers encourage their 
domestic Japanese suppliers to set up new plants in the UK. 
(Nichiguchi 1990, pp297-302.)
The growth in the number of Japanese suppliers post 1985 
is apparent in the consumer electronics sector. As can be seen 
from Figure 1.3, growth in the number of consumer electronics 
suppliers during this period is slightly more pronounced than 
the growth in numbers of manufacturers in this sector. Growth 
for both manufacturers and suppliers peaked in 1988. It is 
also noticeable that of the 24 suppliers identified by the 
research, 18 commenced manufacturing operations in the post 
1985 period. Clearly, the issues of local sourcing, the
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FIGURE 1.3
Date of Commencing Manufacturing Operations at Japanese
Companies In the UK Consumer Electronics Sector :
Manufacturers Vs Suppliers 1986 to 1991
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Does not Include joint ventures. 
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inability of many UK owned suppliers to meet the requirements 
of Japanese companies and the approach of 1992 all seem to have 
played their part in encouraging a second wave of Japanese 
inward investment in the UK post 1985. A significantly 
greater proportion of this second wave investment is dedicated 
to the establishment of Japanese owned suppliers than was the 
case before that date.
Despite a recent increase in the number of consumer 
electronics suppliers locating to the UK the number of local 
workers employed by them in relation to Japanese consumer 
electronics manufacturers remains small in comparison. By the 
end of August 1991, they employed 6063. This represents 
(28%) of jobs at Japanese companies in the UK consumer 
electronics sector. Manufacturers accounted for 15,494 (72%)
(See Table 1.5) The manufacturing total is dominated by the 
number of local employees at companies whose principal product 
falls within the category of domestic electronic goods. At 
11,149 this figure represents 52% of local employees at all 
Japanese companies in the UK consumer electronics sector. (See 
Table 1.6)
The second factor relevant to this period relates to post 
1979 Conservative Governments welcoming Japanese investment 
and their attitude towards the labour market and trade union 
power. The UK Government's welcoming of Japanese investment 
is, argues Morris, a contrast to other EEC host Governments 
who were, "initially ambivalent, as in the French case, or even 
hostile - as in the West German case." (Morris, 1988a, p.34)
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TABLE 1.5
Number of Local Employees at Japanese Manufacturers and 
Suppliers in the UK Consumer Electronics Sector: 
Regional and National Totals
MANUFACTURERS SUPPLIERS
Region Number of Number of Number of Number of
Companies Employees Companies Employees
Scotland 6 3007 5 1377
NE England 3 603 4 2474
NW England
Midlands(inc Telford
1 10 0 0
& Milton Keynes 3 (5)* 2024 7 931
Wales 9 8174 6 823
East Anglia 1 (2)* 598 0 0
South West 2 756 1 65
South East 3 (4)* 322 1 393
Northern Ireland
Totals** 28 (32) 15,494 (72%) 24 6063 (28%)
♦Actual number of companies but employee figures for this total unavailable.
** Bracketed percentages refer to the percentage of those employed out of the total number 
of employees at all Japanese companies in the uK’s consumer electronics sector.
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TABLE 1.6
Principal Products of Japanese Companies in the UK Consumer 
Electronics Sector and Number of Local Employees.
Product Category Principal Product Number
of
Companies
Number 
of Local 
Employees
MANUFACTURERS Domestic Electronic Goods (Including power tools, microwave ovens, 
audio equipment, televisions & video 
cassette recorders.)
20 11149 (52%)
Office Electronic Equipment 
Computers & Printers
(Including telephones, typewriters, 
facsimile machines & photocopiers)
5
7
1402 (7%) 
2854 (13%)
SUPPLIERS Semiconductors (Including associated components.) 3 2329 (11%)
Electrical Components (Including wire harnesses, 
printed circuit boards, switches 
& capacitors.)
13 2877 (13%)
Non Electrical Components (Including plastic mouldings & 
precision metal fitments.)
7 731 (3%)
Other suppliers (Including special chemicals 
necessary for the production of 
consumer electronic goods & 
components.)
1 15 (1%)
TOTALS 56 21557 (100%)
N = 56
1) As at end of August 1991
2) Bracketed percentages refer to the percentage of local employees employed in a product sector in relation to the combined total of those employed 
at all Japanese consumer electronics companies in the UK.
Certainly, there is evidence that potential Japanese 
investors perceive the post 1979 Conservative Governments as 
increasingly safeguarding the effectiveness of their 
investments in the UK and EEC. This is due to the 
Conservatives' industrial relations policies. Joe Kidano, 
Japanese Advisor to the Milton Keynes Development Corporation, 
believed that Conservative industrial relations legislation had 
been a crucial determining factor in the decision of several of 
the 11 Japanese manufacturing companies to locate in Milton 
Keynes. For him:
"The recent Conservative Governments' ability to implement 
legislation that has altered the British industrial 
relations climate by curbing trade union power and 
reducing the individual's rights at the workplace has 
encouraged Japanese companies to invest. We, in Milton 
Keynes have seen the benefits of this legislation. It has 
made Japanese investors feel far more positive about 
locating in the UK. They no longer come to us talking 
about their fear of British workers striking. The new 
legislation has given them a feeling of security."
(Interview: November 1991) 
The aim of the Conservative's legislation is best 
described as a commitment to a "laissez faire" labour market 
structure. Attempts by the EEC to enact legislation that would 
interfere with this objective have sometimes led to UK
resistance and on occasion, the use of its veto over the
proposed legislation.
This UK resistance culminated in its opting-out of the
signing of a revised social chapter to the new European Treaty
at the Maastricht Summit in December 1991 . Instead, while the
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other eleven member states enact and operate legislation 
giving, for example, enhanced consultation at the workplace, 
and extended terms and conditions of employment for part-time 
workers, the UK will adhere to the provisions of the old social 
chapter of the Treaty of Rome. Mr Michael Howard, the then 
Employment Secretary, argued that this stance would aid and 
encourage further inward investment, since UK labour costs 
would remain low and it would free companies from potentially 
restrictive EEC employment legislation in the future.
There should be no doubt about the Japanese perception of 
the UK Government's stance at Maastricht and in the EEC in 
general. Masaki Fukui, Director of JETRO's London office saw 
what happened at Maastricht as typifying the UK Government's 
positive attitude towards Japanese inward investment. He also 
believed that it was indicative of why Japanese companies 
continued to invest in the UK:
"Japan has for the last ten years regarded the UK as the 
right European 'wife' or 'partner'. The UK Government has 
often pursued policies within the community that have 
protected the interests of Japanese inward investors 
within her borders. For us, Maastricht represented a 
positive outcome. Japanese business feared that the 
proposed social charter was regressive. They believed that 
in the UK it would have led to a return of the sort of 
industrial relations that existed before 1979. I cannot 
definitely say that acceptance of the social charter would 
have discouraged Japanese inward investment into the UK, 
but by not accepting it the UK Government has shown the 
importance it attaches to Japanese inward investment and 
that will be appreciated by potential future Japanese 
investors."
(Interview: December 1991)
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The third distinguishable factor of this period concerns 
the "pull" effect of existing Japanese inward investment in the 
UK on newly locating Japanese companies. An 1RS survey in 
1990 of 25 Japanese companies in the UK found that; 
"...Japanese firms in Britain appear to be 'clustering' in 
certain areas of the country." (1RS, 1990.)
The 1RS survey appeared to isolate two reasons for this, 
Firstly, newly arriving components manufacturers were likely to 
locate near their main Japanese customers. For example,
Hashimoto, a components manufacturer for the motor industry 
chose to locate in the North East so that it would be near to 
Nissan's motor manufacturing plant in Sunderland. Secondly, 
the survey showed that the very existence of a core of Japanese 
companies in the UK by the mid 1980s, meant that newly
locating companies were using them as a ready source of 
information about national or regional issues likely to affect 
their operations before deciding whether to locate in the UK 
and which region to chose.
Masaki Fukui explained that because of this core of
existing companies JETRO's London office found that by 1985 it 
was no longer necessary for it to send regular information back 
to Japan that might help companies considering locating in the 
UK. As an extreme example, Matsushita Graphic Communications 
which located to the UK in 1990 would have had six other
Matsushita electronics plants in the UK to glean information 
from.
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One of the most important issues prospective Japanese 
investors seek information about is the local or national 
employment or industrial relations climate. The 1RS survey 
cited above found that 66% of respondents believed the local 
employment or industrial relations climate to have been either 
"quite important" or "very important" when originally deciding 
where to locate. Similarly, 56% believed the national 
employment or industrial relations climate to have been either 
"quite important" or "very important". This would help explain 
the clustering of Japanese companies around new towns such as 
Milton Keynes or Telford where there is no tradition of union 
membership among the local workforce and where it is therefore 
easy to avoid recognising a union. It is also clear that where 
companies have chosen to locate in (or have been pulled to) 
regions where workers have a tradition of union membership 
they have often followed the example of existing local Japanese 
companies by opting to recognise a union.
This pattern is particularly clear in the consumer 
electronics sector. Of the twelve companies in the Midlands, 
which includes Telford and Milton Keynes, none are unionised. 
Conversely, of the fifteen companies in Wales fourteen (93%) 
are unionised while in the North East the figure is three 
companies out of seven (43%). For the trade unions the figure 
for unionisation in Wales is especially pleasing, since it is 
the region where Japanese companies in the consumer electronics 
industry have created the most jobs and therefore offer the 
greatest recruitment potential. Consumer electronics companies
- 42 -
in Wales employ 8997 local workers representing 42% of all 
local workers employed by Japanese electronics companies in the 
UK.
Interestingly, Scotland does not fit this pattern (See 
table 1.7). There is a strong tradition of unionisation in 
Scottish manufacturing industry overall, yet the eleven 
Japanese companies located in Scotland (which includes 
Livingston) appear to share the tradition of non-unionisation 
which prevails in Scotland's Electronics sector.
The causes of this non-unionisation are unclear and none 
of those suggested in the literature seem particularly 
convincing. For example, Maclnnes and Sproull identify two 
possible causes. Firstly, they suggest that most Japanese 
plants in the Scottish electronics industry were established in 
the 1980s. This was a period in which political and economic 
factors altered the UK industrial relations climate and 
undermined the ability of trade unions to secure recognition. 
We could however apply this rule to anywhere in the UK during 
this period not just Scotland.
Secondly, Maclnness and Sproull's work finds that non­
union plants in Scotland appear to out-bid unions in what they 
can offer workers. Plants which had all their employees on 
single status terms and conditions of employment were less 
likely to recognise a union The results suggest that this 
seems to have been a deliberate strategy among Japanese 
consumer electronics firms locating in Scotland. However, given 
the sample size, the statistical significance of these results
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ought to be questioned. Moreover, even if they are valid they 
do actually tell us why this has only happened in Scotland and 
not elsewhere in the UK. (Maclnness & Sproull, 1989, p.44) The 
issue of non-unionisation in Scotland's electronics industry 
clearly requires further research before it can be properly 
explained.
A sharing of information between existing and locating 
Japanese companies may well influence issues concerning union 
recognition. The Japanese perception of unproductive and unco­
operative UK workforces (especially those that are unionised) 
has been undermined by the successful implementation and 
operation of industrial relations strategies at several 
unionised Japanese companies since the early 1980s. Many of 
these are in the UK consumer electronics industry, the most 
cited example being Toshiba Consumer Products (UK) Ltd.
The apparent success of industrial relations at companies 
such as Toshiba undoubtedly helps pull newly locating Japanese 
companies to the UK. They then often proceed to emulate these 
strategies. To return to a previous example, it is no 
coincidence that six of the seven Matsushita plants in the UK 
chose to recognise the same single union, the Electricians 
(EETPU). Nor is it coincidental that 16 of the 21 Japanese 
consumer electronics companies unionised in the UK chose to 
recognise the same union - again the EETPU. (see Table 1.1) 
Japanese inward manufacturing investment's attitude towards the 
issue of unionisation at greenfield: sites is discussed more 
fully in Chapter 4.
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TABLE 1.7
A Regional Breakdown of Japanese Companies in the UK Consumer 
Electronics Sector
Region Number of 
Companies
Number of 
Companies 
Unionised
Number of
Local
Employees
Scotland 11 0 4384
North East England 7 3 (43%) 3077
North West England 
Midlands (inc. Telford &
1 0 10
Milton Keynes) 12 0 2955
Wales 15 14 (93%) 8977
East Anglia 2 1 (50%) 598
South West 3 1 (33%) 821
South East 5 2 (40%) 715
Northern Ireland
TOTALS 56 21 (38%)* 21557
N = 56
As at end of August 1991.
* Percentage of all Japanese consumer electronics plants in the UK 
that are unionised.
3.3) The Effect of Japanese Direct Investment on the 
Performance of the UK's Indigenous Industry
The impact of Japanese direct investment on the 
organization and performance of UK industry has attracted much 
controversy. By focusing on Japanese transplants in the UK 
consumer electronics sector, this study informs and influences 
the debate surrounding the issue. The controversial effect of 
Japanese transplants especially in the UK consumer electronics 
sector can be seen in television manufacturing.
In 1974, Sony set up a television manufacturing operation 
in Bridgend, South Wales. Its arrival marked the start of a 
period in which Japanese electronics companies have completely 
altered the structure of the UK's indigenous consumer 
electronics sector. Sony was able to challenge existing UK 
television manufacturers who were in a weakened state due to 
low levels of research and investment and their reliance on a 
profusion of small inefficient plants. UK companies were also 
unable to compete with advances by Japanese and Korean 
manufacturers into their domestic and Western European markets. 
By 1978, a National Economic Development Council Working Party 
was advocating the encouragement of Japanese direct investment 
into the UK' television manufacturing industry. (Takamiya & 
Thurley, 1985, pp 113-114.)
Following Sony, and by 1980, three of the four other 
leading Japanese consumer electronics companies had set up 
manufacturing operations in the UK. Their arrival was in part 
designed to pre-empt any possible trade restrictions resulting
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from the newly formed European Community. Two of these early 
arrivals, Hitachi and Toshiba opened joint ventures with 
existing UK producers. (GEC and Rank respectively) However 
these collapsed and were taken over by the Japanese partners. 
By 1985 Japanese electronics companies were to completely 
dominate the UK's television production industry. In July 1991 
the last non Japanese television manufacturer in the UK ceased 
production. It was owned by the French company Thompson.
The experiences of the UK television industry can be cited 
as a classic example of the effects of Japanese inward 
investment in a product market. Japanese consumer electronics 
companies were able to capitalise on weaknesses in the UK's 
television manufacturing sector which UK producers seemed 
unable to rectify. Quite simply, and for reasons discussed 
elsewhere in this study, they produced better quality and 
cheaper televisions than their UK competitors.
Critics of the effects of Japanese inward investment on 
the UK economy would see the experiences of the television 
manufacturing sector as an example of how transplanted Japanese 
manufacturing operations contribute to the erosion of 
indigenous industry. There seem to be two basic arguments.
Firstly, those such as James (1988) and Morris (1988b) 
suggest that most Japanese manufacturing investment in the UK, 
especially where it is in consumer electronics sector, has 
created "screwdriver" operations, assembling imported 
components and requiring low skilled local labour. They argue 
that the research development and manufacture of new products 
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remains confined to Japan. To them, "screwdriver" plants and 
low inward investment in research and design are indications of 
the Japanese simply using the UK as a "Trojan Horse" with which 
to find ways through EC trade barriers.
It is significant that James and Morris were writing in 
1988. ■ Their argument regarding the quality of Japanese 
investment in the UK have since that date been somewhat 
undermined. As we have seen 1988 is the year in which the 
growth of Japanese inward investment in the UK peaked, 
especially in the consumer electronics sector. Many of those 
investing in this sector during and subsequent to 1988 were 
suppliers of high technology components such as semiconductors, 
magnetrons and printed circuit boards and as has been discussed 
their arrival was, in part, due to EEC directives concerning 
local component content. Consequently, as local component 
content of consumer electronic goods has increased so the label 
of "screwdriver" assembly operation can no longer be applied to 
many Japanese consumer electronics manufacturers. With regard 
to research and development facilities in the UK James' and 
Morris' arguments were again a little premature. By August 
1991, there were 16 Japanese research and development sites in 
the UK. 7 of these sites were owned by consumer electronics 
companies. (Sources: JETRO & AJEI)
To be fair on those such as James and Morris, while they 
appear to have been incorrect in their assessments of the 
quality of Japanese inward investment their "Trojan Horse" 
argument clearly has some validity. For the Japanese, 1992
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marks the creation of a market that can only be effectively 
penetrated if manufacturing operations are located within it. 
Hence the rush of Japanese direct overseas investment to Europe 
and especially the UK in the late 1980s. The tone of 
criticisms such as James' and Morris' suggests that this is a 
covert and underhand strategy rather than any real attempt to 
internationalize business. In reality it reflects an open and 
pragmatic business reaction to the need to alter manufacturing 
organization to compete in a new market situation.
A second argument is that there is too high a price to pay 
for attracting Japanese manufacturing operations to the UK. A 
proponent of this argument is Garrahan. Garrahan's analysis of 
the arrival of Nissan's car manufacturing plant in North East 
England suggests that its impact on other UK motor 
manufacturers far outweighed its creation of 2,700 jobs. As a 
starting point he notes that Nissan's new plant was expected to 
cost £350 million, but this was subsidised by a Regional 
Development Grant and Selective Financial Assistance totalling 
£100 million. Garrahan's blunt assessment is that: "The 2700 
jobs to be created at Nissan do not come cheap..." (Garrahan 
1986) But this is only the first stage of his criticism He 
goes on to explain that job gains in the North East will be 
offset by the loss of jobs at existing UK car manufacturers. 
It is this that forms the core of Garrahan's argument.
Writing in 1986, Garrahan was forecasting that UK car 
manufacturers would not be able to compete with Nissan's levels 
of labour efficiency and would be forced to cut their workforce
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levels or close. He was correct; by 1991 the Society of 
British Motor Manufacturers was estimating that for the year up 
to July, Nissan's new UK plant had produced 21.7 cars per 
employee and was the most productive in Europe. In contrast, 
Rover could only manage 6.7 cars per employee. (Financial Times 
11/10/91.) In September 1991 it emerged that Toyota's plans to 
produce cars at its new manufacturing plant in Burnaston 
Derbyshire relied on production methods, that if implemented by 
Rover, would mean that it would need only 14,000 of its then
36.000 workforce to produce its annual output of 500,000 cars. 
(Independent, 03/09/91.) In the same month. Rover announced 
that it wished to implement a new set of Japanese style working 
practices at its plants. (Financial Times, 18/09/91.) Ford 
meanwhile, announced a total of 2000 redundancies from its
29.000 workforce and placed the workforce at its Halewood plant 
on half time working. (Financial Times 28/11/91.) Further 
redundancies and short-time working at Ford have continued into 
1993.
Though it is reasonable to point out that some of these 
actions can be attributed to the effects of a deep recession in 
the motor industry at this time, that is not the only 
explanation. The real issue was the inability of UK 
manufacturers to remain competitive with the Japanese. The 
recession only served to emphasise this. It is significant 
that Nissan's performance during the recession allowed it to 
announce that it would be taking on an additional 1000 workers 
at its UK plant to meet export demand. This was double the
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number it had originally planned to recruit at this stage of 
the company's development. (Financial Times 6/9/91)
Garrahan's work offered criticism but no simple remedy to 
the effects of Nissan and other Japanese motor manufacturers 
setting up plants in the UK. His argument that jobs created at 
new Japanese firms in the UK displace jobs at existing firms in 
the same manufacturing sector appears correct. However, his 
work fails to take account of two other relevant factors.
Firstly, though the UK was Nissan's major export market in 
Europe its primary concern was to find a European rather than 
UK location in anticipation of 1992. The implication of 
Garrahan's argument is that more jobs would be saved by Nissan 
locating outside the UK than would be created by its location 
here. This is highly dubious and difficult to prove. Had 
Nissan located its plant in any other Community country it 
would have remained in competition with them. It is hard to see 
how this would not have compelled UK car manufacturers to react 
in the same way as they have to Nissan (and now Toyota) 
locating in the UK.
Secondly, Garrahan's assessment of Nissan's impact looked 
only at its competition with UK manufacturers in the domestic 
market. He failed to appreciate that the locating of Nissan and 
most Japanese manufacturing operations in the UK is also 
based on their export potential to the European market and 
other countries. The result of this strategy has been a highly 
beneficial narrowing of the UK trade deficit. The Nomura 
Research Institute estimates that Japanese plants in the UK
export an average of 75% of their output and that this will 
result in a net annual improvement in the UK trade balance of 
£4 billion by 1995. (Sunday Times, 08/09/91)
The effects of Japanese companies' exports on the UK's 
trade deficit are highly apparent in a number of product areas. 
The trade deficit on cars has been sharply reduced already. In 
1990 the deficit was £4.98 billion. For the three months up to 
September 1991 the deficit was only £239 million. Although 
some of this improvement can be related to the effects of the 
latest recession, much of it can also be attributed to Nissan's 
emergence as a major car exporter as its manufacturing output 
has steadily increased.
Japanese domination of the UK consumer electronics sector 
also appears to be consistent with UK trade surpluses on a 
variety of electronic goods. For example, for the year up to 
September 1991 the surplus on televisions stood at £256 million 
compared with a deficit of £6 million in 1989. In 1989 the UK 
ran a deficit of £47 million on video cassette recorders, but 
in 1990 this was turned into a surplus of £48 million. Recent 
export figures for microwave ovens repeat this pattern. In
1989 there was a trade deficit of nearly £10 million, but in
1990 this was turned into a surplus of £38 million. (Sunday 
Times, 08/09/91)
Nomura's figures suggest that Japanese inward investment 
in manufacturing has already narrowed the UK's trade deficit by 
15%-20%. Such figures serve to underline the significant and 
apparently successful presence of Japanese manufacturing
companies in the UK - not least those in the consumer
electronics sector.
4) SUMMARY AND OUTLINE OF THESIS STRUCTURE
This introductory chapter has served two purposes.
Firstly, the chapter has outlined the main theme of the
research. This is that production system characteristics other 
than employment relations (NIR) practices in use at a Japanese 
transplant will also impact on employee attitudes. It suggest 
that these attitudes will affect the individual in the 
performance of their work, and therefore the performance of the 
company overall.
Secondly, it has familiarised the reader with the issues 
surrounding, and the importance of, Japanese investment in the 
UK with special reference to the characteristics of Japanese 
companies in the UK consumer electronics sector. These 
companies form a significant proportion of Japanese 
manufacturing transplants in the UK. Their significance is 
further emphasised when considering the number of workers they 
employ, the amounts of Japanese inward investment that they 
represent and their contribution to UK manufacturing output and 
trade. Because of these factors a study of this particular 
group of Japanese companies assumes added importance, and it is 
this group of companies that the research draws its sample 
from.
The rest of Part 1 is devoted to providing a conceptual 
framework as the basis of the research. In Chapter 2 the
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failure of much of the earlier UK research to identify the main 
characteristics of a production system at Japanese 
manufacturers in the UK is discussed, as well as its inability 
to adequately identify the link between the production system 
and NIR practices at these companies. The chapter goes on to 
show how the research aims to redress these deficiencies. It 
argues that a basic model of the Japanese production system for 
operation in the UK can be constructed. This could then be 
used to identify the key dimensions of variability among the 
production systems of Japanese transplants in the UK and to 
link these key dimensions to the success or failure of these 
companies' NIR practices at achieving reductions in "them and 
us" attitudes.
Part 2 of the study provides the materials necessary to 
aid the construction of a model of the Japanese production 
system for operation in the UK. Chapter 3 discusses the 
essential characteristics of the domestic Japanese production 
system since they influence considerably the structure of the 
UK model. Chapter 4 surveys literature from both the UK and 
abroad and distinguishes the problems encountered by 
transplants attempting to transfer the Japanese production 
system to host countries. Using the literature it also 
identifies some of the remedies to these problems. Chapter 5 
gives a detailed breakdown of how a model of the Japanese 
production system for operation in the UK is constructed; The 
chapter demonstrates the differences between the UK model and 
the domestic Japanese production system.
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In Part 3, Chapter 6 commences with a summary of the 
research's hypotheses and the methodology. Chapter 7 uses 
this methodology to compare the production systems of nine 
Japanese companies in the UK consumer electronics sector 
alongside the research's model of a production system for 
operation in the UK. In Chapters 8 and 9 the research goes on 
to apply the model in greater detail to two case study 
companies. This allows it to assess the success of their NIR 
practices in altering workforce attitudes and to see whether 
that success has been impeded by failings in other production 
system characteristics.
Part 4 puts forward some general conclusions. It also 
considers the wider implications of the research results in 
subject areas such as NIR and Japanization.
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CHAPTER 2
JAPANESE MANUFACTURERS IN THE UK: THE ISSUES RAISED 
INTRODUCTION
This research focuses on Japanese transplants in the UK 
whose production systems incorporate the use of NIR practices. 
NIR practices are believed to affect employee attitudes and 
behaviour to the benefit of a companies' production system 
performance.
This chapter discusses a number of issues that inform and 
influence the research. It defines what the research means by 
the term "production system". It then discusses the the 
concept of the "Japanization" of British industry and shows how 
it overlaps with the debate about new industrial relations in 
Britain. Finally, it shows how the literature about both 
Japanization and NIR fails to identify some key managerial and 
organizational factors that, as well as NIR practices, can 
influence "them and us" attitudes among employees. The 
research hypotheses place considerable emphasis on the 
importance of these factors.
1) DEFINING THE TERM "PRODUCTION SYSTEM"
A central feature of this research is its discussion of a 
Japanese production system and how well it transplants to the
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UK. It is therefore important to define what the research 
means by the term "production system".
In the context of this research the term "production 
system" is defined in a "broad" sense. The research does not 
take the approach of some commentators who have focused on one 
particular theme or characteristic of a production system. For 
example, a number have focused on how the production system is 
organized in the "narrow" sense of production technology. They 
have then gone on to assess the impact of production technology 
on employee tasks, attitudes and behaviour. (See as examples 
Trist and Bamforth, 1951; Woodward, 1958; Touraine, 1955). In 
one such study, Blauner sought to show how production 
technology alienated workers. He suggested that "..there are 
powerful alienating tendencies in modern factory technology and 
organizations." (Blauner, p. 4, 1964) These alienating
tendencies were described as: a loss of control over conditions 
of work such as pace and methods (powerlessness), a loss of 
significance of work activities (meaninglessness), a loss of 
the sense of community membership (isolation) and a loss of 
personal identity with one's job (self-estrangement) (ibid, 
1964, pp 16-24).
Production technology is however only one characteristic 
of the production system. There are further characteristics 
to consider, such as those raised by industrial relations 
theorists (Clegg, 1979; Flanders, 1975). These studies of 
collective bargaining, job controls etc are also important to 
any interpretation of a production system's performance.
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Purcell (1981) provides a good example of a study of four 
British companies focusing on the importance management 
attached to using the institutions, procedures and processes 
of industrial relations as a means of trying to ensure the 
production system was not disrupted.
In effect, Blauner and Purcell reflect a
Management/Organizational theory versus Industrial Relations 
division among studies of production systems. What is 
posited in this research is that it is not enough to see the 
production system purely in terms of one set of
characteristics such as Blauner's analysis of technology or 
Purcell's examination of industrial relations. The two 
approaches need to be incorporated into a broader definition 
of the production system. This broader definition encompasses 
an acceptance that there are a number of characteristics all of 
which play a part in constraining or facilitating manufacturing 
output.
In this research a broad definition of a production 
system is constructed using four categories or "sets" of 
characteristics. To summarise, these are: managerial
characteristics (control structures, decision making procedure 
and management style), organizational characteristics (the 
organizational structure of the company), personnel 
characteristics (the company's relationship with the employee 
as an individual) and industrial relations characteristics 
(the company's relationship with the employee as part of a 
collective).
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Under the research's broad definition, the production 
system can be seen as a system of throughputs. The behaviour 
of those who manage the production system and of those who are 
employed to work it becomes all the more crucial because an 
action or decision taken under one set of characteristics may 
affect the actions or decisions taken under a different set of 
characteristics. In short, the production system is portrayed 
as holistic - the four sets of characteristics interacting 
with each other.
It is this broad definition that has generally been 
overlooked when analysing the strengths and weaknesses of the 
Japanese production system, especially where it has been 
transplanted to a host country. For the rest of this 
research, the term production system is used in the broad 
sense unless otherwise specified.
2) THE ISSUE OF JAPANIZATION
The now significant presence of Japanese manufacturers in 
the UK is linked to the issue of the "Japanization" of British 
industry. Oliver and Wilkinson's work suggest that the concept 
of Japanization operates at two levels. It can be used to 
describe either the actual "process and impact" of Japanese 
inward investment in the UK, or to describe "the attempts of 
British companies to emulate Japanese practices." (Oliver & 
Wilkinson, 1988, p2)
A more refined definition of Japanization is presented by 
Ackroyd et al. They identify three types of Japanization,
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"direct, mediated and full". (Ackroyd et al, 1988, pp.11-23.) 
This cab perhaps be used to reply to the accusation of those 
such as as Dickens and Savage who have argued that the concept 
is a "bad abstraction..." that "lumps together the unrelated 
and inessential..." and is not able to cope with the wide 
variety of Japanese practices used either in Japan or overseas. 
(Dickens & Savage, 1988, p.63)
Ackroyd et al's first type of Japanization is that of 
direct Japanization. This refers to the arrival in Britain of 
Japanese firms who bring Japanese practices with them. It is 
companies who fall within this category of Japanization that 
this research focuses on.
The second type of Japanization identified by Ackroyd and 
his colleagues is that of mediated Japanization. They use it 
to describe the use of Japanese practices by non-Japanese 
firms and divide it into two sub-categories. In the first 
case, "mediated Japanization 1", applies to British companies 
attempting to emulate Japanese practices. This is based on the 
belief that if Japanese companies enjoy higher standards of 
business performance than their Western counterparts, then 
copying their practices should result in a correspondingly 
better business performance. The argument is simply that the 
Japanese are doing something right and that British indigenous 
industry is doing something wrong so it is of value to copy the 
Japanese method.
Ackroyd et al's "mediated Japanization 2" discusses the 
use of Japanese practices by emulating companies, as a means of
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forcing through changes in production methods and working 
practices. The overall impression given by Ackroyd and his 
colleagues is that there is a greater urgency behind the 
emulation of Japanese practices by companies that fall into 
this category than at those which fall into mediated 
Japanization 1". The workforce is persuaded that the only 
way the company can survive in the face of Japanese competition 
is to adopt Japanese practices. Ackroyd and his colleagues 
argue that in fact what management are doing is using the 
threat of Japanese competition to legitimise the sort of 
changes that they may have wished to implement for some time. 
They take the UK car industry as an example of this approach 
citing Marsden et al's work which argues that processes such as 
Ford's attempt to introduce its "After Japan" campaign are 
more to do with getting the organization of production correct 
than with any real desire to obtain new levels of workforce 
commitment. Consequently, they conclude that: "Increasing the
flexibility of workers has less to do with imitating Japan than 
with the need to improve productivity and maintain production 
levels with much reduced workforces and with the effects of the 
changing technology." (Marsden et al, p.117)
Ackroyd et al's final type of Japanization is that of full 
or permeated. In this instance, Britain could be seen to 
mirror Japan's economic structures by generating Japanese 
approaches towards investment and marketing as well as similar 
employment relations, production systems and organization of 
business.
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Binding these definitions of Japanization together is the 
explicit belief that it offers an alternative manufacturing 
system to traditional British methods. This alternative
production system is believed to include a set of specific 
employment practices. These employment practices are
presumed to contribute to the successful performance of 
Japanese production systems. For example, Oliver and Wilkinson 
describe Japanization as "...not simply a matter of
implementing total quality control and just-in-time (JIT) 
production processes - it entails the adoption of particular 
work practices and personnel and industrial relations systems 
as well..." (op.cit, p.4)
This dependency of the production system on employment
relations practices is a feature of Turnbull's work on 
Japanization at Lucas Electrical, components suppliers in the 
motor industry. Turnbull argued that the success of the 
Japanese production practices introduced at the company was 
based on the social organization of the production process. 
These new organizational structures created a work environment 
in which "...workers feel obliged to contribute to the economic 
performance of the enterprise and to identify with its 
competitive success." (Turnbull, 1986, p.203) In a similar 
vein. White and Trevor's study of Japanese transplants in the 
UK argues that, in theory, their employment practices foster 
"... a stable workforce with a high level of commitment to the 
company: extremely co-operative in accepting change, extremely 
unwilling to enter into strikes or any other forms of conflict,
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and generally putting the company's interests level with or 
even ahead of its own. The outcome is a high and rising level 
of productivity, and an altogether easier climate in which 
management can plan for changes in products and processes." 
(White & Trevor, 1983, p.5)
At one level these particular quotes from Turnbull's and 
White and Trevor's works can be seen as representative of 
discussion concerning the definition and concept of 
Japanization. At a second level they demonstrate the overlap 
of the debate surrounding Japanization with the issue of NIR in 
the UK. The overlap is highlighted by the importance such work 
attaches to the issue of committed and co-operative workforces 
who identify with the interests of their employing Japanese 
transplants or emulators. This, as will be shown in section 
three, directly relates to the definition of NIR.
3) THE ISSUE OF NEW INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
In the context of British industrial relations NIR can be 
seen as a management attempt to attack and reduce underlying 
attitudes amongst employees that are best encapsulated by the 
popular expression "them and us". A social psychological
definition of "them and us" (which is incorporated into this 
research) is given by Kelly and Kelly. They argue that 
employee attitudes regarding this issue are based on the
perception that there exists a clear division between
management and workers and that these two groups have
conflicting interests. Their theoretical framework is based on
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the argument that reductions in this division may be induced by
any one, or a combination, of three mechanisms. (See Figure
2.1 )
The first of these concerns intergroup contact. The
argument runs that an increase in contact between the members 
of different groups (in this case management and employees)
will result in a reduction of the importance of group
membership and the development of interpersonal relationships. 
The outcome is a more co-operative and productive relationship 
at the workplace (Purcell, 1979; Hewstone & Brown,1986).
Greater management/worker contact means that the two groups 
begin to find common interests and realise that the negative 
perceptions they hold of each other are inaccurate. (Allen, 
1986; Allen & Stephenson, 1983, 1985, Torrance, 1961)
Kelly and Kelly cite the use of quality circles and
increased use of consultation as examples of NIR based
intergroup contact. They also note that such contact has been 
found to be most successful where certain conditions are met. 
Firstly it helps if both groups enjoy equal status since 
participants will find they have more in common than where 
unequal status exists. (Allport, 1954) Secondly, the contact 
needs to be reinforced by institutional and social support if 
its effects are to be felt beyond the immediacy of the contact 
situation. (Hewstone & Brown 1986) Thirdly, all participants 
should agree to meet on a voluntary basis. (Brewer & Miller, 
1984)
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FIGURE 2.1
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The second of Kelly and Kelly's mechanisms is the creation 
of superordinate goals. A superordinate goal may be defined 
as one which supersedes the sectional goals of opposing parties 
and which cannot be achieved unless they co-operate with each 
other (Sheriff 1966). Examples of superordinate goals might 
include the use of reward systems based on Profit Related Pay 
or Employee Share Ownership. In effect the interests of the 
worker and the company merge into one based on the 
profitability or success of the company. For such goals to be 
perceived as superordinate there is a reliance on trust so that 
one group does not feel that its efforts to achieve the goal 
result in rewards that are primarily beneficial to the other.
The third mechanism discussed by Kelly and Kelly is based 
on the possibility of altering worker attitudes by changes in 
behaviour at the workplace. New participative or co-operative 
practices are implemented which conflict with old perceptions 
of the management/worker relationship being adversarial. This 
conflict is described as a state of dissonance. It may be 
resolved by altering attitudes so that they are aligned with 
the new behavioural requirements. (Cooper & Fazio, 1984)
Workforce reactions to the use of these three routes, 
along with two other indices of change in "them and us" 
attitudes will be assessed later by this research. Moreover, 
the research identifies the factors that influence these 
workforce reactions.
Two additional points need to be stressed in relation to 
attitude change. Firstly, it is possible to argue that such
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change may take place simply because when workers find 
themselves co-operating with management due to the 
implementation of new practices they ..."infer from this self 
observation that they must feel positive towards management." 
Kelly & Kelly, 1990, p.35) This suggests workers feel that they 
"ought" to change their view of management and do so - a kind 
of hegemonic attitude change. Secondly, an individual must not 
believe that their behaviour is induced by various constraints 
surrounding them. Were this to be the case then behaviour 
could not be said to stem from attitudes. Rather it is a 
reaction to constraints placed on the individual by the 
environment in which they work (Bern, 1967). In effect, 
attitude change in relation to cognitive dissonance can only 
occur where the individual has a choice of whether to alter 
their behaviour or not. If constraints have been placed upon 
the individual then they can justify changes in behaviour while 
maintaining that their attitudes have not in fact changed. 
Where behavioural change is allowed by choice then the 
individual can justify such change by arguing that it must be 
consistent with their attitude. (Festinger, 1962)
The value of Kelly and Kelly's work is that it draws on a 
series of studies of NIR practices to identify what are 
described as "obstacles to attitudinal change". (Op.cit p.35) 
For Kelly and Kelly, these obstacles contribute to the failure 
of NIR practices to capitalise on any of the three mechanisms 
for attitude attitude change, hence the studies they cite
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suggest that NIR practices have yielded poor results. Four 
obstacles are discussed. These are:
1 ) A lack of choice for workers over participation in NIR 
schemes. Are they given the choice to opt out. ? Do 
workers have any say in the decision to adopt a NIR 
practice? Kelly and Kelly note that such practices are 
often unilaterally introduced by management in response to 
competitive pressures.
2) A possible lack of trust between workers and 
management. Do management have a track record of 
consulting with employees before implementing a decision 
that may affect them? Moreover, do employees trust the 
ability of management to manage the workplace effectively?
3) An inequality of status and outcomes where intergroup 
contact is a key element of the NIR practices. Is 
expected equality perceived by one or both parties as 
shallow? Is it confined to the contact situation? 
Finally, are the benefits of the NIR practices perceived 
to favour one group of participants more than another.
4) A lack of institutional support. Studies of NIR often 
emphasise the importance of support from senior management 
if NIR practices are to succeed. It is argued that 
workforce attitudes will not alter where senior management 
fail to show or maintain interest in NIR practices. This 
is believed to occur where management decide that either 
the practice is providing unprofitable results, or it is 
threatening their own power and expertise. The practices 
lose impetus since employees perceive that management do 
not take any notice of their initiatives. Initial 
employee enthusiasm and interest withers.
(Kelly & Kelly, 1990, pp.35-39) 
There are two crucial points to be made about Kelly and 
Kelly's presentation of the issue of NIR. Firstly, the overlap 
between the issues of Japanization and NIR means that these 
obstacles can be assumed to apply to employment practices 
implemented at Japanese manufacturers in the UK. However, 
Kelly and Kelly's work demonstrates that in fact we know little 
about whether such obstacles prevail at these companies.
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(Something which this research begins to remedy.) Of the 19 
empirical studies of NIR techniques they surveyed, none had 
been conducted at a Japanese manufacturer in a host country.
Kelly and Kelly were only able to draw some tentative 
results from the data they collated. Firstly, there was some 
evidence that worker attitudes were altered by NIR schemes 
where workers could see some personal financial gain (Op.cit, p 
43). Secondly, there was little evidence overall of NIR 
practices altering workers' negative views of management's 
ability to manage, trustworthiness, and handling of union 
management relations.
Kelly and Kelly went on to suggest that where NIR schemes 
were in operation management appeared to have gained the 
most from any resultant improvements to the company's 
performance. This had had in fact undermined attempts to 
reduce "them and us" because a key condition necessary for such 
attitude change is that gains and rewards at the workplace must 
be perceived as shared fairly and not to the detriment of one 
side or the other. That this had not often occurred where NIR 
practices were in operation led Kelly and Kelly and Kelly to 
argue that: "In the light of these considerations, it is not 
surprising that ten years of 'new industrial relations' has so 
far made little impact on 'them and us' attitudes in industry." 
(Op.cit, p.44)
Several studies of employment relations practices at 
Japanese manufacturers in the UK paint a far more favourable 
picture of the NIR type techniques that have been implemented
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at each company than Kelly and Kelly's conclusions would have 
us believe. They are discussed in some detail in the next 
chapter. (Wickens, 1987; White & Trevor,1983; Trevor, 1988; 
Bassett, 1987) However, the problem with these studies is that 
though they argue that the NIR techniques implemented can
result in a loyal and highly productive workforce and suggest 
that 'them and us' attitudes have been positively altered, they 
are descriptive thereby devaluing their results and 
conclusions. What is needed then is an empirical study with 
two goals. Firstly, to identify whether any of Kelly and
Kelly's four obstacles are discernable at Japanese 
manufacturers in the UK. Secondly, where the obstacles are 
apparent, the study needs to assess whether and how they were 
overcome. This study goes some way to fulfilling such goals.
The second point to raise concerning Kelly and Kelly's work 
is that it falls ■ prey to two inter-related deficiencies,
prevalent in much of the earlier literature concerning 
Japanization and NIR. The rest of this chapter discusses
these deficiencies in more detail. The first deficiency is a 
failure to highlight the other essential managerial and 
organizational characteristics of the production systems into 
which NIR practices are introduced. NIR practices are only one 
set of production system characteristics. There are few earlier 
studies that indicate what these managerial and organizational 
characteristics are and their effect on the production system.. 
The second deficiency is the failure to recognise that the 
successful implementation of NIR practices may be influenced by
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effective managerial and organizational characteristics within 
a company's production system being effective.
In contrast this research pays considerable attention to 
managerial and organizational characteristics and they are
defined in the next section. The research posits that the
managerial and organizational characteristics of a company's
production system characteristics can act as an intervening
variable where a company seeks to create a work environment 
conducive to a reduction in "them and us". Figure 2.2 
therefore shows Kelly and Kelly's three routes to attitude 
change in amended form.
4) HIGHLIGHTING ALL THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TRANSPLANTED 
JAPANESE PRODUCTION SYSTEM
4.1) Studies Concentrating on NIR Practices
The previous section concluded that earlier literature 
about Japanization and NIR falls prey to two inter-related 
deficiencies. The first of these was that instead of looking 
at all the characteristics of the production system and how 
they interact to facilitate effective production, earlier 
studies have tended to concentrate only on NIR practices at 
the companies studied.
Studies of NIR practices at these transplants have 
covered both personnel characteristics of the production 
system (the employer's relationship with the individual worker) 
and industrial relations characteristics (the employer's 
relationship with the workforce as a collective). In line with
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FIGURE 2.2
Three Possible Routes to Attitude Change Showing Managerial and Organizational Characteristics as an Intervening Variable
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these studies (and studies of NIR practices at non-Japanese 
transplants) the definition of NIR practices used in this 
research is that they comprise of the separate sets of
personnel and industrial relations characteristics within a 
production system.
Though these NIR practices are often portrayed as an
integral part of a production system defined in the "broad" 
sense at a transplant. The way the linkage works is generally 
ignored so that we get no idea of the structure of this 
"broad" system. The emphasis on NIR practices can be observed 
in Wickens' book which barely touches on the way production at 
the new Nissan motor manufacturing plant in the UK is organized
and managed. Wickens' emphasis on what he describes as a
"human resource strategy... integrated into the overall business 
plan" means that even his chapter on Japanese management in 
Japan concentrates on the management of employees rather than 
overall production. (Wickens, 1987, p190; pp.22-38) The work 
simply argues that the production system at Nissan in the UK 
operates successfully because it uses a Nissan developed 
"tripod" of flexibility, quality and teamwork combined with 
common terms and conditions of employment for all employees. 
(Wickens, 1987, p.38)
Other studies, for example that of White and Trevor, have 
focused on employee attitudes at Japanese companies in the UK. 
The attitudes examined concerned personnel management 
practices, employee satisfaction with the company, working 
practices (such as flexibility and teamwork) and
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worker/management relations. Again, the implication is that 
these are some but not all of the distinctive characteristics 
of a Japanese production system. (White & Trevor, 1983)
Finally, there are several studies of unionisation at 
Japanese manufacturers in the UK. (Rico, 1987; Reitsperger, 
1986; Bassett, 1987; Roberts, 1988) They place emphasis on 
whether a role is or is not found for trade unionism within a 
production system that is extremely vulnerable to any form of 
industrial action and requires labour flexibility. Bassett's 
work demonstrates that it is possible for a union to play a 
role within such a system where it signs what has been called a 
"new style" (sometimes called strike-free) collective 
agreement. The provisions of these agreements are discussed in 
detail in chapter 4. Bassett notes that such agreements aim 
to avoid disrupting the production system arguing that: 
"Stability in Japanese manufacturing is central to improving 
performance and output, and it is here that the real link 
between Japanese industrial relations practices and the strike- 
free deals lies: what they hold out is the prospect of 
stable, consensual industrial relations, and so of stable 
company performance, allowing companies to concentrate on 
production, not on ad hoc solutions to keep it going." 
(Bassett, 1987, p.90) However, Bassett does not discuss in any 
greater detail why the characteristics of the production system 
require the stability provided by a new style agreement.
It seems then that where earlier studies of Japanese 
manufacturers in the UK fall down is in their inability to
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provide a clear guide as to what all the main characteristics 
are of the production systems in operation at these companies. 
A Japanese transplant's production system does not simply 
consist of a set of NIR practices in order to function. It 
is more complex than that, involving managerial and 
organizational characteristics. In addition, the failure of 
most earlier studies to identify these other characteristics 
means they cannot show how NIR practices fit into the 
production system, helping it run effectively.
4.2) Studies Indicating Other Sets of Characteristics
If one looks closely at the earlier literature, there are 
some indications as to what the total structure of a production 
system at a Japanese transplant might look like and how it 
works, i.e. what a transplanted Japanese production system 
defined in the broad sense comprises of. Three studies of 
Japanese manufacturers in the UK merit attention for this 
reason.
Firstly, Takamiya and Thurley's study of two Japanese 
television manufacturers in the UK in the late 1970s, argued 
that the better performance of the companies in comparison to 
two other television manufacturers in the UK, one US and one UK 
owned, could not be attributed to any one factor. Instead they 
attributed it to the "internal operations" of the Japanese 
companies exhibiting significant differences in three areas. 
The first was "production management techniques." Within this 
category fell factors related to the organization of
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production by management - working practices such as teamwork, 
a dedication to quality and single status terms and conditions 
of employment that helped maintain employee flexibility. The 
second area was "inter-organizational coordination." The 
Japanese companies exhibited better inter-departmental 
coordination and management decision making structures. They 
also encouraged cross departmental job rotation so that 
individuals came to understand the requirements and 
organization of more than one department in the company. The 
third area of difference concerned "industrial relations". The 
Japanese companies demonstrated simplified collective 
bargaining procedures recognising only one union. This points
to their pursuit of Bassett's production stability. (Takamiya
/
& Thurley, 1985, pp.188-199)
Like Takamiya and Thurley's work, Trevor's analysis of 
Toshiba's UK manufacturing plant suggests that several areas of 
the production system in addition to industrial relations 
practices need to be explored and that they each contribute to 
a successful production performance. Two areas that 
particularly stand out are the company's relationship with its 
suppliers and its management style. In the case of the 
supplier relationship the company placed great emphasis on 
building a close relationship with its suppliers to ensure 
that it was sold quality components at a fair price that were 
delivered on time. This reflected a belief in "...the 
influence that the performance of suppliers can have on the 
total performance of the company." (Trevor, 1988, pi43) The
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company’s management style was deemed to comprise of four key 
factors. These were "vision, leadership, pragmatism," and "the 
right people." (Op.cit, p234)
Trevor's and Takamiya and Thurley’s work, indicate 
additional features of a Japanese transplant’s production 
system but, they do not demonstrate how these features 
interact. As Wood has noted: "The distinctiveness of Japanese 
methods is not simply that a particular set of practices are 
followed but that they are devised and adopted in such a way 
that they are integrated and mutually supportive of each 
other." (Wood, 1991, p7) Only Oliver and Wilkinson’s study of 
Japanization comes close to showing how this occurs by applying 
a theory of "dependency relations" to the management of 
Japanese transplants in the UK.
Oliver and Wilkinson’s work presents a production system 
containing three vital sets of characteristics. The first 
relate to personnel management and industrial relations 
practices. Personnel management practices refer to the 
company’s relationship with the individual employee, industrial 
relations practices refer to issues concerning the company's 
recognition or non-recognition of a union. The second 
characteristic is manufacturing practices. These include 
quality control, flexibility and organization of the work 
environment. The first two characteristics are described by 
Oliver and Wilkinson as internal dependencies. The third 
characteristic concerns supplier relations. As with Trevor’s 
work, a premium is set on a close relationship that encourages
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quality components delivered at the right time and right price. 
This is described as an external dependency. For the 
production system to succeed Oliver and Wilkinson argue that it 
essential that these characteristics integrate. For them,; "If 
there is a 'secret' to Japan's success, we suggest that it lies 
in the synergy generated by a whole system, and not, as some 
have suggested, in the specific parts of that system." (Op.cit, 
p.43)
5 ) THE FAILURE TO APPRECIATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A TWO WAY 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NIR PRACTICES AND THE PRODUCTION SYSTEM
The second deficiency in NIR and Japanization literature 
is that it assumes that there is only a one way relationship 
between NIR practices and the performance of the production 
system. (See Figure 2.3) None of the studies so far cited 
consider the possibility of an alternative relationship. Their 
basic premise is that good NIR practices will facilitate the 
successful operation of the production system. That premise 
is not actually disputed by this research, but it is only part 
of the story. The research presents evidence to show that the 
production system's performance due to other managerial and 
organizational characteristics will affect the extent to which 
NIR practices are successful in reducing "them and us" 
attitudes at a Japanese transplant. This reflects what has 
already been described as the intervening variable of 
managerial and organizational characteristics where NIR
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practices seek to change "them and us" attitudes, (see figure
2.2) In short, a two way relationship exists between NIR 
practices and the production system's performance.
FIGURE 2.3
Assumed Relationship Between NIR Practices 
and the Production System
Effective Reduction of Effective
NIR y "them and us"______ ^  performance
practices attitudes of production
system
For example, if the production system is perceived by 
employees to perform badly due to poor organization and 
management, then no matter how good the NIR practices 
implemented might appear to be, they will fail to reduce "them 
and us" attitudes among the workforce. Crucially, the workers' 
belief that the production system is performing badly and the 
corresponding failure to reduce "them and us" attitudes among 
them, is linked to their perception of some personal cost due 
to the production system's poor performance.
This personal cost stems from a set of expectations among 
workers that their Japanese employer will be successful and 
therefore able to offer job security, good pay and other 
attractive terms and conditions of employment. These 
expectations stem from three sources. Firstly, they are, in
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part, bought with workers to the company, based on popular 
perceptions of Japanese companies that are gleaned through the 
media and local hearsay. The two case study companies 
discussed in this research had located in areas where Japanese 
companies were already established. These companies had 
reputations in their local communities for being successful and 
good employers. Secondly, the expectation of company success 
among workers was further fuelled during the selection and 
induction procedures at the companies. Thirdly, once employed 
at the companies, workers were told that if they delivered the 
quality, effort and loyalty required, the company would be 
successful and that the success of the company would be good 
for every one.
There is considerable evidence in this research that if 
workers decide that the production system is performing badly 
despite their delivering quality effort and loyalty to the 
company then their expectations are not being met. A failure 
to meet worker expectations results in their perception of some 
personal cost to themselves.
Put simply, workers feel that the label of "special” no 
longer applies to their employer. They are employed on the 
understanding that the company is bound to be successful and 
that it treats its workers differently. In an intended 
atmosphere of co-operation where workers and management share 
the common belief of "what is good for the company must be 
good for me," management's inability to manage and organize the 
production system means workers turn the statement around "to
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what is bad for the company must be bad for me." They may
feel that their efforts to aid the performance of the company 
are going to waste. Why bother, when management cannot deliver 
their side of the bargain? Insecurity and uncertainty about 
the company's performance is blamed on management ineptitude. 
A loss of confidence in management ability leads to poor 
morale, a cynicism of practices designed to reduce "them and 
us" and an increasingly conflictual management/worker 
relationship.
Conversely, the research also finds some evidence that 
where a production system performs well due to managerial and 
organizational characteristics, worker's attitudes concerning 
"them and us" will be reduced and they will put in extra effort 
to improve the Company's performance.
What this means is that there is a two-way relationship 
between NIR practices and the effectiveness of the production 
system. Each can affect the successful operation of the other. 
(See figure 2.4) In this research it is posited that on the 
one hand NIR practices, as one set of characteristics of the 
production system, may facilitate the smooth operation and 
improvement of production, but on the other, organizational 
and managerial production system characteristics can either 
impede or bolster the effectiveness of NIR practices at 
reducing "them and us" attitudes. This in turn will impact upon 
the successful performance of the production system. In these 
instances either a vicious or virtuous circle can emerge. (See 
figures 2.5 and 2.6.)
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FIGURE 2.4
The Two Way Relationship Between NIRs Practices and Production System Performance
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FIGURE 2.5
How the Relationship Between NIRs Practices and Production System 
Performance Can Lead to the Emergence of a Vicious Circle
Poor 
Performance of 
Workforce
Poor 
organization 
and 
management 
of production 
system
Poor 
performance 
of production 
systemV
Workforce 
perceives 
poor performance 
of production 
system
Workforce 
perceives 
personal costs 
due to poor 
^  performance 
of production 
system 
(I.e. their efforts 
to enhance the 
performance of the 
company have been 
wasted.)
Maintenance 
of strong 
"them and us" 
attitudes 
c&mong 
workforce
—8 2 —
FIGURE 2.6
How the Relationship Between The Production System's Performance 
and NIRs Practices Can Lead to the Emergence of a Virtuous Circle.
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Deficiencies in the NIR and Japanization literature raise 
a number of issues. Firstly, though NIR practices at Japanese 
companies can be considered an integral part of the production 
system we need to know what the other characteristics of the 
system are. To find this out it is also necessary to highlight 
what the requirements of a production system in operation at a 
Japanese manufacturing transplant in the UK might be. (For 
example, they might include the flexibility of labour, or the 
delivery of components to the production area on a Just in Time 
basis.) It is these requirements that will determine the 
characteristics of the production system. Their purpose is to 
meet the production system's characteristics service its 
requirements so that it performs effectively. Secondly, having 
identified what the characteristics of the production system 
are, it becomes possible to examine how they integrate and
support each other in order to service the system's
requirements. Finally, identification of the Japanese
production system's characteristics and how they integrate is 
crucial to the research in another respect. It means that a 
model is created that can be used to demonstrate what other 
characteristics in the system impede or exacerbate the success 
of NIR practices in reducing "them and us" attitudes among the 
workforce.
Figure 2.7 suggests the basic structure of such a model. 
Four sets of integrated production system characteristics
service the requirements of the system. Each set of the
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FIGURE 2.7
Suggested Basic Structure of a Japanese Production System for Operation in the UK
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production system characteristics have, to varying degrees, 
already been discussed in this chapter. The four sets are:
1 ) Personnel Characteristics - Covering the individual's 
relationship with the company, (i.e. his or her terms and 
conditions of employment.)
2) Industrial Relations Characteristics - Concerning the 
company's policy towards union recognition and its 
treatment of employees in the collective sense.
3) Organizational Characteristics - Relating to how the 
company is organized.
4) Managerial Characteristics - Concerning management 
control structures, the decision making process and 
management style.
Part 2 of the research is devoted to the construction of a 
model of a Japanese production system for operation in the UK. 
This is achieved by a detailed assessment of the literature 
relating to the core characteristics of the domestic Japanese 
production system and to literature which discusses the 
transplantation of this system not only to the UK but to other 
host countries. Such an assessment aids the construction of a 
UK model in three ways.
First, before embarking on the formulation of a model of a 
Japanese production system for operation in the UK, it is 
necessary to acknowledge and show how its structure relates to 
the core characteristics of Japanese production as practised in 
Japan. Indeed, it will be seen in Chapter 3 that the four sets 
of characteristics so far identified in this chapter form the 
basis of the domestic Japanese production system.
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Second, within each of the four sets of characteristics 
discussed in Chapter 3 (and applied to either the domestic or 
transplanted Japanese production system), there exist a number 
of practices that are either subject to differing 
interpretations and/or have aroused considerable debate. An 
examination of this literature is needed so that the research's 
UK model can take account of, and if necessary, incorporate 
its arguments and conclusions. This is carried out in Chapter 
4.
Third, along with the introductory chapter, this chapter 
has focused only on earlier literature studying Japanese 
transplants in the UK. This is because the UK is where its 
sample Japanese transplants are drawn from. The survey of 
literature in Chapter 4 incorporates further UK literature, 
but also draws on that which applies to Japanese transplants 
elsewhere in the world. Other countries with Japanese 
transplants have undergone similar or completely different 
experiences to the UK which may be of value when constructing a 
UK based model. This is of greatest value where the chapter 
discusses managerial and organizational characteristics, since 
very little of the UK literature has addressed the issues 
surrounding their transference.
6) SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, it has been suggested that it is 
necessary to construct a model of a Japanese production system 
for operation in the UK. In relation to the theme of this
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research such a model would have two important uses. Firstly, 
it could act as a "benchmark" against which to compare existing 
Japanese transplants. This would allow identification of key 
dimensions of variability among Japanese transplants' 
production systems - something which much of the earlier 
research in this area failed to achieve.
Secondly, the research argues that the key dimensions of 
variability among the transplants' four sets of production 
system characteristics ought to impact on "them and us" 
attitudes among their workforces. Having identified these 
key dimensions of variability, we can then go on to assess 
their impact on"them and us attitudes" at Japanese transplants 
using case study methodology. For example, and in line with 
the arguments developed in this chapter,we would expect that if 
we examined a transplant that shares the common dimension of 
poor managerial and organizational characteristics we would 
find this to operate to the detriment of its production system 
performance. That in turn would restrict the ability of any 
NIR practices in operation at the transplant to reduce "them 
and us" attitudes and would be evidence of a two-way 
relationship between the production system's performance and 
NIR practices. We might also expect to find evidence of a 
vicious circle at the transplant. In short, the model allows 
identification of key dimensions of variability which, 
examined on a case study basis, could show that not only NIR 
practices in operation at a company can affect "them and us"
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attitudes, but alsç managerial and organizational 
characteristics.
The application of the model to Japanese transplants in 
the UK might also l?e expected to produce results that have 
considerable bearing on the wider debate surrounding 
Japanization and NIR. Two issues in particular stand out. 
Firstly, the results of the model's application might suggest 
to UK companies seeking to adopt Japanese practices, which 
characteristics of the Japanese production system they ought to 
seek to emulate and what problems they could encounter when 
doing so. Secondly, the results might point to previously 
unconsidered factors that affect the successful operation of 
NIR practices at non-Japanese companies in the UK as well as 
Japanese transplants. The implications of the research's 
results with regard to these issues is discussed in the 
concluding chapter.
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PART 2
CONSTRUCTING A MODEL OF A 
JAPANESE PRODUCTION SYSTEM FOR 
OPERATION IN THE UK.

CHAPTER 3
THE KEY ELEMENTS OF THE DOMESTIC JAPANESE PRODUCTION SYSTEM 
INTRODUCTION
This chapter's task is to identify the key elements of 
the domestic Japanese production system. It demonstrates how 
they interact and how they affect employee attitudes and 
behaviour.
The identification of the key elements of the domestic 
Japanese production system is essential because they form the 
foundations of the system when transplanted to the UK and 
elsewhere, without their identification it would be difficult 
for the research to go on to construct its model of the 
Japanese production system transplanted to the UK. The 
research posits that where Japanese transplants fail to 
operate the transplanted production system effectively they 
will also fail to reduce "them and us" attitudes among UK 
employees.
THE DOMESTIC JAPANESE PRODUCTION SYSTEM: KEY ELEMENTS
Figure 3.1 shows a model of the key elements of the 
domestic Japanese production system at large manufacturing 
companies. The aim of this model is to identify the 
requirements of the production system and
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FIGPRE 3.1
THK nOMKRTir JAPANESE PRODUCTION SYSTEM
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what the characteristics of the system are that enable these 
requirements to be fulfilled. At the far right of the model 
are the requirements. Feeding into this section are four sets 
of characteristics. An explanation of the terms and concepts 
listed in the model is necessary in order to aid a clear
understanding of how the production system functions.
1) Requirements of the Domestic Japanese Production System
While there is a considerable literature that discusses 
the components of the Japanese production system, notably 
less literature approaches the subject by attempting to assess 
the system's requirements. The latter approach, (which this 
research utilizes,) emphasises the simple axiom that a
Japanese manufacturer aims to create a product as efficiently 
and as cost effectively as possible, that is reliable and for 
which, there is a diverse model range. (Pascale & Athos, 1986, 
Womack et al 1990; Cusamano, 1985; Kenney & Florida, 1988, 
Krafcik, 1988; MacDuffie & Krafcik, 1990) Womack & his 
colleagues in analysing the Japanese motor manufacturing 
industry note that to do this the production system has to 
eliminate all areas of waste and fully utilize machinery, 
labour and managerial expertise. They, and others associated 
with the International Motor Vehicle Program, have described 
this form of manufacturing as "lean production". (Womack et 
al, 1990, p.65; Krafcik, 1988; MacDuffie and Krafcik, 1990) To 
achieve these aims relies upon the running of a production 
system with a certain set of requirements. (See figure 3.1)
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The construction of the model shows that the requirements 
form four natural clusterings. These concern the organization 
of labour, quality control, organization and supply of 
production and product strategy. The requirements are 
presented below in a form that relates to these clusterings:
Organization of Labour
1 ) Direct Labour - The term direct labour is frequently 
used throughout Womack et al's work. It is best described by 
comparison with ’task organization at western manufacturers 
where a production line and its operators often rely upon large 
numbers of support workers such as repairists, cleaners, 
runners etc (indirect labour) to keep it flowing freely. A 
Japanese production system regards such support workers as 
adding unnecessary costs to production and seeks to transfer as 
many of their tasks and responsibilities as possible to those 
employees who are directly adding value to the product, i.e., 
the line operators themselves.
2) Flexible Labour - The use of a direct labour policy 
creates a minimum number of job grades and places heavy 
emphasis on the individual's ability to carry out a wide range 
of tasks. According to Schonberger: "The wastefulness of staff 
growth and overspecialization is not to be tolerated...". 
(Schonberger, 1982, p.197) The diversity of models that is a 
characteristic of lean production and 'Kaizen' (continuous 
improvement of the production system), also result in constant 
changes to work patterns and tasks. (See items No 4 & No 10
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below.) There is then, a crucial requirement for a flexible, 
multi-skilled workforce.
3) Teamwork - Workers are grouped together on an area of 
the line and allowed to assume control of certain
responsibilities such as quality, house-keeping and minor tool 
repairs. They are also expected to set aside, or are given, 
time in which to discuss and improve anything related to their 
production responsibilities. These are called 'Kaizen’
(continuous improvement) discussions. (See item No 4 below)
Teams often also form Quality Circles. (See item No 5 below)
Organization of workers into teams with these sort of aims is 
believed to have a positive effect on production efficiency. 
Odaka has described this as a "welding together" of individual 
employees to share common fate and common goals. (Odaka, 1986, 
p.1) Groups are expected to compete against each other and 
members to feel a sense of obligation to team colleagues. For 
the Japanese worker, there is, "... a fundamental duty (termed 
giri), not only to keep his own reputation for good work 
spotless, but also to match exactly the contribution made by 
other members of a work team." (Briggs, 1988, p.27)
Quality Control
4) Continuous Improvement (Kaizen) - All employees are 
expected to continuously seek to improve the production system. 
Maximum performance of the production system is never 
attainable since ways of improving it are always believed to 
exist whatever level it has achieved. This might be achieved 
either as an individual e.g. through suggestion schemes, or
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through the organization of workers into Kaizen discussion 
groups. Its successful operation has positive implications for 
quality, safety and productivity. (Wickens, 1987, p.45; Wood, 
1989, p.450)
5) Quality - The production system requires an awareness 
amongst the workforce of expected standards of quality. It is 
every individual's responsibility to maintain or improve upon 
these standards. In addition workers are grouped into Quality 
Circles. These involve workers in improving the quality of 
their work, solving production problems, and in industrial 
engineering. In effect, they are attempting to perfect the 
labour process. (Wood, 1989, p.451)
The production system also requires the supply of high 
quality components. This has three effects. Firstly, it 
minimises the disruption of normal production. Secondly,
high standards of quality free more labour to work directly at 
normal production by decreasing the amount of rework. 
Thirdly, the output of high quality products increases their 
attractiveness to the potential customer. (Womack et al, 1990) 
Organization and Supply of Production
6) Full Utilization of Production Area - This requirement 
is linked to item No5 above. A high standard of quality 
reduces the amount of rework coming off the production line and 
accordingly reduces the amount of production space that has to 
be set aside for these problems to be rectified. (Womack et al, 
1990) The use of some form of Just In Time (JIT) production
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also reduces the amount of production space set aside for the 
storage of components. (See No 9 below.)
7) Full Utilization of Production Machinery - All 
production machinery is in constant use rather than lieing idle
for lengthy periods of time. This is to be achieved through its
multi-dedication wherever possible and efficient re-tooling. 
Machinery is therefore used to produce a range of production 
related items, while wasting a minimum of production resources. 
For example, quick die changes on a multi-dedicated press allow
the exact number of items required to be produced as a small
batch, rather than producing a large batch, much of which may 
have to be stored in valuable production space before use. 
(Shingo, 1982, p.337; Schonberger, 1982, pp.103 130)
8) Full Use of New Technology - The production system is 
expected to fully utilize new technology where it rationalises 
production costs and enhances quality. It must also be able to 
replace the actions of a human being more efficiently. 
(Shimizu, 1989, p.48)
Considerable emphasis has been placed on the contribution 
of new technology to the successful performance of lean 
production. (Cusamano, 1985; Kenney & Florida, 1988; Krafcik, 
1988; MacDuffie & Krafcik, 1990) MacDuffie and Krafcik 
identify two inter-related ways in which this contribution is 
made. Firstly, they believe that where new technology is 
adopted in a lean production system, it is constantly adapted 
and modified to enable manufacture of a diverse product range 
(see No 10 below). They argue that where new technology is
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inherently flexible (e.g. robotics and microprocessor 
programmable equipment) this capability is utilised to far
greater effect than under mass production where ”... high 
volume, specialization and standardization leads to 
[technology's] relatively static or rigid use” (Author's 
insertion bracketed: MacDuffie & Krafcik, 1990).
The second way that MacDuffie and Krafcik believe 
technology contributes to the successful performance of lean
production is related to the first. They believe that lean 
production's effective application of technology's inherent 
flexibility is made possible by the package of Human Resource 
practices operated as part of lean production systems. For 
them, lean production's emphasis on a workforce with flexible 
skills and a problem solving orientation is what enables it to 
”... facilitate the process of introducing any new technology 
and also yield valuable modifications over time” (MacDuffie and 
Krafcik, 1990). This point is also made by Whitehill. He too 
believes that the Japanese production system lends itself to an 
increased used of automation and robotics. He suggests that 
the reason for this is, "the considerable flexibility of the
Japanese corporate structure. Job specifications are
intentionally vague or non-existent: a worker displaced by a 
robot does not feel that he has been dispossessed of his 
personal property and can accept another job without complaint 
or anxiety.” (Whitehill, 1991, p.2.40) The flexibility 
discussed by Whitehill and MacDuffie and Krafcik is also
dependent on the training and retraining offered by the
— 10 0—
employer. (Discussed below in section 1.4 - personnel
characteristics.)
9) Just In Time (JIT) Supply system - Supplies of 
components whether produced by an external supplier or made on 
site are produced and delivered to the production area under 
the following three criteria. Firstly only the exact number of 
components that are to be used for a batch are made and 
delivered. Secondly, there should be a minimal amount of 
buffer stocks maintained in the production area. Thirdly, a 
batch of components should be produced and delivered to the 
production area as close to the time of its use as is possible. 
(Ohno, 1988; Mondon, 1981, 1983, Shingo, 1982, p335 Womack et 
al, 1990) A stringent form of this type of supply system is 
the 'Kanban' system. Schonberger describes this as a, 
"Japanese inventory replenishment system developed by Toyota. 
Stockless production is another term that is sometimes used." 
(Schonberger, 1982, p.17)
JIT has several important production related objectives . 
Tailby and Turnbull suggest that these include, "... the 
reduction of machine 'set up' times, making product 
diversification a more economically viable option, and the 
elimination of wasted or unnecessary labour and machine 
capacity." (Trilby & Turnbull, 1987, p.16) It also helps to 
eliminate poor quality by exposing the source component 
immediately. Large batches of inferior quality components are 
unlikely to enter the production system. The centrality of JIT 
to the production system is underlined by those such as Wood
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who go as far as to argue that the Toyota system of production 
might best be described as management model founded on JIT 
production. (Wood, 1991, pi 7)
Product Strategy
10 ) Adaptability to a Diverse Model Range - For the 
Japanese, servicing the customer's exact product requirements 
while maintaining the quality and low price of the product are 
of paramount importance. (Hodgson, 1987 pp.43-44) To encourage 
custom and instil customer satisfaction, a wide product range 
needs to be placed on the market. Such diversity means that 
the production system must be able to efficiently produce 
large numbers of small batches as opposed to small numbers of 
large batches. Womack and his colleagues argue that this 
diversity of models also contributes to the widening of the 
number of tasks a line operator may need to be able to perform. 
(Womack et al, 1990, p277)
11 ) Continuous Research and Design - Heavy emphasis is 
placed on Research and Design capabilities at Japanese 
manufacturers in two respects. Firstly, there are perhaps the 
more obvious requirements of producing new products up to date 
with the needs of the market and attractive to the customer 
alongside competitors' products. This, Kono describes as the 
creative level of new product development. It requires 
specialized personnel, good financial resources, good rewards 
and freedom to create. It also requires a specialized R&D 
department which he argues is common only in larger companies 
on a mainly centralised basis.
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Kono also defines a secondary, innovatory level. This 
relies far more on problem solving at plant level. (Kono, 1988, 
pp.105-137) For Kono the distinction between his two levels of 
R&D is that: "Creation involves the making of new combinations, 
whereas innovation involves the input of resources to implement 
the creation, also to implement the imitative change, and to 
give impetus towards the goal of the organization." (Kono, 
1988, p107)
Kono's interpretation of the Japanese approach to R&D is 
somewhat mirrored by Matsumoto's work. Matsumoto finds there is 
a level of "basic research" geared to the solving of routine 
technological problems which occur at factory level and in 
divisions. Like Kono, Matsumoto finds that there is a tendency 
for long-term and new product research to be carried out mostly 
at larger companies and on a more centralised basis, i.e. under 
the direct control of the company's headquarters. (Matsumoto, 
1986, pp.329-321)
The production system also requires that a product be 
designed so that it is made up of easy to assemble parts 
thereby decreasing assembly time. The product should also lend 
itself, where applicable, to being produced in a wide range of 
models for the reasons discussed in items No5 and NolO above.
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2 ) The Characteristics of the Domestic Japanese Production 
System
Analysis of literature related to the Japanese production 
system allows identification of four sets of characteristics; 
those of managerial, organizational, personnel and industrial 
relations. Each set can be said to have a considerable 
influence in fulfilling the system's requirements, and enable 
the creation of a model of the Japanese production system as 
defined in the "broad" sense. (See figure 3.1)
2.1) Managerial Characteristics
The managerial characteristics of the domestic model have 
two aims. Firstly, they aim to provide the production system 
with a management team that reach and implement decisions 
reflecting a high standard of technical expertise and 
organizational ability. The decisions will also reflect a 
consensus of opinion among relevant management who therefore 
have the motivation to implement them effectively. Secondly, 
they should provide a management team that are able to develop 
commitment and motivation amongst the workforce in order to 
meet and attain the goals and values of the organization. In 
this latter respect the management style is close to being that 
of a "transforming leadership" as originally defined by Burns. 
(Burns, 1978. For a review and discussion of this concept see 
Guest, 1987, pp.190-194) The five key managerial
characteristics identified are:
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1) Coherent Vision - There is little or no conflict among 
management as to what the goals and values of the organization 
are. All management share a common vision to communicate to the 
workforce. What has been described as a "constancy of purpose" 
is vital to the success of the organization. (Hodgson, 1987, 
p.41) Pascale and Athos' discussion of Matsushita's management 
talks of "underlying values" aiming to "cultivate and maintain 
an entrepreneurial fervour among its divisions." (Pascale & 
Athos, 1986, p.37) More specifically and linked to a 
discussion of strategic Japanese management, Shimizu identifies 
the importance of management (especially top management) 
conveying "business vision" to all employees. He also argues 
that: "The Directing, coordinating and controlling..." of 
employees must be in line with this business vision, but that 
this will only be successfully achieved where coherency of the 
vision makes it easier for the workforce to understand and 
identify with. (Shimizu, 1989, pp.72-75)
2) Consistency of style - Management behaviour is 
consistent in terms of how they carry out their organizational 
responsibilities both individually and collectively. This is 
important since as Pascale and Athos note, "a manager's 
behaviour is a powerful form of symbolic communication to 
people down the line." (Pascale & Athos, 1986, p.41) This is 
not to say that the style of management stifles innovation or 
is unchanging, but rather that the means by which any decisions 
(innovative or otherwise) are made and the methods by which 
they are implemented are consistent. In part, a consistency of
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management style may rely upon a coherent management vision 
(See item No 1 above.), and consensual/groupist decision 
making. (See item No 4 below)
3) Intensive Selection Procedures - Rigorous selection 
procedures for management trainees are applied. Candidates at 
the larger companies are expected to have attained a high 
standard of academic qualifications. Selection is often based 
on the use of a company examination followed by interviews 
designed to assess the individual's personality and 
compatibility with the corporate culture.
Corporations have their preferred sources for prospective 
employees, and this is seen to create "self-perpetuating" 
university cliques ('gakubatsu'). These cliques will ensure 
that the company returns to their institution each year to fill 
management vacancies. (Whitehill, 1991, pp.128-138)
The unattractiveness of a management career in 
manufacturing, combined with shortages in graduate labour 
during the 1990s has suggested that the "gakubatsu" system is 
not an inflexible force. Of late, some large companies have 
altered their selection criteria and procedures. In order to 
obtain what they consider to be the right calibre management 
trainees, they have opted to recruit candidates from 
universities not linked to the company's gakubatsu. (Financial 
Times, 16/12/91 )
A Japanese management trainee is selected with the 
expectation of their being committed to remaining with the 
company for the rest of their working life. (Pascale and Athos,
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1986, p54; Womack et al, 1990, p240) Again, labour shortages 
are beginning to force Japanese companies to accept that 
professional and technical workers have the ability to leave a 
company for better pay. Large companies do take on mid-careeer 
employees. Nonetheless, the numbers moving around are thought 
to be extremely small, suggesting that the prospect of life­
time employment and the systems used to reinforce it is still 
extremely effective at constraining labour mobility. 
(Financial Times, 16/12/91)
4) Consensual/Groupist Decision Making - The decision 
making structure at Japanese companies has been described as 
consensualist and groupist. (Smith, 1984, pi25. For groupist 
definitions see Odaka, 1986, p8; Komai, 1989, p36 & p120; 
Yoshino, 1968, p.203) Both the groupist and consensualist 
definitions are based upon an understanding of the Japanese 
'ringi' method of decision making. Informal consultation 
('nemawashi') followed by the preparation of a written proposal 
('ringi-sho') which is circulated to all those to be affected 
by the proposal and also to senior management. By the time the 
proposal reaches a formal meeting it is well known and its 
approval is generally assured. (Whitehill, 1990, pp.160-161; 
Smith, 1984, p.128; Yoshihara, 1989, p.23; Tsurumi, 1978,
p.108)
The 'ringi' system of decision making is often praised for 
allowing all those affected by a proposal to pass comment on 
it. For example, Burgleman believes that in relation to the 
strategic decision making process: "One critical strength... is
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that lower level participants' ideas can be considered equally 
as important as higher level participants' ideas." (Burgleman, 
1988, p.75) However, he goes on to question whether the 'ringi' 
system is not in fact dominated by senior management 
considerations. Similarly, Whitehill suggests that the most 
important discussions regarding a proposal take place on an 
informal basis at the 'nemawashi' stage among top executives. 
(Whitehill, 1991, p.160)
Whitehill and Burgleman both discuss concerns that the 
decision making structure in Japanese companies is influenced 
by informal group structures which supplement the vertical 
chain of command. New recruits enter a company and begin 
their careers together. Seniority based promotion is slow but 
steady leaving plenty of time for an individual to build a 
network of personal contacts ('jin myaku'). A further element 
of these informal group structures is membership of the 
'habatsu'. Membership is based on a specific set of 
credentials. Graduation from the same university ('gakubatsu') 
has already been discussed. (See item No 3 above.) Other 
groupings include the same prefecture ('kenbatsu') or 
originating from the same town ('kyodobatsu).
In effect, belonging to one of these groups is involuntary 
and permanent. Moreover, the groups have their own internal 
hierarchy which runs parallel to the company's formal authority 
structure. The result is that the decision making process at a 
company may be considerably influenced by a dominant informal 
group. Whitehill offers a good description of how their
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potential to influence operates: "A powerful habatsu can assure 
the success of a proposal or doom it to failure. The leader of 
such an informal group usually is a person with considerable 
prestige and seniority in the formal organization. The loyalty 
of habatsu members to the leader is often as intense and 
unswerving as their loyalty to their formal boss. Bound by 
highly emotional and personal ties, the member-leader 
relationship has been likened to the traditional oyabun-kobun, 
or patron-client relationship, in Japanese feudal society. 
Clearly, the informal groups in Japanese organizations are a 
force to be reckoned with. Gaining the support of the dominant 
habatsu is essential for top management decision making. 
Deference to influential informal leaders is necessary to avoid 
serious morale problems." (Whitehill, 1991, pp.120-121)
5) Circulation - As with Western managers, a Japanese 
manager, is initially employed because he has a specialist 
knowledge to bring to the organization. For example, an 
engineering degree. Managerial training and career ladders are 
structured in a way that increases the ability of the manager 
to carry out an ever increasing range of tasks while assigning 
them to posts with greater responsibility as they grow older. 
This is more than the traditional western concept of "job 
rotation". it allows what Odaka calls "broad exposure" to all 
areas of the production system. (Odaka, 1986, p.4) Ouchi 
also dismisses the term rotation and refers to management 
"circulation" around the organization. (Ouchi, 1981, p.33)
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Carrying out tasks that to Western eyes might appear to be 
the preserve of other departments or managers, staves off 
specialization and develops a "well rounded expertise" in the 
individual. (Odaka, 1986, p.1) It also ensures that a manager 
is able to better understand the workings and requirements of 
other departments outside that which he is currently in. 
(Pascale & Athos, 1986 p.53; Takamiya, 1979, p.10; Schonberger, 
1982, p.9)
2.2) Organizational Characteristics
The organizational structure of Japanese manufacturers in 
Japan should contribute to the effective operation of their 
production systems in two ways. Firstly, it should provide a 
structure within which management and the workforce are not 
restricted or obstructed as they go about their respective 
tasks. Secondly, the structure should create and maintain a 
smooth and efficient flow of production. The key 
characteristics are:
1 ) Co-ordination and Co-operation of all Departments - 
Several commentators have suggested this to be an important 
strength of the Japanese production system. Takamiya called it 
"inter-organizational co-ordination". (Takamiya, 1985, pi 90) 
Its overall aim is to restrict departmental insularity. The 
co-ordination and collaboration of for example the design 
engineering, procurement, production and sales arms of the
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company is seen to logically result in a product that is easy 
to make and easy to sell.
The development of ideas, new products and product 
modifications relies upon some if not all of the following 
actions. Firstly, a new proposal is likely to be subject to 
the 'ringi' system of decision making. (Discussed under 
managerial characteristics.) Secondly, a team from all 
relevant departments is often assembled to consider and develop 
the proposed idea, and where applicable design the product or 
modification. Thirdly, all relevant departments are supposed to 
be kept informed of the team's progress enabling them to 
prepare for any new requirements that the outcome of the team's 
work might place upon them. (Womack et al, 1990; Takamiya, 
1985, pp190-193) For Kagono et al, this means that, a
"functional manager or department has a holistic view extending 
beyond an assigned function and that he sometimes invades the 
functions of other managers and departments." (Kagono et al, 
1985, p.106) The success of these actions can be seen to rest 
upon the generalist training of managers so that they are able 
to comprehend the difficulties departments other than their 
own may face. (Discussed under managerial characteristics.) It 
also rests with the effective dissemination of information 
throughout the company. (See item No2 below.)
2) Company Wide Communications - The term "company wide" 
is taken from Takamiya. (Takamiya, 1985, pi92) It is taken to 
mean the constant dissemination of written or spoken 
information both vertically i.e., from top management to all
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employees, and horizontally i.e., from one department to
another. (Pascale & Athos, 1986, pp28-57)
The dissemination of information to the workforce may be 
carried out in a variety of ways, e.g., regular mass meetings 
of the workforce, team meetings with supervisors, or the 
distribution and display of the information in written form at
the workplace. The communication of information 'down' to
employees is expected to be two way, in that they are allowed 
to comment constructively on what they are told and to feed 
information regarding production back 'up' the line of 
communication. Shimizu places great emphasis on the 
contribution of successful communication to organizational
effectiveness. He argues that it stifles sectionalism and the 
formation of small factions detrimental to the goals of the 
organization. (Shimizu, 1989, p.158)
3) Emphasis on First Line Supervision - Considerable 
responsibility is delegated to what White and Trevor have 
defined as "first line supervision". (White & Trevor, 1983, 
p.4) Foremen are expected to develop initiative and motivation 
among those they supervise. They are a crucial link between 
employees and senior management, promoting a team approach and 
creating a climate in which individual workers feel encouraged 
to make suggestions for improving production. Foremen are 
responsible for monitoring quality, worker performance, 
training costs and the flow of supplies into their work area. 
They also assume control of duties such as housekeeping, and 
where possible maintainence. In addition they are expected to
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'lead' their workers. This means participating directly in 
the tasks their workers are required to achieve as opposed to
'overseeing' their completion. (Dore, 1973, p261)
4) Close Ties With Suppliers - It is important that the
production system is fed with quality components, delivered on 
a JIT basis, and which are designed to be easily assembled into 
the product. This is achieved through close ties with suppliers 
which are apparent in several respects. Firstly, the company 
and its supplier work closely together in the development and 
design of the component. Frequent visits between the companies 
by management and engineers ensure a constant flow of 
information and exchange of ideas. (Womack et al, 1990, pp.60- 
62) In the case of a large manufacturer there may be a 
financial link between the two companies (through a 
'Keiretsu'), whereby the Manufacturer owns a proportion of the 
supplier's equity. (Abegglen & Stalk, 1985; Sako, 1990, 1992) 
The Japanese buyer/supplier relationship, whether or not 
it incorporates a financial link, reinforces a sense of 
"reciprocal obligation" between the two companies. At the
one level this means that there is a commitment by both sides 
to maintain a stable relationship that guarantees delivery 
time, price, quality, swift payment for goods received and 
future new supply contracts. Close ties may also result in 
companies seconding managerial or technical expertise to each 
other on a mutually beneficial basis. They may also lend 
labour to one another if there is a work surge. (Womack et al, 
1990, pp.194-195)
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2,3): Personnel Characteristics
In general terms personnel characteristics aim to provide 
a committed and motivated workforce, able to comply with the 
demands that are placed upon it by the production system. The 
specific characteristics are:
1 ) Core/Periphery Workforce Distinctions - Employees are 
grouped into a core/periphery structure. There are different 
conditions of employment for employees in each part of the 
structure. The company's internal labour market is segmented 
so that part-time and contract employees are given the least 
favourable conditions. These workers act as a buffer, 
enhancing the employment security of permanent workers. (Wood, 
1989, p.453; Briggs, 1988, p.25; Thurley, 1989, p.6)
2). Life-time Employment - As a "general guiding 
principle", core employees can expect that a job will be 
available for them until retirement age. (Hasegawa, 1986, p.11) 
Abegglen, in his earliest study of a Japanese factory equated 
this to a "lifetime commitment" by the company and argued it 
was central to its successful production performance. 
(Abbeglen, 1958)
Recent work by those such as Komiyo suggests that this 
policy has come under some demographic and economic related 
pressures. Faced with a decrease in the number of of young 
entrants into the labour market companies now find they have to 
compete harder to retain and recruit employees. Life-time 
employment is only attractive where it offers pay rewards
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appropriate to experience and ability and where it matches pay 
levels elsewhere.
Komiyo notes that the ratio of those changing jobs has 
recently increased, especially among those under the age of 34. 
Between 1985 and 1990 it rose by about 45%. His figure of 
45% only represents about 4.2% of the total Japanese workforce. 
Moreover, other literature finds the idea of life-time 
employment to be highly important to Japanese workers at all 
levels of responsibility and argues that far from withering 
away, the commitment is becoming more widespread among Japanese 
companies. (Dore et al; 1989 Whittaker, 1989; Komiyo 1991, 
P.65; See also Financial Times 16/12/91)
3 ) Single Status - Companies provide a common set of
terms and conditions of work for all core employees. Blue and 
white collar distinctions do not exist in areas such as payment 
systems, holidays and welfare benefits. (See item No 4 below) 
(Dore, 1973; White & Trevor; 1983)
The idea of single status should be understood to extend 
to the principle of allowing all staff where possible to
participate in the decision making structure of the company, 
to be allowed to know what is happening at the company and to
be able to communicate their views about what is happening
upwards to management. (This is related to the effectiveness of 
the communications and participation structures in operation at 
the company.)
4) Welfarism - Extensive welfare benefits are available, 
but generally only apply to core employees. They may include
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pension schemes, provision of company housing shops and
schools, medical care schemes and sick pay. (White & Trevor, 
1983, p. 4) All are rewards used to demonstrate the commitment 
of the company to its employees on a long-term basis and to 
emphasise their status. Such practices are expected to foster 
a commitment among employees to staying with the company. They 
may also tie employees to the company since to move elsewhere 
may result in their loss. (Hirshmeier & Yui, 1981; Dore, 1973, 
pp.202-207)
5) Seniority (Pay) - An individual's pay is often
assessed, in part, on the basis of either merit or 
performance. (Pucik,1985; Moore, 1987) However, such
schemes are likely to have to co-exist with the use of
seniority ('nenko') systems, whereby length of service is a 
major determinant of pay levels. For those such as Shimizu 
seniority based rewards are a product of the life-time
employment system and aim to increase the sense of employee 
belonging to the company. (Shimizu, 1989, p.58)
Whitehill expresses doubts as to whether merit or 
performance pay is entirely compatible with a "group centred 
work environment," but goes on to argue that: "Until very
recently, almost complete reliance had been placed upon nenko,
or years of service, as the basis for ... salary decisions. 
But with the need for tighter controls and cost savings during 
recent years of low growth, there has been no escaping the need 
for evaluating individual performance and increasing
efficiency." (Whitehill, 1991, p.167 & p.204)
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6) Seniority (Promotion) - As with the reduction of 
seniority's influence over pay, new systems for allocating 
promotion are now more evident in the face of economic 
pressures. Qualifications, training and development and formal 
systems of appraisal are increasingly used to determine 
promotion potential. But as with pay, these systems still co­
exist with the use of seniority which in turn reinforces the 
life-time employment ideal.
7) Intensive Selection Procedures - Potential core 
employees are subjected to rigorous selection procedures and 
are taken on from school on the basis of the school's 
reputation, its recommendation about the candidate, and the 
level of educational qualifications acquired. (Dore, 1973, 
pp.31-73) Candidates may also be turned down where they exhibit 
radical views or an inability to work with others. (Robbins 
1983) Dore & Sako make the additional important point that: 
"Recruitment is for a career, not for a job. Selection 
criteria therefore concentrate, on demonstrated ability to 
learn rather than on particular job related competencies 
already acquired. (Dore & Sako, 1989, p.77)
8) Training - There is a heavy emphasis on formal training 
away from the workplace and on on thé job training and
induction for all employees. The policy of life-time
employment means that there is "a strong justification for 
firms to invest in the training of their workers." (Dore & 
Sako, 1989, p.75) Retraining is seen as part of a normal career
progression and may demonstrate not only a desire to merit some
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form of reward, but also to contribute to the company's 
success. Induction programmes, typically averaging ten days, 
induce a sense of membership and obligation to the
organization. (Naylor, 1984; Hirschmeier & Yui, 1981)
9) Elements of Consensualitv and Participation - The
employing company encourages a consensual style of decision 
making among the workforce within the framework of
management/worker communications (See No2 under organizational 
characteristics), teamwork, and quality circles etc. This 
allows all employees some involvement in certain aspects of the 
company's affairs. A structure evolves "based on mutual trust 
and respect..." where "both management and labour are receptive 
to integrative problem solving towards the issues of conflict 
through consensual decisions, joint consultation, or joint 
study projects." (Urabe, 1988, p. 17)
The expectation is that this consensuality and 
participation contributes to high levels of job satisfaction 
but there is evidence that Japanese workers are no more 
satisfied and often less satisfied, than Western workers. 
(Azumi & McMillan, 1976; Odaka, 1975; Komai, 1989) Lincoln and 
his colleagues suggested that this may be because Japanese 
workers expect more of their jobs than their Western 
counterparts. (Lincoln et al, 1981) Komai believes that low 
levels of job satisfaction among Japanese workers are negated 
by a) intense levels of participation, b) consensuality and 
c) the tendency to be organized into, work as and to identify 
with, teams at the workplace (groupism). He considers his work
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to demonstrate that: "Japanese management servies to enhance
worker identification with the company. It is this groupism, 
as demonstrated by the ability to have lower-level views 
transmitted to the top, the positive assessment of 
participation at the shop level, the trust in management, and 
the sense of identification with the company , that is the 
secret of why Japanese workers are able to achieve high 
productivity even though they are not very satisfied with their 
work." (Komai, 1989, p.45)
10) Regimented Work Environment - Certain a;spects of the 
work environment can be described as regimented. For example, 
individual employee performance may be enhainced through 
techniques such as exercise sessions at the workplace, or the 
use of slogans of encouragement. Individual and team 
performance and attendance records may be displayed publicly at 
the workplace fostering an element of peer grcDup pressure. 
There is also a greater acceptance of management authority 
among Japanese workers than their Western counterparts. Dore 
has described this as a culturally based "subimissiveness", 
but has also suggested that it is acceptance based on a 
perception among the workforce that management .authority is 
legitimated by their competence. (Dore, 1973, p.262 & 1987)
2.4) Industrial Relations Characteristics
The industrial relations characteristics of tthe domestic 
model have three general aims. Firstly, to provide a single, 
formalized structure of employee representation. Secondly, to
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ensure that while some differences of opinion with management 
may exist, the union is committed to the success of the 
company. Thirdly,to minimise the possibility of any disruption 
of production through labour disputes. Work such as that of 
Okochi, Karsh and Levine is clearly based on the argument that 
much of the post-war growth of Japanese industry is due to a 
system of unionism geared to maintaining stable and co­
operative labour/management relations. (Okochi, Karsh, & 
Levine, 1973) The specific characteristics are:
1 ) Single Unionism - Only one union is recognised at the 
company. It represents all regular employees including white 
collar, supervisory and lower management. This ensures a 
simplified bargaining and consultative structure. Koshiro sees 
this as being reinforced by an internal labour market structure 
at the company based on the promotion of complete employee 
flexibility and which also minimises blue/white collar 
distinctions. Indeed, Shirai argues that it is a key aim of 
enterprise unionism to abolish any distinctions between blue 
and white collar workers. (Koshiro, 1983; Shirai, 1983)
2) Enterprise Unionism - The recognised union only 
represents employees at a single firm. The emphasis is on its 
representing employee views in relation to what is happening 
at the company. It does not raise craft based issues or 
political social and economic issues that are external to the 
enterprise. Full-time union officials are often company 
employees seconded to their position after election. It is
-120-
not uncommon for them to later go on to take management 
positions within the company. Japanese companies regard a 
period as a full-time union official as a valuable method by 
which to develop an individual's leadership and management 
skills. (Hanami, 1979)
3) Formalized Union Organization - The union structure is 
geared to maintaining close but formal bargaining and 
communications links with the enterprise management. Shirai 
believes that: "As the workers' organization it confronts and 
resists the employer in order to protect the employees' 
interests when they conflict with those of the employer. It 
also co-operates with the employer in promoting the mutual 
interests of the parties in a particular enterprise." Shirai, 
1983, p.187)
it is questionable whether the structure of 
labour/management relations allows the enterprise union to 
fulfil either a real opposition role or a collective bargaining 
role. Shimabukuro believes the union is too far incorporated 
into a structure of participation that compliments and 
therefore negates the effectiveness of collective bargaining. 
For him: "Workers must construct an autonomous labour union of 
their own and secure room to actively develop opposition 
activity with regard to managers." (Shimabukuro, 1983, p.132)
4) Enterprise Level Bargaining - Though consideration is 
given to what is happening at the industry and national levels 
during the "shunto", spring offensive, wage bargaining is 
carried out at the enterprise level only. The company pays
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what it alone can afford. Negotiations are between the 
company's higher management and senior union full-time 
officials. Koshiro notes that even where the union is 
affiliated to a federation, federation officials rarely attend 
negotiations. (Koshiro, 1983, p.210)
3) SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
To return to figure 3.1, each of the four sets of 
characteristics flow both directly and indirectly into 
production system requirements. At the direct level the effect 
of a set of characteristics or even an individual 
characteristic within each set is often quite apparent. For 
example, the employment characteristic of formalised and on 
the job training (OJT) for all employees should directly help 
to fulfil the system's requirements of a flexible labour 
force with an awareness of the importance of quality and of the 
ideas behind continuous improvement. This is termed a direct 
relationship and is represented by an unbroken line on the 
diagram.
To understand how they flow indirectly into the production 
system's requirement's section, the four sets of
characteristics need to be seen not as four separate entities, 
but as being interactive. Consequently, if an individual or 
set of characteristics operate to specification, this may have 
a positive effect on one or more characteristics in another set 
or sets and logically it follows that this will help meet some 
of the production system's requirements. These are termed
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indirect relationships and are represented by broken lines on 
the diagram. The exception to this rule is that there is no 
indirect relationship that flows from the structural, 
employment or industrial relations characteristics via the 
managerial characteristics. This is because the model 
acknowledges that management play a unique role in the 
production system. There are two facets to this role. 
Firstly, the implementation of structural, employment and 
industrial relations characteristics is reliant upon management 
having the ability to make a decision that initiates their 
existence. Secondly, because of management’s initiating role, 
the effective operation of these three sets of characteristics 
is inevitably influenced by the effectiveness of managerial 
characteristics, but not vice versa.
Two final points merit attention. Firstly, the 
construction of the model can be seen to reflect the ’’holistic” 
nature of the Japanese production system when defined in 
’’broad” terms. Those such as Clegg have described it a 
’’synergistic” structure. (Clegg, 1987)) Combined, the four 
sets of characteristics provide the system with its entire 
requirements. Secondly, we have so far tended to highlight the 
positive relationship of individual or sets of characteristics 
with each other and their beneficial impact upon the 
requirements of the production system. It is therefore 
important to bear in mind that because the model is holistic, 
where a characteristic or set of characteristics do not operate 
to specification, or are missing, then they may have a negative
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impact on other characteristics. It follows that such a 
relationship may lead to some of the requirements of the 
production system not being met. For example, poor training 
might contribute to a failure to satisfy production 
requirements such as quality, or flexibility.
This chapter has identified four sets of characteristics 
essential to the operation of the domestic Japanese
production system. The characteristics must operate
effectively in order that the requirements of the production 
system are fulfilled. Fulfilling these requirements is the key 
to successful production performance. Whether these 
characteristics are easy to transplant to a host country will 
determine the features of any model of a Japanese production 
system for operation in the UK. Chapter 4 provides an analysis 
of the literature that is pertinent to the issue.
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CHAPTER 4
DOES THE DOMESTIC JAPANESE PRODUCTION SYSTEM TRANSPLANT EASILY? 
INTRODUCTION
Much of the discussion concerning Japanese transplants and 
also the issue of Japanization, has centred on whether it is 
easy to transplant the domestic Japanese production system to a 
host country. In essence, debate has centred on attempts
to research the success of transplants using various
measurements and indices. The debate is analysed in this 
chapter and taken into account when constructing a model of a 
Japanese production system for operation in the UK.
THE DOMESTIC JAPANESE PRODUCTION SYSTEM: PROBLEMS OF
TRANSFERENCE AND THEIR POSSIBLE REMEDIES.
Implicit in commentaries related to the production 
systems at Japanese transplants is the belief that they 
exhibit the same set of production requirements as the 
domestic system. Variability among companies' production 
system characteristics will impact on the fulfilment of their 
respective production system requirements. It is the 
fulfilment of those requirements that makes the Japanese 
production system so successful. It is therefore unlikely that 
a Japanese company will set up a manufacturing transplant that 
does not aspire to have the same basic requirements as those 
of the domestic system discussed in Chapter 3,
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In the the context of creating a model of the Japanese 
production system for operation in the UK, there are two 
requirements that are an exception to this rule. These are a 
JIT supply system and continuous research and design. Chapter 
5 will show how each is a requirement of the UK model, but in 
a modified form, reflecting in JIT's case a management desire 
to achieve it, and in R&D's case reflecting the wishes of the 
transplant's parent company. Modification is necessary
because though the model would expect the transplant to aspire 
to reach the standards of JIT and R&D achieved under the
domestic Japanese production system, it must acknowledge that 
there are a a set of external constraints that influence these 
issues. In the case of JIT, the constraints can only be
overcome by a long-term strategy of the transplant working 
closely with local suppliers to bring them up to the standards 
it requires. In the case of R&D, it is up to the transplant's 
parent company to make the decision as to whether facilities 
should be made available locally or remain in Japan. Despite 
the modifications there is already evidence that the
constraints are being challenged in the UK, especially in the 
consumer electronics sector.
The task of this chapter is to examine whether the
requirements of the transplanted Japanese production system in 
the UK or elsewhere are successfully fulfilled. The rest of 
its structure is in line with the four sets of production 
system characteristics already identified by this research. It 
analyses earlier research into the production system
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characteristics exhibited at Japanese transplants in the UK and 
elsewhere in the world. Given that we are constructing a UK 
model of the transplanted production system, it is noticeable 
that only the sections discussing personnel and industrial 
relations characteristics at Japanese transplants are able to 
draw on predominantly UK literature. In contrast, the 
literature highlighted under the sections considering 
managerial and organizational characteristics is drawn, in 
part, from the UK, but also from elsewhere in the world, 
especially the US.
The chapter considers the following questions: How
similar are the production system characteristics at 
transplants to those identified in the domestic Japanese 
system? Do Japanese characteristics that are modified to suit 
local conditions work effectively? Do those characteristics 
that are not modified transfer easily to a host country? It 
is also important to reflect on what variables might actually 
impede the successful operation of a Japanese transplant. In 
short, we are looking to identify the problems encountered when 
attempting to transplant the characteristics of the Japanese 
production system and how these problems may be overcome. The 
main problems of transferring the characteristics and the 
possible remedies as identified by the literature are 
summarised in table 4.1.
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TABLS_i_,_X
caauuurrERiSTics or the girsTEju
BY TWK LlTKBATURg
Probl
Managerial Characceri.st.lca
1) Coherent Vision
2) Consistency of Style
3) Consensual/Group 1st 
Decision Making 
Procedures
4) Intensive Selection 
Procedures
5) Circulation
Larger transplants may need 
to create a dual management 
structure which increases the 
likelihood of conflict between 
local and Japanese managers. 
(Tsururoi, 1978: Thurley, 1981)
Conflict under dual management 
structures due to cultural 
differences. Japanese emphasis 
on consensual/groupist decision 
making (nemawashi & ringi) is 
believed to shut out local 
management from the decision 
making process and lead to 
friction and misunderstandings 
(Smith, 1984: Inohara. 1981:
Turcq. 1987: Tsurumi, 1978:
Lorenz. 1991) Japanese 
personality leads to decisions 
that puzzle or anger local 
management (Van Wolferen. 1988)
Conflict due to cultural 
differences denied, or believed 
irrelevant. Conflict purely due 
to different Japanese management 
practices.
(Matsumoto. 1982: Yoshihara. 1989) 
Local management are hostile to 
seniority based pay and 
promotion and are unhappy with 
policy of management circulation
A promotional ceiling exists for 
local management. Local managers 
feel shut out of strategic 
decision making process. Japanese 
management make little effort 
to explain Japanese management 
practices to local colleagues. 
(Yoshihara. 1989: Kichiro. 1985. 
1988: Dunning. 1986: Thurley. 
Trevor & Worm. 1981)
>
Compromise of both Japanese and local 
management styles and attitudes 
needed. Special effort required from 
Japanese management to incorporate 
local management into the decision 
making process and to explain 
Japanese management practices (Odaka 
1986: Koyabashi. 1985)
Japanese management place local 
managers in positions of increasing 
authority and responsibility. 
(Trevor. 1988: White S Trevcr. 1983)
Selection of local managers 
whose attitudes are compatible 
with operating Japanese 
management practices a priority. 
(Takamiya. 1985)
Adoption by Japanese transplants 
of local management pay levels and 
systems in order to retain cuallty 
management. (Thurley. Trevor & 
worm. 1981)
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TABLE, 4^1 Çont 'd
Charaoteri BticB
Problems 
of Transference
Remedies 
Idcnti fled
OrganiEaiionaL Çharacteri.st ics
Co-ordination and 
co-operation of all 
departments 
Coraipany wide 
communications 
Emphasis on first 
lirue supervision 
Close ties with 
suppliers
>
Breakdown of effective Inter­
departmental co-ordination due 
to problems in transfering 
ringi/nemawashi decision 
making process. Local managers 
retreat into their own areas of 
authority, resist intrusion of 
others into it and refuse to 
communicate with other areas of 
the organilation. (Tsurumi. 1978: 
Kichiro. 1980: Johnson 1977)
Local management may be hostile 
to vertical communications 
programmes, believing that they 
challenge their authority. They 
also lose interest in them.
(Bradley & Hill. 1983: T own ley. 
1989)
The production system's reliance 
on highly skilled first line 
supervision with managerial ability 
may create recruitment problems 
and upset internal promotion 
policies. (IDS. 1991)
Local suppliers are often not able 
to match the transplant's criteria 
concerning quality, price and 
delivery time The transplant may 
be forced to buy from geographical!y 
distant suppliers leading to long 
lead tiroes within its JIT supply 
system. (Dunning. 1986: Hishiguchi, 
1990; Sako. 1990. 1992)
►
Selection of local managers with 
attitudes conductive to fostering 
good horizontal communications. 
Circulation of local managers 
encourages them to appreciate the 
difficulties encountered by all areas 
of the organization. (Takamiya. 1979 : 
Fukada. 1988; Ouchi 1981:
Schonterger. 1982)
Minimal evidence available as to the 
quality of vertical communications 
at transplants. Local management 
commitment to the practices may 
depend on the selection of the right 
type of manager. (Takamiya. 1979: 
Townley. 1989)
Adoption of pay levels above the 
local norm for supervisors in order 
to attract those with the special 
skills required. Creation of a 
promotional and training structure 
that allows shop-floor employees to 
reach supervisor level. (IDS. 1991. 
Wickens. 1 9 8 7; Abo. 1988: Jurgens 6 
Stromel. 1986)
Creation of close buyer/supplier 
relationships which aim to bring the 
supplier up to the standards 
required. (Trevor. 1988 : Dunning. 
1986; Salfo. 1990. 1992)
Evidence of transplants awaiting/ 
encouraging Japanese owned suppliers 
to locate in the UK. (Financial Times 
21/05/91; See also Chapter 1)
- 1 2 9 -
t a b u ; conX Ld
Characteristics
Problems 
of Transference
Remedies
Identified
1) Core/Periphery 
Workforce 
Distinctions 
Li fe-1 iroe 
Employment 
Single Status 
Welfarism 
Seniority (Pay) 
Senior!ty 
(Promotion)
7) Intensive 
Selection 
Procedures
8) Training
91 Elements of
Consensuali ty 
and Participation
10) Disciplined and 
Regimented Work 
Env i ronment
Failure to guarantee life-time 
employment, seniority based pay and 
promotion often unsuitable for 
transplanting. Little use of welfare 
benefits beyond the local norm.
(Reitsperger. 1986a: Oliver and 
Wilkinson. 1988)
Evidence that variance in the 
extent of Japanese personnel 
practices adopted by transplants 
will lead to corresponding 
variances in workforce attitudes 
and behaviour. The less Japanese 
the practices the lower the levels 
of workforce Job satisfaction and 
sat is facton with management/worker 
communications. In addition, quality 
and productivity are inferior to 
those transplants exhibiting practices 
closer to those under the domestic 
Japanese production system.
(Rei tsperger. 1986a: Takamiya. 1985: 
Fukada, 1988: Komai. 1989: Takamiya' 
and Thurley 1985: Sethi et al, 1984)
Evidence that Western workers are more 
individualistic and less groupist than 
their Japanese counterparts. Western 
employees respond best to those personnel 
practices at a transplant that tap their 
instrumental work goals. They are less 
interested in individual sacrifice for 
the good of the company overall. (Komai, 
1989: Rei tsperger. 1986a : Matsuura. 1984)
An emphasis on the recruitment of school 
leavers may lead to problems of 
discipline, turnover, absenteeism etc. 
(Broad. 1989)
Some compromise of local and 
Japanese personnel practices 
desirable especially in areas 
concerning pay and promot.on. 
(Wickens. 1987: Trevor. 1988, 
Matsuura. 1984: Jenner & Trevor, 
1985)
Despite some compromise of 
local and Japanese personnel 
practices, it has been argued that 
the closer a Japanese transplant 
comes to emulating Japanese 
practices the more successful it 
will be at inducing positive 
employee attitudes to the 
benefit of production - wnat 
can be termed as a reduction of 
"them and us" attitudes.
(Takamiya, 1985: Komai. 1989: 
Reitsperger. 1985. 1986a :
Fukada. 1988)
Literature suggests the 
Importance of a selection 
procedure that identifies those 
with attitudes and values that 
are more responsive to Japanese 
personnel practices. Avoidance 
of a policy concentrating on 
the recruitment of school 
leavers. (Wickens. 1987:
Carrahan. 1987: Trevor. 1988:
White & Trevor. 1983: Bread.
1989)
- 130-
TABLE_,4^1„Conf«i
Domestic 
Character! g ticK of Transference
Remedies
Identified
Industrial Relations 
ÇhacaçterLstjçs
Single Unionism 
Enterprise Unionisn 
Formalized Union 
Organiztion 
Enterprise Level 
Bargaining
►
Japanese Management are hostile to 
multi-union recognition and are 
concerned at local traditions of 
adversarial management/union 
relations. They believe the local 
industrial relations system 
produces unions that disrupt 
production. (Reitsperger. 1986b; 
Bassett. 1987)
Local unions may be hostile to 
Japanese management practices, 
on the basis that they represent 
an intensification of work.
(Garrahan. 1986: Beaumont. 1991)
Local unions may be wary of attempts 
to create co-operative industrial 
relations styles at transplants.
They see the styles as uni tari st and 
fear incorporation. (Garrahan. 1986: 
wiIkinson. 1989 :)
Where a union is recognised at a 
transplant. Japanese management 
leave the operation of industrial 
relations to their local 
colleagues. In the UK. local 
managers may adhere to the local 
tradition of low trust, adversarial 
industrial relations despite having 
signed an NSA. (Grant. 1988 : Bassett 
1987)
Some evidence that unions recognised 
at a transplant may fail to satisfy 
the expectations of their members or 
that workers may decide it unnecessary 
to have a union at the company. (Trevor 
1988: Adler. 1991) Membership 
dissatisfaction with the union means 
management lose an independent channel 
of communication with workers. The valu 
of formal industrial relations 
procedures is diminished.
►
Manaigement choose not to 
reco'gnise a union, usually 
where the transplant is located 
in am area with a tradition 
amon-g employers of non union 
recoigni t ion . (Reitsperger, 1986b: 
Beautmont. 1987; Maclnness & 
Sproiull. 1989)
Manaigement choose to recognise 
a simgle union at the transplant. 
Both the union and management must 
be willing to sign an agreement 
desicgned to foster co-operative 
industrial relations. (Bassett 
1986: Rico. 1987; Burrows. 1986: 
Gregory. 1986: IRR. 1989 :
Re i tisperger . 1985b)
Where» a union is recognised, both 
the JJapanese and local management 
must adhere to the high trust 
style of industrial relations 
that is required to make it work 
effectively. To avoid 
marginalisat ion of the union it 
is emcouraged by management to 
play an active and influential 
role. (Trevor. 1988: Bassett.
1986: Grant. 1988)
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1) Managerial Characteristics at Japanese Transplants: Problems 
and Remedies.
It appears from the literature that there are two basic 
management structures predominantly in use at Japanese 
transplants. These are:
1 ) A single management system, where the management
structure is dominated by expatriate Japanese management. 
(Often local management is confined to the personnel 
function.)
2) A dual management system, in which UK management are, 
to varying degrees, incorporated into the decision making 
process alongside Japanese management.(i.e., in areas 
other than personnel management.) However, executive 
control of the company usually remains with Japanese
managers.
(Trevor, 1983, pp.109-125; Dunning,
1986, pp.67-79; Thurley, Trevor & Worm,
1981; Tsurumi, 1978, pp.108-117;
Yoshihara, 1989, pp.23-30)
It has been suggested that the size of a Japanese 
transplant will directly relate to its management structure. 
(Tsurumi, 1978; Thurley, 1981) Tsurumi's research in the USA 
contends that "most Japanese subsidiaries show serious signs of 
conflict between Japanese and American managers, and that this 
conflict appears to increase in complexity and seriousness 
exponentially as the firm's size and scope of operations 
expand." (Tsurumi, 1978, p.113) Both Tsurumi and Thurley's 
work implies that, in some instances, size, and therefore 
Japanese/local management conflict, is linked to the age of 
the transplant.
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Studies of Japanese transplants have suggested that 
Japanese managerial characteristics do not always transfer 
easily, leading to stresses and conflicts in dual management 
systems (See for example Smith, 1984; Yoshihara, 1989; 
Matsumoto, 1982; Tsurumi, 1978). These studies can be divided 
into two categories. The first sees the cause of the problems 
as being culturally based. The second denies, or more often 
ignores, the cultural issue and examines management 
organizational issues at transplants. It is perfectly 
plausible that the two causes are inter-related, i.e. culture 
accounts for several if not all of the organizational issues 
discussed.
It has been argued that the cultural basis of the 
Japanese management style may not operate effectively in a host 
society. Commentators have suggested that where a dual 
management structure exists 'ringi' and 'nemawashi' processes 
are often well beyond the understanding of local management 
(Trevor, 1983; Kidd & Teramoto, 1981; Inohara, 1981; Turcq, 
1987; Tsurumi, 1978; Smith, 1984; Yoshihara, 1989; Matsumoto, 
1982; Tsurumi, 1978). Due to the cultural "subtleties" of
these processes (e.g. the habatsu structures discussed in 
Chapter 3), "Western managers may have great difficulty 
gaining access to this information in organizations all of 
whose senior members are Japanese." (Smith, 1984, p.128) 
Explanations of these processes are rarely forthcoming from 
Japanese management. Case studies of dual management
structures seem to confirm that the processes can "lock out"
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local management from the decision making process leading to 
friction, misunderstandings and distrust. (Trevor, 1983; Kidd & 
Teramoto, 1981; Inohara, 1981; Turcq, 1987; Tsurumi, 1978)
Even where there is a realisation among local managers 
that the Japanese management style is consensual and groupist 
there is often a belief that its use is confined to the elite 
of Japanese management. Lorenz suggests that efforts by 
local managers to dispel the label of 'gaijin' (foreigner) and 
enter the influential "in group" are unlikely to succeed. He 
concludes that overcoming "the homogeneity of Japanese 
culture, the tendency to keep power centralised, and pride in 
the Japanese way of doing things" is . an enormous if not 
impossible task for local managers. (Financial Times, 15/11/91) 
In contrast. Van Wolferen emphasises the impact of 
culture on the Japanese personality, leading to the Japanese 
ability to "manage reality". It is perfectly acceptable that: 
"Japanese in positions of control show great agility in moving 
from one reality to another as they seek to explain facts and 
motives to other Japanese or to foreigners." It is he says "one 
of the ways in Japan by which the higher ranking and the 
stronger claim their privileges" (Van Wolferen, 1988, p.8). 
If necessary, what has happened in the past can be denied and 
replaced by what the individual wants to think happened.
In the context of a dual management structure, what Van 
Wolferen terms "malleable reality" could have dire 
consequences. His key point is that; "How things are supposed 
to be tends to coincide, of course, with the immediate
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interests of one's group." (Van Wolferen, 1988, p.8) That 
group might be constructed around the formal Japanese control 
or authority structure or around an informal 'habatsu' 
grouping. In either situation, malleable reality might lead 
to Japanese management decisions that puzzle or anger local 
managers since it appears a denial of what has actually
occurred.
Not all studies of Japanese management style see it as 
being determined by culture. For example, Matsumoto sees 
culture as a 'red herring' and an outdated argument. He 
believes that: "the Japanese company's features are the product 
of visible systems and practices, and not of any exotic 
secrets." It is, he says, "fully possible to explain Japanese 
management on rational grounds without resort to intangible 
spiritual or psychological theory." (Matsumoto, 1982, p.74) It 
has been argued by Yoshihara that when transplanted without 
modification, these "visible systems and practices" cause four 
types of problems. (Yoshihara, 1989, pp.15-27)
Firstly, Japanese transplants are seen as providing low
salaries, and a slow pace of promotion. This he believes is due 
to the transference of a seniority based system of pay and 
promotion alien to US managers. Citing Kichiro, he notes that
seniority based promotion and pay appears too arbitrary and
vague a concept for local managers to grasp. (Kichiro, 1988) 
There is however evidence that, with regard to pay, transplants 
in Western Europe have tended to adopt local practices that 
bring their salary levels into competition with those existing
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in the local management labour market. (Thurley, Trevor, & 
Worm, 1981, p.49)
Yoshihara’s second type is that of promotional prospects 
at transplants. These are perceived as poor. The posts of 
company president and other heads of department are seen as the 
exclusive preserve of Japanese expatriate staff. The best a 
local manager could expect to achieve is vice-president. 
Research by Dunning in the early 1980s found that at 14 out of 
23 Japanese transplants in the UK the majority of directors 
(76%) were Japanese. Dunning saw this as evidence of 
excessive parental company influence and it is an issue pursued 
by Lorenz. (Dunning, 1986, p.77; Lorenz, Financial Times, 
15/12/91) In effect, a promotional ceiling exists for local 
management which may contribute to de-motivation and high 
turnover among them.
These are not insurmountable problems, as UK case studies 
of transplants demonstrate. Trevor's analysis of Toshiba 
notes that at its inception Japanese and UK management agreed 
that despite Japanese ownership the company should take tha 
unusual step of having a UK Managing Director. (Trevor, 1988, 
p.28) White and Trevor's work included a case study company 
where once Japanese management were satisfied that production 
was correctly organized they had returned to Japan leaving UK 
managers in sole control. (White & Trevor, 1983, pp.54-55)
Promotion for local managers may also be linked to their 
ability to adapt to the idea of non specialization in one task 
area. , Their reactions to this practice vary. There can be
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some confusion in local manager's minds over the Japanese 
emphasis on developing the "person" rather than selecting a 
person to match a specific "job". (Thurley, 1981, p. 18) 
Takamamiya's description of "cross departmental job rotation" 
at two case study transplants in the UK indicates that the idea 
was popular among young production managers. The selection 
of local management with the right attitudes may have some 
bearing on how well such schemes are received. (Takamiya, 
1985, pp.192-193)
A third category relates to communications with the 
Japanese parent company. Such communication is inevitable, and 
is generally in Japanese. Few local managers speak or write 
Japanese, therefore even with a position of real authority and 
influence at the local level a local manager may be at the 
disadvantage of his Japanese colleagues who have a greater 
knowledge of, and contact with, management of the parent 
company in Japan. Inevitably, important strategic decisions 
are made in Japan. Because the communications structure 
between the transplant and its parent company is Japanese 
dominated, local managers may feel shut-out from crucial 
decisions affecting the long-term business performance of the 
transplant. They feel they are the last to know of such 
decisions and that the reasoning behind them is rarely 
explained. (Thurley, Trevor, & Worm, 1981, pp.48-50; Kichiro, 
1985;)
Yoshihara's work identifies a fourth type of problem. To 
local management, the methods for performing certain tasks are
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unfamiliar while the decision making processes used by 
Japanese management appear ambiguous and are difficult to 
understand. On the one hand, overcoming these problems 
requires Japanese management making "special efforts" and 
adopting "special measures" that help explain to their local 
colleagues what is needed and incorporates them into the 
decision making process. On the other, local managers clearly 
need to be receptive to the use of Japanese management 
practices. (Odaka, 1886, p.84)
What is required by those such as Koyabashi is a 
compromise of Japanese and local management attitudes, and 
styles; the recognition by both sides that the other may offer 
the correct solution. Such a compromise enables the subsidiary 
to be efficiently managed, but remains compatible with the 
parent company's control structure and business strategy. 
(Koyabashi, 1985, p.229)
It can be concluded that, on the whole, commentators have 
tended to focus on problems within the management 
characteristics at Japanese transplants where dual management 
structures exist. Yet it has to be remembered that many such 
companies have successfully overcome these problems by using a 
compromise of Japanese and local management characteristics. 
In one sense, Ouchi's theory Z is an example of how to go about 
doing this. The theory draws on a combination of both 
Japanese and American management practices. It places emphasis 
on the Japanese ethos of groupism and relies on high trust 
relationships, but at the same time it relies on fast
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assessment and promotion, more explicit methods of control, and 
situations where the individual bears final responsibility for 
group decisions. But as he is not explicitly discussing 
Japanese multinationals in the US, Ouchi remains silent on how 
well such strategies operate under a dual management structure. 
(Ouchi, 1981)
2) Organizational Characteristics at Japanese Transplants: 
Problems and Remedies
For Takamiya, "inter-departmental co-ordination" at a 
transplant is based upon the selection of people with the 
"right attitude and industriousness." (Takamiya, 1979, p. 12) 
Selection of such personnel is on the basis that they will be 
highly receptive to other production system characteristics 
that contribute to effective inter-departmental co-ordination. 
These include, the circulation of management staff so that 
they gain a wide experience and knowledge of all areas of the 
organization which enables them to appreciate the difficulties 
of other departments, the use of the ’ringi' system of decision 
making (see chapter 3), and the operation of effective 
communications structures. Earlier research argues that such 
characteristics can be transplanted and operated successfully. 
(Fukada, 1988; Ouchi, 1981; Schonberger, 1982)
Effective inter-departmental co-ordination is reliant on 
good vertical and horizontal communications. As was discussed 
in Section 1, there are potential problems with the 
transplanting of the 'ringi' and 'nemawashi' based system of 
decision making. These seem to impact on the success of
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horizontal communications i.e. between departments. Several 
commentators have perceived that local managers feel 
resentful where the "Japanese grapevine" comes to dominate the 
structure and/or output of management decisions thereby 
excluding local management input. They retreat into their own 
areas of authority, resist the intrusion of others into it and 
refuse to communicate with other areas of the organization. 
(Tsurumi, 1978, p.109-110; Kichiro, 1988; Johnson, 1977)
Where literature discusses vertical communications at 
Japanese transplants it looks at practices aiming to induce a 
two way sharing of information with the workforce. A 
survey of 26 Japanese transplants in the UK, found that eight 
out of ten companies operated some form of what it termed 
"involvement or participation" schemes. These schemes
included workforce and team meetings. Kaizen discussions, 
suggestion schemes and quality circles. (1RS, 1990, pp.7-10)
Oliver and Wilkinson's survey of 64 transplants in the UK found 
that 83% used some form of "in-company communications 
practice". (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1989) Two questions arise 
here.
Firstly, how committed are management to communications 
schemes? There is for example, ample evidence that during the 
1980s UK management attitudes in manufacturing were not geared 
to the "open style of management" that the practices require to 
be effective. (Townley, 1989, p.351) Bradley and Hill (1983) 
found that management often perceived such practices as 
challenging their authority or that initial management interest
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in them would decline, undermining how often they were used and 
their permanence. In the context of Japanese transplants, such 
studies serve to underline the importance of the selection of 
local management who are genuinely comfortable with such 
practices.
Secondly, what is the quality of these practices? Team 
meetings may effectively disseminate information, but do they 
automatically induce two way communications? This issue is 
inadequately explored by the literature. Only Sakuma has gone 
some way to comparing the quality of communications structures 
at Japanese transplants in detail. He concludes that there is 
wide variance between the subsidiaries of Japanese companies 
from country to country and that the subsidiaries of some 
Japanese companies consistently scored better than others, 
irrespective of which country they were located in. (Sakuma, 
1988)
Supervisors, as a key interface between management and 
workers, are often used to give impetus to several types of 
communication practice. For example, they often lead team or 
workforce briefings. Communications is however only one 
aspect of the supervisor's role at the Japanese transplant that 
has attracted attention.
The Japanese emphasis on autonomy and responsibility at 
the first- level of supervision compels them to become first- 
line managers. This is a feature adopted by many companies 
attempting to Japanize their production systems. An Incomes 
Data Service (IDS) Survey of supervisory arrangements at such
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companies noted how " a number of previously managerial tasks 
such as selection, appraisal, budgets, training and target 
setting now come within the realm of the supervisor." (IDS, 
1991, p.2) Broadly speaking the supervisor's are expected to 
perform a more extensive and/or intensive range of Mintzberg's 
"inter-personal", "informational" and "decision making" 
management roles than they might have previously. (Mintzberg, 
1973) However, Mintzberg's model does not explicitly require 
a high level of technical ability - the IDS study does.
The IDS study argues firstly that it is necessary to 
attract graduates with special technical and "people" skills to 
the supervisory role. They will regard the supervisor's role 
as a step towards a higher post. This requires paying above 
the norm for "traditional" UK supervisors. Secondly, it is 
important to create a promotional structure that allows shop- 
floor employees the chance to achieve the supervisor's grade. 
A failure to do so will lead to dissatisfaction. Shop-floor 
workers will see their promotional opportunities diminished. 
(IDS, 1991, pp.4-5; See also IRR, 1986, pp.8-12)
Certainly, the sort of recruitment and promotional 
policies concerning supervisors which are advocated by the IDS 
study have been adopted at Japanese car transplants in the 
motor manufacturing industry in both the UK and US. (Wickens, 
1987; Abo, 1988; Jurgens & Stromel, 1986) It is though, 
unclear from these studies, to what extent the external 
recruitment policy is maintained once a transplant is
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established or whether it moves towards a more Japanese 
orientated policy of promotion from within.
A final organizational issue for discussion concerns the 
Japanese transplant's relationship with its suppliers. With 
reference to the UK and the EEC, local sourcing policies compel 
transplants to look for local suppliers who can meet their 
requirements related to quality, price and delivery date.
For Japanese transplants: "Close relations with suppliers 
are a major source of competitiveness... the absence of a well 
developed network of reliable suppliers with whom they can 
cultivate long-term business relations is seen as a serious 
disadvantage..." (Trevor, 1988, p.141) At Toshiba in the UK 
this is countered by the use of regular visits to supplier's 
factories, assistance with tooling, and guidance with 
production or other problems related to the product supplied. 
In return, the supplier is expected to meet quality, delivery 
and price criteria. Such a relationship aims to foster mutual 
loyalty. (See also Dunning 1986, pp 102 - 136; Sako, 1990, 
1992) Similarly, selection of local suppliers often involves 
the company conducting a "mini audit" of the supplier's 
production systems to assess whether it can meet the buying 
company's requirements. (Financial Times, 15/05/91 &
21/05/91 )
Efforts by some UK transplants to help their suppliers 
meet delivery, price and most especially quality requirements 
pay off. A JETRO survey of Japanese manufacturers in Europe 
found over 40% believed they were able to increase the local-
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content ratio of their product due to the improved quality, 
delivery time and price of local goods. (JETRO, 1990) But not 
every Japanese transplant has been encouraged to develop this 
strategy for a number of reasons.
Firstly, a lack of R&D facilities at many transplants 
stops them involving the local supplier in the modification or 
design of components as deeply as they would wish. Secondly, 
the ability of UK suppliers to continually meet quality 
requirements is questionable. Nichiguchi cites a case where 30% 
of components from a local supplier were rejected by a Japanese 
television manufacturer. (Nichiguchi, 1990, p.298) Thirdly, 
the inability of local suppliers to match the requirements of 
Japanese transplants is believed to have led to an inflow to 
the UK of Japanese owned suppliers. The Welsh Development 
Agency has calculated that just 10% of 6,000 small or medium 
sized firms in Wales are capable of meeting Japanese quality 
standards. If this deficiency is true, it may continue to 
encourage a growth in the numbers of Japanese suppliers who 
displace local companies. (Financial Times, 21/05/91) As we 
saw in the introductory chapter this pattern is discernable in 
the consumer electronics sector, with 1988 being a peak year 
for such inward investment.
Two general weaknesses in the transplanted Japanese 
production system have been identified in this section. 
Firstly, there is evidence that good vertical and horizontal 
communications structures at Japanese transplants and an 
emphasis on first line management have been undermined by
-144-
recruitment policies that do not attract local managers and 
supervisors with the right attitudes and skills. Secondly, 
poor relationships with local suppliers often fail to satisfy 
production system requirements such as quality and JIT at 
transplants. These problems can only be avoided where the 
company is willing to work closely with and support the local 
supplier, or where a Japanese owned supplier is available 
locally.
3) Personnel Characteristics at Japanese Transplants: Problems 
and Remedies
Personnel practices (concerning the company's relationship 
with employees on an individual basis) implemented at Japanese 
transplants in the UK are regarded as being one of two sets of 
characteristics of the production system synonymous with NIR in 
the UK. The other is industrial relations characteristics 
(concerning the company's relationship with its employees on a 
collective basis).
There is considerable research showing that many of the 
personnel characteristics at Japanese transplants are the same 
practices as those identified under the domestic Japanese 
production system. (See table 3.1) Implicitly the research 
argues that a set of practices evolve that aid a reduction of 
"them and us" attitudes essential to a production environment 
requiring a workforce committed to the company's goals and 
values. (Dunning, 1986, p.167; IRR, 1990; Fukada, 1988;
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Trevor, 1988; Wickens, 1987; Matsuura, 1984; Johnson & Ouchi, 
1974; Rehder, 1979; White & Trevor, 1983)
Despite these similarities, there are also differences
between the personnel practices used at transplants and those 
used in Japan. Transplants have not introduced life-time 
employment, or seniority based wages systems, but rather, have 
concentrated on creating pay levels for local employees around 
the local median for the skill required. Neither have they
used seniority dominated promotion schemes. (Reitsperger, 
1986a; white & Trevor, 1983; Matsuura, 1984) Instead, they 
have concentrated on promotion structures based upon the 
individual's flexibility, commitment and performance.
It is also evident that many Japanese transplants do not 
offer employees welfare benefits beyond the norms given by 
their local counterparts. (Reitsperger, 1986a; Oliver &
Wilkinson, 1988; Matsuura, 1984; Komai, 1989; Fukada, 1988; 
Johnson & Ouchi, 1974; White & Trevor, 1983) There is also a 
dearth of information as to the extent of use of both on- and 
off- the- job training used by transplants. Certainly, 
specialist staff are often trained away from the workplace, 
and several case studies point to the sending of employees to 
the parent company in Japan for a period of training. That 
said, there is little examination of the extent or quality of 
the training. Finally, there is evidence that some transplants 
have attempted to adopt a selection procedure based on a policy 
of employing only school leavers. The hope appears to have 
been that a young workforce, would be more malleable, would
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mature with the company and would allow thœ creation of a 
seniority based internal labour market. Ones case study in 
particular points to several unfavourable ouatcomes, notably 
disciplinary problems at the workplace, poor equality products 
and high turnover. (Broad, 1989)
Interpretations of the personnel practicess implemented at 
Japanese transplants in the UK vary considerzably. Positive 
interpretations cite companies such as Toshiboa, Hitachi, and 
Nissan as companies whose personnel pracctices exemplify 
the use of enlightened Human Resource Management (HRM) 
techniques. Untapped employee resourcefulness is drawn out by 
rewarding them with a greater degree off autonomy and
responsibility. This is purported to result in the
alteration of workforce attitudes to thes benefit of 
production. (One can see from this definition wltiy HRM is a term 
that often encompasses NIR practices) (Trevor-, 1988; Pegge, 
1986;, Wickens, 1987)
Conversely, there is scepticism as to whetther HRM is no 
more than a "wolf in sheep's clothing". For some, its
unitarist nature in fact conceals a managcement approach 
whereby: "People will only come first when it iis economically 
advantageous to pursue such a strategy." (Keemoy, 1990, p.9)
Guest has argued that HRM often "appearrs essentially 
opportunistic." (Guest, 1989, p.25)
The link between Japanese transplants and HRM has
inevitably led to this sort of scepticism beimg directed at 
their personnel practices, especially those rrelated to the
-147-
regimentation of the work environment. When transferred, the 
practices have been variously portrayed as facilitating the 
intensification of work; a form of "management by stress"; as 
being reliant on peer group pressure to keep up productivity 
and efficiency through the public display of individual 
attendance records and performance ratings at the workplace; 
and as originating from a Japanese emphasis on servility 
rather than loyalty. Garrahan, 1986; Slaughter, 1987; Oliver 
and Wilkinson, 1988; Briggs, 1988)
There is no evidence that workforce attitudes are 
consistently negative or hostile towards personnel practices 
at Japanese transplants. It is therefore difficult for the 
sceptics to develop their argument. What can be argued is 
that variability among the extent and nature of personnel 
practices adopted at transplants will for some reason account 
for workforce attitudes varying from one transplant to the 
next. The impact of this variability on workforce attitudes 
needs to be explored further - the implication being that 
that the type of personnel practices adopted at a transplant 
appear to influence considerably the extent to which it 
successfully reduces "them and us" attitudes. This in turn 
will have some bearing on the characteristics incorporated 
into the research's UK model.
Attempts to observe how closely personnel practices at 
transplants match domestic Japanese practices have identified 
considerable variance from company to company. (Sethi et al, 
1984; Fukada, 1988; Thurley and Takamiya, 1985; Komai, 1989;
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Reitsperger, 1985a) Several of these works identify 
corresponding differences in workforce attitudes at each 
transplant. For example, using a worker opinion survey 
conducted at two case studies, Fukada is able to show that the 
closer a transplant's personnel characteristics are to those of 
the domestic Japanese production system, then the greater is 
local employee job satisfaction. (Fukada, 1988, pp.182-183)
Thurley and Takamiya's study of companies in the UK CTV 
manufacturing industry also provides details of variance in 
the success of two Japanese companies' differing personnel 
policies in comparison to each other. An employee attitude 
survey implemented at each company showed considerable variance 
in workforce attitudes concerning aspects of job satisfaction, 
and satisfaction with the way the firm communicated with and 
treated its employees. (Thurley & Takamiya, 1985. See 
especially chapters by Reitsperger; Jenner & Trevor; and 
Takamiya.)
A later study by Reitsperger, drew on the same data as 
Thurley and Takamiya's work. In it he specifically argued 
that it was the more "paternalistic" approach of one company 
compared to the other (for example, it offered extensive 
welfare benefits) which resulted in higher levels of overall 
job satisfaction and satisfaction with its personnel practices. 
Komai's study of two Japanese transplants in the US comes to 
similar conclusions arguing that successful productivity and 
job satisfaction was not possible "... unless Japanese
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companies take their Japanese management practices with them 
overseas." (Komai, 1989, p.61)
Komai's work is also of value in that it pinpoints a 
factor which may hinder the acceptance of Japanese personnel 
practices among local workforces. Komai sees the desire for 
personnel practices at Japanese transplants to foster groupism 
(a requirement of the Japanese production system) among local 
employees as problematical. He believes that Japanese groupism 
is founded on seniority and excessive status consciousness 
within the group. He suggests that excessive identification 
with the group to the extent of merging private and work life, 
creates unhealthy exclusionism and group egoism. (Komai, 1989, 
p. 120) These attributes are consistent with Japanese society, 
but less so with Western society.
Komai matches these attributes to Maslow's hierarchy of 
human needs so that Japanese groupism is associated with a 
need for belonging, love and esteem. If these needs are 
fulfilled this leads to what Maslow describes as a desirable 
feeling of self-actualization. His concern is that at US 
transplants excessive groupism may alienate employees whose 
societal values place less emphasis on these particular needs. 
Consequently, he believes US workers are more "instrumental" 
in their work goals while Japanese workers are "solidaristic". 
(Komai, 1989, p.36) Komai's study finds that though Japanese 
car workers are far more concerned with aspects of production 
such as quality they display far less overall job satisfaction
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(40%) than their counter parts at a US motor manufacturer. 
(84%) (Komai, 1989, p.26)
Komai’s results correspond with the results of a survey 
of workers at other Japanese transplants in the US. Matsuura 
found that: "US employees welcome, in general, those elements 
of Japanese labour practices which increase employment 
stability, wages, benefits and their individual leverage within 
the firm, while rejecting those elements which require some 
form of individual sacrifice (monetary or non-monetary), 
collective behaviour and loyalty to the company." (Matsuura, 
1984, p.46) Reitsperger discusses this issue in terms of 
transplants only being successful at tapping "Western 
Individualism" among their workers rather than fostering 
Japanese based groupism. (Reitsperger, 1986a, p.584)
To conclude this section, variability among personnel / 
practices adopted at Japanese transplants does exist. For a 
Japanese transplant to transfer its production system 
effectively in a host country its personnel practices must 
facilitate a compromise between Japanese groupism and Western 
individualism. A failure to obtain this compromise may result 
in poor worker job satisfaction and, with regard to NIR 
influences, worker attitudes and behaviour concerning "them 
and us."
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4 ) Industrial Relations Characteristics at Japanese
Transplants: Problems and Remedies
In the UK NIR involves the use of practices that break
with traditional approaches to dealing with the workforce as a 
collective. Within this context, and with regard to elsewhere 
in the world, the key question for Japanese transplants is 
whether the industrial relations characteristics of their 
production systems include a role for trade unionism.
A key determinant of union recognition at a Japanese 
transplant would be whether Japanese management are convinced
that having a trade union poses little, or no threat of
disruption to fulfilling the production system requirements. 
Reitsperger, outlines three options that Japanese companies 
investing in new manufacturing sites in the UK must consider. 
(Reitsperger, 1986b) The options are:
1) "To avoid unionization." - This may well be rejected 
for one of two reasons. Firstly, local industrial 
relations law may make it difficult or even impossible to 
avoid union recognition (e.g. France). Secondly, local 
staff assigned to deal with industrial relations issues 
convince Japanese management that in the long run 
unionization is inevitable and that trying to avoid it may 
result in extra costs in wage concessions and fringe 
benefits. (Reitsperger, 1986b, p.76) Here, assessment of 
the local industrial relations tradition and climate as 
discussed • in the introductory chapter may play a role in 
the UK. (Beaumont, 1987; Beaumont & Townley, 1985); 
Maclnnes & Sproull, 1989) In the national context it has 
been suggested that Japanese transplants have realised 
that the UK political and economic climate has led to a 
weakening of the trade union movement that is conducive to 
avoiding having to recognise any trade unions. (Bassett, 
1988)
2) "To accept unionization and watch its development with 
a laissez faire attitude associated with British 
voluntarism in industrial relations. (Roberts 1976)"
Japanese transplants are unlikely to choose this option.
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They perceive multi-union recognition as leading to 
difficulties in flexibility, the utilization of labour, 
demarcation disputes and complex bargaining arrangements.
3) "To accept unionization as inevitable, but to devise 
strategies and policies to channel plant unionization in 
such a way as to avoid some of the dysfunctional aspects 
associated with the British union structure." - In this 
instance management accept some restricted form of 
unionization at the company which in return allows them 
to achieve desired levels and methods of production. It 
is this strategy of compromise that Japanese transplants 
who decide to unionize, generally opt for. In the UK, 
this strategy has entailed transplants signing new style 
agreements (NSA) with a single union.
NSAs can vary considerably in content, but are generally 
taken to include five key components. Individually, each 
component is not new to British industrial relations, but 
combined, they create a novel package that has attracted 
considerable attention. (See Bassett, 1987; Burrows, 1986; 
Gregory, 1986; Rico, 1987, IRR, 1989) The components are:
1) Single union recognition - For. the company, single 
unionism simplifies communications and bargaining structures
and compliments the Japanese desire to operate a policy of
labour flexibility.
The union gains a near captive potential membership on 
the relevant site. A 1989 1RS survey of single union 
agreements (not all signed by Japanese companies) found an 
average membership level of 74% at 33 companies. Only seven 
companies had a membership level below 50%, while 23 had levels 
between 71% and 100%. (1RS, 1989)
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2) Total labour flexibility - The union agrees that 
employees will carry out any work requested by their employer 
so long as it is within their trained capability. In acceding 
to this clause in the agreement the union is signing away any 
ability to assert control at the workplace through job 
regulation.
3) Single status - As under the domestic Japanese model, 
common terms and conditions of work for all employees aim to 
reduce social barriers at the workplace. Distinctions between 
blue and white collar workers are reduced to a minimum.
4) Participation - The general belief is that NSAs offer 
detailed participative arrangements that are designed to 
enhance employee influence over management decisions. Joint 
representative bodies, often called Advisory Boards, are able 
to discuss any issue either management or employees wish to 
raise such as business strategy, investment policy, and trade 
performance. They are also a forum in which to discuss 
industrial relations issues and conduct collective bargaining. 
Decisions are supposed to be reached on a consensual basis and 
though not binding on management they are expected to adhere to 
them since they have participated in their formulation. Such a 
function means the Boards should not be confused with, for 
example, contemporary "joint consultative structures" discussed 
by Marchington. (Marchington, 1987 & 1989)
In reality there can be wide variations in the level of 
participation from company to company in the UK. For example, 
at Toshiba, Trevor's questionnaire asked the workforce how
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effective they thought the Company's Advisory Board (COAB) was. 
On a six point scale, 70% answered positively, while only 5% 
answered very negatively. Another study asked shop stewards at 
eight companies with NSAs about the effectiveness of the 
participative elements of their agreements. Four of these 
companies were Japanese owned. (One of them was in fact
Toshiba.) The results of the questionnaire revealed that 
Toshiba's COAB did not necessarily typify participation at the 
other Japanese companies. It revealed five areas of weakness in 
the participative structures of NSAs at Japanese companies in 
the sample. (Grant, 1988)
Firstly, at two out of the four Japanese companies, 
management reduced the effectiveness of their respective
advisory boards by only having middle management
representatives sitting on them. Decisions and questions to 
management were often deferred while management representatives 
consulted their superiors.
Secondly, management representatives were often not 
senior because they were not Japanese. Japanese managers 
showed a marked reluctance to sit on the boards, possibly
because they were wary of their decision making powers, and 
possibly because they felt their English was inadequate to join 
in the discussions.
Thirdly, where UK management sat on the boards there were 
complaints from stewards at two of the four Japanese companies 
that they consistently refused to conform with the required co­
operative spirit of the agreement. Management withheld
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information from meetings and treated them as consultative 
rather than participative structures.
Fourthly, the effectiveness of the boards was called into 
question. Employee representatives were felt to lack the 
necessary training or competence with which to understand and 
and make use of the information available.
Fifthly, at three of the Japanese companies the NSAs 
specified that members of the advisory board did not have to be 
stewards or union members. The steward respondents expressed 
disquiet that this could result in the board becoming dominated 
by non-union employees and being seen by workers as an 
alternative structure to union representation.
5) No strike procedure - Both parties agree that under 
these procedures strikes and lock-outs are forbidden. This 
involves the use of some form of morally binding arbitration 
in the collective bargaining and grievance procedures as a 
final method of solving irreconcilable differences between 
management and employees.
There are several points to make about the incorporation 
of arbitration into NSAs. First, and most importantly it does 
not always happen. Some companies prefer to retain procedures 
that allow the possibility of strike action and avoid the use 
of arbitration. For the Japanese however the use of 
arbitration offers the avoidance of conflict in a production 
system that because of its reliance on lean manning levels and 
short lead times is highly vulnerable to disruption. The 
question is what type of arbitration should they adopt?
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NSAs signed by unions during the 1980 - 1986 period showed 
an inclination to opt for pendulum arbitration. Many of these 
agreements were between Japanese companies and the EETPU in the 
consumer electronics sector. (Metcalf & Milner, 1991) In this 
instance, the arbiter must choose between the final offer of 
each side, and not compromise between the two. Fear of losing 
at the arbitration stage is supposed to force two parties to 
moderate their claims and seek out the middle ground so that 
they reach agreement without actually requiring arbitration. 
(See Lewis, 1990; Singh, 1986; Wood, 1985 & 1988; Employment 
Gazette, 1986; Kessler, 1987) Since 1986, the number of new 
companies that opt to sign agreements incorporating this form 
of arbitration has declined significantly. This could be 
attributed to two factors.
Firstly, as Metcalf and Milner point out, the period 1980- 
1986 was one in which Roy Sanderson a National Officer at the 
EETPU was responsible for organising many NSAs. Sanderson 
exhibited a strong preference for pendulum arbitration and they 
see him as the driving force behind the adoption of NSAs which 
included this procedure after the pioneering agreement signed 
at Toshiba in 1981. Since 1986, when Sanderson moved on from 
this post, the EETPU signed fewer agreements with pendulum 
arbitration. Instead it moved to signing more NSAs containing 
conventional arbitration or industrial action as the final 
stage in the grievance procedure. (Metcalf & Milner,1991, p.11)
The second factor is a realization among employers and 
trade union officials that pendulum arbitration creates an
-157-
obvious winner and loser and that this conflicts with the co­
operative spirit of industrial relations that the agreements 
are supposed to create. This may explain why the agreement 
signed between Nissan and the AEU, engineering union in 1984 
has a pendulum arbitration clause, whereas the deal the AEU 
signed with Toyota in 1991 contains no such commitment. The
Toyota agreement states that some form of arbitration might be
used as a last resort, but its use is not compulsory.
Proponents of NSAs argue firstly, that it is necessary 
for trade unions to sign them in the face of poor union 
membership levels and restricted power during the 1980s, and 
secondly, that they are designed to establish co-operation and 
partnership between employer and union rather than a 
conflictual relationship. (Roberts, 1988; Burrows, 1986; 
Wickens, 1987) Conversely, those such as Wilkinson have 
criticised them as emphatically unitarist; "not admitting to 
any legitimate difference of interest between employer and 
worker." (Wilkinson, 1989 p.13) Whether or not one accepts the 
unitarist prognosis, the agreements signed at Japanese
manufacturers in the UK should be seen as a blend of of a) 
traditional methods of British trade union representation such 
as collective bargaining, and recognition of a trade union 
independent of the company and b) aspects of Japanese 
enterprise unionism such as single unionism.
Unions have found it difficult to accept that single 
union recognition at greenfield sites is determined by the 
employer. The 1988 TUG Special Review Body (SRB) saw this as a
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major threat to the ability of unions to protect the interests 
of their members where they secured NSAs. This was because 
securing the agreement is often achieved through competition 
with other unions. The SRB therefore concluded that such 
competition may "lead unions to compete with each other for 
employers' approval, which encourages dilution of trade union 
standards and procedures." (TUC, 1988, p.8)
Such competition contributed to a bitter debate at the 
TUC's 1991 annual conference. Mr Ken Gill, General Secretary 
of the Manufacturing Science and Finance Union (MSP) attacked 
"beauty contests" run by companies such as Toyota in which 
unions were selected by the employer and not the workforce. Mr 
Gill, whose union competed for recognition at Toyota, argued 
that "whoever looks least like a trade union is odds on 
favourite" to be chosen. (Times 07/09/91) Delegates went on to 
approve a motion that attacked NSAs and the "alien" working 
practices favoured by many Japanese companies in the UK. 
The motion also supported the idea that there are advantages to 
recognising several unions at one workplace. Only the 
engineers' union, the AEU, and GMB general union voted against 
it.
That the TUC General Council had recommended delegates 
support the motion, suggests an anger among many trade union 
leaders that given the economic and political environment, 
trade unions are powerless to determine who represents workers 
and under what terms at new, especially Japanese owned, 
companies. As Wood has noted, unions feel constrained in their
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response to what can be seen as NIR strategies. They see these 
strategies as , integral to a scenario in which management are 
increasingly able to marginalise their role at the workplace. 
(Wood, 1986)
The reaction of some unions to the scenario has been to 
adopt a strategy of pursuing NSAs at Japanese companies. In 
the UK this particularly applies to the like-minded EETPU and 
AEU, who in 1992 merged to form the Amalgamated Engineering and 
Electrical Union (AEEU). Such a strategy has also been 
apparent in the US, where for example the Union of Auto 
Workers (UAW) signed a collective agreement in 1984 with New 
United Motor Manufacturing Inc (NUMMI) - a joint venture 
between Toyota and General Motors. The agreement has a similar 
framework to the UK NSAs.
Other North American trade unionists have attempted to 
resist NIR practices. Beaumont highlights opposition from 
local UAW officials and the Canadian Auto Workers Union (CAW) 
towards Japanese working practices which they believe intensify 
work. In a 1989 policy document the CAW stated: "We reject the 
use of Japanese Production Methods which rigidly establish work 
standards and standard operations thereby limiting worker 
autonomy and discretion on the job. (Beaumont, 1991, pp. 304- 
305)
Where unions have accepted NIR practices at Japanese 
transplants a fundamental question arises - whether they can 
satisfy the expectations of their membership at these 
companies. Klandermans, in his evaluation of expectancy-value
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theory, looks at the action of joining a union on the basis of 
motives. In other words workers are expecting to achieve 
something when they join a union. (Klandermans, 1986, p.108) 
Whether unions can satisfy the expectations of their membership 
depends somewhat on what those expectations are. The union may 
not meet their expectations for one of three reasons.
Firstly, if management at a company with a NSA choose to 
use its structure in a way that does nothing to reduce "them 
and us" attitudes among the workforce, we might expect a non­
co-operative, perhaps conflictual environment to prevail. 
Workers would expect their union to continually challenge 
management prerogative and to defend their interests in a 
traditional adversarial style. But what if the structure of 
the agreement inhibits the union's ability to achieve this 
role? Its future at at the company seems uncertain. Members 
may perceive it as ineffective and marginalised. Secondly, a 
co-operative atmosphere of management/union relations may exist 
in which union officials feel they are achieving real gains for 
members, but the members do not concur believing the union to 
be to be incorporated and ineffective. (Adler, 1991, p.37; 
Garrahan, 1986, p.11)
Under both of these first two scenarios there is a real 
danger that membership distrust of the union and 
dissatisfaction with its performance might lead to a reduction 
in membership levels at the plant. It also means management 
lose an effective, independent channel of communications with 
their employees and that the value of formalised industrial
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relations procedures is therefore diminished. This is not a 
situation in which co-operative, non-conflictual industrial 
relations is likely to flourish.
Finally, suppose NIR practices (including NSAs) are highly 
successful at the company and alter workforce attitudes 
regarding "them and us"? What role would the union have to 
play? Might employees come to believe it plays an unnecessary 
role and drift away from membership? This would undermine the 
theory of "dual commitment" where it is posited that worker 
allegiance to both union and employer is higher in co-operative 
industrial relations climates than in less co-operative ones. 
(Angle & Perry, 1986; Fukami & Larson, 1984; Gallagher 1984)
Trevor's study of Toshiba provides some evidence related 
to this issue, albeit limited. There was a negative
correlation between length of service and union membership. 
The longer respondents had been at the company the less likely 
they were to be members of the union. Nevertheless, a majority 
of workers felt union/management relations were good. (Trevor, 
1988, p.200) That said, a recent study of employees at some 
Japanese companies in the UK electronics sector demonstrates 
that the reason for leaving the union cannot necessarily be 
linked to a higher level of allegiance to the company. The
study by Guest and Dewe (1990) found that only 10% of
respondents displayed dual commitment and that a majority 
displayed allegiance to neither organization.
To summarise, industrial relations characteristics at 
transplants revolve around the issue of union recognition.
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where unions are recognised the characteristics bear the 
hallmark of compromise. In the UK this is a compromise between 
Japanese enterprise unionism and the far more adversarial UK 
management/union relationship where the union is far more 
independent of the company's organizational structure.
For some unions there are clear ideological difficulties 
in coming to terms with this compromise; hence their opposition 
to NSAs. They are wary of representing workers in an
environment that requires them to surrender their ability to 
control the organization of work and to accept a considerable 
narrowing, if not eradication, of their differences of interest 
with management.
Where unions have secured recognition at Japanese 
transplants, the issues of membership expectations and dual 
commitment raise questions about their long term survival at
these companies. If management pursue low-trust adversarial 
industrial relations, does the agreement restrict a union's
ability to match members' expectations of how they should 
react? Conversely, what happens when management at a company 
with a NSA do use its structure to create harmonious industrial 
relations? On the one hand, the union may have to overcome 
its members' distrust of the co-operation exhibited between 
management and union representatives. On the other, the
successful operation of the agreement could lay the foundations 
for making the union redundant. Without a reactive or 
defensive role would the union simply wither away?
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5) SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Many elements of the domestic Japanese production system 
do transfer to host countries with relative ease. What this 
chapter has suggested is that some elements of the system do 
not transfer so easily. Table 4.1 summarises where these 
problems of transference arise.
There seem to be a number of problems associated with the 
transplanting of the domestic Japanese production system's 
managerial characteristics. Japanese management practices, 
notably ringi or nemawashi procedures, may be difficult for 
local management to grasp or constrain their influence within 
the company.
Organizational characteristics often meet problems where 
the ringi/nemawashi dominated decision making process excludes 
or discourages local managers from communicating with parts of 
the organization outside of their own areas of authority. 
Local management may also find it hard to adapt to a vertical 
communications structure that they see as impinging on their 
authority over workers. It has also been suggested that a 
transplant has to recruit supervisors with the skills to match 
an emphasis on first line supervision. Finally, many 
transplants encounter difficulties in finding local suppliers 
able to meet their stringent criteria surrounding a JIT based 
production system.
Personnel characteristics vary considerably from plant to 
plant and this appears to correspond to variance in workforce 
attitudes and behaviour. In addition, it seems that Western
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workers respond best to practices that tap their instrumental, 
work related aspirations and are less interested in group 
orientated practices.
With regard to transferring industrial relations 
characteristics, Japanese management often doubt local trade 
union ability to operate within a co-operative (perhaps 
unitarist) framework. Local management may also lack the 
ability to operate within such a framework. Local trade unions 
may fear that the industrial relations environment at a 
transplant restricts their ability to defend their members' 
interests and meet their members' expectations. Where a union 
is recognised these problems may undermine the effectiveness of 
formal industrial relations procedures and lead to low trust or 
conflictual management/union relations.
It is apparent that there are two over-arching remedies 
to these problems which are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
Firstly, Japanese and local practices can be modified so that 
a compromise evolves that is acceptable to both locals and 
Japanese. NSAs are good example of this. Secondly, the 
successful implementation and operation of compromise and 
Japanese production system characteristics will be determined 
by the careful selection of management, supervisory and 
operator level employees with suitable attitudes and skills.
This chapter has highlighted problems that may be 
encountered when transplanting the domestic Japanese production 
system. The value of identifying these problems is that they
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can be taken into account in Chapter 5 when constructing a 
model of a Japanese production system for operation in the UK.
— 1 66—
CHAPTER 5
A MODEL OF A JAPANESE PRODUCTION SYSTEM FOR OPERATION IN THE UK 
INTRODUCTION
In line with their Japanese parent company's corporate 
strategy, it is a task of management at a Japanese transplant 
in the UK to create and operate a modified version of the 
domestic Japanese production system. Using this modified 
production system should enable the transplant to perform to 
maximum efficiency within the context of the UK manufacturing 
sector. This chapter briefly discusses the link between 
corporate strategy and transplanting the Japanese production 
system. It then presents a model of what such a production 
system might look like - a model of a Japanese production 
system for operation in the UK.
The idea is simply for the model to be used as a 
"benchmark". The model's value is that it allows us to assess 
and compare production systems among Japanese transplants in 
the UK. The research posits, and goes on to test, whether a 
company that comes close to emulating the characteristics of UK 
model is better able to facilitate reductions in "them and us" 
attitudes among its employees.
The intention is not to suggest that the UK model 
presented is as efficient as the domestic Japanese production 
system, but rather that it represents the best system 
potentially attainable by Japanese manufacturers in the UK.
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This research does not attempt to quantify and compare 
production efficiency at Japanese companies manufacturing in 
the UK and Japan, For such an approach, see for instance
studies associated with the International Motor Vehicle 
Project which provide data suggesting that lean production in 
the motor industry can be implemented at Japanese run 
companies in the West, taking production efficiency close to 
that of Japanese motor manufacturers. (Womack et al, 1990;
Krafcik, 1988; MacDuffie & Krafcik, 1990)
STRATEGY AND THE UK MODEL: RHETORIC Vs OPERATIONAL REALITY
The transplanting of the domestic Japanese production 
system raises the issue of how the features of the transplanted 
system actually relate to corporate strategy. As Chandler
(1952) has noted, structure (in this case the transplanted 
Japanese production system) follows from strategy.
The transplanted Japanese production system can be seen as 
an expression of the long-term business strategy of the firm. 
This research assumes that those at the executive level of a 
firm (executives of the parent company in Japan) will, given
proposed activities, markets and location of the transplant, 
advocate a strategy which necessitates that its production 
system is akin to the research's UK model. Koyabashi's 
(1985) study of Japanese management within Japanese 
multinationals shows that these executives are at a level of 
responsibility and seniority that could be compared to what
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Purcell has described as "first order strategic decision
making" (Purcell, 1991, p 72).
Decisions taken at this first level of strategic decision 
making will predetermine senior management strategy at a
transplant. Senior management at a transplant could be
described as Purcell's "second order strategic decision
making" (ibid). These managers will, in order to remain in 
line with the strategy devised at the first level of strategic 
decision making, put in place a series of policies and 
procedures that are designed to facilitate the effective 
performance of the transplants's production system. These 
policies and procedures should lead to the production system 
exhibiting the characteristics contained in the research's UK 
model.
The strategies devised at the first and second order of 
strategic decision may appear convincing to those who formulate 
them, but incorporate a major fallibility. This is that until 
attempts are made to put them into practice they remain 
"rhetoric". The question is does strategy which is rhetoric 
transform into what could be called "operational reality"? As 
we shall see in this research, the rhetoric stemming from first 
and second levels of strategic decision making can fail to 
materialize "downstream" at a "third order of strategic 
decision making" (Purcell, ibid). This third order includes 
middle managers and those below them in the organizational 
hierarchy and it is they who are responsible for the actual 
operation and implementation of a transplant's production
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system characteristics. What happens at this third level can 
lead to a set of outcomes very different to that envisaged by 
strategy which is rhetoric.
The failure of this rhetoric to materialize as operational 
reality has an important effect on attempts to reduce "them and 
us" among a UK transplant's employees. The link between 
corporate strategy and employee relations/HRM has been made 
elsewhere (Thurley & Wood, 1983; Batstone, Ferner & Terry, 
1984; Purcell 1991), but in the context of this research it can 
be specifically linked to NIR and the issue of "them and us". 
Senior management at the first and second order of strategic 
decision making within a Japanese company will devise a 
strategy part of which entails their transplant's 
production system exhibiting characteristics that are 
conducive to reducing "them and us" attitudes and behaviour 
among employees. However, what these senior management want 
and expect to happen, and what actually happens can be two 
different things. In reality the effective operation and 
implementation of such characteristics may not occur and the 
result is no reduction of "them and us" and a low-trust 
adversarial management/worker relationship.
THE UK MODEL: KEY ELEMENTS
Figure 5.1 summarises the differences between the 
domestic Japanese production system and the research's model 
of a Japanese production system for operation in thew UK. 
Two types of differences have been highlighted in italics.
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FIGURE 5.1
THE MODEL OF J W A K E S E  FHOOUCTIOH SYSTEM EDR OPEKATIOti Ilf THE UK
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS (NIR Practices) 
T1 Core/Periphery workforce distinctions 
2 I Guarantee of secure employment
3) Welfarism
4) Single Status
5) Market led pay levels
6) Merit based promotion
7) Intensive selection procedures
8) Training
9) Elements of consensuality and 
participation
MANAGERIAL CHARACTERISTICS_______
T1 Coherent vision
2) Consistency of style
3) Consensual/groupist decision 
making procedures
4) Circulation
5) Special selection/ 
retention procedures
 >
Î-R-CHARACTERISTICS 
T
NIR Practices) 
tfo unionism or single unionism
2) Enterprise level bargaining
3) Formalised union or other organization
4) Hew style agreement in operation or 
altgroative procedures __ _^___
ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Co-ordination and co-operation 
of all departments 
Company wide communications 
Emphasis on first line supei-vision 
Close ties with supervisors 
UK personnel management
PRODUCTION SYSTEM 
REQUIREMENTS
Qrganiz.^tlpn .of_LabpuT
1) Direct Labour
2) Flexible
3) Teamwork
Quality Centro1
4) Continuous Improvement
5) Quality
Organization and Supply 
Production
6) Full utilization of 
production area
7) Full utilization of 
production machinery
3) Full use of new 
technology
9) Just in time supply
Prgduct_St rategy 
■JlO) Adaptability to diverse 
model range 
II) Continuous R 6 D
NB: An unbroken line denotes c 
direct relationship 
A broken lines denotes an 
indirect relationship.
Characteristics or 
requirements in bold type 
represent an area of 
difference in comparison 
to the domestic Japanese 
production system.
Firstly, several characteristics have been replaced by newly 
titled ones. Secondly, it will be noticed that in some 
instances a characteristic or requirement is highlighted, even 
though its title remains the same as featured in the domestic 
Japanese production system. This is because though the same 
characteristic or requirement is desirable under the UK model, 
achieving it involves the transplant using a different set of 
methods to those used under the domestic system. For example, 
achieving an emphasis on first line supervision at a^  UK 
transplant necessitates special recruitment procedures for 
supervisors that do not operate under the domestic system. 
This chapter focuses on both these types of differences, 
explains why they have occurred and discusses how the UK model 
contends with them.
Table 5.1 compares the requirements and characteristics of 
the UK model alongside the domestic Japanese production system 
and provides a summary of the differences that the UK model 
must contend with. As with figure 5.1 5.1, requirements or 
characteristics of the UK model that are highlighted in italics 
represent an area of one of the two types of difference when 
the model is compared to the domestic Japanese production 
system.
Where the chapter does not discuss a specific requirement 
or characteristic shown as part of the UK model it should be 
taken that the concepts and objectives which underlie it are 
identical to those already discussed in Chapter 3 dealing with 
the domestic Japanese production system.
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A COMPARISON Or_T}lE DOMESTIC JAPANESE PHODOCTION SYSTEM 
AMD THE OK MODEL WITH A SWWART. OP jnffiJIPFTOE?»^ 
THE UK .MODEL HAS TP CONTEND WTTH
UK Model Differences
Requi remen tK Requirements UK Model Has to 
Contend With
Organisation of Labour Qcg anitaiiffin.jei_-kabou r
11 Direct Labour 1) Direct Labour
2) Flexible Labour 2) Flexible Labour
3) Teamwork 3) Teamwork
2y aiitiL_een t rfil Quality. Spntjcol
4) Continuous Improvement 4) Continuous Improvement
5) Quality 5) Quality A compromise JIT supply system 
operates where local suppliers 
arc unable to meet criteria
related to quality, price and
Orgajv.isation.arid SUBPIÏ QrgAatJia tA2n_And. .supply delivery time. The transplant
o.f Prsiuctieo QL_P.r2duci.ioD aspires to operate a JIT supply
6) Full Utilization of 6) Full utilization of . system the same as that achieved 
 ^ in Japan by developing close tiesProduction Area Production Area
7) Full Utilization of 7) Full utilization of with locally based suppliers. (See
Production Machinery Production Machinery summary of organizational
8) Full Use of New 8) Full Use of New characteristics below).
Technology Technology
9) Just in Time Supply 9) Juat in Time Supply Local employees are likely to have a
System (JIT) System (JIT) restricted input into "creative" or 
"innovative" R 6 D. (Kono. 1983:
Matsumoto. 1986) This form of 
R & D 1s mostly carried out in Japan
Prodnsi.SArat_e.gj Product Stcategy
101 Adaptability to 10) Adaptability to "Basic" or "innovatory" RSD (Kono.
Diverse Model Range Diverse Model Range 1983. Matsumoto. 1986) is carried out
11) Continuous Research 11) Continuous Research by local employees.
and Design (RSD) and Design (R6D)
UK model requirements in bold type represent an ar 
difference in comparison to the domestic Japanese 
production system.
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TABLE 5,1 C ontd
Managerial 
Character1Kticm
UE Model 
Managerial 
CharacterlBtlcs
Differences 
UK Model Has to 
Contend With
11 Coherent Vision
2) Consistency of Style
3) Consensual/GroupiSt 
Decision Making 
Procedures
4) Circulation
5) Intensive Selection 
Procedures
Coherent Vision 
Consistency of Style 
Consensual/Crouplst 
Decision Making 
Procedures 
Circulation 
Special Selection/ 
Retention Procedures
>
It is a key objective for the company 
to select Japanese and, where necessary, 
local management with the attitudes and 
skills best suited to operating a set of 
management practices that are alien to 
the environment in which they are 
imp 1emen ted.
Where a dual management structure exists 
the recrui tment/retent ion of local 
managers relies on a career path which 
includes "horizontal" promotion. There is 
also a Japanese commitment to the 
"vertical" promotion of local managers 
into positions of greater influence 
within the organization.
Local managers are also recruited/ 
retained through payment of salaries 
above the local medium (Preferably 
near or in the upper quart lie).
UK model characteristics in bold type represent ar 
difference in comparison to the domestic Japanese 
production system.
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TAByE, 5 ._1 _Con tld
Domestic 
Organizational 
diaracterist ics
UK Model 
Organi zational 
Characteristics
Differences 
UK Model ILas to 
Contend With
11 Co-ordination and 1) Co-ordination and
Co-operation of all co-operation of all
Departments Departments
2) Company Wide 21 Company Wide
Communications Communicat ions
3) Emphasis on First 3) a«phasiK on First
Line Supervision Line Supervision
4 ) Close Ties With 4) Close Ties With
Suppliers Suppliers
5) UK Personne 1 Manage
Supervisors with suitable attitudes and 
skills are recrui ted/retained by offering 
a wage above the local roediun.
Where at all possible the company 
promotes employees to the supervisory 
level on the basis of merit.
The company aspires to create a JIT supply 
system the same as that in Japan. (See 
summary of production system requirements 
above). This, combined with EEC local 
sourcing requirements, necessitates 
the development of close ties with 
locally based suppliers in order to 
bring them up to the standard of quality, 
price and delivery time required. It may 
take some time for this to be achieved, 
which, in the meantime, will lead to a 
compromise JIT supply system.
The personnel manager at the transplant is 
"a UK national. He/she has a high level of 
influence and is not inhibited by the need 
to report to any but the most senior of 
Japanese management. He/she assumes full 
responsibility for personnel and 
industrial relations issues.
UK model characteristics in bold type represent ar 
difference in comparison to the domestic Japanese 
production system. #
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T M U ;  5,1 -Confd
Personnel
Characteristics
UK Model 
Personnel 
Character1st les
Differences 
UK Model Has to 
Contend With
1 ) Core/Periphery 1) Core/Periphery
Workforce Workforce
Distinct ions Distinctions
2) Llfe-tlme 2) Guarantee of Secure
Employment Employment
3) Welfarism 3) Welfarism
4) Single Status 4) Single Status
5) Seniority (Pay) 5) Market Led Pay I.evels
6) Seniority (Promotion) 6) Merit Based Promotion
7) Intensive Selection 7) Intensive Selection
8) Training 8) Training
9) Elements of 9) Elements of
Consensual1ty Consensuali ty
PartIcipation Participation
10) Regimented Work 10) Regimented Work
Envlronment Envi ronment
A voluntary guarantee (preferably 
written) is given to core employees 
regarding Job security at the 
transplant. They will be the last 
group of workers to be laid off and 
every effort will be made to retain 
them In return for their loyalty.
There Is a commitment from the 
transplant to provide core employment 
with basic welfare benefits. (Not as 
extensive as those offered at large 
companies In Japan).
Pay at the transplant Is determined by 
a mixture of local pay levels and what 
the company can afford to pay for the 
skills required. It may. in part, be 
assessed on the basis of employee merit 
or performance. No element of pay is 
linked to seniority.
Promotion of employees is based on merit. 
Seniority only plays a role when linked 
to an individual’s experience.
The transplant does not operate a policy 
geared to the recruitment of school
Careful selection and Implementation of 
practices related to the regimentation of 
the work environment is necessary at UK 
transplants. Extra time and effort is 
needed to explain the reasoning behind 
some practices. In some cases it may be 
better to Implement practices on a 
voluntary basis.
UK model characteri s tics in bold type represent an area of 
difference in comparison to the domestic Japanese 
production system.
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TMJLE_5,A^ntld
Industrial Relations 
Cliaracterlstics
Industrial Relations 
Character!sties
Differences 
OK Model Has to 
Contend With
1) Single Unionism
2) Enterprise Unionism
3) Formalized Union 
Organ!zat ion
4) Enterprise Level 
Bargaining
Mo Onion or Single 
Onion Recognition 
Enterprise Level 
Bargaining 
Formalized Union 
Organization where 
a Onion Is Recognised 
Mew-Style Collective 
Agieemcnt (MSA) where 
a Onion Is Recognised 
or Alternative Written 
Procedures Where no 
Onion Is Recognised
The transplant recognises either 
no union or a single union. Irrespective 
of recognition some form of elected 
workforce representation is available.
Collective bargaining is carried out at 
the enterprise level only. Unlike in 
Japan, enterprise in the UK refers to a 
single bargaining unit confined to one 
localised site.
The union recognised at a transplant 
will be far more independent of the 
company than an enterprise union in Japan 
However, it will place the interest of 
the transplant before external craft, 
industry or political issues.
Where union recognition occurs at a 
transplant, a NSA is signed. Local and 
Japanese management must adhere to the 
high trust, co-operative "spirit of 
interest" underlying the agreements.
UK model characteristics in bold type represent an area of 
difference in comparison to the domestic Japanese 
production system.
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The research's UK model featured in figure 5.1 is 
constructed using three sources. The first is the domestic 
Japanese production system outlined in Chapter 3.
Secondly, the model takes in to account issues presented 
by literature in Chapter 4. In many cases, the insertion of a 
difference into the UK model is influenced by this literature, 
which highlighted problems of transference and their possible 
remedies when the domestic Japanese production system is 
transplanted.
The third source is the analysis of data drawn from 
interviews and discussions with personnel and production 
management from 21 Japanese companies in the UK manufacturing 
sector. This was used to cross check the literature's accuracy 
in identifying problems of transference and their possible 
remedies in the UK. The interviews were held between October 
1988 and February 1992. Nineteen of these companies were 
involved in the UK consumer electronics sector. Two were 
involved in vehicle and heavy plant manufacturing. Nine of the 
consumer electronics companies subsequently became involved in 
this research project. In addition, interviews with full-time 
officials from three unions representing or attempting to 
represent employees at Japanese manufacturers were conducted. 
Drawing on each of these sources a picture emerges of what is 
believed to be the most practicable and effective production 
system for Japanese companies wishing to manufacture in the UK.
The shape and mechanics of the research's UK model are 
the same as that of the domestic Japanese production system.
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i.e., to the right of the diagram are a set of production 
requirements, which four sets of characteristics feed into. As 
before, the characteristics flow directly and indirectly into 
the production requirements section, while management's role 
as initiators and operators of the organizational, employment 
and industrial relations characteristics means that there can 
be no indirect relationship that flows via the managerial 
characteristics.
There are three additional features of the research's UK 
model that need to be outlined. Firstly, the model assumes all 
Japanese manufacturing companies in the UK to have the same 
basic set of production requirements regardless of industry or 
technology. What we are interested in examining here is the 
characteristics that their production systems display in 
attempting to fulfil those requirements.
The second additional feature is that the model is 
constructed to allow for the possibility of either a dual or 
single management structure existing at a company. (A dual 
management structure is defined as a combined Japanese and UK 
management team, a single management structure as a management 
team comprising of only Japanese management excluding the 
Personnel Management function.)
It is not the intention of the research to suggest that 
either single or dual management structures represent the best 
structure for incorporation into a UK model. Nonetheless, the 
research does acknowledge that a dual management structure 
consisting of complex anglo/Japanese relationships may be more
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difficult to operate. Only in this respect could either 
management structure be considered as intervening in the 
effective operation of of the model. We must therefore accept 
that either structure may be the most suitable, depending on 
variables such as the age or size of the company they are in 
use at. What the research's UK model does, however, expect is 
that both structures will operate effectively when they exhibit 
the managerial characteristics that it specifies and when both 
incorporate the organizational characteristic of using a UK 
personnel manager (see item No 3 below - Organizational 
Characteristics) with real influence. In short, if the 
production system exhibits the correct characteristics, this 
should stop the emergence of problems associated with either 
the single or dual management structures.
The third feature to note is that the model attempts to 
provide a production system that works equally as well whatever 
the external circumstances that arise. External circumstances 
are those factors that are beyond the model's control, such as 
the transplant's location, size, or age and levels of financial 
backing and autonomy given by the parent company. These 
factors might, for instance, determine the transplant's 
management structure, whether it has a NSA and whether R&D 
facilities are available locally or in Japan.
1) THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UK MODEL: WHERE THE DIFFERENCES LIE
As under the domestic Japanese production system the 
requirements of the research's UK model can be seen to form
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four natural clusters. These are the organization of labour, 
quality control, the organization and supply of production and 
product strategy. There are only two modifications to this 
section of the model. These relate to the issues of a JIT 
supply system and continuous research and design.
1 ) Just In Time Supply System - It has to be recognised 
that, for the UK model, the immediate operation of a JIT
supply system in a form close to that described under the
domestic Japanese production system is unrealistic. To
summarise, the research's UK model expects transplants to 
aspire to operate a JIT supply system close to that achievable 
in Japan. These aspirations are evidenced by close, supportive 
relationships built with locally based suppliers. These 
relationships are discussed in section 2.2 below. However, the 
model accepts that transplants in the UK may on occasion be 
compelled to modify their JIT supply system to allow for lead 
times, quality and price that would be unacceptable in Japan.
2) Continuous Research and Design - The Japanese tendency 
has been to keep the research and design (R&D) of products made 
at their overseas operations based in Japan. Consequently, 
transplants may rely upon the continuous research and 
development of new products and product modifications by the
domestic Japanese production system of the UK operation's 
parent company.
As was discussed in Chapter 1, the retention of research 
and design facilities in Japan has been seen as indicative of
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either a Japanese unwillingness to export all but the minimal 
amount of technological information and/or no long term 
commitment to their presence in Western markets. (James,1988; 
Morris, 1988b) Japanese owned Western operations are 
therefore seen as nothing more than "screwdriver" 
manufacturing operations used to outmanoeuvre Western, notably 
EC, trade restrictions. Indeed, Jacques Calvet, Chairman of 
Peugeot, in France, has described Britain as a giant "aircraft 
carrier" lurking off the European coast, comprising of nothing 
more than "manufacturing assembly points." (Independent 
8/10/1990. )
Conversely, one might view the introduction of R&D
facilities as the next phase in a long term strategy of direct 
investment in the UK, though given the comparative youth of
most Japanese manufacturers in the UK it is perhaps a little 
premature to judge as to whether this is the case. There is 
however evidence that the early trend of keeping such 
facilities at home is being reversed. This applies especially 
to the UK consumer electronics sector. By the end of August 
1991, seven major Japanese companies involved in the UK 
consumer electronics sector had located R&D facilities to the 
UK. For instance. Sharp have a £10 million research and
design laboratory in Oxford, while Hitachi employ
approximately fifty research and design engineers in the
television division of their South Wales plant.
In the context of the research's UK model continuous R&D 
remains a production requirement. But realistically the term
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has to be modified to reflect a set of circumstances that are 
only gradually altering. These circumstances are:
1 ) It is still necessary for the UK model to receive new 
product designs and existing product modifications for 
the company to remain competitive.
2) Management and technical staff working under the UK 
model are likely to have a restricted input into the R&D 
of new products and the major modifications of existing 
products. The transplant is unlikely to offer localised 
R&D facilities that could be categorised under Kono's 
"creative" or Matsumoto's "long-term" product development 
definitions. (As discussed in chapter 3. Kono, 1988; 
Matsumoto, 1986)
3) Even where all research and design is carried out in 
Japan, day to day product modifications will arise during 
production which can only be carried out by the UK 
transplant's employees. This is what Kono describes as 
"innovatory", and Matsumoto as "basic" R&D. (Kono, 1988; 
Matsumoto, 1986) Day to day product modifications often 
require considerable consultation between the transplant 
and component suppliers. (Discussed under section 2.2 
below.)
2) THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UK MODEL : WHERE THE DIFFERENCES 
LIE
The same four sets of characteristics exist under the 
research's UK model as under the domestic Japanese model. 
These are managerial, structural, personnel and industrial 
relations characteristics. It is stressed that the general 
aims of each set of characteristics remain the same as those 
identified under the domestic Japanese model. The differences 
within each set are as follows:
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2.1) Managerial Characteristics
1) Consensual/Groupist Decision Making - In Chapter 4, it 
was argued that the transference of ringi and nemawashi based 
decision making can lead to misunderstandings and distrust 
between local and Japanese managers, (See for example Tsurumi, 
1978; Yoshihara, 1989; Smith 1984) These problems will, 
inevitably, have a detrimental effect on the production system 
as defined in the broad sense in Chapter 2. Conversely, there 
is also evidence that some Japanese transplants avoid these 
problems while still operating a decision making process the 
same as that which exists under the domestic Japanese model. 
(Trevor, 1988; Koyabashi, 1985)
The challenge issued by the research's UK model is for 
the selection of Japanese transplant managers who are 
sensitive to these problems and make special effort to 
incorporate UK management into the decision making process. 
(See item No 2 below.) One UK production manager at a Japanese 
transplant described this as requiring "cultural compromise" 
from Japanese management. He went on to stress that it is 
also essential that Japanese managers, where necessary, select 
local managers with attitudes and skills that enable them to 
adapt to an unfamiliar decision making process. (See item No 2 
below.) Only then can the decision making process be said to 
be truly consensual or groupist based. Another UK manager, 
at a Japanese company pointed out that this approach has a 
crucial effect: "If everyone has been party to a decision.
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everyone agrees with it and if everyone agrees with it then 
they implement it."
2) Special Selection/Retention Procedures - As with the 
model of the domestic Japanese production system the UK model 
still requires rigorous selection procedures and academic 
standards. A senior local manager in the personnel function 
compared the selection of managers, whether Japanese or UK, to 
the selection of production components. "They have to be of a 
certain specification so as to fit into the system here, and 
they need meet our demand for a high level of quality." 
However, because the procedures must operate in the UK there 
are two issues which the selection characteristic must contend 
with.
Firstly, the selection of Japanese managers to manage 
overseas manufacturing operations with either a single or dual 
management structure, requires the additional quality of the 
manager being able to achieve a set of objectives through the 
use of management practices that are often alien to local 
managers and employees. These managers will also need good 
communication skills (especially given linguistic
differences), and the talent to identify situations in which it 
is necessary to create a compromise of their own beliefs and 
attitudes with local custom and practice.
The second issue relates to companies that adopt a 
management structure in which UK managers are used. The 
judgement of their Japanese management will have a crucial 
bearing on the quality of the UK management selected. They
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have to select UK managers who have a clear understanding of 
and belief in the company's strategies and goals, as well as 
the ability to achieve them using unfamiliar Japanese style 
management practices. In the UK management labour market, good 
managers are expected to move from company to company for more 
money and new challenges. Finding such people and then 
retaining them is easier said than done. To overcome this 
problem, the research's UK model offers two solutions.
Firstly, the model aims to provide competitive levels of 
management pay. The levels should be above the local median, 
preferably near or in the upper quartile.
Secondly, good calibre local management are also retained 
by virtue of the fact that the production system, by its 
very nature, inevitably provides them with a series of 
motivating challenges and interests. In part, these challenges 
and interests arise from the requirement of, and acceptance by, 
local managers of a career path in which while, nominally 
remaining attached to a particular department, they will 
circulate around the company from function to function accruing 
an increasing number of skills. As under the domestic Japanese 
model, circulation is vital to the manager gaining a greater 
understanding of the organization as a whole and may occur at 
senior as well as junior management levels.
Management circulation forms part of a promotional 
structure that incorporates what one local manager described as 
"both horizontal and vertical promotion." By horizontal 
promotion he meant that, while circulating around the company
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accruing extra skills, a manager often acquires and retains 
responsibility for a wider range of tasks. Vertical promotion 
is a movement up the management hierarchy, which increases 
power and influence within the the organization.
For vertical promotion of local management to occur, there 
needs to be an acceptance by Japanese management that in the 
long term the UK based operation will be entrusted to a 
management team comprising solely of, or at least dominated 
by, UK recruited staff. This was made clear at a seminar 
with Japanese and UK managers in which the personnel practices 
applied to management at Japanese companies in the UK came 
under scrutiny. Several local managers argued that it was 
vital for local management morale that a Japanese acceptance 
of increasing UK management influence was demonstrated by 
actions and not words. As one local manager argued: "Its good 
that my company has made it known that it expects to be a 
British managed operation in the future, but for people to 
believe it is going to happen we need some British promotions
now. These would indicate a reduction in Japanese influence
and be seen as proof of Japanese intentions." (Third 
Mitsubishi Bank Foundation Conference on Japanese Overseas
Investment, 1989)
2.2) Organizational Characteristics
1 ) Emphasis on First Line Supervision - An emphasis on 
responsibility and leadership at the first line of supervision 
means that the rewards in terms of job satisfaction and
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motivation for the individual concerned may be considerable. 
The UK model has to take in to account the fact that in the UK 
this is not enough to consistently attract people with a level 
of qualifications, technical skills and experience that are in 
excess of the expected norm for the ' traditional ' UK 
supervisor. As one personnel manager explained: "Most of our 
supervisors have got degrees, because the duties we expect of 
them are extremely onerous. They are really the first tier of 
management, because in addition to their leadership of the 
workers under them they are deeply involved in the planning of 
production and decision making." Consequently, the recruitment 
and retention of such people to supervisory posts will, to a 
considerable extent, rely upon rewarding their suitability by 
payment of an attractive wage. For the research's UK model 
this would be above the local median.
Several personnel managers at Japanese transplants 
suggested that there is in fact a very small pool of 
appropriate labour from which to recruit the type of supervisor 
they wanted. Added to that, they preferred, where at all 
possible to promote individuals from within the company to the 
posts. (For the reasoning behind this see section 2.3 below- 
concerning Merit Based Promotion.) Those internal candidates 
promoted to supervisor level were often under-qualified 
relative to the levels specified by the company. Their
appointment was based on the understanding that they study 
for any qualifications and skills that the employer felt it was 
necessary for them to have and this is incorporated into the
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model. The model still, however, requires that once obtained, 
the necessary qualifications and skills are financially 
rewarded by an attractive wage.
2) Close Ties With Suppliers - While it is not
unreasonable for a Japanese transplant in the UK to aspire to 
operate a JIT supply system as described under the domestic 
Japanese production system it is clear that such a procedure 
cannot be applied to every product component supplied. The 
evidence presented in Chapter 4 showed that Japanese companies 
had often found local UK suppliers unable to meet delivery 
times, quality and price. In other instances the component may 
not yet be available in the UK. As one local manager explained 
at a transplant, "EEC constraints compel us to use a 
proportion of locally produced components in our goods but we 
still find it more effective to ship in several of our
components from Japan. The only problem is that we have to 
operate a forty two day lead time! In this respect our JIT
system is compromised and we are therefore continually seeking 
good local suppliers."
This situation gives transplants two choices. Firstly, 
through the development of close relationships they can 
achieve levels of quality, price and delivery time by raising 
UK suppliers to the standards required. Secondly, they can
encourage/await the arrival of Japanese owned suppliers 
locally. Once they have arrived the buying transplant proceeds 
to develop close ties with them. (Nichiguchi, 1990; Sako, 1990, 
1992)
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As with suppliers in Japan, it is also important that 
suppliers feed the production system with components that are 
designed to be easily assembled into the product. Often the 
component has been produced in Japan so that the specifications 
are already available, but modifications may be necessary for 
the product to sell on the European market.
These issues mean that the research’s UK model needs to 
exhibit the following characteristics. Firstly, while 
acknowledging that it may not be possible to immediately obtain 
a perfect JIT system, a transplant is expected to establish a 
clear set of criteria for the supplier to match so that the 
production system moves towards obtaining the benefits of 
guaranteed delivery times, stable component prices, and 
quality. Secondly, for a supplier to match these criteria and 
where the component needs to be modified for the European 
market, it is important that, as under the domestic Japanese 
model outlined in Chapter 3, close and supportive 
buyer/supplier relationships are developed by the transplant.
3) UK Personnel Management - Given the crucial role played 
by personnel and industrial relations in the Japanese 
production system the personnel management function assumes 
considerable importance. Under the research's UK model the 
personnel function is deemed to require UK management, even if 
the rest of the production system is managed by expatriate 
Japanese. Japanese employers generally admit that their 
knowledge and ability of UK personnel and industrial relations
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practices is limited and are usually happy to leave personnel 
management in UK hands. (Dunning, 1985, pp.67-79)
Where a UK Personnel Manager is employed at a transplant 
the model assesses their level of influence within the 
organization. Ideally, the post is at a level that assumes 
full responsibility for personnel and industrial relations 
issues. It should not be inhibited by the need to report to 
any but the most senior of (Japanese) management and is 
certainly not an administrative rather than managerial post. A 
high level of influence allows the personnel manager to create 
an understanding among the management team as a whole of the 
institutionalized elements of UK industrial relations and how 
best to deal with them under a Japanese orientated production 
syst'em.
2.3) Personnel Characteristics
1) Guarantee of Secure Employment - The research's UK 
model does not offer a job for life, while the horizontal 
nature of the UK labour market means that employees, while 
appreciative of job security, do not necessarily desire to 
remain with the same company throughout their working lives. 
There is then a fine distinction between the guarantee made in 
the UK, and the tradition of life-time employment in Japan. 
One personnel manager believed that: "There's an implicit sense 
of security fostered by this company from the first time you 
walk through the door. During our recruitment interviews we 
stress the long-term commitment of the Japanese to this venture
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and that continues while the individual works here." Another 
suggested: "Our reputation in the local community rests on this 
issue. Our permanent employees Know we're never going to go 
away over night, and we've installed the expectation in them, 
that as far as is possible, we will reward loyalty with job 
security."
On this basis, though the UK model aspires to a clear 
written statement of intent regarding job security, it expects 
at the very least a voluntaristic most often verbal, 
understanding between employer and core employees. This 
understanding is that they will be the very last group of 
workers to be laid off and that every effort will be made to 
retain their services in return for their loyalty and 
commitment.
2) Welfarism - As was shown in Chapter 4, the majority of 
Japanese manufacturers in the UK have not been found to offer 
employees welfare benefits beyond the UK norms. (Reitsperger, 
1986b; Oliver & Wilkinson, 1988) The research's UK model does 
not necessitate the provision of the kind of services available 
at some large manufacturers in Japan. Few, if any, Japanese 
transplants in the UK are of a size or have the financial 
resources to provide for example company housing or company 
hospitals. Instead the model looks for a commitment to allow 
all core employees basic benefits such as pension schemes, sick 
pay or perhaps enhanced conditions for maternity leave. These 
are well within the financial scope of even the smaller 
companies.
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3) Market Led Pay Levels - Wage levels are based upon the 
local median for the levels of skill required and what the 
company can afford to pay. The higher above the median the 
company is the better since this indicates that the company 
feels it is successful enough to be able to offer such rates. 
In addition, pay may, to varying degrees, be assessed on the 
basis of appraisals of employee merit or performance. Other 
financial rewards based on seniority, productivity bonuses or 
attendance allowances are less acceptable to the model. This 
is because they do not rely on a form of appraisal that 
assesses what the individual's motivation is for meeting the 
criteria that makes them eligible for the reward. Instead, 
they assume and encourage the development of financially driven 
employee motivation only. This is adjudged detrimental to the 
objectives of the UK model. As one of several personnel 
managers put it: "If we see good quality hard work we will 
reward it, but just turning up every day and going through the 
motions indicates no desire to see the company do well in the 
long-term . It's just a grab what you can attitude."
4) Merit Based Promotion - Promotion is based upon the 
individual's commitment and performance. Seniority should 
play no role in determining suitability for promotion except 
when linked to an assessment of the individual's experience. 
In part, this experience is linked to the company's development 
of the individual via training either off or on the job so 
that they accrue a greater number of skills.
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The model also expects a written undertaken that where at 
all possible posts will be filled by promotion from within the 
organization. Several personnel managers interviewed
believed that this policy played an important role in 
motivating and retaining workers. As one pointed out: "Internal 
promotion forms a key element of our reward system. We want 
our shop floor workers to know that it’s possible to get 
promotion. We want them to see their colleagues getting 
promoted on the basis of merit and to understand that the same 
criteria applies to them."
5) Intensive Selection Procedures - The model requires a 
selection procedure that involves the use of detailed 
application forms, intensive interviews and aptitude tests. It 
avoids a policy geared solely to recruiting school leavers. As 
was suggested in Chapter 4, this may lead to difficulties of 
discipline, motivation and loyalty. (Broad, 1989)
The company is expected to adopt a policy of recruiting a 
mixed age profile of workers. The benefit of such an approach 
is that as one personnel manager explained: "Older workers,
because they've inevitably worked somewhere else before are 
more experienced of a working environment. They can compare 
the company with others and hopefully decide it's not a bad 
place to work. They know that the grass is not greener down 
the road at other local employers and stay put. Family 
responsibilities also mean that they are less likely to move 
off at a whim. They're generally more reasoned in their 
arguments with management and easier to get interested in the
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company's objectives. We find that all this rubs off on the 
younger more impressionable workers who, if they had been the 
dominant group, might otherwise be too immature to mould into 
the kind of worker that we want."
7) Regimented Work Environment - It is desirable for the 
inclusion of this characteristic, since the Japanese
production system does not allow for slack work practices.
It has however been argued that the unexplained application of 
such policies in an authoritarian manner and/or the use of 
management authority to uphold actions that are of little more 
than antagonistic value may force up productivity and
efficiency, but cannot be said to elicit reductions in "them 
and us" attitudes among employees. (Oliver & Wilkinson, 1988; 
Slaughter, 1987) Consequently, a regimented work environment 
needs to be applied with a great deal of sensitivity by 
management operating a Japanese transplant in the UK. A 
compromise has to evolve between what is required of UK workers 
and what is acceptable to them. If management make the time 
and effort to explain the reasoning behind policies concerning 
for instance housekeeping, absenteeism and performance, then
there is evidence that UK employees will respond positively. 
(Jenner & Trevor, 1985, p.120; White & Trevor, 1983, pp.20-71; 
Wickens, 1987, pp.96-110) Other practices such as Taiso (pre­
work physical exercises) can be successfully implemented on a 
voluntary basis if their use and benefits are properly 
explained. (Broad, 1987)
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In light of these issues the UK model therefore requires 
evidence of a regimented work environment. However, any new 
policy or procedure related to this issue is explained to the 
workforce verbally or in writing before implementation and 
employee concerns about its proposed implementation are 
considered carefully by management.
2.4) Industrial Relations Characteristics
1) No Union or Single Union Recognition - The research's 
UK model has to cope with two possible scenarios concerning the
issue of union recognition at Japanese manufacturers in the UK.
The first scenario is the avoidance of union recognition 
altogether.
A personnel manager at one non-unionised company candidly 
admitted that: "No matter how paternalistic you feel you are, 
you should still have an employee representative structure 
able to give you an alternative expressed view. It is also 
vital to the communication and operation of a common interest 
between workers and management in the success of the company." 
The model follows this approach, in that where no union is 
recognised it also allows for the use of a non-independent 
staff association/union at a company as an alternative, but 
less effective form of employee representation. A non- 
independent staff association/union would be expected to have 
a high density of membership at the company. The model also 
judges the election of employee representatives to a
consultative committee in a company with no union or no
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independent staff association/union as an unsatisfactory 
method of employee representation.
The second option is for transplants to sign "new style" 
collective agreements with a single union. (See item No 4 
below.) The key to union recognition at a company in South 
Wales was, for its personnel manager, "the fear among the 
Japanese that a tradition of active trade unionism in this 
region would result in the company facing recognition claims 
from two or three trade unions. They wanted to deal with the 
workforce as a coherent group, and saw single unionism as 
essential to the reduction of divisive status barriers among 
employees."
2) Enterprise Level Bargaining - Wage bargaining is 
carried out at the enterprise level only. Unlike in Japan, 
enterprise in the UK context means a single bargaining unit 
confined to one localised site. For example, bargaining at one 
Matsushita owned site in the UK will not be linked to any of 
the company's other UK operations.
Where a union is recognised the negotiations are, in the 
first instance, between senior management and elected lay 
representatives. If these two groups cannot agree, only then 
do local and national full-time union representatives become 
progressively involved. Pay should be determined on the 
principle of what the company can afford to pay without 
damaging its competitiveness. (See section 2.3 above.)
Where no union is recognised, ideally negotiations should 
occur between elected employee representatives and senior
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management. (See item No 1 above in this section.) Management 
must avoid simply imposing a pay award without any form of 
consultation or negotiation with employees.
3) Formalised Union or Other Structure - The research's 
UK model expects a formalised union or other structure to 
exist. This is able to represent individual or collective 
employee grievances. Where a union is recognised it represents 
all core employees who wish to join. This includes white 
collar and supervisory staff, but not management. It cannot be 
viewed as an enterprise union along the lines seen in Japan. 
It is a nationally structured union, often representing 
workers in many different sectors of industry. Lay
representatives at the company (shop stewards and branch 
officials) are paid on the basis of the production related work 
they do, not for their union related duties, though they may be 
given paid time off to conduct union affairs. Local and 
national full-time officials' wages are funded through the
union's membership subscriptions.
Despite this independence, the union's officers and its 
membership at the company are expected to place the interests 
of the enterprise before any external craft, industry or 
political issues. A local trade union official summed up this 
relationship during interview: "Yes, we're like any other
union, we're here to get more for our members, but only what we 
believe the company can afford to pay. If, for example, the
company convinces us that what we're expecting will lead to a
reduction in its training budget, then we'd argue that that
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wasn't in the interests of our members and revise our 
expectations downwards." This official was quick, to add a 
proviso to his statement which reflects the nature of the 
relationship between the company and union : "It is of course up 
to the company to trust us with the level of information that 
shows this to be the case."
4 ) "New-Stvle" Collective Agreements or Alternative 
Written Procedures - Where a single union is recognised it will 
have signed a "new-style" collective agreement (NSA) with the 
company. The agreement aims to encourage co-operation and 
partnership between the employer and union rather than a 
conflictual relationship.
Ken Biggs, National Organiser for the EETPU, has 
negotiated several NSAs with Japanese employers in the UK and 
talks of the "spirit of intent" that lies behind them. For 
him, "A Japanese and local management understanding of this 
spirit is crucial to the successful operation of these 
agreements. There is so much in them that is based on fairness 
and trust. Its up to the company's management to adopt the 
attitudes and behaviour that lead to a consensual style of 
management. If they don't play fair then they're asking for our 
members to revert to traditional, adversarial industrial 
relations." Perhaps the best summing up of why it is necessary 
for management to understand the spirit of intent behind an NSA 
was given by the personnel manager of a Panasonic plant in the 
UK. He talked of his NSA's reliance on "honourability", 
believing that "...the agreement has great gaps in it that
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management could drive a bus through, but in fact what we aim 
for here is the understanding that we're both on the same bus!" 
The model contains an assessment of the extent to which 
management are perceived by union members to adhere to the 
spirit of an NSA in operation at a unionised company. It also 
expects NSAs to include the following components:
1) Single union recognition
2) Total labour flexibility
3) Participation
4) No strike procedure
The components do not include any mention of single 
status terms and conditions of employment. There is good 
reason for this omission.
Several commentators, notably Bassett and Burrows, present 
the issue of single status terms and conditions as if they are 
included in a NSA as an automatic concession to the recognised 
union by management. (Bassett, 1987; Burrows, 1986) They are 
not. Reading Bassett's account, "Strike Free", one is led to 
believe that the union bargained for and obtained a set of 
single status terms in return for signing the NSA at Toshiba. 
However, Trevor's book, also concerning Toshiba's agreement, 
reveals that management had decided before opening negotiations 
with union representatives that a single status package would 
form part of their strategy to obtain and reward workforce 
commitment. (Trevor, 1988) In fact, while some of the early
— 2 0 0 —
NSAs signed with Japanese companies (Hitachi for example) do 
make some mention of single status, many later agreements do 
not, simply because they are usually an automatic feature of 
the individual employee's personal contract. Japanese 
transplants tend to regard single status terms as a matter of 
course. Thus, as under the domestic Japanese model, single 
status features in the research's UK model, as a personnel 
characteristic.
Where no union is recognised an alternative set of written 
procedures are required. These include a grievance procedure, 
participation and flexibility.
3) SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The research's UK model appears very similar to the 
domestic Japanese model. This can be attributed to both models 
incorporating virtually identical production requirements. The 
differences discussed should be seen as modifications to the 
domestic Japanese production system, offering the best way of 
fulfilling its requirements when transplanted to the UK.
This chapter has analysed the differences between the 
requirements and characteristics of the domestic Japanese 
production system and the UK model. A summary of these 
differences is provided in table 5.1.
Table 5.1 shows that only two modifications are necessary 
to the production system requirements of the UK model. These 
relate to a compromise form of the JIT system and the
-201-
recognition that long-term R&D is likely to be carried out in 
Japan.
Managerial characteristics under the research's UK model 
suggest that great care needs to be taken in the selection of 
Japanese management sent to a transplant. In addition, the 
model requires a special selection/retention characteristic in 
order to attract the most suitable local managers where a dual 
management structure exists.
The model's organizational characteristics are designed 
to allow the recruitment of individual's with the level of 
skills most suitable for an emphasis on first line supervision. 
The transplant is expected to develop close ties with its 
suppliers in the context of bringing its JIT system closer to 
that achieved under the domestic Japanese production system. 
The personnel management function should be filled by a local 
manager with a high level of responsibility and influence.
Personnel characteristics display five basic differences. 
These are a voluntaristic guarantee of job security, a 
commitment to basic welfare benefits for core employees, market 
led pay, merit based pay, and careful selection procedures that 
are not geared to the recruitment of school leavers.
Four differences are discernable under the model's 
industrial relations characteristics. Firstly, the transplant 
may or may not recognise a single union. Secondly, wage 
bargaining is carried out at a single bargaining unit confined 
to one localised site. Thirdly, where a union is recognised it 
remains far more independent of the company than would an
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enterprise union under the domestic Japanese production system, 
though it is still expected to place the interests of the 
company before any external interests. Fourthly, where a union 
is recognised, a NSA is signed which incorporates a high
trust, co-operative "spirit of intent".
There are two issues to bear in mind when assessing the 
structure of the research's UK model. Firstly, it is important 
to note that when the two sets of personnel and industrial 
relations characteristics in the UK model are combined they can 
be seen to exemplify the sort of NIR practices that are 
indicative of a strategy that seeks to reduce feelings of 
"them and us" among employees. Nevertheless, the research 
posits that a Japanese transplant's attempts to reduce "them 
and us" are also reliant upon the effectiveness of the UK 
model's managerial and organizational characteristics. >
Secondly, it is also worth considering the implications 
of the UK model in respect of the debate concerning the 
Japanization of British industry. (See for example Oliver and 
Wilkinson 1988; Ackroyd et al 1988) The model created here 
gives some credence to the argument that where British owned 
industry seeks to emulate the success of its Japanese 
competitors by altering its production requirements to those of 
the Japanese production system, it must accept the broad 
definition of the system as was defined in chapter 2. This 
necessitates the adoption of the entire four sets of production 
characteristics rather than attempting to implement personnel 
or industrial relations characteristics ad hoc.
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In Part 3 the research’s UK model is used as a 
benchmark against which to compare the production systems of 
nine Japanese transplants in the UK consumer electronics 
sector. The model is then applied in greater detail to two 
case study companies. In each case the research assesses how 
successful the companies' NIR practices have been in altering 
workforce attitudes and shows whether the extent of their 
success has been influenced by strengths or weaknesses in other 
managerial or organizational production system characteristics.
Part 3 commences with Chapter 6 which summarises the 
hypotheses the research's UK model helps to test. Chapter 6 
also explains the methodology used to compare the model 
alongside the production systems of nine sample companies in 
the UK consumer electronics sector.
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PART 3
MEASURING UP TO THE UK MODEL: HOW STRENGTHS 
AND WEAKNESSES IN THE PRODUCTION SYSTEMS OF 
JAPANESE TRANSPLANTS CAN AFFECT 
"THEM AND US" ATTITUDES.

CHAPTER 6
HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY
1) THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
The research posits two inter-related hypotheses. They 
can be summarised as follows:
1 ) That when compared to the research ' s UK model ( see 
figure 5.1 repeated on p 209), a number of key dimensions 
of variability exist among the production systems of 
Japanese transplants in the UK consumer electronics 
sector. These dimensions of variability relate to the 
extent to which a company displays the UK model's four 
sets of production system characteristics.
2) That the closer a transplant is to displaying all four 
sets of production system characteristics as identified 
under the research's UK model, then the more likely it is 
that "them and us" attitudes will be reduced among its 
employees. This assumes that it is not only personnel 
and industrial relations characteristics (NIR practices) 
that impact on "them and us" attitudes but also managerial 
and organizational characteristics. It is posited that, 
though the performance of the production system is reliant 
on effective NIR practices reducing "them and us" 
attitudes, strengths and weaknesses in a transplant's 
managerial and organizational characteristics may also 
have a detrimental or beneficial affect on production 
performance. This in turn will impact on "them and us" 
attitudes. In short, the effectiveness of NIR practices 
and the effective performance of a transplant's production 
system enjoy a two way relationship (see figure 2.4 
repeated on p 211).
Because of their intervening role (see figure 2.2 repeated 
on p 210), poor managerial and organizational
characteristics can have a highly detrimental effect on 
"them and us" attitudes. They may impede the successful 
operation of a transplant's production system to the 
extent that workers perceive some personal cost to 
themselves. They come to believe that their working for 
the good of the company is a waste, perceiving that other 
managerial and organizational characteristics are 
undermining their own efforts. Consequently their level 
of morale drops, they lose confidence in management's 
abilities and they become cynical of NIR practices. A
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vicious circle emerges (see figure 2.5 repeated on p 211). 
Poor managerial and organizational characteristics impede 
the performance of the production system, and this stops 
NIR practices reducing "them and us". The failure of NIR 
practices in turn impairs the already poor performance of 
the production system.
Conversely, and given this intervening role, the effective 
performance of the production system owing to good 
managerial and organizational characteristics may lead to 
the emergence of a virtuous circle (see figure 2.6. 
repeated on p 212). In this situation workers feel that 
the effective performance of the production system is to 
their benefit. They react positively to NIR practices and 
"them and us" attitudes are therefore reduced. This, in 
turn, further improves the production system's 
performance.
2) THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research hypotheses are tested by comparing the
production systems of nine Japanese transplants in the UK 
consumer electronics sector with the research's UK model. 
This enables the identification of some key dimensions of
variability among their production systems. Those exhibiting a 
close match with the UK model's production system 
characteristics are said to have a "strong" set of production 
system characteristics. Those which display few similarities 
are said to display a "weak" set of production system 
characteristics.
Two companies are selected from the sample of nine as
case studies. The research goes on to demonstrate how the
strengths and weaknesses of each of these two case study 
companies' production system characteristics impact on their 
efforts to reduce "them and us" attitudes among their 
workforces. This section of the chapter is therefore divided
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FIGURE 2.4
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FIGURE 2.6
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into two. The first part describes the methodology used to 
apply the research's UK model to the nine sample companies. 
The second part describes the methodology used to identify how 
strengths and weaknesses in each case study company's 
production system affected workforce attitudes and behaviour 
related to "them and us."
2.1) Measuring Up to the UK Model: A Method of Evaluation
The Model's Objective
The research's UK model was constructed with the following 
objective in mind. This was :
To provide a "benchmark" against which to measure the 
production system characteristics of a sample set of 
Japanese manufacturing companies in the UK. This allowed 
the research to identify those companies with the 
strongest or weakest set of production system 
characteristics and to rank order them accordingly. The 
model was not used to measure production system 
requirements. These are deemed to remain constant from 
company to company and their presence is a matter of 
course. The model is based on the argument that the 
closer a company is to displaying a full set of production
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system characteristics, then the closer it is to 
satisfying these requirements.
The Method of Evaluation
Meeting the model's objective entailed using the following 
methodology :
1) The sample consisted of nine companies. All the 
companies were Japanese owned and were in the UK consumer 
electronics sector.
2) Collation of the necessary data was carried out 
through the use of interviews with a sample of management 
and employee representatives at each sample company. A 
set of open ended questions were used to identify each 
sample company's production system characteristics. The 
same questionnaire was applied at each company. (Appendix 
6.1.) The interview sample at each company comprised of 
the following:
a) Personnel Manager. If no specific post existed then 
the manager responsible for personnel related issues.
b) Two production managers. Where a dual management 
system existed one of these managers was Japanese.
c) Procurement Manager. If no specific post existed then 
the manager responsible for procurement related issues.
d) Two lay union representatives or where no union existed 
employee representatives.
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3) The information drawn from the interviews, was then 
subjected to a method of scoring which showed how near 
to achieving each of the model's characteristics a sample 
company was.
In order to do this, the method of scoring was 
constructed to take account of two problems. Firstly, 
though some characteristics such as the personnel and 
industrial relations characteristics can be identified as 
existing on a straight forward 'yes/no' basis, the 
existence of others, notably several managerial 
characteristics, will only be exhibited through human 
actions and behaviour. Such actions and behaviour may be 
apparent only by the identification of more than one 
indice of the characteristic, all of which will therefore 
need to be incorporated into the method of evaluation.
Secondly, there may also be variance in the level of 
attainment companies achieve for certain characteristics. 
For example, one company may have an extensive set of 
welfare benefits available to its core employees (one 
company in the sample offered paternity leave), a second 
may offer several basic benefits such a pension scheme, a 
third may offer a few basic benefits, while a fourth may 
offer none at all.
For these reasons, the method of evaluating the 
existence of every one of the model's characteristic at a 
sample company provides four scores reflecting four 
possible levels of achievement. (These are given in
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appendix 6.2.) The method is similar to that used by 
Sakuma when evaluating his "Information Sharing System". 
(Sakuma, 1990) As an example, the four levels of welfare 
benefits at a company are scored in the following way:
Welfarism - An interview with the company's Personnel Manager 
was used to identify one of the following:
1 ) The company provides in excess of the following 
welfare benefits for its employees :- company 
pension, and company sick pay. (Excess benefits 
might include, for example,
company maternity pay or health care schemes.) 3
2) The company provides the following welfare benefits for
its employees :- company pension and company sick pay. 2
3) The company provides one of the following welfare benefits 
for its employees:- company pension and company sick pay. 1
4) The company provides neither a company sick pay scheme nor
a company pension scheme for its employees. 0
Having allocated a score to each individual characteristic 
at a company the following procedure was then applied:
a) Scores for individual characteristics in each set were 
added together to form a total score for the set. The 
scores for personnel and industrial relations 
characteristics were weighted so that maximum scores for 
all four sets were the same. This was done deliberately. 
According one set of characteristics a greater potential 
score than another would have been highly subjective and 
would have led to questions about how arbitrary the scores 
were. For example, the structure of the UK model as
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shown in figure 5.1 acknowledges that managerial 
characteristics occupy a special role in the production 
system. It shows management as being responsible for 
initiating and implementing organizational, personnel and 
industrial relations characteristics. .To have allocated a 
higher maximum score to managerial characteristics on the 
basis of this special role and then to obtain a higher 
score for a transplant's managerial characteristics when 
measuring its production system alongside the UK model 
would be of little use. The results could be interpreted 
not as highlighting the importance of the transplant's 
managerial characteristics, but as reflecting a biassed 
system of scoring. In other words the model would become 
a "self fulfilling prophecy". To have assigned different 
maximum scores to each of the four sets of production 
system characteristics would have undermined the model's 
value as a benchmark.
The maximum scores achievable for each of the four sets 
of characteristics with their weighted scores in brackets 
were:
Managerial Characteristics Maximum score
= 15 (15)
Organizational Characteristics Maximum score
= 15 (15)
Personnel Characteristics Maximum score
= 30 (15)
Industrial Relations Characteristics Maximum score
= 12 (15)
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b) Each company's four scores were added together so as to 
form an overall score that could be rank ordered in 
comparison to other companies participating in the
research. In addition, the scores for each of a
company's four sets of characteristics were compared by 
rank ordering them with the scores achieved by the other 
sample companies. The scores for each company's
individual sets of characteristics, and each company's
overall score were reported as percentages.
2.2) The Case Studies: Methodology 
Objectives
The use of case studies in the research (Company A and
Company B) had two objectives. These were:
1) To analyse strengths and weaknesses in each company's 
production system characteristics.
2) To assess workforce attitudes and behaviour related to 
the issue of "them and us."
3) To demonstrate how strengths and weaknesses in each 
company's production system characteristics impact on 
workforce attitudes and behaviour related to "them and 
us".
-218-
The Methods of Evaluation
In order to achieve the case study objectives three 
methods of evaluation were used. These were questionnaires, 
interviews and observation.
Questionnaires
As Kelly and Kelly have noted, it is "striking.,. just how
few studies there are of worker attitudes before and after the
introduction of NIR practices." (Kelly and Kelly, 1991, p.27) 
The case study of Company A was not quite a before and after 
study. Nonetheless, it did comprise of a survey of the 
workforce conducted when the company was just two months old. 
This aimed to look at workforce expectations of their new 
employer and their union, and to look at their beliefs 
conçerning "them and us". (See appendix 6.3.) A second 
questionnaire was then conducted sixteen months later to see
whether these expectations had been met and whether attitudes 
regarding "them and us" had altered. (Appendix 6.4.) A 
questionnaire was also implemented at Company B after it had
been in production for eighteen months. (Appendix 6.5) All 
employees up to but not including management level were 
eligible to fill them in. Each of the three questionnaires 
was constructed using the same four sections. There were few 
differences in the specific questions each questionnaire asked 
respondents to answer.
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The first section covered general demographic details, 
e.g. age, sex, self perception of class, grade and work 
location within the company.
Section two contained the key question "co-operation in 
firms is impossible because workers and management are really 
on different sides". This was to be used as a dependent 
variable to indicate whether perceptions of "them and us" as a 
general feature of British industrial relations were affected 
by perceptions of "them and us" within the company. Other 
questions in the section aimed to show what attitudes 
respondents brought with them to the Japanese transplant. How 
did they perceive British management? Did they attach any 
value to trade unionism and industrial action at the workplace?
The second section also aimed to analyse issues raised by 
those such as Angle and Perry and Fukami and Larson regarding 
dual commitment. (Angle & Perry, 1986; Fukami & Larson, 1984) 
Questions looked to discover whether respondents believed it 
was possible to be loyal to both a trade union and employer.
Several questions in this section were based upon Mann's 
study of work and the work ethic and Marshall et al's study of 
social class. Both studies found strong evidence of a belief 
among workers that management and employees had differences of 
interest that were difficult to overcome. Marshall et al 
found that 63% of their sample agreed that: "The main social 
conflict in Britain today is between those who run industry and 
those who work for them." (Mann, 1986; Marshall et al, 1988, 
p151)
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A third section of each questionnaire was designed to 
assess workforce perceptions of the work environment at their 
own Japanese employer. It included questions designed to test 
the individual's level of Job satisfaction. These were drawn 
from a combination of Clay Hamner and Smith's Work Attitude 
Model and Hackman and Oldham's Job Diagnostic Survey. Hamner 
and Smith assessed workforce job satisfaction as a predictor of 
levels of union activity. (Both case study companies in this 
research were unionised.) Hackman and Oldham aimed to 
highlight those areas of a job that might be redesigned to 
improve motivation and productivity.
Other questions in section three were designed to test 
whether respondents believed specific practices at the 
companies designed to reduce "them and us" existed, and whether 
they perceived them in a positive light. Perceptions of the 
union's role at the company were also assessed. Some of the 
non-union related questions were drawn from Dewe, Dunn and 
Richardson's study of why workers might be attracted to the 
NIR practice of Employee Share Option Schemes. (Dewe, Dunn and 
Richardson, 1988)
There also existed within this section four key 
questions. These were to be used as dependent variables that 
indicated what it was at the companies that had impacted on 
"them and us" attitudes among their workers.
Three of these questions related to Kelly and Kelly's 
three routes to attitude change that were discussed in Chapter 
2. (Kelly and Kelly, 1991.) One was to be used to assess what
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Kelly and Kelly describe as "increased contact across group 
boundaries". This is increased contact based around practices 
such as detailed consultation and quality circles. 
Accordingly, a question asked respondents whether they felt 
management/worker communications at the company were poor.
A second route to attitude change was the creation of a 
superordinate goal. In relation to "them and us" the 
superordinate goal under scrutiny was for workers to appreciate 
that their efforts to make the company successful were in 
their interests as well as the company's. To identify whether 
respondents felt that such a superordinate goal was in place at 
their company the questionnaire therefore asked them whether 
they thought management were ever interested if they had an 
idea that might improve the way they did their job.
Kelly and Kelly's third route to attitude change in 
relation to "them and us" was "changes in attitude and 
behaviour". The idea is that new participative or co-operative 
behaviour at the workplace leads to alterations in attitude. A 
question on the questionnaire therefore simply asked 
respondents how they felt workers were treated at their 
company.
The fourth question to be used as a dependent variable 
indicating successful reductions in "them and us" attitudes 
was not directly related to Kelly and Kelly's three routes to 
attitude change. It asked respondents whether it would not 
take much for them to leave their employer. This assumes 
something more than loyalty to one's firm. It might actually
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be possible to be feel some loyalty to a company, but still 
leave if you are unhappy about some aspect of the work or 
simply offered a job with better terms and conditions 
elsewhere. Instead, the research was looking for indications 
that the case study companies provided employees with work 
environments to which they attached great value and felt they 
could not obtain elsewhere. They would therefore be loathe to 
leave. Indeed, the personnel managers at both case study 
cpmpanies talked of creating work environments which because 
they induced reductions in "them and us" attitudes would 
install a "sense of belonging" or "lock in" employees to their 
firms.
It is not suggested that any one of these four questions 
was the best indicator of "them and us" attitudes at either 
case study. They should be seen as separate but equally valid 
indices of "them and us" attitudes among employees. All could 
contribute to a general reduction or exacerbation of these 
attitudes. On this basis it is perfectly plausible that a 
response to one key variable might be conducive to a reduction, 
while the response to another by the same respondent might 
indicate exacerbation.
The final section of the questionnaire asked respondents 
to give the reasons why they had or had not joined the union 
recognised at their company. For those who had joined, the 
aim was to identify what they expected of the the union.
-223-
Interviews
Each questionnaire asked workers to nominate themselves 
or a colleague to be interviewed as a follow up to the 
questionnaire results. Those who agreed to be interviewed were 
from a sample which was weighted to cover all work areas at 
each company. Interviews did not follow a fixed format, but 
comprised of open ended questions and covered the same set of 
issues examined by the questionnaire in more detail. Additional 
interviews concerning management/union relations at the company 
were conducted with shop stewards and local full-time union 
officials.
Interviews were also held with UK and Japanese management. 
Those interviewed were from the personnel, production and 
procurement areas. The interviews followed no fixed format, 
and asked open ended questions. They aimed to assess 
management views of their company's operation of managerial, 
organizational, personnel and industrial relations 
characteristics. Because under the research's UK model there 
is an emphasis on first line supervision, interviews were also 
conducted with all production supervisors at each company.
Observation
Observation enabled the examination of management and 
worker behaviour at each company. It was of great value in two 
respects. Firstly, it allowed identification of incidents and 
situations that assisted in the interpretation and explanation 
of strengths and weaknesses in each company's production
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system when compared to the research's UK model. Secondly, 
it helped to demonstrate how strengths and weaknesses in each 
company's production system characteristics impacted on 
workforce attitudes and behaviour related to "them and us".
The observation technique employed needed to enable
observation and contact with a large cross section of employees
at each company. After some consultation and negotiation with
each company it was agreed that the observation would take a
form similar to that of an "observer continuous diary"
advocated by Thurley and Wirdenius. (Thurley and Wirdenius,
1973) Their work used this method of observation to record the
actions and events surrounding a supervisor. In relation to 
%
this research it was felt that shadowing supervisors offered 
the most productive form of contact and observation of a large 
cross-section of employees. This was because the supervisor's 
work required them to move about within their respective areas 
of authority and responsibility. An emphasis on first line 
supervision also meant they were a key element of the 
management worker interface.
A first reaction might be to question whether shadowing a 
supervisor leads to employees associating the observer with 
management. Experience from this research suggests that this
need not be the case provided employees are forewarned of your
appearance and you explain to them what you are doing. I also
found that unless the nature of the work prevented it, 
supervisors were happy to allow me the opportunity to talk to 
individuals at their work stations alone, and at any time I
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wished. To this more structured form of observation can be 
added the observation of management meetings, of the
management/worker advisory board, of the union organization and 
of socializing with employees both during their breaks and 
leisure time away from the company. Periods of observation 
totalled two months at Company A and four weeks at Company B.
3) SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In order to test the research's hypotheses it was
necessary to use a methodology incorporating two mutually 
supportive approaches. The first necessitated the
construction of the model of the Japanese production system
for operation in the UK. This was then applied to a sample of 
nine companies and used to demonstrate key areas of variability 
variability among their respective production systems. This 
variability formed the basis of strengths and weaknesses within 
sample company production systems - strengths and weaknesses 
that might impact on their attempts to reduce "them and us" 
attitudes.
The research's second methodological approach 
incorporates the use of case study material. The extensive use 
of questionnaires, interviews and observation at two companies 
enables a linkage to be made between strengths and weaknesses 
in production system characteristics and workforce attitudes 
and behaviour related to "them and us".
The importance of the case studies is that having shown 
how strengths and weaknesses in their production systems affect
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"them and us" attitudes and behaviour among their workforces 
the research can then return to the results of its comparison 
of the other seven companies' production system 
characteristics. Where it identifies similar strengths and 
weaknesses, the implications for the non-case study companies' 
attempts to reduce "them and us" attitudes among their
workforces are likely to be the same as those identified at the
two case study companies.
The methodology outlined in this chapter allows the 
research to test whether the closer a company comes to 
achieving the UK model then the more likely it is that the
company will reduce "them and us" attitudes among its 
employees. In this respect, the results will concern
"intermediate" outcomes - they will not seek to confirm that a 
"close fit" with the model leads to a company's statistically 
proven better production performance. Thus the results do not 
confirm that where a company reduces "them and us" attitudes 
the "final" outcome will be its achievement of correspondingly 
higher levels of say production output, efficiency or profit 
when compared to companies that have not attempted to, or have 
failed to, reduce "them and us" attitudes.
In the following three chapters the research hypotheses 
are tested using the two forms of methodology outlined in this 
chapter. Chapter 7 applies the research's UK model to the 
sample nine companies in the UK consumer electronics company. 
Chapters 8 and 9 go on to examine workforce attitudes and 
behaviour concerning "them and us" at the two case study
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companies. Each case study is treated separately. Chapter 8 
presents the results of the first questionnaire, interviews and 
period of observation conducted at Company A two months after 
it had commenced production. It then looks at Company A 
sixteen months later and analyses the results of the second 
questionnaire, interviews and observation. Chapter 9 presents 
the results of the questionnaire, interviews and observation 
carried out at Company B.
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CHAPTER 7
MEASURING UP TO THE UK MODEL: NINE JAPANESE COMPANIES 
IN THE UK CONSUMER ELECTRONICS SECTOR
INTRODUCTION
Using the methodology outlined in Chapter 6, section 2.1 
of this chapter presents evidence of key dimensions of
variability among the production systems of nine Japanese
companies operating in the UK consumer electronics sector. 
These key dimensions of variability reflect common strengths 
and weaknesses in the nine companies' production systems -
strengths and weaknesses that explain why some of these 
companies are more successful than others in measuring up to 
the research's UK model.
Analysis of the strengths and weaknesses is supported by 
the extensive reporting of interviewee's comments on their 
respective company's production system characteristics. The 
summary and concluding section of the chapter identifies two 
case study companies and discusses why their production systems 
merit closer examination.
The chapter commences by highlighting three particular 
company traits that appear to influence strengths and 
weaknesses in sample companies' production system 
characteristics.
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1 ) MEASURING UP TO THE UK MODEL: EVIDENCE OF STRENGTHS AND
WEAKNESSES
1.1) The Sample Companies: General Details and Overall Scores
Table 7.1 rank orders the nine sample companies in terms 
of the overall score they achieved when compared to the 
research's UK model. (The overall score combines total
scores for the four sets of production system characteristics 
displayed by each company.) Overall scores demonstrate 
considerable variance between the production systems of the
nine companies. Scores range from the highest of 87% to the 
lowest of 43%.
Table 7.1 also provides general details of each company. 
The longest any had been in production was nine years and ten 
months. (Company No 1) The shortest period was one year.
(Company No 3) Size of workforce varied from 62 (Company No
4) to 1000 employees. (Company No 1) Seven (77%) of the nine 
companies were unionised. This is considerably higher than the 
38% for all Japanese companies in the UK consumer electronics 
sector discussed earlier. (See table 1.7 chapter 1.) Union 
density at the nine companies ranged from between 45% at
Companies No 2 and No 6, and 98% at Company No 3. There was an 
average union density of 64% among the sample.
As regards the possible link between company size and 
management structure, (See for instance Thurley 1981; Tsurumi 
1978) only one company, Company No 6, (the joint second 
smallest of the sample) had what the research terms a single
management structure. The other three smallest companies
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G O m M L  PETJUia luro OVgRAU. SCORES OF HIME CPMP W I E S
III THE OK OOWSHMEH ELECTHOMICS SECTOR HICT COMPARED.TO THEJUA MODEL
Company 
Numbe r
No of 
Employees
Age at Time 
of Survey
Union Density 
if Unionsed
Manufacturer
(Ml
or Supplier 
(S)
Single (S) 
or Dual (D) 
Management 
Structure
Overall Score 
Compared to
UK
Model *
Parent Co 
Turnover 
1990/91 
(tOOOm)
Co No 1 1000 9 yrs 8 mths 60% D 87% >200
Co No 2 860 6 yrs 10 mths 65% D 84% 100- 200
Co No 3 90 1 yr 98% D 83% 10-99.9
Co No 4 62 2 yrs 2 mths 70% M D 81% >200
Co No 5 150 4 yrs 1 rath ... S D 69% >200
Co No 6 90 1 yr 8 mths 45% s S 66% «9.99
Co No 7 500 4 yrs 2 mths -- M D 60% <9.99
Co No 8 230 2 yrs 85% M D 49% 10-99 9
Co No 9 550 5 yrs 10 mths 50% D 4 6» <9.99
Weighted and rounded 
to nearest percent
To maintain the anonymity of the research's 
sample companies, specific turnover of parent 
companies is not given.
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(Companies No 3, No 4 and No 5) argued that they expected to 
expand to a size in the next 2 years or less where it was 
necessary to operate a dual management structure. As a result, 
they felt it best to have a dual management team in place well 
before the expansion was undertaken even though it might not 
appear necessary given their current size.
Table 7.1 also shows that Companies No 5 and No 6 were 
suppliers within the UK consumer electronics sector. Finally, 
it shows that four of the top six rank ordered companies had 
parent companies with a turnover in excess of £100,000m in 
1990/91.
Table 7.2 presents correlate analysis of the nine sample 
companies' general details as well as overall scores for each 
company and scores for their four sets of production system 
characteristics.
Analysis of the general details alongside each company's 
overall score reveals several issues for consideration. These 
relate to each transplant's age, size in terms of number of 
employees and its management structure.
On the issue of age, it might be argued that reaching 
something close to the research's UK model would take a company 
some time to achieve. Though the two longest established 
companies (Companies No 1 and No 2) scored highest when 
compared to model, table 7.2 shows , there is no obvious 
correlation between age and score. Indeed, the third and 
fourth oldest companies are ranked fourth and ninth, while the 
youngest company is rank ordered third. This suggests that
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TAfiLE_:/. 2
CX)RRElATIOIK : GEMEMU. DKTJUl-S AM) SCORES WHKN COMPARED TO THE UK MODEL OK MIME SAMPLE. OOMPAMIES 
IM t h e  UK COMSUMER ELECTHOMICS SECTOR
Density at 
Co (»;)
2
Age of 
Co (12 - 120 
Months)
No. of Wafers 
Employed at 
Co (0 - 1000)
Turnover 
of Parent 
Co (LOOOM) 
1990/91
Overall Score 
Compared to 
Ideal UK Model
(%l
Score for 
Manager:a I 
Characteristics 
(%l
Score for 
Organizational 
Characteristics 
{%)
Score for 
Personnel 
Characteristics
Score for 
Industrial 
Relations 
Characteristics 
(%)
10
Overall Scores 
Rank Ordered by
G.'oop I'ltmbecsWip 
1'Group 2 
2'Group 1 
3'Oroup 3
(1)
(2) -.29
(3) -.12
(4) 44
(5) .26
(6 ) .10
(7) -.18
(8) .43
(9) 21
(1 0 ) .21
.05
.01
.001
♦ Scores weighted and rounded to nearest whole percent 
N'9
there is no common timetable under which a Japanese transplant 
might expect to achieve a high score compared to the UK model. 
Moreover, Company No 3 has shown it to be possible within a 
year.
Turning to company size, this appears to be a significant 
factor in relation to both the score achieved and other general 
details on table 7.1. If the nine companies are divided into 
groups based on the number of employees several points emerge. 
Figure 7.1 places the companies into three groups while 
displaying each company's overall score when compared to the UK 
model. Companies in Group 1 employ up to 200 employees. Those 
in Group 2 employ more than 200 employees, but less than 800. 
Companies in Group 3 employ 800 or more. . Companies in Group 
2, irrespective of age, encounter difficulties in operating a 
production system close to that required by the model. If, as 
in table 7.2, overall scores are rank ordered in line with 
membership of these groups then a significant and strong 
association becomes apparent. Group 2 companies have low 
overall scores while companies in Groups 1 and 3 secure higher 
overall scores. Alternatively, if the same groupings are used 
and the overall scores are presented as a normal distribution 
curve then a U shape is obtained. (See figure 7.2)
Why do companies in Groups 1 and . 3 encounter fewer 
difficulties than those in the "mid" size range? There are 
three possible and inter-related answers to this question.
The first answer can be seen if we return to overall 
scores when compared to the research's UK model. Four of the
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ÇWPÎUVU, gOpRES • OF SW®PLB_OpHPJUfrES BASED OH NUMBER OF_ EMPLOYEES
Co No 1 Co No 2 
Group 3 
\ 800 Employees 
Mean » 85.2%
Co No 4 Co No 5 Co No 6 
Group 1 
200 Employees 
Mean • 74.7%
No 7 Co No 8 Co 
Group 2 
201 - 799 Employees 
Mean ■= 51,5%
Overall scores are weighted and 
rounded to the nearest whole percent
Means calculated from exact weighted scores
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picywE 7^2
OyTÜUUJk • OF SAMPLE OqKPAIIIB BASa_OII m M B B  OFL_EMPLCgBS
PRESPn-EP AS A_ PISTRI BgTim ÇURVg
84^
46'
66%
X
Co No 1 Co No 2 
Group 3 
> 800 Employees
40 7 Co No 3 Co No 9 
Group 2 
201 - 799 Employees
40 4 Co No 5 
Group 1 
200 Employees
• Overall scores are weighted and
rounded to the nearest whole percent
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top five scores are achieved by companies who, in terms of 
annual turnover (1990/91 ), fall in the top six Japanese
electronics manufacturers. (Source: JETRO) Three of these
companies fall in Group 1 and two in Group 3. The ability of
these transplants to match the model may therefore be
influenced by the financial and management resources that
their parent companies are able to direct towards them.
The second answer relates to the size of the
manufacturing operation. It is fair to say that given the size 
of the companies in Group 1, it is easier to operate a 
production system with characteristics closer to that of the 
model than at those of companies in Groups 2 and 3. For 
example, several managers at these Group 1 companies argued
that management/ employee communications and communications 
between departments was of a high standard simply because they
had a small number of departments and fewer people were
involved in the process. It may then be easier for the 
production systems at these companies- to fulfil the model's 
requirements.
The third answer is that the products of all four
companies in Group 1 were less complex to produce than those at 
companies in Groups 2 and 3. In the cases of the two
manufacturers in Group 1 (Companies No 3 and No 4) their
products were theoretically just as complicated to manufacture 
as those at companies in Groups 2 and 3. Like all the 
manufacturers in Groups 2 and 3, manufacturers in Group 1 
were what Woodward would describe as "large batch" producers.
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That is they manufactured large batches of a product, on 
assembly lines. (Woodward, 1980, p.39) Batches were of the 
same product, but different models. However, the task of 
organizing production was made less complex at these companies 
because they were still at a stage in their development where 
they could be described as "screwdriver" assembly transplants, 
simply assembling products out of kits sent by their parent 
company. Neither had matched or exceeded local content 
requirements for their products, though both were working 
towards these levels through the development of close ties with 
local suppliers (a characteristic required by the UK model).
These two companies also intended to increase their size 
of operation to at least that of companies in Group 2. Whether 
they could do so without developing similar production system 
weaknesses to those in the sample that already fall into this 
group may be determined by the fact that in each case their 
parent companies had the financial and managerial resources to 
assist them in overcoming such difficulties.
The two suppliers in Group 1, would fall under Woodward's 
"combined category system", that is the production of 
"standardized components in large batches to be subsequently 
assembled diversely". (Woodward, 1980, p.39) The products at 
these companies were less complex to assemble than those those 
in Groups 2 and 3. They required fewer components and their 
production en masse could be achieved with a small number of 
managers and employees which as we have already seen, can make
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it easier to fulfil the model's production system
requirements.
A further question to consider is why companies in Group 2 
appear to encounter greater difficulty in measuring up to the 
UK model than those in Groups 1 and 3? Firstly, all have
parent companies who, in terms of turnover for 1990/91, fall 
outside the top eight Japanese electronics companies. (Source: 
JETRO) This may contribute to an inability on the part of 
these parent companies to direct the necessary financial and 
managerial resources at transplant production system
problems. Secondly, the actual size and scope of the 
manufacturing operations in Group 2 mean that it is harder to 
operate a production system that exhibits a set of 
characteristics close to those identified under the research's 
UK model. Thirdly, all companies in this group were
manufacturing products which were complex to assemble and none 
could be considered "screwdriver" assembly plants. All had 
matched or exceeded local content requirements for their 
products. A combination of these three factors could 
influence the extent of the weaknesses that these transplants 
displayed when compared to the UK model.
The final issue for consideration is that only Company No 
6 in the sample has a single management structure. It is 
noticeable that this company achieves the poorest score (66%) 
of any in Groups 1 or 3. Granted, it is a joint venture 
between two Japanese companies. Neither of these companies 
fall within the top 100 Japanese manufacturers in terms of
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annual turnover, but it might be expected that a Japanese 
management team, at a small supplier and without the potential 
hindrance of stresses and conflicts that can occur under a dual 
management structure would result in a higher score when 
compared to the model. There would appear to be weaknesses in 
this company's production system that contradict the 
successful image of single management structures at Japanese 
transplants portrayed, for example, by White and Trevor's work 
"Under Japanese Management". (White & Trevor, 1983)
The issues raised under this section suggest that the 
evaluation of a sample company's production system 
characteristics needs to take into account whether the company 
exhibits one of the following three traits. These appear to 
influence the extent of its production system's strengths or 
weaknesses :
1) Companies that fall into Groups 1 and 3. (Companies in 
these groups received high overall scores when compared 
to the UK model.)
2) Companies that fall into Group 2. (Companies in this 
group received low overall scores when compared to the UK 
model.)
3) The company with a single management structure. (This 
is the only company with such a structure and it received 
the lowest overall score of any company in Groups 1 and 3 
when compared with the UK model.)
1.2) Managerial Characteristics: The Strengths and Weaknesses 
Table 7.3 provides details of the scores achieved for 
individual characteristics within the managerial and other 
three sets of production system characteristics at the nine 
sample companies. Individual characteristics are identifiable
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by the number above each score. These correspond to the numbers 
allocated to characteristics on figure 5.1. (Repeated next to 
'table 7.3) Thus, a score allocated to number one of managerial 
characteristics represents a company’s score fpr coherent 
vision. Figure 7.3 reports each company's total score for 
managerial characteristics. Companies are placed on the 
horizontal axis on the basis of their rank ordered overall 
score. (See table 7.1) The figure also divides the companies 
into the three groups based on workforce size.
Examination of figure 7.3 reveals that while companies in 
Groups 1 and 3 achieve high mean scores of 71% and 76% 
respectively for their managerial characteristics, those in 
Group 2 secure an extremely low mean score of 26%. This 
creates a strong and significant correlation between achieving 
a low score and being in Group 2 and achieving better scores by 
being in Groups 1 and 3.. Analysis of the results for 
individual characteristics in table 7.3 reveals the main causes 
of this variance.
1) Coherent Vision - In general, companies in Groups 1 and 3 
demonstrated good levels of coherent management vision. 
Managers at each company generally shared a common set of 
management objectives. The two most common responses were those 
relating to the quality of the product and attempts to make the 
product price competitive. The inverse applied at companies 
in Group 2. Here, there was rarely a coherent vision of what 
the company hoped to achieve. Managers at these three companies 
never shared more than one common objective. At one company
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FIGURE 3.1
THE MODEL OF JIU'WfESE l'kOpUÇTIOM SYSTEM , FOR OPERATIOW IK „THE UK
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS (NIR Practices) 
Core/Periphery workforce distinctions
Guarantee of secure employment
Welfarism
Single Status
Market led pay levels
Merit based promotion
Intensive selection procedures
Training
Elements of consensua1ity and 
participation
MANAGERIAL CHARACTERISTICS
TT Coherent v i s ion
2) Consistency of style
3) C o nsensua1/g roup i s t decision 
making procedures
4) Circulation
5) Special selection/ 
retention procedures
 >
I-R-CHARACTERISTICS (NIR Practices)
T ) N o  u n i o n i s m o r  single unionism
2) Enterprise 1 eve 1 bar-gaining
3) Formalised union or other o r-gani za t ion
4) New style agreement in operation or 
alternative procedures________________ ____
ORGAN IZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS.
Co-ordination and co-operation 
of all departments 
Company wide communications 
Emphasis on first line supervision 
Close ties with supervisors 
UK personnel management
PRODUCTION SYSTEM 
REQUIREMENTS 
Organization ofj^bpur
1) Direct Labour
2) Flexible
3) Teamwork
2ualiiy._Gontrol
Continuous Improvement 
5) Quality
Prganiza_tion and Supp_ly 
Production
6) Full utilization of 
production area
7) Full utilization of 
production machinery
B ) Fu11 use of new 
techno 1ogy
5) Just in time supply
Pxeduct_Slrategy 
-)lO) Adaptability to diverse 
model range 
II) Continuous R & D
NB: An unbroken line denotes £ 
direct relationship 
A broken lines denotes an 
indirect relationship.
Characteristics or 
requirements in bold type 
represent an area of 
difference in comparison 
to the domestic Japanese 
production system.
TABLE 7.3
s a m p l e  COMPAITf SKXIRES TOR IITOIVIDCAL CHARACTERISTICS AND SETS Of 
CHARACTERISTICS WHEH COMPARED TO THE UK MODEL
Company 
Numbe r
Managerial 
Character!s tI c e
Organ!tat Iona! 
Character!sties
Personnel 
Character!sties
Indust r i a 1 
Re 1 at ions 
Characteristics
1 2 3 4 5
2 3 3 1 2.5
Total 11.5 (76%)*
11.5 (76%)**
1 2 3 4 5
3 2.7 2 2.5 3 
Total 13.2 (88%)* 
13.2 (88%)'*
5
2.5
1 2  3 4
3 3 3 3
Total 12 (100%)' 
14.4 (96%)’
6 7 8 9 10
3 1 2.6 3 3
Total 26.1 (87%)* 
13.05 (87%)
Overall Score 62.8 (87.2%)’ 
52.15 (86.91%)’
1 2 3 4 5
2 3 3 1 2.5
Total 11.5 (76%)*
11.5 (76%)**
1 2 3 4 5
2.6 2.9 1 3 3
Total 12.5 (83%)* 
12.5 (83%)**
1 2  3 4
1 2 3 2.5
Total 10.5 (87.5%)’ 
12.6 (84%)**
6 7 8 9 10
3 3 3 2.6 2.5
Total 27.1 (90.3%)* 
13.55 (90.3%)'
Overall Score 61.59 (85.5%)’ 
60.15 (83.5%)’
1 2 3 4 5
2 3 2 2 1.5
Total 10.5 (70%)*
10.5 (70%)**
1 2  3 4
3 2.2 3 3
Total 14.2 (87%) 
14.2 (87%)
5
2.2
1 2  3 4
3 3 3 3
Total 12 (100%)* 
14.4 (96%)’
6 7 6 9 10
3 1 2.6 2.5 2.6
Total 20.9 (69.6%)* 
10.45 (69.6%)'
Overall Score 57.6 (80%)*
49.55 (82.5%)'
1 2  3 4
3 2 2.2 3
Total 11 (68%)* 
11 (73.3%)
Co No 5 1 2 3 4 5
1 3 3 3 0
Total 11.1 (74%)*
11.1 (74%)**
1 2 3 4 5
3 2.8 1 2.5 2 
Total 12 8 (85.3%)' 
12.8 (85.3%)’
1 2 3 4 5
3 2.4 2 2.5 3 
Total 13.1 (87.3%)’ 
13.1 (87%)**
1 2 3 4 5 1 2  3 4
3 2 0 3 1 . 5 1 3 2 2.3 
Total 10.8 (90%)*
12.9 (86.4%)**
6 7 8 9 10
3 1 2 . 6 2.2 2
Total 23.8
11.9
(79
(79.
. 3%) * 
.3%)**
Overal1 Score 58.4 (81.5%)*
48.16 (80.6%)**
1 2 3 4 5 1 2  3 4
1 1 1 3 2 3 3 2.5 2.3 
Total 7.6 (63%)*
9.12 (60.8%)**
6 7 8 9 10
2 0 3 1 2 . 6
Total 16.6
8.3
(55.
(55.
3%)*
3%)**
Overall Score 48.4 (67.2%)* 
41.62 (69.3%)’
-243-
TABl^ 7,3 Conlld.
Company 
Numbe r
Managerial
Characteristics
Organi national 
Characteri st ics
Personnel 
Character!St 1cs
Indust ri a 1 
Relations 
Characteristics
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 5 1 2 3 5 1 2  3 4
3 2 2.2 3 0 3 2.4 2 2.5 3 1 1 1 3 2 3 3 2.5 2.3
Total 10.2 (68*)* Total 11.3 (75 . 3*)* Total 8.3 (69.6*)*
10.2 (68*)** 11.3 (75 .3*)** 9.96 (66.4*)**
6 7 8 9 10
2 1 1.3 1 1.3
Total 16. 1 (53..6*)*
8.05 (53..6*)**
Overall Score 45.9 (63.7*)*
39.51 (65.8*)**
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2  3 4
1 3 1.2 0 1 1 2.3 2 3 3 0 1 2 3 1. 6 3 2 2 2.3
Total 6.2 (41. 3*)* Total 11.3 (75 .3*)* Total 9.3 (77.5*)*
6.2 (41. 3*)** 11.3 (75 .3*)** 11.1 (74.4*)**
6 7 8 9 10
3 2 2.6 2 2
Total 17.2 (57. 3%)*
8.6 (57. 3*)**
Overal1 Score 44 (61.1*)*
35.2 (60.3*)**
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2  3 4
0 1 0.2 1 0.5 0 1.8 1 3 3 3 1 1 3 1 . 6 3 3 1.5 1.6
Total 2.7 (18*)* Total 5 8 (38. 6*1* Total 9.1 (75.6*)*
2.7 (18*)** 5.8 (38. 6)** 10.92 (72.8*)**
6 7 8 9 10
3 2 1.6 1 . 6 1 . 6
Total 19.4 (65.,3*)*
9 8 (65..3*)**
Overal1 Score 37.2 (51.6*)*
29.22 (48.7*)**
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2  3 4
1 2 0 0 0 1 2.5 0 3 2 1 2 2 3 1 1 3 1 1.6
Total 3 (20*)' Total 8.5 (56. 6*)* Total 6.6 (55*)*
3 (20*)' 8.5 (56. 6*)** 7.92 (52 8*)**
6 7 8 9 10
0 0 1.3 2 1 . 6
Total 15.9 (53. 6*)*
7.95 (53. 6*)**
Overall Score 33.9 (47.2*)' 
27.37 (45.6*)'
Unweighted Totals 
* Weighted Totals
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FIGUKE 7._3
TOTlULSOORœ • r O K EJVCH_SJlMPL^jD0r«PMnC5_S^_Qr 
?PUIACERIAL çsgiHACTraiSTiœ
Co No 1 Co No 2 
Croup 3 
>, 800 Employees 
Mean * 76.0%
Co No 3 Co No 4 Co No 5 
Group 1 
^ 200 Employees 
Mean » 71.3%
No 7 Co No 8 Co N
201 - 799 Employees 
Mean = 26.4%
* Scores are weighted and rounded 
to the nearest whole percent
Means calculated from exact weighted scores
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three different objectives were shared between four managers. 
These ranged from "the production of high quality goods" to 
"getting the stuff out of the door at the end of the day".
2) Consistency of Style - All but Company No 8 achieved a good 
level of consistency in their management styles. Several 
managers commented that if consistently applied, policies and 
procedures contributed to the stability of management/worker 
relations and to the uninterrupted flow of production. In 
contrast, at Company No 8, (in Group 2) all but the personnel 
manager argued that there was no written promotion procedure 
and instead applied their own interpretations and practices to 
it. One manager stated that on occasion he felt it necessary 
to promote employees without the posts they had filled being 
first advertised internally. This directly contradicted a 
requirement of the written procedure.
3) Consensual/Groupist Decision making Procedures - Companies 
in Groups 1 and 3 all achieved high scores in relation to their 
decision making procedures. A production manager at a company 
in Group 1 was adamant that "the Japanese here never retreat 
into little huddles and not tell us what's going on and they 
are always coming to us with problems and ideas for discussion. 
We're also made to feel more secure about what's happening by 
the fact that right at the time of the company's start up they 
made a big issue about all business being conducted in 
English. I've never had cause to complain that that's not the 
case".
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Japanese and UK managers at companies in both groups 
consistently talked of the compromise of attitudes and 
behaviour necessary to make "nemawashi/ringi" based decision 
making procedures accessible and useful to both parties. For 
one production manager the reasoning behind the compromise was 
simple: "You have to adapt to their way of working. Their way 
of reaching a decision is what make us successful". For other 
UK managers the compromise appeared to centre on the acceptance 
of the value of what one procurement manager described as 
"shared responsibility". He explained that he had initially 
found it difficult to accept that other managers should 
contribute to a decision affecting a department that in non 
Japanese companies would be regarded as being of their 
jurisdiction.
For one Japanese manager the need to compromise had, he 
believed, changed his management style: "In Japan I would
never express my opinion about a proposal without hesitating. I 
would be very careful about what I said. But here. I've lost 
the hesitation, I don't think about all the things I would in 
Japan... The reason I have become like this is because British 
managers are suspicious if we hesitate. They think it means no 
or we don't like the proposal".
A very different situation was apparent at companies in 
Group 2. Local managers made the following types of observation 
about their Japanese colleagues: "In my mind there is no doubt 
that there are meetings (between Japanese) that go on and that 
while decisions are not exactly made in them they determine the
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outcomes of proposals which we are meant to have helped
evaluate"; "They're (the Japanese) incapable of a snap 
decision, it's exasperating"; "Meetings sometimes lapse into 
being bilingual, and we then rely on a Japanese manager's 
interpretation. We've got no way of knowing whether he's 
translating what was actually said"; "It often seems that they 
don't want to tell us something and then it's very hard for us 
to find out what's going on until we are told to go off and 
make it happen". Evidence of a compromise between local and 
Japanese attitudes and behaviour was in short supply. A 
personnel manager argued that there was "... no evidence of any 
strategy to harmonise the two cultures. It's all very
piecemeal, 'a let's see what happens' approach. Production here
has suffered accordingly."
Japanese managers at these companies seemed somewhat
suspicious or dismissive of their local colleagues' abilities. 
Often their role was to act as advisor to local management, but 
on several occasions they made it quite clear that Japanese 
management felt that there was more to their role than that. 
One went as far as to describe the Japanese and local 
management relationship in terms of "Bunraku". (Japanese puppet 
theatre where each puppet is manipulated by puppeteers using 
sticks.) For him, local managers were puppets, which required 
manipulation by Japanese puppeteers. Other Japanese managers 
explained that much of their suspicion about local management's 
abilities stemmed from local management's refusal to accept 
the value of "shared responsibility". One believed that: "Not
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every local manager understands that he is part of a team. 
They try to make decisions alone and do not look at the
possible problems. They may cause other problems when they do
this."
4) Circulation - All companies in Groups 2 and 3 received poor 
scores. Japanese managers complained that UK managers tended 
to resist taking on responsibilities in areas other than those 
that they had been employed to manage. They were deeply 
concerned that local personnel, sales or administrative 
management did not get enough experience of production and vice 
versa. Why, they constantly asked, did local management believe 
that they should remain specialists in one area, rather than 
become specialists in several? Local managers were perfectly 
aware that their Japanese colleagues wanted them to circulate, 
but talked of a fear of the unknown and a feeling that they 
would be most productive using the specialist skills they were 
employed to bring to the company. One explained: "It's
something the Japanese would very much like us to do, but no
one puts themselves forward for it. It only seems to happen 
between related departments. For example, we might move people 
between departments such as design and quality".
Companies in Group 1 scored highest in relation to this 
characteristic. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, all 
managers at these companies had been employed on the basis that 
while they might have a particular skill which the company 
needed, the small size of the company meant that they would be 
compelled to have a wide range of responsibilities and to carry
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out a wide range of tasks. The Personnel manager at one 
company was also company secretary and responsible for 
procurement. Secondly, Company No 6 which had a single 
management structure falls in Group 1. Managers at this company 
being predominantly Japanese circulated as a matter of course. 
5) Special Selection/Retention Procedures - All companies in 
Groups 1 and 2 scored poorly for this characteristic. Apart 
from paying local management a competitive salary based on the 
local median, their selection procedures usually consisted of 
using agencies to screen candidates followed by a series of 
formal interviews. Recruits were always selected on the basis 
of a particular skill, rather than attitude, and few local 
managers felt that they could honestly say what exactly their 
employer had been looking for when they had been interviewed.
Though several companies claimed to be aiming for a UK 
dominated management team, some local managers were sceptical 
as to how genuine a commitment this was, since no company had 
set a timetable in which to achieve it. Local managers at these 
companies were also concerned that a promotional ceiling 
existed for them; that there was nowhere for them to be 
promoted to after a certain level at the transplant. As one 
put it: "I worry that when I reach a high level here all I will 
be able to do is build horizontally". Others who expressed 
similar concerns, acknowledged that the only other alternative 
would be to leave.
Selection of Japanese managers at companies in Groups 1 
and 2 was based purely on technical skills. Some had worked
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with the transplant’s product at equivalent parent company 
factories in Japan or elsewhere in the world. None had 
undergone any form of induction prior to arrival in the UK, and 
though several had voluntarily attended English classes either 
in Japan or the UK, none felt that it had been a prerequisite 
for selection to do their job. Indeed, at one company some 
Japanese managers could speak no English at all, A Japanese 
manager interviewed here candidly admitted that he had "no 
idea" why or how he had been selected.
At companies in Group 3 the selection of UK managers was 
far more intensive. At one company, a procurement manager 
described how a key element of his selection had involved him 
sitting in on a Group discussion with eight existing management 
staff. The procedure was clearly aimed at assessing his ability 
to contribute to a consensual style of decision making: "At the 
time I couldn’t work it out, but what they’d done was put me in 
a team to see how I fitted in. There were people there I hadn’t 
expected to work with. From finance etc. Within two minutes 
I’d forgotten their respective positions."
Japanese management at these companies also tended to have 
undergone selection procedures which as well as technical 
ability, included short induction courses prior to arrival in 
the UK, and made English one of the prerequisites of their 
selection. The procedures were also believed to have helped 
identify attitudes that might be helpful at the transplant. 
Interviewees at these companies talked of "compromise" with
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local management and of encouraging "peaceful" or "harmonious" 
management practices.
1.3) Organizational Characteristics: The Strengths and
weaknesses
Figure 7.4 reports each of the nine companies' total 
scores for organizational characteristics. Scores for 
individual companies range from 39% to 88%. As with managerial 
characteristics, the figure reveals that companies in Group 
2 secure the lowest three scores out of the nine companies 
resulting in a mean score of 56%. Companies in Group 1 secured 
a mean score of 83% and those in Group 3 85%. Table 7.2
reveals a strong and significant association between achieving 
a low score and being in Group 2 and and achieving a better 
score as a Group 1 or 3 company. Each company's scores
for specific organizational characteristics are contained in 
table 7.3.
1) Co-ordination and Co-operation of all Departments - Managers 
at companies in Groups 1 and 3 reported good levels of inter­
departmental co-ordination and co-operation. Decision making 
was clearly influenced by ringi/nemawashi procedures. As one 
production manager argued: "There's tremendous interaction
between departments - a lot of informal meetings and 
discussion. There are very few fancy official meetings with 
formal presentations of ideas... . Formal meetings are just 
for approval of proposals already discussed. If we have a 
major new proposal we'll form a team of people from all the 
relevant departments and with all the relevant experience in
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TOTM.. SCpRJES • FOR EACH SAMPLE OOMPAMYlS SET OP 
ORGANIEATIOMAL CHMAÇTKRISTICS
Co No 1 Co No 2 
Croup 3 
800 Employees 
Mean =■ 85.5%
Co No 3 Co No 4 Co No 5 Co No 6 
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ilo 7 Co No 8 Co r 
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201 - 799 Employees 
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order to consider it. There are no overnight decisions, every 
one goes away takes advice and then comes back. Time is the 
only drawback but then you're more likely to come to a decision 
with which everyone agrees and is keen to implement".
Such co-operation and co-ordination was not apparent at 
companies in Group 2. The reasons stem from those discussed in 
the previous section concerning managerial characteristics. In 
some instances, local managers argued that informal discussion 
of a new proposal or idea was confined to an elite of Japanese 
management so that by the time it reached them for 
consideration the outcome was a forgone conclusion. In others, 
contact with other departmental managers was generally confined 
to regular, formal meetings. Japanese management at these 
companies suggested that British managers were simply not 
interested in what was going on in departments other than their 
own, and would not approach managers in other departments for 
advice unless absolutely essential. As one Japanese manager 
explained: "UK managers don't believe there's an overlap
between departments, they forget that they might have a common 
interest." In short, development of a new proposal at these 
companies could not be said to bare any relation to 
ringi/nemawashi processes.
2) Company Wide Communications - None of the nine companies 
received a maximum score for horizontal and vertical 
communications. Two of the three companies in Group 2 received 
a marginally poorer score than those in Groups 1 and 3. What 
tended to occur was that average scores for the characteristic
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were negatively affected in instances where though companies 
received good scores for horizontal, inter-departmental 
communications they received a poorer score relating to the 
communication of information down to employees. While some 
companies did operate daily team briefings, others operated 
them on a weekly basis, some monthly.
Employee representatives often revealed that, while in 
theory line management were expected to operate regular daily 
or weekly briefings, some did not bother while others did so on 
an ad hoc basis. At one Group 2 company an employee 
representative talked of a manager who had reasoned that "I 
will give you information as and when I get it". This was not 
said as a criticism, for she went on to point out, that unless 
information was withheld that directly affected their pay or 
conditions of work, employees were unlikely to be bothered by 
such an attitude. It was not possible at this stage of the 
research to to discern whether these management actions were 
due to a lack of interest or a fear that such procedures 
challenged their authority in some way. The issue is more 
fully examined later in the case study material.
3) Emphasis on First Line Supervision - Several companies, 
irrespective of which group they were in achieved a low score 
for this characteristic. Most did attach considerable 
importance to their supervisors' leadership and managerial 
qualities, but only one out of the nine actually employed 
supervisors who were expected to attain or had attained a high
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level of qualifications. (Higher National Diplomas and above.) 
Few paid their supervisors in excess of the local median.
On several occasions it was Japanese management at these 
companies who picked up on this deficiency. Their concern was 
summed up by one manager who argued that quality of the product 
rested on the quality of the operators who built it, and the 
quality of the operators was determined by the quality of 
supervision they received. He described each operator as a 
"baby" and was critical of UK supervisors: "All our
supervisors do is watch. Operators don't know what is going 
on and it needs a good supervisor to show them. You can't
develop a good operator without such supervision... If we're 
bad parents and show no interest in them the baby can't grow 
into a good adult and we can't expect it to be loyal to the 
company".
4) Close Ties with Suppliers - All but Company No 8 in Group 2 
achieved good scores for their relationships with local 
suppliers. Of these eight, all but three applied what one 
company called a "Purchase Agreement" to each of their 
suppliers - some form of written criteria concerning price, 
delivery time and quality. All eight were willing to lend 
expertise and advice to jointly solve a supplier's problems. 
One, would if the need arose, underwrite its suppliers' stock
purchases. Nonetheless, all were anxious to stress that there
would come a point where it was necessary to phase out a 
consistently poor supplier rather than suffer themselves. 
Conversely all maintained some form of relationship with the
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supplier even where it gave them no problems. At one company 
the procurement manager explained that "We keep our suppliers 
informed of our plans for up to the next five years so that if 
they don't think they can be part of them (say they haven't got 
the capacity and don't think they can expand to the level 
required) we can both plan accordingly." All eight conducted 
mini audits of suppliers before conducting business with them. 
This involved evaluation of a supplier's production capacity 
and its quality control practices, analysis of its customer 
base and a discussion of its long-term plans.
At Company No 8 none of this was happening. There 
appeared to be no procedures in place which either compelled or 
assisted local suppliers to reach the standards of price, 
delivery time, and quality required by the company. 
Interviews with production management revealed considerable 
concern that late delivery of components and more especially 
the supply of poor quality components was disrupting the 
efficiency of the production system.
5) UK Personnel Management - Only at two out of the nine 
companies could the level of influence and responsibility of 
the UK Personnel manager be questioned. At these companies, 
the Personnel managers reported to a more senior Japanese 
manager, and were at a level in the management structure which 
they believed on occasions hindered their influence over 
personnel and industrial relations issues.
At Company No 9 the lack of seniority for the Personnel 
manager was not simply based on its being a UK filled post.
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other UK management posts at the company were at a more senior 
and influential level. Company No 6 had a single management 
structure. The Personnel manager was concerned that exclusion 
from Japanese dominated senior management led to decisions 
being made without seeking this manager's opinion. It is for 
this reason that the company did not achieve a maximum score 
for consensual and groupist decision making. (Under managerial 
characteristics above.)
1.4) Personnel Characteristics: The Strengths and Weaknesses
Figure 7.5 presents each company's total score for 
personnel characteristics and shows that companies in Groups 1 
and 3 achieve higher mean scores than those in Group 2. Table 
7.2 reveals a significant association between securing a low 
score and being a Group 2 company and achieving better scores 
as a Group 1 or 3 company. However, when analysed company by 
company, scores for personnel characteristics do not divide up 
as easily into Groups 1, 2 and 3 as they did for managerial 
and organizational characteristics. The two highest scores 
of 90% and 87% were for companies in Group 3. Of the two 
lowest scores, one of 50% was for a company in Group 2, the 
other of 52% was for Company No 6, in Group 1. This is the only 
company in the sample with a single management structure.
Two out of the three companies with the lowest scores were 
not unionised and do not therefore fit the argument that non­
unionised companies are compelled to offer their employees 
terms and conditions of employment in excess of unionised
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companies. Examination of individual personnel characteristics 
in table 7.3 reveals several areas of variance from company to 
company.
1 ) Core/Periphery Workforce Distinctions - Core/periphery 
distinctions were a priority at companies in all three groups. 
Only three companies achieved a score of one or less.
Where clear core/periphery distinctions existed personnel 
managers cited one or both of two positive outcomes. Firstly, 
permanent employment appeared as a possible reward for 
temporary staff. It was something for them to work towards. At 
a company in Group 3, permanent operators were always recruited 
from temporary employees. That way, explained the personnel 
manager, "when a permanent vacancy arises we've already had a 
good look at the successful candidate and know exactly what 
we're getting". Secondly, these companies wanted permanent 
employees to attach status to their jobs; to feel that the 
additional benefits, level of pay or holiday entitlement they 
received were indicative of the company's valuing their work.
2) Guarantee of Secure Employment - Only one company in Group 
3 had a written statement to avoid making core employees 
redundant except as a very last resort. Others in all three 
were less equivocal. Several explained that they gave a verbal 
undertaking when interviewing for temporary or permanent 
employees. "It adds status and value to a permanent job" 
said one personnel manager. Others were even less specific. 
One company relied on the premise that: "They know we'll not go 
away over night".
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3) Welfarism - Both companies in Group 3 offered welfare 
benefits in excess of a pension and sick pay to all employees. 
Additional benefits included a week's extra holiday entitlement 
when getting married and two days paternity leave. Only the 
company with a single management structure operated neither a 
pension or sick pay scheme.
4) Single Status - All companies irrespective of which group 
they were in or their management structure achieved maximum 
scores for single status. All operated harmonised methods of 
payment and holiday entitlement and all had a policy of 
minimising the number of job grades.
5) Market Led pay Levels - Interviews with Personnel management 
at each company established that every company's pay was 
influenced by their conducting surveys and accruing other 
information in order to establish the local median for the 
skills required. Irrespective of group or management 
structure, three companies claimed to pay above the top 
quartile of local pay rates, three claimed they paid above the 
median and three claimed that they paid the local median.
Only three companies, one from each group operated a 
payment system that incorporated an element of merit or 
performance related pay. Other companies had avoided these 
systems or, as in two cases, planned to implement them at a 
later date. There was often a desire to use performance or 
merit related pay, but it was matched by anxiety over its 
suitability for UK employees in manual occupations. This 
anxiety was summed up by one personnel manager; "I'm worried
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about getting into a situation where we have to explain to 
operators every five minutes why the person next to them did 
better financially out of such a scheme when they're both doing 
exactly the same task. I'm also unsure how compatible some of 
these schemes are with single status. They open us up to 
allegations of favouring the 'blue eyed boy'".
6) Merit Based Promotion - Six of the nine companies, 
irrespective of the group they were in, had a written merit 
based promotion policy. At one, the employee handbook stated: 
"We have a policy of seeking to promote from within and to 
maximise opportunities for existing employees. To this end, 
all vacancies will initially be advertised internally whenever 
possible, and all suitable employees are welcome to apply". 
Two of the other companies operated an unwritten merit based 
policy. One, in Group 2, had no clear policy and the personnel 
manager was concerned that in some work areas "fitting a mould" 
created by the immediate manager was more important than 
genuine ability, commitment and performance. There was a 
tendency among certain managers to promote those "in their own 
image" rather than to look at who it might be best to promote 
in the interests of the company.
7) Intensive Selection Procedures - No clear pattern of 
variance emerged regarding employee selection procedures at the 
sample companies. Five companies used either one or two of the 
intensive selection procedures required by the research's UK 
model. Three companies, including company No 6 with a single 
management structure, operated none of the required procedures.
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Only one company achieved a maximum score. It used 
detailed application forms which included questions ranging 
from employment and educational history to attitudes to work. 
Candidates also went through an initial screening interview 
conducted by the personnel department and then if successful 
went through a further interview which included management or 
supervisory representatives from the work area with the vacancy 
for which they had applied. Finally, the candidate had to 
undergo a series of dexterity, and comparison tests. The 
personnel manager at this company believed that such procedures 
enabled them to identify not only those candidates best suited 
to the nature of the work, but those with some sort of 
potential, either attitudinal or skills based, which could be 
developed to the future benefit of the company.
8) Training - A mixed set of results emerged for this 
characteristic. Only two companies one in Group 1 and one in 
Group 3 ensured that all employees received a period of regular 
formal training away from the production area, gave all 
employees a minimum period of a day's induction away from the 
work area and put all employees through a period of formal on- 
the-job training (OJT). All other companies offered either 
some of the procedures on a formal basis, or some or all of 
the procedures on an informal basis. At two companies, informal 
arrangements meant that it was left to the relevant supervisor 
to organize the procedures as and when they had the time.
9 ) Elements of Consensualitv and Participation - Both 
management and employee representatives were asked to identify
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any structure of employee participation at their respective 
company which they felt allowed the formulation of a decision 
based on consensus between management and employees. Only 
shop-floor based structures of participation were considered, 
such as quality circles, team meetings, or Kaizen discussions. 
Company advisory boards were not included. (These are discussed 
under section 2.5, industrial relations characteristics)
The highest scores achieved were by companies in Group 3. 
The lowest two were accredited to two companies in Group 1, one 
of which had a single management structure. Both management and 
employee representatives at these latter companies gave 
examples of participation structures that were in fact 
consultative and received low scores. Management used 
structures to inform employees of what was proposed, took their 
comments into account, and then implemented the proposal. Only 
one company, in Group 3, achieved a maximum score where both 
management and employee representatives agreed that structures 
existed where employees could formulate decisions related to 
their work areas. The decisions were rarely vetoed by 
management and were implemented on the basis of consensus. All 
other companies operated participative structures but some or 
all of the respondents believed that decisions were often 
vetoed by management.
10) Regimented Work Environment - Only one company, in Group 3, 
achieved a maximum score for this characteristic. The lowest 
two scores achieved were from companies in Group 2. Their 
scores were low because although they operated procedures that
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created a regimented work environment, employee representatives 
reported that new rules and procedures related to the
workplace were only occasionally implemented by management 
after verbal or written explanation. This was said to have 
caused resentment among the workforce. An employee
representative argued that management; "... implement 
something, see the outcomes and judge it a success. That's all 
they're concerned with and that's why before they implement it, 
they don't actually talk to the people who it affects to see 
how they feel... Rules just appear at briefings. We can say
something but by then it's too late". Other companies' scores 
were low either because their employee representatives had 
cited similar experiences, though such experiences were
described as being the exception rather than the rule, or 
because they did not exhibit specific procedures required by 
the research's UK model for this characteristic.
2.5) Industrial Relations Characteristics: Strengths and
Weaknesses
Total scores for each company's industrial relations 
characteristics are given in figure 7.6. Two companies, one in 
Group 1 and one in Group 3 achieved maximum scores. (Weighting 
of responses reduced these scores to 96%.) The lowest score 
was for a company in Group 2 which scored 53%. mean scores for 
each of the groups reflect this pattern of results.
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EJLCOKE 7,6
TQTM, SCORES . • FOR EACH SAMPLE C C W A W Y  ’ S SET OF 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIOIS CHARACTERISTICS
Co No 1 Co No 2 
Group 3 
^ 800 Employees 
Mean • 90.0%
Co No 3 Co No 4 Co No 5 Co No 6 
Group 1 
^ 200 Employees 
Mean » 77.4%
4o 7 Co No 8 Co h 
Group 2 
201 - 799 Employees 
Mean - 66 6%
Scores are weighted and rounded 
to the nearest whole percent
Means calculated from exact weighted scores
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Correlations in table 7.2 show a significant relationship 
between gaining a low score and being in Group 2 and gaining a 
higher score as a Group 1 or 3 company. However, when analysed 
company by company, scores for industrial relations 
characteristics do not divide up on the basis of membership of 
Groups 1, 2, or 3. Nor are they influenced by management
structure. Table 7.3 lists the scores for individual 
industrial relations characteristics at each company.
1 ) No Union or Single Union Recognition - Seven companies 
recognised a single union. In all cases the union recognised 
was the EETPU. Of these, two, one from Group 1 and one from 
Group 2, had not achieved union density levels above 60% and so 
achieved a low score. One of these two was company No 6 with 
a single management structure. Personnel managers at these 
companies all expressed disquiet at the thought that shop 
stewards did not speak for a significant majority of the 
workforce. One posited that low membership was not because the 
union was ineffective, but rather that it was a victim of its 
own success: "I wonder if its a general apathy. They don't
bother joining because they feel they've got all they need 
anyway and they seem to fail to accredit any of what they've 
got to the union". Stewards at another of these companies saw 
the problem differently believing that membership was low 
because: "The union here is seen as being too weak.
Management are seen to ignore us. We complain or act using the 
usual procedures but workers here never see any outcomes or
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results. We're judged on that basis and it causes considerable 
problems".
Two companies, one in Group 2 and one in Group 1, were rot 
unionised. One, a manufacturer, had located to an area in
which other Japanese companies had not unionised either. The 
other, a supplier, was based in an area with a strong tradition 
of unionisation and where other Japanese companies lad 
recognised unions. In both cases management claimed that their 
was no desire among employees to join a union. They would rot 
however be drawn into discussing whether they would recognise a 
union if the desire to join a union were to subsequently emerge 
among their employees. At the smaller Group 1 company, 
employee representatives concurred with their management, 
arguing that the size of the company ensured gœd 
management/worker communications and that management attitucfes 
determined a fair hearing of any employee relations problems 
that arose. One employee explained: "We're a small company - 
like a family. We don't need a union to sort out cur 
problems. Management are very fair here. They operate an 
'open-door' policy so that we can see them at any time and 
talk problems through."
Employee representatives at the larger Group 2 company 
were less assured as to whether the workforce desired union 
representation, arguing that some workers saw it as necessary 
to check management power. As one put it: "A lot of them would 
rather be in a union, because they feel that ... how can I pit 
it ... if you don't get the right wage rise, then you can go on
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strike and do this and do that to get it. You're not allowed 
to join a union here - it's company policy and they tell you 
from the word go, 'NO UNION'".
2) Enterprise Level Bargaining - One company, though its pay 
was linked to the enterprise level only, did not operate a 
formalised bargaining structure. This was Company No 5; the 
smaller of the two companies that did not recognise a union. 
The company did not have any form of elected employee 
representation with which it consulted about pay. Instead, 
management gave an annual presentation concerning the company's 
performance. At this presentation they announced what the pay 
rise for the year would be, and then explained how the figure 
had been arrived at. (It was calculated on the basis of the 
local median for the skills required and what the company could 
afford to pay.) The increase was then actioned without further 
discussion. Both management and employee representatives 
interviewed at the company concurred that, to date, workers 
appeared to have accepted increases as being fair and 
satisfactory.
All other companies in the sample operated some formalised 
bargaining procedure ever pay and other terms and conditions of 
work which was conducted at the enterprise level only.
3) Formalized Union or Other Structure - Only Company No 5 did 
not have a formalised union or other structure of employee 
representation that was supposed to deal with collective or 
individual grievances.
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Employee representatives at three companies with either of 
the required structures (two in Group 3 and one in Group 1) 
believed that management as a whole saw the structures as 
necessary and useful. These companies achieved maximum scores 
for the characteristic.
The existence of union or other structures elsewhere, 
notably the three companies in Group 2 was not without its 
problems. Employee representatives invariably criticised sDiie 
managers or management as a whole for not believing the 
structure was necessary and perceiving it as a hindrance. At 
one of these companies shop stewards argued that some managers 
disliked the union's interference in grievance and disciplinary 
procedures: "They {the procedures) are supposed to be based on 
honesty, but if we complain about management's actions tiey 
get defensive and hostile. They just can't handle Dur 
involvement. Our existence is too much of a challenge to thsir 
authority". Invariably, these criticisms were aimed at local 
management, since it was they who were left to operate 
industrial relations on a day to day basis at the transplants.
Employee representatives were uncertain as to what their 
Japanese managers thought about their respective employee 
representative structures since attempts to communicate 
problems to Japanese management were hampered by having to ise 
local management as the intermediary. For one steward this 
meant: "Local management act as a screen. They don't ask sen.or 
Japanese managers what we've asked, they ask it differently so
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the facts get distorted and we end up with an answer that isn't 
honest or accurate".
Only at Company No 6, with a single management structure, 
did shop stewards express specific concerns about some 
Japanese managers' attitudes towards the recognised union. The 
size of the company compelled Japanese management to become
involved in day to day industrial relations issues.
Accordingly, stewards had far more contact with them on this 
basis than employee representatives at other companies in the 
sample. The stewards here felt that some Japanese managers 
believed that the union was too adversarial and that this meant 
that it did not have the company's interests at heart. As one 
steward put it: "Because we do sometimes challenge a decision 
they've made they try and avoid telling us anything that they 
think we might not like. They think we're just a typical
British union, anti whatever management do or say and pro­
strike" .
4) "New Style" Agreement in Operation or Alternative Procedures 
Two unionised companies one in Group 1 and one in Group 3 
achieved maximum scores related to the operation of a NSA. All 
companies which recognised a union had a new style agreement 
(NSA) which incorporated the four key elements required by the 
UK model. (Single union recognition, participation,
flexibility, and a no-strike procedure.) Three of these
companies did not have pendulum arbitration. The personnel
managers at Companies No 3 and No 4, both explained that
avoidance of pendulum arbitration was based on the belief that
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it created a winner and loser which was not conducive to the 
co-operative style of industrial relations the company wanted 
to pursue.- All three companies had signed their agreements 
post-1986, when as Metcalf and Milner (1991) note, the number 
of companies signing agreements incorporating pendulum 
arbitration declined significantly.
Where both Japanese and local management were criticised 
for seeing the union or other structure of employee 
representation as unnecessary or a hindrance (discussed under 
item No 3 above - "Formalised Union or Other Structure") 
employee representatives believed they did not adhere to the 
"spirit of intent" that lay behind their company's NSA. These 
criticisms were what reduced scores concerning the NSA for all 
but the two unionised companies with maximum scores. At one of 
these latter two companies, a shop steward was adamant that 
management "from top to bottom" at the company abided by the 
agreement. This steward placed special emphasis on senior local 
and Japanese management's role. Local middle management were, 
he claimed, unlikely to abuse the agreement because: "In the 
past top management have rapped middle management's knuckles 
where they've misinterpreted the agreement or used it to their 
own ends".
At other unionised companies, senior management were not 
believed to play such a policing role. This was especially 
true of unionised companies in Group 2 where management were 
believed to not understand, or to dislike the trust and co­
operation supposed to form the "spirit of intent" behind NSAs.
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One steward lamented that; "Our agreement was set up before 
the union actually got to know anything about the management 
style here. On paper it looks really good, but some local
managers constantly break procedures and they know wh$t they're 
doing." Another argued: "You take our advisory board. It's 
supposed to be a place where all decisions reached are
consensual and we can discuss anything but an individual 
grievance. But there's no real senior management on it. It's 
dominated by local middle management who just don't trust us 
with any information. If we have a proposal they don't like 
they just turn around and say they'll have to consult senior 
Japanese management. If we reach a decision that has to be 
taken away as well by middle management to be presented to 
senior Japanese management for acceptance. We quite often find 
its been accepted in a very different form to what was decided 
at the advisory board. Don't tell me that's how the agreement 
is supposed to run."
Stewards at Company No 6, with a single management
structure, believed that Japanese managers were simply unable 
to comprehend what was expected of them in accordance with the 
spirit of intent underlying the company's NSA. This, they
argued was because their Japanese managers believed British 
unions to prefer conflict to co-operation. Consequently, they 
did not entrust the union with information or allow it any real 
influence in the company's decision making processes. In the 
case of their advisory board the stewards claimed that it was
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used by Japanese management as a consultative structure to 
simply convey information to the workforce.
The two companies without a recognised union also failed 
to achieve maximum scores. This was partly because neither 
operated all three key written procedures required by the UK 
model as an alternative to a NSA, and partly because employee 
representatives interviewed did not perceive management as a 
whole to be consistently fair when conducting industrial 
relations.
2) SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Many of strengths and weaknesses identified in this 
chapter were discernable in the literature and preliminary 
interviews discussed earlier in Chapters 4 and 5. It is these 
strengths and weaknesses that contribute to the considerable 
variability among companies' production system characteristics 
when compared alongside the research's UK model. Table 7.4 
summarises these strengths and weaknesses and shows how they 
correspond to the company traits identified in section 2.1 of 
the chapter.
When measured alongside the research's UK model the scores 
achieved by the nine sample companies appear to have been 
influenced by two key factors. Firstly, companies in Groups 1 
and 3 gain higher overall scores for their production systems 
than those in Group 2. Looking at figures 7.3 and 7.4, it 
becomes apparent that companies in these two groups score 
consistently higher for managerial and organizational
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TABLE 7.4
WW^AÇERLAL,£HARACTERIâT.IC§
IlOW STREIIGTHS Airo WEAXKESSES WITHIM TltE PRODUCTION SYSTEM 
CHARACTERISTICS OE NIKE JAfAMESE MANUKACTVRERS IH THE UK OONSUMER 
ELECTRONICS SECTOR VERB INFLUEUCED BY GROUP MEMBERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
GROUP.I GROUP. 2 ÇR9U,P_3
COMPAI^Y NO. 6
s ingle.J3ANA5JEMENT. STRUS.TURE
Coherent Vision
Consistency of Style
Consensua1/Croupist Decision 
Making Procedures
Ci rculat ion
Special Selection/Retention 
Procedures
Sharing of several common 
objectives among a majority of 
managers interviewed at each 
company.
Consistent use and interpretation 
of a policy or procedure by 
management.
Compromise of local and Japanese 
management attitudes and styles. 
Incorporation of local management 
into a consensual style of 
decision making based on ringi/ 
nemawashi procedures Appreciation 
of shared responsibility.
High levels of circulation. 
Responsibilities for managers in 
areas beyond the remit of the 
department to which they were 
attached.
Local management paid competitive 
salaries; selected for technical 
skills alone rather than attitude. 
Concern among local management of 
the existence of a promotional
No induction for Japanese 
management. English not a pre­
requisite. Selected for technical 
skills alone.
Few common objectives 
identifiable among a majority 
of managers interviewed at each 
company.
As for Croup 1. except at 
company no. 8. where policy and 
procedure was implemented on a 
discretionary basis
Concern among Japanese management 
of local management's abilities 
Accusation of Japanese elitism 
from local managers regarding 
the decision making process
Japanese concerns over local 
managements' inability to 
specialise in several areas. 
Little circulation among local 
management.
As for Croup 1
As for Group 1
As for Croup 1
As for Group 1
As for Croup 1
Selection of local management 
based, in part, on attitudes 
displayed. Some induction for 
Japanese management English a 
prerequisite. Indication that 
selection was. in part, 
based on attitudes.
As for Group 1
As for Croup 1
Japanese dominated management ha 
adopted a consensual/groupist 
decision making procedure, but 
local personnel manager was shut 
out of decision making process 
due to lack of seniority.
As for Croup 1
As for Japanese management in 
Croup 1.
TABLE 7.4 Çonf <j.
Co-ordination and Co-operation 
of all Departments.
Company Wide Communications.
Emphasis on First Line 
Supe rv i sion.
Close Ties with Suppliers.
UK Personnel Management.
CROUP 1
Use of ringi/nemawashi 
procedures to maintain good 
departmental inter-action. Use 
of teams to consider major new 
proposa 1s
Good horizontal communications. 
Vertical communications 
infrequent or applied by 
management on a discretionary
Emphasis matched by calibre 
of recruits only at one 
company
Supervisors rarely paid in 
excess of local medium.
Use of purchase agreements to 
ensure delivery time, quality 
and price match the criteria 
set by the company. Financial 
or technical support lent to 
supplier.
Regular contact, irrespective 
of whether a problem arises.
High levels of seniority and 
influence for UK personnel 
management. (Except at company 
No. 6 with a single management 
structure I.
g-Royp 2
Accusations from local 
management that ringi/ 
nemawashi procedures were 
confined to Japanese elite 
Use of regular formal 
meetings by local management 
to maintian contact between 
departments.
Japanese concerns that local 
management displayed 
departmental insecurity and 
resisted intrusion of others 
into their areas of authority.
As for Group 1
Emphasis not matched by 
calibre of recruits. 
Supervisors rarely paid in 
in excess of local medium.
As for Group 1. except company 
No. 8 which did not use any 
form of purchase agreement. 
Regular contact with suppliers 
not maintained.
As for Group 1. except at 
company No. 9. where the post 
was not senior and lacked the 
influence of other UK manage-
SRgUJ* .3
As for Group 1
As for Group 1
As for Group 2
As for Group 1
High levels of seniority and 
influence for UK personnel 
management.
COMPANY NO. 6
SINGLE MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
As for Group 1
As for Group 1
Emphasis not matched by 
calibre of recruits. 
Supervisors rarely paid in 
in excess of local medium.
As for Group 1
UK personnel management post 
at a lower level of seniority 
than Japanese colleagues 
Influence resticted.
TABL£ 7 A.ÇonV
PfiRSQMEL CHARACTERISTICS
Core/Periphery Workforce 
Restrictions.
Guarantee of Secure 
Employment
Single Status.
Market Led Pay Levels
Merit Based Promotion.
Intensive Selectic 
Procedures
GRQUP.l
Core/periphery distinctions a 
priority. Permanent employment 
made to appear as a possible 
reward for temporary staff.
Verbal or implied guarantees.
No benefits in excess of 
pensions and/or sick pay.
Harmonised methods of payment 
and holiday entitlement, 
minimisation of the number of 
job grades.
Pay based on local median or 
skills required. Various levels 
of pay in comparison to local 
median. At one company an 
element of pay was linked to 
performance.
Written and unwritten policies. 
Emphasis on promotion from 
within
Selection based on some, but 
not all three of the following: 
Use of detailed application 
forms, intensive interviews and 
dexterity or aptitude tests.
GR0UP_2
As for Croup 1
As for Group 1 
As for Group 1 
As for Group 1
As for Group 1
Written merit based promotion 
policies at two companies. 
Emphasis on promotion from 
within.
One company without a clear 
written or unwritten policy - 
Concern that genuine ability, 
commitment and performance 
being overlooked.
As for Group 1
GROUP 3
As for Group 1
One written voluntary 
guarantee given, one verbal.
Welfare benefits in excess of 
pension and sick pay
As for Group 1
As for Group 1
Written merit based promotion 
Emphasis on promotion from
Use of one selection procedure 
required by the UK model by 
one company.
Use of all selection procedures 
required by UK model by one 
company.
COMPANY NO. 6
SINCL E..MAN AG EM ENT S TRUCTU.RE
As for Group 1
Verbal guarantee
No welfare benefits
As for Group 1
Based on local median.
Level of pay at local median. 
No element of pay linked to 
performance.
Unwritten merit based promotion 
policy. Emphasis on promotion 
from within.
No use of any procedures 
required by the UK model.
T M L E  7,1 Çpnt d,
PERSONNEL CHARACTERISTICS 
Training
Elements of Consensuality 
and Participation.
Regimented Work Environment
CROUP X
Some 2X all of the following 
in use on a formal or informal
Regular training for all or 
some employees away from the 
production area; OJT; a 
minimum of a d ay s instruction 
away from the production area
Participative structures allowed 
formulation of decisions based 
on consensus. Some employee 
representatives believed 
management often vetoed 
dec!s ions.
Two companies gave earaples of 
participative structures which 
were deemed consultative.
Rules and procedures usually 
implemented with prior written 
or verbal explanation.
ÇR.QUP. 2
Sdme of the training require­
ments under the UK model in 
use on a formal basis: some 
or all on an informal basis.
As for Group 1. but no 
participative structures deemed 
consul ta tive
Rules and Procedures often 
implemented without prior 
written or verbal explanation.
CROUP 3
As for Group 1
COMPANY NO. 6
SINGLE MANAGgMENT__STRUCTURE
As for Group 2
As for Group 2. but at one 
company employee representatives 
believed management rarely 
vetoed decisions.
Rules and procedures usually 
O X  always implemented with prior 
written or verbal explanation.
Example participatit 
deemed consultative.
As for Group 1
TABLE 7,4 Cpntld,
INDUSTRIAL
RELAÎipN_S.. CHARACTERISTICS GRQUP_I GROUP _2
COMPANY NO.
No Union or Single Union.
Enterprise Level Bargaining.
Formalized Union or Other 
Organ i z at ion.
New Style Agreement (NSA) 
in Operation. (Or Alternatit 
Procedures Where Non- 
Uni on i sed ) .
Two companies with single union 
recognition where membership 
density was 50%
One company with single union 
recognition where membership 
density was below 50%.
One company with no union.
Formalized bargaining procedure 
in place, in all but one (non­
union i sed1 company.
Bargaining at enterprise level.
Formalized union structure was 
used for individual or 
collective grievances at all 
but one company. Belief among 
employee representatives at 
two companies that some 
managers saw unions as 
unnecessary or a hinderence.
One company (non unionised) 
had no alternative form of 
employee representation, but 
Instead operated an "open 
door" policy.
All but one (non unionised) 
company operated a NSA 
incorporating single union 
recognition, participation, 
flexibility and a no-strike 
procedure. Employee 
representatives believed 
management adhered to spirit 
of intent at one company.
The company with no NSA 
operated two key alternative 
procedures. Employee 
representatives believed that 
management were consistently 
fair.
One company with no union.
Two companies with single union 
recognition, one with membership 
density below 50%.
Formalised bargaining. Conducted 
at enterprise level.
Two formalized union and one 
other structure of employee 
representation used for 
individual or collective 
grievances. Belief among 
employee representatives that 
some managers saw unions or 
the structure of employee 
representation as unnecessary 
and a hinderence.
As for Group 1. but employee 
representatives at all three 
companies belived that some 
local managers did not adhere 
to the spirit of intent 
behind the NSA or. where an NSA 
was not in operation, were not 
always fair when dealing with 
employees.
Both companies with single union 
recognition, one with membership 
density below 50%.
As for Group 2
Formlized union structures used 
for individual or collective 
grievances. Belief among 
employee representatives at one 
company that some managers saw 
the union as unnecessary or a 
hinderence
Both companies operated NBAs. 
with all procedures required by 
the UK model.
Employee representatives at one 
company believed that not all 
local managers, adhered to the 
spirit of intent behind the NSA.
Single union recognised. Membe 
density below 50%.
As for Group 2
As for Group 3. but employee 
representatives believed that 
Japanese management perceived 
the union to be adversarial 
rather than co-operative.
Operation of a NSA with all 
procedures required by the 
UK model.
Employee representatives 
believed Japanese management 
did not understand the spirit 
of intent that lay behind the 
NSA and criticised them for 
not trusting the union.
characteristics than those in Group 2. All but one of the
companies in these two groups (Company No 6) has a dual 
management structure. This suggests that some transplants do
manage to overcome or avoid the sort of managerial and
organizational problems encountered under dual management 
systems that were discussed in Chapter 4, often by using the 
remedies that were also highlighted in that chapter.
Conversely, it is exactly these sorts of problems that 
companies in Group 2, especially those rank ordered eighth and
ninth, have failed to overcome or avoid.
Though companies in Groups 1 and 3 gain higher scores for
their managerial and organizational characteristics than those
in Group 2, the same pattern does not apply to personnel and 
industrial relations characteristics. (See figures 7.5 and 
7.6.) Inspection of scores achieved by individual companies 
reveals a far more mixed set of scores. For both 
sets of characteristics, there are two companies in Group 2 
that achieve better scores than Company No 6 (with a single
management structure) and Company No 5 in Group 1 . Indeed,
Company No 7, the non-unionised company in Group 2, achieves a 
better score for its industrial relations characteristics than 
Company No 2 in Group 3.
The second factor is that when compared alongside the 
model. Company No 6 with a single management structure, 
achieves the lowest overall score out of any company in Groups
1 and 3. Nevertheless, its scores for managerial and
organizational characteristics are higher than those of
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companies in Group 2. This lends some credence to Tsurumi's 
argument that managerial and organizational problems at 
Japanese transplants tend to occur where the transplant is a 
size which of necessity requires the employment of local 
managers and the adoption of a dual management structure. 
(Tsurumi, 1978) However, Company No 6's overall score was 
lower than other companies in Groups 1 and 3 because it
received weak scores for its personnel and industrial
relations characteristics.
What the research's UK model has so far accomplished is to 
highlight variability among the production systems of
Japanese transplants in the UK electronics sector on the basis
of size related issues or management structure. In particular 
it has shown that the production systems of companies in Group 
2 commonly display weak managerial and organizational 
characteristics while the overall score for the production 
system of Company No 6 with a single management structure is 
inhibited by poor scores for its personnel and industrial
relations characteristics. But in relation to the research's
examination of "them and us" attitudes and behaviour among 
employees at these companies that is as far as the model can 
take us. It cannot tell us how weaknesses in these 
companies' production system characteristics impact on
workforce attitudes and behaviour linked to this issue.
Accordingly the next stage of the research is to take two 
companies from the sample of nine and to use them as case
studies by applying the methodology described in Chapter 6 to
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them. The two companies selected are Company No 8 from Group 
2, and Company No 6, with a single management structure, from 
Group 1 . These companies are from here on named Company A and 
Company B respectively.
Figures 7.7 and 7.8 give details of the two case studies’ 
scores for each of their four sets of production system
characteristics. A comparison of the two companies' scores 
raises two important issues in relation to the research's
hypothesis.
Firstly, Company B achieves a higher overall score than
Company A when its production system characteristics are
compared to the research's UK model. The hypothesis would 
therefore expect it to experience a greater degree of success 
in its efforts to reduce "them and us" attitudes and behaviour 
among its workforce.
Secondly, • on paper. Company A appears to exhibit a 
reasonable set of NIR practices. These are the personnel and 
industrial relations characteristics required by the model. 
However, the company's managerial and organizational
characteristics are poor. This, argues the hypothesis, has a 
detrimental effect on the company's production output and 
hampers the effectiveness of NIR practices in reducing "them 
and us" attitudes and behaviour at the workplace.
Conversely, Company B, achieves lower scores than Company 
A in respect of its NIR practices - though not by a large 
margin. But in comparison to Company A, Company B achieves 
significantly higher scores in relation to its managerial and
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organizational characteristics. In this situation the 
research's hypothesis points to Company B being more successful 
than Company A in reducing "them and us" attitudes and 
behaviour among its employees.
Chapters 8 and 9 investigate these issues, beginning with 
an investigation of workforce expectations and attitudes 
regarding "them and us" at the time Company A commenced 
production.
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CHAPTER 8
WORKFORCE ATTITUDES CONCERNING "THEM AND US" AT COMPANY A 
INTRODUCTION
This study argues that the closer its fit with the 
production system characteristics of the research's UK model, 
the better the chances of a Japanese transplant reducing "them 
and us" attitudes. The further away from model's
characteristics, then the less likely it is to reduce "them and 
us" attitudes.
Chapter 7 showed that when compared alongside the 
research's UK model. Company A was what the chapter defined as 
a Group 2 company. It achieved a low overall score coming 
eighth out of the nine sample companies. This could be 
attributed to weaknesses in all four sets of its production 
system characteristics. Firstly, it achieved very poor scores 
for its sets of managerial and organizational characteristics. 
Secondly, though it achieved better scores for its sets of 
personnel and industrial relations characteristics (NIR 
practices) they to displayed several weaknesses.
Interviews, observation and employee attitude surveys were 
used to show how weaknesses and strengths in Company A ' s 
production system characteristics impacted on "them and us" 
attitudes among its workers. In Company A's case this was a 
two part study. The first part was a scene setting exercise, 
examining workforce attitudes at the company two months after 
it had commenced manufacturing operations (Stage 1 of the
— 2 86—
study). The second part aimed to assess "them and us" 
attitudes after the company had been operational for a period 
of eighteen months (Stage 2 of the study).
The Stage 2 results are especially important because they 
reflect workforce attitudes at the time Company A’s production 
system was compared alongside the research's UK model. Hence, 
they are used to test the research's second hypothesis 
described in Chapter 6. This was that it was not only 
strengths and weaknesses in Company A's personnel and 
industrial relations characteristics (NIR practices) that 
affected workforce attitudes concerning "them and us", but 
also its managerial and organizational characteristics. Were 
this to be the case, did the the effectiveness of NIR practices 
and the effective performance of the company's production 
system enjoy what the hypothesis terms a two-way relationship? 
In addition, the results were used to look for evidence of the 
emergence of either a vicious or virtuous circle.
1) COMPANY A: SOME GENERAL DETAILS
Company A produces one type of product in consumer 
electrical manufacturing and is, in Woodward's (1980) terms, a 
"large batch" manufacturer, producing different models of the 
same product using assembly lines. At Stage 1 of the study 
the manufacturing site was divided into two departments. One 
was an area where the finished product was assembled. The 
other was an area where the main body, the facia and other 
metal components of the product were pressed and welded
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before being sent to the assembly area. By the time Stage 2 
was conducted a third department had been established for 14 
months. This was located some miles away from the main 
production site and assembled an essential electrical component 
for the company's product. Here it is referred to as the sub- 
assembly department.
From the day it opened, Company A had a dual management 
structure. Most of the senior management positions were 
occupied by Japanese managers. The company recognised a 
single union (the EETPU) and by Stage 2 of the study operated 
a NSA which incorporated pendulum arbitration.
At Stage 1 of the study Company A employed 108 people 
including Japanese and local management. Of these, 75 workers 
up to supervisory level were classified as non-management. 
They had gone through an intensive selection procedure in 
comparison with most UK manufacturing employers. This involved 
the use of a detailed application form, and two interviews. 
Before a final decision was made, the individual was invited 
to tour the factory with a manager. While this tour was going 
on the manager was also assessing how the candidate reacted to 
the work environment in terms of interest shown in or 
familiarity with any of the work in progress.
The company argued that it had tried to employ experienced 
workers (as opposed to school leavers) who were receptive to 
its aim of reducing "them and us". For the personnel manager, 
any successful reduction of "them and us" would enable the 
company to "lock in" employees. Workers would not wish to
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leave the company because it offered a work environment that 
made them feel they had helped make it successful. They would 
therefore come to feel a "sense of ownership" of the company. 
Employee motivation to work and a commitment to stay with the 
company were not to be simply based on financial reward, but 
rather because they felt that this was "our company".
The 75 workers selected were invited to fill in a 
questionnaire. 58 replies were received, a response rate of 
77.3%. By Stage 2 of the study the company had expanded its 
workforce to 230 using the same selection techniques. Of 
these 180 were classified as non-managerial and eligible to 
fill in a second questionnaire. 144 responses were received, a 
response rate of 80%. No clerical staff responded to either 
the first or second questionnaire though invited to do so. (See 
Chapter 6 for details of the questionnaires' structures.)
From here on the chapter is divided into sections 
reflecting the two stage approach. Section two gives an 
overview of attitudes displayed by employees at the time 
Company A commenced production (Stage 1 of the study). It 
examines their perceptions of issues related to British 
Industrial Relations in general and their expectations and 
initial impressions of the company's work environment.
Section three links these early results to a number of key 
factors that had become highly apparent by Stage 2 of the study 
and which were influencing workforce attitudes. Section four 
takes these key factors and using regression analysis shows the 
extent to which they influenced attitudes specifically related
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to "them and us". A number of these key factors are found to 
relate to weaknesses in Company A's production system 
characteristics.
The regression finds that weaknesses in all four sets of 
the company's production system characteristics had an 
unfavourable impact on "them and us" attitudes among its 
workers. This confirms that part of the research hypothesis 
which argues that it is not only personnel and industrial 
relations characteristics (NIR practices) in operation at a 
company which influence "them and us" related attitudes, but 
also managerial and organizational characteristics. The 
regression also suggests that the influence of financial reward 
over "them and us" attitudes cannot be discounted. A summary of 
the results of the case study at Company A is given in table 
8.1.
2) WORKFORCE ATTITUDES AT COMPANY A: STAGE 1
2.1) Workforce Perceptions of Issues Related to British 
Industrial Relations in General
At this early stage in Company A's development and since 
97% of the questionnaire respondents had worked elsewhere, 
their responses to this set of questions might have reflected 
previous employment experiences. Those employees interviewed 
talked of having worked at companies where management/employee 
relations were low-trust and conflictual. Percentage scores,
means and standard deviations for these questions are shown in
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sicwiFiourr strewcths mto wBAiarHSSES im oohpmit %'s pboddctioii
SYSTEM CHMaCTEHlSTICS : THEIR aSSOCIATIO* WITH WORKFORCE 
ATTITUDES BKT-KTFD TO -THEM M D  OS*
Significant Strengths/Weaknesses in 
Production Systea Characteristics
Association with 
‘Tbesi and Os" Related Attitudes
Managerial Characteristics
Conflict and no compromise of Japanese and local management attitudes and 
styles: hence no consistency of style or coherent vision.
Japanese use of rlngl/nemawashi decision making believed by local management 
to shut them out of the decision making process.
Evidence of Van-Wolferen's malleable reality.
Japanese accused of making little effort to explain Japanese management 
practices to local colleagues.
No special se lection/re tent Ion procedures. No circulation of local managers. 
Belief among local management that a promotional celling existed.
Poor Inter-departmental co-operation and co-ordination. Local management 
resented Japanese made decisions, retreated Into own area of authority, 
resisted Intrusion of others Into It and refused to communicate with other 
areas of the organization.
Local management hostile/uninterested In vertical communications.
Emphasis on poorly skilled. low paid supervisors supervising In the 
traditional UK sense, rather than leading.
Poor relationship with suppliers leading to constant disruption of 
production.
Pergonnel Characteristics
Avoidance of a policy concentrating on the selection of school leavers. 
Attempts to recruit those with attitudes and values responsive to efforts to 
reduce ''them and us" .
Concern among core employees that the company's apparent lack of success 
would Jeopardize their prospects of secure employment.
Employee dissatisfaction with pay and concern that the company was not paying 
what It could afford. Dissatisfaction with the allocation and explanations of 
promotion.
Control and discipline In the workplace left to local management who 
maintained it In a traditional and adversarial style. They also avoided 
Implementing elements of consensua11ty and participation.
Industrial Relations Characteristics
Operation of an NSA designed to foster co-operative Industrial relations was 
left to local colleagues by Japanese management.
Local management adhered to traditional low trust, adversarial Industrial 
relations.
The EETPU seen as being weakened by the NSA and as falling to satisfy 
membership expectations.
The company has failed to live up to 
many employees' expectations of 
success. Employees perceived personal 
costs as a result of management's 
(especially local management's) 
Inability to manage and organize 
production effectively.
This contributed to "changes in 
attitudes and behaviour" the "creation 
of a superorxiinate goal", "increased 
contact across group boundaries* and 
"propensity to leave the firm".
Local management's methods of 
maintaining control and discipline In 
the workplace and their low trust 
relationship with the EETPU contributed 
to a "propensity to leave the firm". In 
addition It affected perceptions of 
"changes in attitudes and behaviour* 
and "increased contact across group 
boundaries".
Evidence of dissatisfaction with pay 
and promotion Influencing perceptions 
of "changes in attitudes and 
behaviour". "increased contact across
group boundaries" and "propensity to 
leave the firm".
"Propensity to leave the firm" and no 
belief that "changes in attitudes and 
behaviour" had occurred at Company A 
Influenced "perceptions of "them and 
us" as a general feature of British 
Industrial relations".
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table 8.2. Responses were measured on a five point scale, from 
strongly agree to strongly disagree. The results of correlate 
analysis are shown in table 8.3.
Several strong and significant correlations demonstrated 
that the issue of "them and us" was believed a central feature 
of British industrial relations. Respondents saw British 
industrial relations as being based on inherent conflict 
between management and employees with management instigating 
the conflict. These attitudes were associated with what might 
be termed traditional trade union values. Unions were 
perceived as a "good thing", and as protecting workers' 
interests. It was not thought possible to be a union member 
and support management at the same time.
A set of questions also tapped views about issues related 
to NSAs. Respondents agreed that there should be some other 
way to resolve disputes other than striking, and disagreed that 
one union weakens the workforce. However, they disagreed with 
the idea that workers never gain by striking. Interviews 
revealed that employees thought that an alternative to 
striking was preferable to conflict and a loss of earnings, but 
that it should still be available as a very last resort. As 
one operator explained: "You can't really afford to do it, but 
if there is no other way then you have to come out and to hell 
with any no-strike agreement." On the issue of single unionism 
interviewees argued either that one union created a single 
channel of communication and representation with an employer or 
that they had not given the issue any thought. These attitudes
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TABIÆJB^2
WP R W P R Ç E  ATTITUDE AT COMPAITY A: STAGE 1
p_e rcep t i ong _o_f, Iggyeg. _ Bel a gh 
Indugtrial Reiatlong_ip_Çenecal Hean Std Dev
1
Strongly
Agree
X
2
Agree
X
3
Ho View 
X
4
Disagree
X
5
Strongly
Disagree
X
1) Co-operation in firms is impossible 
because workers and management are 
really on different sides.
2. .30 1 . 21 29.3 39.7 8.6 17.2 5.2
2) Managaers always try and get the 
better of workers.
1.98 1 . 10 41.4 39.7 0.0 19.0 0.0
3) Managers do not always know what is 
best for a firm.
1. 22 0.88 17.2 55.2 15.5 12.1 0.0
41 It is not easy to be loyal to both 
your union and management
1. 59 1 .00 15.5 34 .5 27.6 22 . 4 0.0
5) Workers must have some say in
management decisions that affect 
the work they do.
1 .33 0.47 67. 2 32.8 0.0 0.0 0.0
6) Unions should always try and 
co-operate with management.
2. 26 1 07 24 . 1 48.3 3.4 24 . 1 0.0
7) Unions are a good thing. 2.01 0.55 13.8 69.8 15.5 I .7 0.0
8) You can be a union member and support 
management at the same time.
1 .95 1 .03 1 . 8 45.6 15.8 31 .6 5.3
9) People need a union to protect their 
interests at work.
1 .78 0.94 42. 1 47.4 3.5 3.5 3.5
10) Trade unions in Britain are not too 
powerful.
1.54 1. 23 19.0 41.4 15.5 15.5 8.6
11) Single unionism at a company does 
not weaken the workforce.
1.42 1 .07 12.1 55.2 15.5 8 . 6 8 . 6
12) There should be some other way to 
resolve disputes other than going 
on strike.
1 .96 0.93 25.9 62.1 3.4 3 . 4 5. 2
131 Striking can benefit workers. 1 .95 1.41 17.2 31.0 8.6 25.9 17.2
tterkfarçe.J*Enyui.loF»_9f >k?r*lng, at
Cpapanj, A
1
Agree
Strongly
2
Agree
Fairly
Strongly
3
Agree
Little
4
Di sagree 
Little
5
Disagree
Fairly
Strongly
6
Disagree
Very
Strongly
14) This firm is good to its workers. 3.42 1 . 26 5.2 13.8 43.1 19.0 10.3 8.6
151 I am very satisfied with my job. 3.15 1.41 13.8 19.0 29 . 3 24 . 1 5.2 8.6
161 This is a very friendly place to work 2.31 1 . 37 36. 2 29 3 15 5 10 3 5.2 3 . 4
17) I feel loyalty towards this firm. 2.87 1 . 29 10. 3 32.8 36. 2 8.6 5.2 6.9
18) Morale is good here. 4 .07 1.78 8.6 15.5 19.0 10. 3 12.1 34.5
19) If a problem comes up at work 1 can 
get it sorted out easily.
3.98 1 . 34 1.7 12.1 25.9 22.4 22.4 15.5
20) It is worth complaining here. 2.72 1 . 55 5.2 17.2 29. 3 17.2 8.6 22.4
21) My job gives me freedom to get on 
with my work in my own way.
2.51 1 . 62 15.5 15.5 13.8 31.0 6.6 15.5
22) The job I do has responsibility 
attached to it.
1 .84 1 .44 24 . 1 22.4 29. 3 10. 3 8.6 5.2
23) Communications between workers and 
management are good here.
2.76 1.58 7.0 21. 1 14.0 24 . 6 14.0 19.3
24) It would take a lot for me to 2.55 1 .73 17.2 15.5 17.2 20. 7 8.6 20.7
leave this firm.
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TABLE 8.2 ContZd^
Workforce lepreKslons of Working at
copawjr A
1 2 
Agree Agree
Very Kairly
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Disagree 
a Kairly Very
Little Strongly Strongly
25) I am not made to work too hard here
25) It bothers me If I do not do my job 
we 11 .
1 61 
1 .50
1 , 2 1
0.98
31 .0 
72.4
15.5
15.5
31 0 
6.9
19.0
3.4
3.4
1.7
0.0
0.0
27) The way I am supervised makes me 2.15 1.90 34.5 12.1 13.8 5.2 17.2 17.2
like the work that I do.
28) There is variety in my Job. 2.42 1.57 19.0 17.2 17.2 22.4 10.3 13.8
29) The way I am managed at Company A 1.64 1.69 36.2 20.7 10.3 15.5 8.6 8.6
is different to other companies I
have worked at.
To ease statistical analysis some of these questions and their scores are presented reversed.
e.g. Scores for question 22 were originally based on responses to the statement "The job I do has no
responsibility attached to It".
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TABLE 8.3
OPRREXJITICWS - PERÇEPTIOIIS OE ISSUES RELATED TO BRITISH INDUSTRIAL REIATIONS 
IN GENERAL STAGE 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1
Co-operation in firms is impossible 
because workers and management are 
really on different sides
-
2 Managers always try and get the better 
better of workers
46*** -
3 Managers do not always know what is 
best for a firm
. 19 15 -
4 It is not easy to be loyal to both 
your union and management
. 17 . 33** 32** -
5
Workers must have some say in 
management decisions that affect the 
work that they do
- . 16 . 11 12 - .12 -
6 Unions should always try and co-operate 
with management
-.24* - . 19 . 32** - . 13 -.00 -
7 Unions are a good thing .04 -.08 -.08 -.05 .11 -.03 -
8 You cannot be a union member and support 
management at the same time
.03 . 28* -.15 -.08 -.00 .06 -.08 -
9 People need a union to protect their 
interests at work
. 23* .08 12 -.01 .08 -.08 .35** . 23* -
10 Trade unions in Britain are not too 
powerful
.25* . 19 02 .02 .17 . 12 .06 .01 .05 -
11 Single unionism at a company does not 
weaken the workforce
. 30* . 05 . 13 .00 . 09 - . 17 .01 . 09 . 07 . 27* -
12 There should be some other way to resolve 
disputes other than going on strike
- . 38* -.17 36* . 32* -.01 . 21 . 10 - . 15 - . 11 . 26* . 37* -
13 Striking can benefit workers . 33** . 33** 05 .12 .02 .00 . 04 .07 09 .51*** .31** .41***
N = 56 
P =  ^ .05 
P = J 01 
P = .< .001
NB; 5 point scale 1 = strongly agree 5 = strongly disagree 
Some of these questions and their scores are presented 
reversed. See table 8.2 for an explanation of this procedure
may have been influenced by union representatives during 
initial recruitment drives at the company.
2.2) Expectations of the Work Environment at Company A
Stage 1 of the study revealed two sets of expectations 
about working at the company. Both were relevant to the 
company's aim of reducing "them and us" among the workforce. 
The first concerned how it would treat its employees. The 
second concerned the role of the trade union at the company.
Given their perception of "them and us" related issues as
a general feature of British industrial relations, employees
might have been expected to be cynical of attempts by the 
company to overcome "them and us" attitudes. Interviews 
revealed no cynicism but rather a "wait and see" attitude. 
There was a hope that because the company was Japanese its 
management would treat its workers differently. Employees also 
expected that being Japanese it would be successful thereby 
offering the chance of secure employment. This was despite the 
company not giving an explicit written or verbal guarantee 
that core employees would be the last to be laid off.
Two other well known and successful Japanese manufacturers
operated in the area and Company A employees made their 
judgements on this basis. As one put it: "I thought the chance 
of a permanent new job in a Japanese factory would be great. 
They look after their workers differently and they know how to 
make a place run. You've only got to look at how well .... has 
done." These expectations were combined with an awareness of,
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and willingness to strive for, the superordinate goal of 
management and workers alike, working to make the company 
successful because its success was in workers' as well as 
management's interests.
84.5% of the Stage 1 questionnaire sample had joined the 
EETPU at the company. To test what they expected of their 
union they were presented with a list of ten reasons for their 
joining. They were then asked to rank order the three most 
important reasons why they had joined. (See appendix 8.1.) 
The four reasons most cited demonstrated traditional beliefs in 
union membership being an investment based on both collective 
interests (e.g. workers need trade unions to protect them), and 
individual interests (e.g. it will give me job security). The 
fifth less traditional reason for joining was a desire for 
greater participation in the company's decision making process. 
These results suggest that most union members expected the 
union to play a role in keeping with their earlier answers 
about issues related to British industrial relations in 
general. (See section 2.1 above.) It remained to be seen 
whether the union would be able to carry out such a role under 
the provisions of an NSA which called for it to place the 
company's before sectional interests.
2.3) Initial Impressions of Working at Company A
A section of the Stage 1 questionnaire aimed to assess the 
workforce's initial impressions of working at the company. 
Individuals' responses were measured on a six point scale from
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"agree very strongly" to "disagree very strongly". The means 
and standard deviations for these questions are shown in table 
8.2. Correlations are shown in table 8.4.
Responses to these questions suggest a dichotomy of 
attitudes among employees. One set of significant and 
promising correlations suggested that the company had started 
off with a reasonable level of loyalty, by being seen as a 
friendly place to work, and as treating its employees well. 
These also correlated with positive responses to general and 
some specific aspects of job satisfaction such as supervision 
and responsibility. However, these positive responses were 
undermined by a second set of correlations. These associated 
low morale, poor management worker communications and the 
belief that "it would not take much for me to leave this firm."
This second set of negative responses were attributable 
to two factors. The first related to British management’s 
operation of NIR practices at the company. During interviews, 
employees argued that several British managers exhibited what 
might be termed traditional UK management attitudes concerning 
control and discipline of the workplace. "They're not looking 
for co-operation, they haven't the time to be patient", 
observed one. "They believe that bawling you out and using 
threats is more effective and far quicker."
The second factor concerns the effectiveness of the 
production system resulting from the way it was managed and 
organized. Workers expressed a number of concerns. Few felt
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TABUK 8,4 I irrE K C O K H K IJV T IO H S  -  WOKK.KOKCK IK P R E S S IO W S  OK M JK K IIIG  A T  COMI'AMT A  
ST A C K  1
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
14 This firm is good to its workers -
15 I am very satisfied with my job 71*** -
16 This is a friendly place to work 50*** 44*** -
17 I fee 1 loyalty towards this firm 70*** 62*** 50*** -
18 Morale is good here 43*** -.39** - . 48*** -.34** -
19 If a problem comes up at work 
I can get it sorted out easily
35** . 18 . 29* . 14 -.4 3*** -
20 It is worth complaining here 31** 23* . 09 . 28* -.47*** 36** -
21 My job gives me freedom to get 
on with my work in my own way
55*** 39*** 26* 32** - .07 39*** 35**
22 The job I do has responsibility 
attached to it
23* 16 . 14 . 13 - 33** 36** 18 14
23 Communications between workers 
and management are good here
39** - . 10 -.28* -. 10 49*** -.38** -.60*** - . 19 - . 29* -
24 It would take a lot for me to 
leave this firm
65*** -.50*** -.41*** -.53*** . 25* -.39** -.32** -.61*** -.31** . 29* -
25 I am not made to work too hard 50*** 26* .41*** . 25* -.23* 40*** 04 4 1*** .05 - . 19 -.36** -
26 It bothers me if I do not do my 
job well
.44*** . 29* . 01 .48*** -.08 . 20 . 24* 33*' . 18 -.06 -.30* .37** -
27 The way I am supervised makes me 
like the work I do
.49*** . 37** 41*** . 37** - .33** . 36** 08 48*** 25* - . 24* -.46*** .33** . 39*** -
28 There is variety in my job 34** . 34** 11 . 24* - .07 18 .12 24* 21* -.07 -.25* . 23* .37** 40*** -
29 The way I am managed at Company 
A is different to other companies 
I have worked at
.00 .04 .02 . 15 - . 16 .08 26* . 00 .04 -.02 -.13 .24* .03 .06 .26*
N • 57 NB: 6 point scale 1 » Agree very strongly 6 • disagree very strongly
* P ' .05 Some of these questions and their scores are presented reversed.
** P * .01 See table 8.2 for an explanation of this procedure
*** p . ,< .001
that they were made to work hard enough, simply because there 
was no continuous flow of production. "It's all stop start" 
said one operator from the assembly area. "The line often has 
to close down and we're left with nothing to do. When it opens 
back up we're expected to try and meet the day's target. We go 
too fast and then make more mistakes so that the line stops 
again."
A number of employees who were interviewed believed that 
British management were not capable of managing to Japanese 
standards. They detected a drive among UK management for 
quantity rather than quality and found this confusing. 
Quality had been a major feature of the selection process and 
they talked of a far more quality conscious Japanese management 
who patiently explained how to overcome problems.
Disruption to production and the differing emphasis on 
quality and quantity were partially indicative of the 
emergence of communications problems between Japanese and UK 
management. Several of the British managers argued that they
did not feel part of a team. Initially all British managers
had been present at management meetings but by Stage 1 of the 
study only a handful of senior British managers were allowed to 
be present. There was, said one UK manager; "a groundswell 
of opinion among UK middle management that they want more 
information and involvement in the decision-making process. 
I'm perfectly willing to learn their methods and to compromise 
the way I do things with how they (the Japanese) do them. But
how can they expect us to do our jobs effectively if they
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don't tell us what they want or give us any guidance in their 
ways."
The following conclusions can be drawn from Stage 1 of 
the study of Company A:
a) New employees imported strong beliefs in "them and us" 
as a general feature of British industrial relations into 
the company. However, they hoped that their new work 
environment would help to reduce such attitudes.
b) There existed among all interviewees a strong belief 
that Japanese management would organize and manage the 
company in way that would lead to its being highly 
successful.
c) Employees' propensity for joining the union and their 
expectations of it, suggested a deep rooted belief that a 
union was insurance to protect them against any excessive 
management power. Few saw the union's primary role as 
being a proactive force in the company's decision-making 
process or of helping to ensure the success of the 
company.
d) Though some NIR practices at the company received 
promising responses from some employees, the majority of 
respondents also gave negative responses that were 
attributable to concerns over UK management's ability to 
manage the company successfully, and their attitude 
towards management/employee relations.
e) There were signs of poor interaction and communication 
between Japanese and local management which directly 
contributed to the poor performance of the production 
system.
3) WORKFORCE ATTITUDES AT COMPANY A: STAGE 2
3.1) Workforce Perceptions of Issues Related to British 
Industrial Relations in General
As with Stage 1, a section of the Stage 2 questionnaire
assessed respondent's views about issues related to British
industrial relations in general. Table 8.5 gives means,
standard deviations and percentage scores for these questions.
There appeared to be similar responses to these questions
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T M Ü  e,_5
W P W O K C E  ATTITUDES AT OOMPAMY 2
PeXS^P.t.tQM of , 18JSUÇB, Rel«t«sd to BritiKh 
Industrial^ RelatiM^ in General «ean Std Dev
1
strong 1j 
Agree 
t
2
Agree
%
3
Ho View 
%
4
Diaagret
X
5
; Strongy 
Disagr-c 
X
1 ) Co-operation in firms is impossible 
because workers and management are 
really on different sides.
2.18 1 . 24 38.9 31.9 4 . 2 22 2 2.8
2) Managers always try and get the 
better of workers.
2. 17 1 . 23 38. 2 31.9 8.3 17.4 4.2
3) Managers do not always know what is 
best for a firm.
1.15 1 .09 33.3 47. 2 7.6 5.6 6.3
4) It is not easy to be loyal to both 
your union and management
1 .83 1.06 13.2 31 .9 25.7 27. 1 2.2
5) Workers roust have some say in 
management decisions that affect 
the work they do.
1 . 50 0.73 59.7 34 .0 4 . 2 0.7 1 . 4
6) Unions should always try and 
co-operate with management
2.41 1 . 20 24 . 3 39. 6 12.5 17.4 6.3
7) Unions are a good thing 2. 18 1.01 22.2 53.5 13.9 4.9 5.6
81 People need a union tc protect their 
interests at work.
1 .76 0.82 38.9 50.0 6.9 2. 1 2. 1
9) Single unionism at a company does 
not weaken the workforce.
1 .94 1.22 8.3 38. 2 20. 8 17.4 15.3
10) There should be some other way to 
resolve disputes other than going 
on strike.
1 94 0.85 3.5 2. 1 6.9 60. 4 27 1
11 ) Striking can benefit workers 2.00 1.21 7.6 36.8 17. 4 24 . 3 18.9
Workforce Impressions of Working at 
Company A
1
Agree
Very
Strongly
2
Agree
fairly
Strongly
3
Agree
Little
4
Disagree
a
Little
5
Disagre
Fairlj
Strongly
6
Disagree
Very
Strongly
12) This firm is good to its workers 4 .05 1.33 1 . 4 9.0 34 . 7 20.8 14.8 19 , 4
13) I am very satisfied with roy job. 3 66 1.41 4 . 9 18.1 28.5 21.5 13.9 13.2
14 ) This is a friendly place to work 2.63 1 . 32 18.8 31.3 34 .0 6.9 2.8 6. 3
15) There is a good team spirit in my 
work area.
2.97 1 , 61 19.4 27.8 25.7 8. 3 5.6 13.2
16) Getting promoted at Company A is 
important to me.
2 . 25 1.58 22.2 13.2 18.8 27.8 8.3 9.7
17) I fee 1 loyalty towards this firm. 3.43 1.54 11.1 19.4 31.3 14.6 9.0 14 8
18) I can influence management 
decisions that affect the work I do
3.66 1. 56 6.3 5.6 14 . 6 14.6 18. 1 41.0
19) Promotion at Company A is given on 
a fair basis.
4.21 1 .46 4 . 2 6.9 25.0 20.8 16.7 26 4
20) I frequently get ideas about how to 
improve the way 1 do my job.
2.64 1 . 19 16.0 30.6 37.5 9.7 2.1 4 . 2
21) Morale is good here. 4 . 67 1 .44 2.1 6.9 16.7 15. 3 15.3 43 8
22) It is worth complaining here. 3 . 48 1.72 9.0 9.7 13.9 11.1 11.8 44 4
23) Management here are interested if 
I have an idea that might improve 
the way I do my job.
3. 16 1 .76 15.3 9.7 18.8 16.0 12.5 27. 8
24) My job gives me freedom to get on 2.80 1. 53 10.4 10. 4 20. 1 27.8 14.6 16,7
jith my work In my own way.
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TABLE 8.S Conl'd^
Workforce r«i)reKsipms of Worjking at 
Company A
1 2 3 4 5 6
Agree Agree Agree Disagree Disagree Disagree
Very Eairly a a Fairly Very
Strongly Strongly Little Little Strongly Strongly
25) T)ie job I do has responsibility 
attached to it.
26) If a problem comes up in my work 
area the workers there usually try 
and sort it out themselves.
27) Communications between workers and 
management are good he re.
16.7 45.8
28) It would take a lot for 
leave this firm.
13.9 37.5
29) I am satisfied with management' i 
explanations of other people's 
promot ions
30) I am not made to work too hard here.
31) It bothers me if I do not do my job 
wel 1 .
2 . 26 
1 . 53
1.46 
1 .07
10.4 
70. 1
22.2
19.4
35.4 
4 . 9
12.5 
1 . 4
7.6 
2  . 1
11.8
2 . 1
32) The way I am supervised makes me 
like the work that I do.
33) There is variety in my Job.
34) The way I am managed at Company A 
is different to other companies I 
have worked at.
2 . 59 
1 . 43
1 . 76 
1 . 60
2 0 . 1 
43.1
6. 3 
15. 3
22 . 2 
18.8
2 0 . 1 
1 1 . 1
11.8 
4 . 2
19 4
7.6
35) Company A gives its workers enough 
information about its present and 
future plans
11.8 28.5
36) The union here is good at taking up 
our Individual grievances.
37) The union here influences some of 
the management decisions that 
affect the work 1 do.
38) I feel loyalty towards the union 
here
39) Having a .No Strike agreement at
Company A does not weaken the union.
13 3 26.6
40) The union here is not too co­
operative with management.
18.2 25.9
To ease statistical analysis some of these questions and their scores are presented reversed.
e.g. Scores for question 33 were originally based on responses to the statement "There is no variety
in my job"
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to those recorded at Stage 1 of the study and many were 
strongly and significantly correlated (see table 8.6). These 
responses emphasised a belief in the existence of conflictuel 
low trust industrial relations where management and workers 
have divergent interests. Trade unions were still perceived as 
"a good thing", vital to the protection of peoples' interests 
at work in the face of hostile management.
3.2) Workforce Impressions of Working at Company A
A further section of the questionnaire assessed employee 
impressions of the work environment at the Company. Means, 
standard deviations and percentage scores for these responses 
are shown in table 8.5. Table 8.7 shows that two distinct 
patterns of correlations emerged reflecting the views of a 
majority of the workforce.
Firstly, a pattern of correlations linked poor morale, 
dissatisfaction with the company's treatment of workers, low 
levels of loyalty and a propensity to leave the company. Also 
included were poor perceptions of management/worker 
communications, hostility to supervisory style, dissatisfaction 
with management explanations and allocation of promotion, and 
the belief that there was no point in complaining about 
anything. Furthermore, most of the items in this pattern 
corresponded to poor perceptions of the union's performance at 
the company. It was seen as too co-operative, lacking 
influence over management decisions and as weakened by the no­
strike clause in the NSA at the company.
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t a b l e , 8, 6
mpPFTJtTiqKS - PEJtCEyriOWS OF.ISSl^ REIATBD.TP BRITISH IBPUSTRIAL RELATIgK 
I" GEKERAL : s t a g e  2
1 2 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1
Co-operation in firms is impossible 
because workers and management are 
really on different sides
-
2 Managers always try and get the better 
better or workers
.53*** -
3 Managers do not always know what is 
best for a firm
, 19** .01
4 It is not easy to be loyal to both 
your union and management
26*** . 34*** . 10 -
5
Workers must have some say in 
management decisions that affect the 
work that they do
18 14 00 .03
6 Unions should always try and co-operate 
with management
.01 . 08 . 17* . 16* . 18* -
7 Unions are a good thing . 1 1 . 18* 08 . 12 08 -.02 -
8 People need a union to protect their 
interests at work
. 11 31*** 06 .01 -.02 -.03 .57*** -
9 Single unionism at a company does not 
weaken the workforce
.30*** . 18* 03 - . 11 21** .08 24*** - .09 -
10 There should be some other way to resolve 
disputes other than going on strike
-.07 -.09 -.15* -.08 -.00 . 04 14* .01 .08 -
11 Striking can benefit workers 00 . 10 02 . 00 00 01 . 08 . 17* -.04 -.40*** -
N = 144
P = .05 5 point scale 1 « Strongle Agree 5 = Strongly Disagree
P : v< .01 Some of these questions and their scores are presented reversed
P : .001 See Table 8.5 for an explanation of this procedure.
COmtKUlTIOIIS - WORRPORCE IMPRESSIONS OP WORKING AT COMPANY A ; STAGE 2 12 13 14 15
12) This firm is good to its wor)<ers. -
13) I am very satisfied with my Job. . 4 1 -
M  ) This is a friendly place to worlt. 10 .19 -
15) There is a good team spirit in my wor)< area . 29 . 39 . 40 -
16) Getting promoted at Company A is important to me .30 . 15 .00 . 14
*•*
17) I feel loyalty towards this firm. .55 .46 . 23 . 36
18) I can influence management decisions that affect the wor)t I do. .12 .03 .02 - . 18
***
19) Promotion at Company A is given on a fair basis. .34 .47 . 16 . 17
20) I frequently get ideas about how to improve the way I do my Job. . 24 . 13 . 05 - . 05
21 ) Morale is good here 42 43 12 . 35
22) It is worth complaining here. 45 . 23 - . 09 -. 16
23) Management here are interested if I have an idea that might improve the way I do my Job .50 . 33 - . 17 -.36
24 ) My Job gives me freedom to get on with my work in my own way. 34 . 36 - . 18 -.22
25) The Job I do has responsibility attached to it. -.02 -.06 12 14
26) If a problem comes up in my work area the workers there usually try and sort it out 
themselves.
.00 1 3 . 10 19
27) Communications between workers and management are good here 53 . 48 -.07 - 34
...
28) It would take a lot for me to leave this firm 57 .61 -.22 - . 48
29) 1 am satisfied with managements explanations of other peoples promotions. 32 43 -.00 . 19
30) I am not made to work too hard here. - .46 - . 38 .00 19
31 ) It bothers me if I do not do my Job well. - .01 - . 01 . 14 08
321 The way I am supervised makes me like the work that I do. . 25 43 - .06 - . 25
33) There is variety in my job. - 15 -23 .31 25
34) The way I am managed at Company A is different to other companies I have worked for - . 20 - . 16 - .09 10
35) Company A gives its workers enough information about its present and future plans. .32 26 -.11 - . 29
36) The union here is good at taking up our individual grievances. .27 . 26 .08 07
37) The union here influences some of the management decisions that affect the work I do . 26 . 25 .08 . 04
38) I feel loyalty towards the union here. .23 . 15 . 18 - . 00
39) Having a "No Strike" agreement at Company A does not weaken the union. . 36 .31 - .05 - . 16
40) The union here is not too co-operative with management. .32 . 27 .02 -. 17
p « .05 6 Point Scale 1 » Agree Very Strongly 6 » Disagree Very Strongly
- 3 0 6 -
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
.15 .31
- . 10 . 30 - . 04 14 -
••
- . 23 43 00 .42 12 -
-.25 . 20 . 16 . 19 -02 29 -
-.32 . 50 . 10 . 27 - .09 . 40 . 46 -
-.12 .30 .16 . 37 -.08 .22 . 34 . 39 -
.02 -.12 .06 -. 17 07 -. 15 -.07 - . 28 - . 20 -
02 07 - .12 - . 00 10 - .01 - . 09 - .02 - . 16 - . 16 -
- . 27 43 1 1 -.13 . 45 45 .53 .45 - . 25 - .09
- .23 . 64 02 -.13 .52 30 . 58 . 35 -.22 - . 12 60 -
- . 23 . 17 .02 .02 . 22 . 26 . 24 .47 .03 - . 21 . 4 1 . 28 -
-.32 - . 30 - . 05 - . 20 06 - 24 - . 35 -.41 - . 33 .01 .05 - . 34 -.36 -
-.03 -. 20 -.15 -.01 00 - . 04 -.12 -. 10 - . 07 . 17 .02 - . 10 - .01 .05 -
. 13 . 23 . 10 . 27 .01 18 . 28 . 30 .48 -.03 -.12 . 38 . 35 - . 44 - . 38 - .08 -
-.02 - . 27 00 - . 22 - . 01 - . 29 . 00 - . 29 - . 12 .43 .09 -.36 -.12 .12 . 24 - . 23 -
- . 17 - . 19 -.09 .08 . 1 3 -.25 - . 14 -.32 -.03 . 04 .05 -.35 -.10 . 26 .04 -.07 00 -
. 19 . 29 .11 . 20 -.04 . 31 . 29 . 38 . 32 - . 11 - . 06 .41 . 29 -.31 -.09 .31 - . 14 .43
- .05 . 28 . 14 . 12 . 29 .32 . 20 . 39 .05 -.18 . 27 . 35 -.16 -.01 .42 -03 -. 12
-.15 .33 .06 . 14 . 27 . 19 .12 . 11 .03 . 10 . 27 09 -.13 -.05 . 18 - . 01 -. 17
. 15 , 25 -.09 . 11 .31 -17 - . 14 -.34 .04 - . 16 -. 23 . 22 . 09 . 10 - .31 . 08 .04
. 08 .45 - .00 .03 . 27 . 25 . 25 .32 - .08 - .07
...
.42 . 29 - . 16 -.08 . 26 -.11 -.02
.22 . 29 ■ 15. . 16 . 39 .42 . 28 . 35 -.06 -.13 . 30 .42 . 28 -.20 .03 .50 . 04 -.17
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These perceptions of the EETPU's performance contradicted 
employee expectations of it. As at Stage 1, respondents were 
asked to rank order their three most important expectations of 
their union. Once again, they placed heavy emphasis on it 
playing a traditional role of defending workers' terms and 
conditions of work. (See appendix 8.2.) Given the correlation 
results, the union was not fulfilling that role to their 
satisfaction.
What is noticeable about this first set of significant 
correlations is that they focus on management's style of 
control and discipline of employees. This is in contrast to 
the second pattern of correlations.
This second pattern of significant correlations, like the 
first, included poor perceptions of management/worker 
communications, a propensity to leave the firm, and 
dissatisfaction with the way the company treated its workers. 
However, other items related to employee dissatisfaction with 
the extent to which management involved them in decisions and 
actions concerning production-related issues. The items 
included general job dissatisfaction, the poor supply of 
information concerning the company's present and future plans, 
management's lack of interest in employee ideas about improving 
the way they did their jobs, a lack of job autonomy and 
dissatisfaction with influence over management decisions 
concerning work related issues. These responses suggest that 
any desire workers had to improve performance was frustrated by 
the way in which production was managed and organized.
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3.3) Association of Attitudes About British Industrial 
Relations in General and About Working at Company A
Responses " to the two sets of questions about issues 
related to British industrial relations in general and the work 
environment at Company A were tested for correlations. (See 
table 8.8) There was a strong and significant association 
between beliefs in the existence of conflictuel and low trust 
management/employee relations as a general feature of British 
industrial relations and negative perceptions of Company A's 
work environment. In addition, support for trade unionism 
external to the company correlated with negative perceptions of 
the EETPU's performance within it.
These results show that one set of responses was 
influencing the other. The question is whether it was the work 
environment at the company that was influencing respondents' 
perceptions of issues related to British industrial relations 
in general, or vice versa. The direction of this association 
is examined in section 3.4 below.
3.4) The Association of Workforce Attitudes at Company A With 
Factors Other Than the Research Hypothesis
Before examining the research hypothesis in light of 
results obtained at Company A, this section briefly takes 
account of factors other than the hypothesis that might have 
influenced employee attitudes at Stage 2 of the study.
A series of t-tests were carried out on job related and 
personal characteristics. In order to test for interaction 
among them these characteristics were also subjected to Anova
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IRTO(gORRBL^IOI!S _^ _ PK ISSUES RELATED TO BRITISH IITOUSTRIAL REUlTICmS
IR GENERAL M D  OE WORRIRG AT OOKPARY A^ STAGE 2
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
* * ... .. ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... * * * * * * * * * ... ...
1 - . 50 - . 30 .03 -.24 . 35 - . 38 .06 -.30 -.11 - . 34 -.35 -.41 - . 36 . 11 - 00 - 47 -.45 - . 29 38 -.05 -.41 09 -.12 - . 35 - . 37 -.11 . 21 -.37 - .44
* • * ... . . . . . ... ... .. . .. ... . «
2 - 30 - . 08 - .09 -.25 . 21 -. 18 -.00 -.19 .12 -.19 -.29 -.28 -.21 . 19 ,01 -.20 - . 28 -. 16 18 15 -.22 . 21 -.01 .09 -.22 -.11 14 -.20 -.40
* * * ... . , ... ... ... ... .. ... ...
3 .31 . 34 . 20 . 18 . 19 .31 -.07 -.34 . 10 -.40 -.11 -.32 .09 -.08 .09 -.21 - 45 04 16 -.05 -.13 .25 . 16 -. 18 . 13 -.22 . 18 -.17 - . 14
... . . . ... , .. ..
4 .28 .15 .14 .11 . 16 .26 -.02 .11 .04 -.19 -.10 -.16 - . 16 .01 .00 -.16 - . 24 -.21 15 , 12 -.13 . 14 . 08 -.15 . 18 .08 . 10 -.22 -.21
. .. ... .. .. ,
5 - . 10 .01 ,01 - . 06 . 13 06 -.19 - .00 .00 -.07 - . 24 - . 34 -.22 .00 . 23 20 00 - .03 07 . 14 . 18 . 10 .01 . 14 - . 14 -.02 .11 -.06 -.23
. . .. * ..
6 -.18 -.17 -.04 -.00 .07 . 22 06 - 28 .09 -.15 .07 -.09 .09 - . 06 .08 -.03 - 22 . 09 . 11 . 11 .11 . 18 . 15 .04 -.11 -.29 -.00 -. 13 .05
. . . . . . . , , .**
7 -.16 . 06 . 01 .01 .04 . 19 .01 -.07 .08 -.14 -.23 -.18 - . 15 . 12 -.06 -.17 -.20 -.17 . 18 -.00 -.16 .03 , 17 -.16 -.38 .09 -.17 -.28
8 -.02 -.03 -.04 -.25 .04 -.03 - .08 - , 15 . 14 -.01 -.02 .01 .03 09 .01 07 . 10 - .01 .05 .02 .02 .12 .06 .08 .11 .11 .08 -.00
... . ... « ... . .. *** ...
9 -.28 - . 06 .06 .00 .06 . 16 .09 - . 04 .05 - .05 -.26 -.17 -.26 - . 04 . 17 -.15 -.23 - . 13 . 23 .05 -.32 .07 . 16 -.24 - . 36 - . 10 -.25 - .44
..
10 12 - . 01 .01 .02 . 20 .02 .06 - . 12 - . 04 - . 20 .06 .02 03 - . 08 .00 -.03 - . 03 04 - . 04 . 13 -.04 -.03 . 13 .12 .09 -.06 . 10 -.23 - .03
. . . ... ...
11 .03 .13 . 23 . 18 .16 .02 .02 -.08 -.08 -.03 .09 - . 50 - . 11 - .03 .01 - .05 -.12 - .00 . 10 .07 - .09 -.08 -.12 .09 -.27 -.00 .07 -.29 -.07
N • 144
* P • <^ .05
• P » ^ .01
* P • ^ .001
Questions one to eleven - 5 point scale 1 ■= Strongly Agree 5 » Strongly Disagree 
Questions twelve to forty - 6 point scale 1 « Agree Very Strongly 5 = Disagree Very Strongly 
Some of these questions and their scores are presented reversed - See Table 8.5 for an 
explanation of this procedure.
QueEtipn Key:
I) Co-operation in firms is impossible 
because workers and management are 
really on different sides
2 1 Managers always try and get the 
better of workers.
3) Managers do not always know what is 
best for a firm.
4) It is not easy to be loyal to both 
your union and management.
5) Workers must have some say in 
management decisions that affect 
the work they do
6) Unions should always try and 
co-operate with management.
7) Unions are a good thing.
8) People need a union to protect their 
interests at work.
9) Single unionism at a company does 
not weaken the workforce.
10) There should be some other way to 
resolve disputes other than going 
on strike.
II) Striking can benefit workers.
12) This firm is good to its workers.
13) I am very satisfied with my job.
14) This is a friendly place to work.
15) There is a good team spirit in my 
work area.
16) Getting promoted at Company A is 
important to me.
17) I feel loyalty towards this firm.
18) I can influence management 
decisions that affect the work I do
19) Promotion at Company A is given on 
a fair basis
21) Morale is good here.
22) It is worth complaining here.
23) Management here are interested if I have 
an idea that might improve the way 1 do 
my job.
24) My job gives me freedom to get on with 
my work in my own way.
25) The job I do has responsibility 
attached to it.
26) If a problem comes up in my work area 
the workers there usually try and sort 
it out themselves.
27) Communications between workers and 
management are good here.
28) It would take a lot for me to leave this
29) I am satisfied with management's explanations 
of other people's promotions.
30) I am not made to work too hard here.
31) It bothers me if I do not do my job well.
32) The way I am supervised makes me like the 
work that I do.
33) There is variety in my job.
34) The way 1 am managed at Company A is 
different to other companies I have worked
35) Company A gives its workers enough information 
about its present and future plans.
36) The union here is good at taking up our 
individual grievances.
37) The union here influences some of the manage­
ment decisions that affect the work 1 do.
38) I feel loyalty towards the union here.
39) Having a "No Strike" agreement at Company A 
does not weaken the union.
20) I frequently get ideas about how to 
improve the way I do my job.
40) The union here is not too co-operative 
with management
tests. The Anova test showed no significant patterns of 
interaction. t-tests on the influence of union
membership/non-membership and respondent's age, gender, and 
perception of own class revealed little significant variance 
in questionnaire responses. However, t-tests related to 
duration of employment at the company and satisfaction with pay 
showed significant variance.
T-tests were conducted which compared the responses of 
the 33 (22.9%) Stage 2 questionnaire respondents who had also 
participated in Stage 1 of the study to those employed 
subsequently. (See appendix 8.3.) This factor influenced 
workforce attitudes at the company in two ways. Firstly, those 
who had participated in Stage 1 often had more negative 
perceptions of issues related to British industrial relations 
in general and of the work environment at Company A than those 
subsequently employed. This suggests that their attitudes had 
been influenced by being exposed to Company A's work 
environment for longer.
Secondly, the results explain the direction of the 
association between respondents' perceptions of issues 
related to British industrial relations in general and the work 
environment at Company A. (The pattern of questionnaire 
correlations discussed in section 3.3) They show that length 
of exposure to the Company's work environment determined poor 
perceptions of issues both external to the company and within 
it. It therefore follows that it was perceptions of the work 
environment at Company A that were influencing perceptions
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of "them and us" as a general feature of British industrial 
relations.
A second set of t-tests found respondents' satisfaction 
with pay also appeared to have a significant effect on their 
attitudes. (See appendix 8.4.) Pay or the "cash nexus", was 
for many employees an influential factor in their assessment of 
the company. 60% of respondents who believed their pay was 
"pretty" unfair or "very" unfair tended to have poor 
perceptions of the company's work environment. In contrast, 
the 40% who expressed some degree of satisfaction with pay had 
more positive perceptions.
3.5) The Association of Workforce Attitudes at Company A With 
the Research Hypothesis
The research hypothesis under consideration argues that 
it is not only the use of personnel and industrial relations 
characteristics (NIR practices) that may influence "them and 
us" attitudes, but also other managerial and organizational 
production system characteristics. Further, poor managerial 
and organizational characteristics may lead to the emergence of 
a vicious or virtuous circle.
Interviews and observation led to the identification of 
two key sets of problems in line with the hypothesis. The 
first set of problems relate to weaknesses in Company A's 
personnel and industrial relations characteristics. (NIR 
practices.) The second concern weaknesses in the company's 
managerial and organizational characteristics. These
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problems were the cause of the two patterns of questionnaire 
correlations concerning management's style of control and 
discipline of employees and management/worker interaction and 
communications about production related issues. (Discussed in 
section 3.2 above.)
a) The Hypothesis and NIR Practices at Company A
Compared to the research's UK model, Company A's
personnel characteristics displayed poor training and lack of 
welfare benefits. Interviews revealed that the extent to 
which these and other NIR practices were in operation at the 
company was not the focus of employee discontent. The 
exceptions to this rule were characteristics relating to the 
financial rewards of pay and promotion.
Though not cross-checked using the New Earnings Survey, it 
was established in interviews with local full-time union 
officials, lay officials and the company's management that the 
company paid the local median for the skills required. 
Already, we have seen that 60% of questionnaire respondents 
were dissatisfied with the fairness of their pay and it was 
suggested that this contributed to their negative perceptions 
of the work environment at the company. Interviewees argued 
that the pay was too little, especially where it was the 
primary income for a family and that it contributed to many 
employees' desire to leave the company.
On promotion, interviewees claimed a "blue eyed boy" 
syndrome existed rather than its being merit based as required 
under the model. In line with responses to the questionnaire,
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they expressed dissatisfaction with its allocation and 
explanations of its allocation. They did not want more 
responsibility or a more interesting job, but saw promotion, 
one of the few possibilities of earning more money at the 
company, as unavailable.
If the extent to which NIR practices were in operation at 
the company was not the overriding concern of employees, what 
was? The answer appeared to lie with the style in which local 
management operated them.
The majority of middle management positions were occupied 
by local managers so that it was they who were inevitably 
involved in most day to day interaction with employees. Local 
management made poor use of NIR practices related to personnel 
characteristics at the company. For example, they were 
criticised for their lack of enthusiasm about practices 
designed to foster consensuality and participation. As an 
operator from the assembly area argued: "When we first came
here we had a morning meeting every day. I think we're still 
supposed to, but we don't any more. That sums up their interest 
in telling us what's going on. They assume we're too thick to 
understand or not interested."
Local management were also accused of applying rules 
related to the regimentation of the work environment in a harsh 
unfair style. One particular rule was that workers should 
not talk to each other in the work areas. It was based on 
Japanese management's belief that a worker talking was less 
productive than one who did not. The rule was bitterly
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resented and the style of enforcement was harshly criticised. 
Employees complained that there had been no explanation of 
the reasoning behind it. Further, they believed that it was 
enforced in an arbitrary fashion. The result, as one operator 
explained, was that some local managers "hand out warnings like 
sweets. I've worked nineteen years and I'd never had a warning 
until I came here."
This management style appeared to be emulated by 
supervisors. The relevant organizational characteristic of the 
UK model requires that supervisors act as leaders, encouraging 
and developing the skills of workers. Supervisors at Company 
A did not do this and were harshly criticised: "They were
meant to be part of the team, helping out when things get 
rough", lamented an operator from the press/weld area. "Instead 
they just watch you waiting for you to make a mistake so they 
can report you."
The problems so far discussed, show why responses to the 
questionnaire created a pattern of correlations reflecting 
concern about local management's style when maintaining 
control and discipline of the workforce. This pattern of 
correlations included critical responses to questions 
evaluating the performance of the union at the company. The 
inclusion of these responses can be explained by examining 
the style in which local management dealt with their workforce 
on a collective basis.
Industrial relations at Company A was predominantly the 
remit of UK management. This was because as one Japanese
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manager explained, Japanese management felt they lacked the 
knowledge and confidence to deal with UK trade unionism. 
Moreover, day to day industrial relations at the company was 
conducted between middle management and shop stewards and 
middle management was dominated by local managers. Japanese
management were therefore somewhat remote from the workforce. 
As one operator put it: "We only see them when there are
problems with production. They don't get involved in our 
disputes with the British managers."
The local management dominance over industrial relations
led to a situation in which they were allowed to maintain
control and discipline of the workplace in a low trust and 
adversarial manner. Japanese management appeared content to 
let this happen. Their remoteness from industrial relations
matters meant that during the study they never directly 
interfered in, questioned or criticised the methods used by 
local management to maintain control and discipline of workers. 
Nor was there any suggestion of disquiet about the issue at 
Company HQ in Japan.
The style in which local management operated industrial 
relations at the company had a further vital implication. It 
rendered the union ineffective, to the extent that employees 
believed the union was weak and/or too co-operative.
Though union membership at the company was high at 85%, 
stewards recognised that many of its members believed the 
union to be weak and/or too co-operative. One explained why 
this sentiment was only half correct. "Weak yes, but too co-
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operative no. Management won't let us be co-operative. 
Depending on the issue, I've tried suggesting that rather than 
go into a disciplinary procedure they should let me have a 
quiet chat with the individual to warn him or her that they're
being watched. But they just call me in to the disciplinary
as the rep and that's that. Our relations are very formal. The 
idea that we are supposed to help the place run better just 
doesn't cross management's minds. They just see us as the other
side. We do our best, but with management having that sort of
attitude we rarely get a fair hearing. Workers see what's 
going on and think that because we're not allowed to organise a 
strike we're weak."
Only in the sub-assembly area where there was no local 
management presence was there little employee concern about 
management's control and discipline of the workforce and its 
effect on the union's performance. Japanese management left 
day to day disciplinary matters and grievances to be dealt 
with by the one UK supervisor on site who had adopted a very 
different style to local managers and supervisors employed 
elsewhere at the company. The steward for the department had 
no complaints about his fairness in handling these matters. 
She described her role in the exact opposite way to that of the 
steward discussed above. "It's the union's role to keep things 
on an even keel here. If we (the steward and supervisor) see 
trouble brewing he'll often let me go and have a word with the 
individuals concerned rather than letting things get to a 
disciplinary."
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The co-operative supervisor/union relationship may well 
have influenced employee responses to the questionnaire in this 
area. T-tests revealed that, unlike workers elsewhere at the 
company, they had better perceptions of the union's performance 
and were more loyal to it. They were also more inclined to 
believe it was worth complaining. (See appendix 8.5.)
Overall poor perceptions of the union's performance at 
Company A may have been exacerbated by events surrounding the 
most recent pay discussions. These events are a good 
illustration of the sort of difficulties the union encountered 
when dealing with a local management. Local management took 
responsibility for these pay discussions. Their actions showed 
they were not interested in using the company's NSA for a 
reduction of "them and us" at the workplace and so ignored the 
spirit of tryst and co-operation supposed to underlie it.
Pay discussions took place at the company's advisory 
board. Management's first offer was rejected by the workforce 
in a ballot. This was despite a recommendation from employee 
representatives on the board that they accept it because it was 
all the company could afford. These representatives were 
either stewards and/or union members.
Eventually, and after the issue had been referred to ACAS 
for conciliation - as required under the NSA's disputes 
procedure - a revised and complicated package was assembled. 
This did not improve on the basic rate of pay previously 
offered because management remained adamant that the company 
could not afford such an increase. Instead, it offered
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additional payments and benefits related to sick pay and skills 
accrued. These were to pay for themselves by improving the 
company's performance.
Once again, employee representatives accepted in good 
faith that the offer was all the company could afford, and 
along with management set about persuading the workforce to 
accept it. They encountered considerable difficulty. Many 
workers found it hard to understand the package. Others asked 
why management could find extra money to fund the additional 
payments and benefits, but not an increase in basic pay.
Management realised that the offer was likely to be 
rejected. Their reaction was simple and suggested that during 
the pay talks they had had little regard for the "spirit of 
intent" that was supposed form the basis of the NSA. Three 
months from the date the first offer was put forward 
management called in the local full-time official and the 
senior steward and made an increased offer on the basic rate of 
pay for all shop floor workers. There were no additional 
payments and benefits attached.
Shop floor workers were delighted and accepted this offer, 
but as the the basis of the deal sank in they became aware that 
they, the advisory board and the union had been misled. For 
many, the events showed that management could not be trusted 
and therefore the advisory board was an ineffective body. One 
operator remarked that: "For weeks now management have been
telling them on the board that they can't afford any more and
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then when they realise they can't get what they want they
suddenly find the extra money."
For the union the events were a blow to its credibility. 
A steward explained: "Anything we bring back from the advisory 
board, they're (the employees) going to be deeply suspicious of 
now. We've been made to look like management mouthpieces." 
She also noted: "We're (the union) not going to believe
anything they tell us on the board anyway." This was a poor 
portent for future industrial relations at the company.
In summary, even where institutional processes which 
could be termed NIR practices were in operation at the company 
(such as its NSA or consensuality and participation) their
success at influencing "them and us" attitudes among the 
workforce appeared to be hampered by the style in which local 
management attempted to maintain control and discipline of the 
workplace. This was a style which was becoming apparent at
Stage 1 of the study. It was a style which could best be
termed as traditional British industrial relations - low trust 
and adversarial.
b) The Hypothesis and Managerial and Organizational 
Characteristics at Company A
The second set of problems which are connected to the
hypothesis concern the effect of weaknesses in the managerial 
and organizational characteristics in use at the company. 
These appeared to account for the second, further pattern of 
correlations concerning management/worker communications and 
interaction about production related issues. (Discussed in 
section 3.2 above.)
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The extent to which managerial and organizational 
characteristics influenced workforce perceptions of the work 
environment at Company A becomes most apparent when employee 
attitudes are linked to the level of disruption to production 
in the department in which they worked. In the main assembly 
area, where production was most disrupted and worst organized, 
a series of t-tests on the questionnaire results showed 
employees to have the most significant and negative 
perceptions of the work environment at the company. Workers 
there complained about the lack of information from 
management, and management's lack of interest in ideas workers 
had to improve their jobs. They felt communications were poor, 
lacked job satisfaction, believed the company treated them 
poorly and displayed most propensity to leave. (See appendix 
8.5.) Similar attitudes prevailed among workers in the 
press/weld area but were less pronounced.
By contrast, perceptions of the work environment in the 
sub-assembly area, where production flowed uninterrupted and 
was better organized, were the most positive. Here, workers 
displayed least propensity to leave, had positive perceptions 
of management/worker communications and were happiest with the 
way that the company treated its workforce. (See appendix 8.5.)
There was then considerable variance in the level of 
disruption to production between departments. Interviews and 
observation established that this was related to the management 
structure at the company. Where it was dual it caused
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weaknesses in managerial and organizational characteristics 
which affected "them and us" attitudes among its workers.
Where dual management structures existed communications 
between Japanese and local management were particularly poor. 
The two groups regarded each other as separate structures and 
this caused problems such as a lack of coherent vision, no 
consistency of style and non-consensual/groupist decision 
making. (All contrary to managerial characteristics required by 
the research’s UK model.) The Japanese appeared to have little 
respect for many UK managers based on their lack of skills (at 
doing things the Japanese way) and as one exclaimed, "because 
they are lazy and don’t care." That may be a fair description 
of some UK managers but begs the question of how the Japanese 
came to employ them.
The selection procedures for both Japanese and local 
managers were inconsistent and contrary to the relevant 
managerial characteristic of the model. Japanese managers 
simply arrived at the company at short notice. They believed 
they had been selected for their skills with little regard for 
their attitude or linguistic abilities. UK management were 
usually screened via an agency and then interviewed at the 
company with a view to filling a specific post. Few of them 
were clear as to the exact reasons why they had been employed 
and contrary to the relevant managerial characteristic of the 
model, they were all unsure of their promotional prospects. 
As one complained: "They've said (Japanese management) that
this company will eventually be UK managed, but they’ve given
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no timetable and when any senior Japanese manager goes back to 
Japan another one comes over here to take his place."
There was no policy to circulate UK managers so that they 
would accrue a wider range of management skills. Several
preferred to be insular from other departments. As one put it: 
"I'm not interested in other people's problems. I get what I 
need to know and give them what they need to know as and when 
required." This prevented good horizontal communications
between departments and limited departmental co-ordination and 
co-operation - organizational requirements of the model.
By Stage 2, the overall management structure, though dual, 
might also be described as two tier. An Executive Management 
Committee (EMC) existed which several local managers described 
as "the inner cabinet". Only the UK Personnel Manager sat on 
it. Key policies were formulated and decisions taken in this 
committee, but even the UK Personnel Manager was sceptical as 
to his role. "I'm pretty sure that a lot of late night meetings 
go on before anything arrives for discussion there" he 
remarked. "The result is usually a foregone conclusion. The 
only time I have any real influence is when they come to me for 
advice over a personnel or industrial relations issue. That's 
because they simply haven't the knowledge or communications
skills to handle those areas and it was the justification for
me getting on the committee."
All other UK managers got their feedback from the EMC via 
Japanese managers. Local managers from both the press/weld and 
assembly area expressed concern about not being properly
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consulted over decisions taken by the EMC. One local manager
explained: "What we have is an elite of Japanese. They want
to know everything we're doing but rarely tell us what they're 
up to! Of course we've got some influence over what happens on 
a day to day basis but we have little influence over longer 
term strategies. They never actually talk about that with us.
They decide the policy at the EMC. It then suddenly arrives as
a memo or is brought up at a production meeting and is only to 
be discussed in terms of how we're going to implement it."
Local managers also complained about Japanese senior
management in terms of Van Wolferen's "malleable reality", 
discussed in Chapter 4. (Van Wolferen, 1989) In one instance, a 
local manager in the assembly area informed his Japanese 
superior that initial quality checks on a particular product 
batch had revealed a faulty electrical component. He had
reason to believe that the whole batch of this component was 
faulty but he could not prove it. He suggested suspending 
production until the components were cleared for use rather
than continue using them and risk production of a large number 
of faulty units. This was a major decision to take and the
Japanese manager opted to continue production.
The whole batch of the component was found to be faulty 
and the best part of a day's production contained the 
component. The UK production manager explained that this was 
the case to his Japanese superior and was asked why this had 
been allowed to happen and why had he not stopped production 
earlier? A pointless argument ensued in which it was clear that
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the Japanese manager regarded it as his right to deny that he 
had been informed that an early stop on production would be 
wise and that his UK subordinate was wrong to challenge his
interpretation of events. "It's as if they deny something was
ever said or happened..." the UK manager subsequently 
complained.
Problems of management communication and interaction were 
apparent in the assembly and press/weld areas, but not the 
sub-assembly area because it was solely Japanese managed. For 
example, no elite of Japanese management were shutting out UK 
management from the decision making process. There was no UK 
management to shut out.
So far, instances of poor interaction and communication
between Japanese and local managers can all be seen as
weaknesses in the company's managerial characteristics. These 
weaknesses impacted on the company's organizational 
characteristics and as will be shown particularly the 
organizational characteristic concerning the company's 
relationship with its suppliers.
Company A's relationship with its suppliers often led to 
severely disrupted production which in turn affected workforce 
attitudes and behaviour there. In the assembly area in 
particular, the poor company/supplier relationship contributed 
to poor component quality and late component delivery.
There were two reasons for the poor relationships with 
suppliers. Firstly, the manager in charge of procurement was 
British, though he reported to a senior Japanese manager. His
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system of procurement did not involve the use of written 
criteria concerning component price, delivery time or quality 
as required under the research's UK model. Instead, they were 
all based on a verbal understanding. Secondly, there was no 
close supportive relationship of the company with its 
suppliers. Problems with the quality of components supplied 
were never speedily redressed and appeared to be accepted as a 
fact of production life by management.
One way in which poor quality components impacted on 
workforce attitudes at the company was their effect on the 
routine of work tasks. One of several examples in the 
assembly area concerned the front facia of the product. The 
facia was metal and was sent out to a sub-contractor to be 
painted, it incorporated two holes into which slotted two pins 
that acted as hinges. Every facia that was returned from this 
sub-contractor had the hinge holes drilled out by an operator. 
This was because the paint had been allowed to run into the 
hinge holes and harden. This had been going on for at least 
six months according to the production manager. The operator 
concerned was annoyed that nothing appeared to have been done 
about the problem. "Why don't they tell the painter that he'll 
lose the job unless he gets his act together. What I'm doing 
is a complete waste of time. We're supposed to think of ways to 
improve our jobs. My job shouldn't even exist!"
A lack of communications and interaction between Japanese 
and local management contributed to their not affecting any 
change in the quality of the component supplied for this
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particular job. Had they done so it would have freed workers 
to do other tasks in a production system that required 
functional flexibility and the use of direct labour and might 
have increased worker confidence in management's competence.
Poor quality and late delivery of components also affected 
attitudes at the company by interrupting the flow of 
production. (On one occasion the assembly area produced 
nothing for three days because a batch of a vital component was 
found to be faulty.) This was an area that was extremely 
vulnerable to disruption because it was dependent on a host of 
components from outside suppliers.
Frequent disruption to the flow of production in the 
assembly area led to workers complaining that all they wanted 
was for management to organize work to come down the assembly 
line consistently. This suggests a plea for "traction" as 
discussed by Baldamus. He maintained that a rhythm of line 
work made it more acceptable and that its disruption leads to 
exaggerated weariness and tedium. (Baldamus, 1961) For the 
personnel manager, interrupted production was a major concern. 
"It affects worker morale. Without a continuous flow of 
production workers know we can't deliver the success that we 
constantly promise."
As a result of disruption related to quality a vicious 
circle as is described by the hypothesis emerged in the 
assembly area. However, an important link in the circle could 
not be proven. This link ought to have shown that the 
effectiveness of NIR practices in operation at the company in
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reducing "them and us" attitudes was restricted by the 
ineffective performance of the production system owing to 
managerial and organizational characteristics. The link could 
not be proved because the effective operation of NIR practices 
was already impaired by the style in which local management 
operated many of them when trying to maintain control and 
discipline.
The vicious circle with its unproven link highlighted, is 
summarised in figure 8.1. It shows that despite the company 
placing great emphasis on the issue, workers believed 
management were uninterested in quality. As has been 
described, they often supplied the workforce with poor quality 
components which often disrupted the flow of production. 
Employees were supposed to take responsibility for the 
quality of products by self-checking their work. However, 
several explained that they saw little point in self-checking 
what they did when they doubted the quality of the components 
used to build the product. As one pointed out: "Why bother to 
self-check when you know you're going to see the thing back on 
the line as re-work anyway?" This of course further 
contributed to the company's already poor performance. - hence 
the emergence of a vicious circle.
Many employees felt that the poor performance of the 
company's production system had resulted in some personal cost 
to themselves. They expressed doubts and cynicism about the 
superordinate goal of both management and workers working to 
make the company successful. Expectations of management as
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FIOTOE 8,1
How the Kelatlonnhip Between BIB Practice# and the Production Systc 
Performance at Company A Led to the Rmergence of a Vicious Circle 
With Special Reference to the iBKue of Quality
Poor Performance
 . of workforce.
(Workers cease tc 
pursue the manufacture 
of quality products.)
Poor organization 
and management 
of the production 
system. (Poor buyer/ 
supplier relations 
leads to problems 
of component quality.
Poor performance 
of production. 
(Evidenced by 
disruption of production 
and rework due to poor 
quality components.)
Maintenance of strong 
"them and us" attitudes 
Cynicism about the 
value of. and rejection 
of. NIR practices. 
(Especially those related 
to quali ty. ) 
(Onproven.)
Workforce perceives 
poor performance of 
product ion system.
Workforce perceives 
personal costs to 
themselves. Efforts 
devoted to superordinate 
goal (in this case quality) 
believed pointless due to 
managerial and organizational 
failings. Fear that failings 
will lead to loss of job.
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expressed at Stage 1 were not being met. They had no 
confidence in management's ability to manage the company 
successfully and were especially critical of local management 
with which they had the most contact.
An operator summed up these feelings: "As far as I can
see there's no respect for management's ability to manage here 
any more. The British management just don't know what they're 
doing. A lot of them don't even seem to care about what's 
going on. Everyone can see that. If they're no good then 
they won't get any respect and I don't see how they can expect 
people to work for the good of the company." Others saw the 
personal cost in more dramatic terms: "I can't see how we'll
still be open in a year's time when nothing's going out of the 
door", said one. Given their initial expectations of the 
company supplying a permanent job, this was a major setback.
What appeared to be happening in the main assembly area 
was that the production system's perceived poor performance 
was being blamed by employees for the company's inability to 
meet their expectations. This inability to meet expectations 
worked to the detriment of the company's efforts to reduce 
"them and us" attitudes among its workforce. Had expectations 
been met, then efforts to reduce "them and us" attitudes would 
have been more favourably received.
Turning to the press/weld area there appeared to be better 
organization of production. It relied on the procurement 
department for the purchase of a small number of mainly steel 
and aluminium supplies in bulk rather than the large number of
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different components required by the assembly area. This meant 
fewer problems with quality and delivery deadlines.
The main disruption to this production area stemmed from 
machine faults. Poor organization for their repair and 
maintainence meant that the production system requirement of 
full utilization of production machinery was not being met. 
Insufficient spares were carried while the reputation of the UK 
maintainence technicians among operators was of them being 
poorly skilled. One of the technicians explained their 
reputation arguing that: "We can't get anything from the
maintainence manuals because they're all written in Japanese! 
Our only real training is done by watching the Japanese work on 
machinery that is unfamiliar to us."
These problems meant that the press/weld area suffered
frequent and often lengthy machine shutdowns and relied on 
Japanese management to repair them when they had the time. For 
example, a semi-automatic weld line was particularly prone to
break down which necessitated a reversion to manual welding
while it was being repaired. The frequency with which this 
happened led to numerous complaints from operators about the 
"stop start" nature of work that it caused. Despite this, it 
was apparent that the area suffered far less disruption due to 
poor components or materials than the assembly area. 
Complaints registered during interviews and observation were 
less aimed at management incompetence and more at local 
management's attitude and treatment of the workforce.
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At the sub-assembly department production was rarely 
disrupted. A number of factors contributed to this. As already 
shown, the possibility of poor UK/Japanese management 
communications and interaction affecting the performance of the 
production system was not an issue here. The area also relied 
on a minimal number of components and materials from outside 
the company to make its product which caused few problems 
related to quality and delivery deadlines. Further, the 
production line was half robotics and half manual. The robotics 
were not prone to breakdown like the technology employed in the 
press/weld area.
It might be expected that a virtuous circle had emerged in 
the sub-assembly area. The conditions for its emergence 
appeared ideal. Production flowed uninterrupted, the area did 
not suffer from managerial and organizational weaknesses 
experienced in the press/weld or assembly areas, nor were its 
workers concerned about the style in which the supervisor 
operated NIR practices.
Nonetheless, a virtuous circle had not emerged. This was 
because workers were aware of and had negative perceptions of 
what was happening at the company elsewhere and how it
affected them. They knew from team briefings and feedback from 
the company's advisory board how poorly the company was 
performing overall. (See appendix 8.5.) Typically they would 
argue: "What's the point of us putting in the effort here when
the rest of the company's a mess?" They believed that even if 
they worked harder the rest of the company's performance
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undermined their job security. Several went on to express 
concerns about their job security. In short positive 
perceptions of the immediate work environment were cancelled 
out by negative perceptions of what was going on elsewhere in 
the company.
To conclude section 3 of this chapter, a combination of 
questionnaire results, interviews and observation led to the 
identification of four factors that may have influenced 
workforce attitudes regarding "them and us" during Stage 2 of 
the study. Two of them do not form part of the research 
hypothesis but rather may co-exist with it. These are:
1 ) Length of employment at the company. (Was the 
respondent a participant in Stage 1 of the study?)
2) Financial reward based on satisfaction with pay and 
promotion.
The other two factors clearly relate to the hypothesis 
under investigation. They are:
3) The style in which local management maintained control 
and discipline of the workplace, thereby impeding the 
effectiveness of NIR practices supposedly in operation at 
the company.
4) The management and organization of production in the 
respondent's work area and its affect on the production 
system's performance. (Production related issues.)
In the case of factors three and four, it is suggested 
that as they concern attitudes about the work environment, 
within Company A they influence attitudes about issues related 
to British industrial relations in general.
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4) KEY EXPLANATIONS OF "THEM AND US" AT COMPANY A: STAGE 2
Section 3 identified four factors as influencing attitudes 
regarding the work environment at Company A and perceptions of 
issues related to British industrial relations in general. 
This section assesses the extent to which these factors account 
for "them and us" related attitudes among the company's 
employees.
Each factor was introduced into five regression models. 
(See table 8.9.) The models also included dummy variables 
concerning the job related and personal characteristics of 
union membership, age, gender and perception of own class. 
Other relevant variables based on responses to specific 
questions on the questionnaire were also inserted. Only those 
dummy or other variables showing a significant relationship 
with one or more dependent variables are displayed on table 
8.9.
The dependent variables for these models were based on the 
responses to five key questions on the questionnaire. 
Responses to these questions were taken to indicate how 
successful the company had been in influencing "them and us" 
attitudes. The research does not argue that any one of these 
dependent variables is the best indicator of what had 
influenced "them and us" attitudes at the company. (Chapter 6 
provides an explanation of why these questions were chosen to 
represent influences on "them and us" attitudes.) Four of 
the questions concerned "them and us" related issues within 
the company.
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British IN
Dissatisfaction with pay.
Promotion not given on a 
fair basis.
-0.1435 
(-1.98)
-0.1882 
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-0.1670 
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No variety in job.
No autonomy in Job.
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Dissatisfied with 
explanation of promotic
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-0.2317 
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-0.1997 
-(2.70)
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No point in complaining 
at Company A
-0.3245 
(-4 24)
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Not enough information 
given about company A s  
present and future plans.
Union perceived as not 
influencing management 
decisions
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(1.98)
No strike clause in NSA 
believed weaken the unie
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Union believed too co­
operative .
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communications are good
Company A believed to 
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The first three questions were designed to assess whether 
reductions in "them and us" attitudes had been secured via any 
of Kelly and Kelly's (1991) three routes to attitude change. 
These three routes were firstly, "increased contact across 
group boundaries" (assessed by responses to the question 
"management/worker communications are good here"). Secondly, 
the creation of a "superordinate goal" (assessed by responses 
to the question "management here are interested if I have an 
idea that might improve the way I do my job). Thirdly, 
"changes in attitudes and behaviour" (assessed by responses to 
the question "this firm is good to its workers").
The fourth dependent variable concerned whether the 
company had created a work environment which retained workers 
for reasons other than purely financial reward (assessed by 
responses to the question "it would not take much for me to 
leave this firm").
The fifth and final dependent variable was taken to 
represent attitudes about "them and us" as a general feature of 
British industrial relations. It featured responses to the 
question "co-operation in firms is impossible because workers 
and management are really on different sides." The regression 
model was based on the acceptance that attitudes concerning 
"them and us" related issues within the company affected 
attitudes concerning "them and us" related issues as a general 
feature of British industrial relations. i.e. to see if 
respondents' perceptions of what happened at Company A would 
influence their perceptions of what is, or might > be, the
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norm at other workplaces. Accordingly, four independent 
variables put into the model were the four tested as dependent 
variables representing "them and us" related attitudes within 
Company A. The dummy variables concerning job related and 
personal characteristics were also used. Only those dummy or 
other independent variables showing a significant relationship 
with the dependent variable are displayed on table 8.9.
4.1) Increased Contact Across Group Boundaries
Increased management/worker interaction did not appear to
have led to positive perceptions of management/worker 
communications at Company A. 80% of respondents disagreed to 
some extent that communications were good. Four items accounted 
for 29% of variance (Column a, table 8.9).
Kelly and Kelly (1991) describe this interaction in terms 
of the use of NIR practices designed to enhance participation 
and consultation. Two items suggested that employees did not 
believe such practices at the company had contributed to a 
reduction in "them and us" attitudes. One concerned the lack 
of information employees received about the company's present 
and future plans, indicating a failure in the company's 
vertical communications structure (an organizational 
characteristic under the UK model). A second item 
demonstrated employee discontent with the style in which local 
management maintained control and discipline of the workplace. 
It concerned the belief that the union had little influence 
over management decisions that affected the work done by 
respondents.
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A third item suggested that poor perceptions of
management/worker communications were most pronounced in the
assembly and press/weld areas. These were the areas in
production that were worst organized due to poor interaction
and communication between Japanese and local management and in
which local management style in relation to the control and
discipline of the workplace came in for the most criticism from
employees. A further item linked poor communications to
discontent with management explanations about promotion which
offered a financial reward for employees, if achieved. None of
the dummy variables for job related and personnel
characteristics featured as significant in the model. This
suggests that poor perceptions of management/worker
communications were purely based on the above three items.
4.2) Creation of a Superordinate Goal
56% of workers disagreed to some extent that management
would be interested if they had an idea that might improve the
way they did their job. Four items accounted for 33% of
variance (Column b). This response was linked to the belief
that there was no point in complaining. Employees may have
taken this view because of the unenthusiastic way in which
local management responded to employees who expressed views
about production related issues. The belief that management
lacked interest in employee ideas about how to improve their
jobs was also accentuated by the inclusion in the model of
variables expressing employee dissatisfaction with the amount
of autonomy and variety in their jobs.
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A fourth item indicated that the lack of belief in a 
superordinate goal was most pronounced in the assembly area. 
This would explain why a vicious circle was highly apparent 
there.
4.3) Changes in Attitudes and Behaviour
55% of workers disagreed to some extent that the company
treated its workers well. Five items contributed to this
criticism and accounted for 33% of variance (Column c).
Management’s general attitudes and behaviour were not believed
to have altered to the benefit of "them and us" attitudes.
Again, workers believed the company treated them poorly in
terms of whether management took notice of their grievances.
This suggests that they had this belief not only because of
management reactions when they expressed views about production
related issues, but also because of the style in which local
management operated NIR practices. This response was also
linked to poor perceptions of the union’s performance, in part,
due to the terms of the NSA in operation at the company.
Consequently, the regression model included workers’ beliefs
that the no strike clause in the company’s NSA weakened the
union.
Management’s operation of NIR practices was not the only 
factor influencing workers’ perceptions of how the company 
treated them. The regression model showed they also reacted to 
weaknesses in its managerial and organizational production 
system characteristics. The company’s treatment of workers was 
likely to be perceived most poorly by those working in the
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assembly area. This was the area in which poor interaction and 
communications between Japanese and local management 
contributed to weak managerial and organizational 
characteristics. As a result production was considerably 
disrupted and the emergence of a vicious circle related to the 
issue of quality was apparent.
Finally, despite the company's attempts to motivate 
workers by other means, the model also showed the influence of 
the financial rewards of pay and promotion in employees' 
assessments of how the company treated them.
4.4) Propensity to Leave the Firm
That 68% of respondents disagreed that it would take a lot
for them to leave the company can be attributed to seven items 
accounting for 51% of variance (Column d). Dissatisfaction 
with pay and promotion were strong features re-emphasising the 
influence of financial reward in attempts to reduce "them and 
us" thereby inducing loyalty to a company. That said, a lack 
of information about the company's present and future plans 
also featured as did poor job satisfaction and whether the 
respondent worked in the assembly area. The inclusion of items 
concerning financial reward suggests that had the company 
operated a set of more effective managerial and organizational 
characteristics (i.e. closer to those of the UK model) 
employees might have been more receptive to management efforts 
to reduce "them and us" thereby increasing their loyalty to 
the company.
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Similarly, a seventh item concerned the belief that the 
union was too co-operative with management. That employees 
perceived it this way was as we have seen a reflection of 
management operating NIR practices in operation in the company 
in a traditional style. Had they not done so this might have 
influenced "them and us" attitudes and employee desires to 
leave.
4.5) "Them and Us" as a General Feature of British Industrial 
Relations
Column e in table 8.9 shows the result of regression 
analysis on the belief that co-operation in firms is impossible 
because workers and management are really on different sides. 
69% of respondents agreed to some extent with this statement. 
Two items accounted for 30% of variance. These were both 
responses to the work environment at Company A. They were the 
firm's treatment of its workers, and management
worker/communications.
At first sight, it may seem surprising that none of the 
dummy variables inserted featured in this model. Nonetheless, 
satisfaction with pay and whether the respondent worked in the 
assembly area, have already been shown to account for 
considerable variance in attitudes concerning the firm's 
treatment of workers and employee commitment to staying with 
the company. Since we are arguing that perceptions of "them 
and us" as a general feature of British industrial relations 
are affected by perceptions of "them and us" related issues 
within the company, these factors must remain significantly 
influential.
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Overall, the results of this regression model imply that 
what happens to a person at their place of work colours their 
views and judgement of management/employee relations at other 
workplaces. They believe that what they experience at their 
workplace is representative of what happens elsewhere.
Three conclusions can be drawn from the results of these 
regression analyses. Firstly, in all but the model concerning 
the creation of a superordinate goal there were items 
demonstrating that not only weaknesses in NIR practices were 
affecting "them and us" attitudes, but also weaknesses in 
managerial and organizational characteristics. Regression 
models displayed employee dissatisfaction with both the style 
in which local management operated NIR practices and the way in 
which poor managerial and organizational characteristics 
affected the performance of the production system. This would 
appear to be in keeping with the research hypothesis.
Secondly, it appears that for many respondents, and in 
relation to several of the models, financial motivation was 
still a major influencing factor in their receptivity towards 
any attempts to reduce their "them and us" attitudes. It 
blocked efforts by the company to lock them in to its work 
environment using non-financial rewards. However, it is 
difficult to assess the true impact of financial rewards 
since neither NIR practices nor managerial and organizational 
characteristics at the company operated effectively enough to 
compete with this factor's influence.
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The issue of financial rewards at Company A raises an 
important question. If the company had paid better, would 
employees have been happier and therefore responded more 
positively to attempts to reduce "them and us"? There are two 
ways to test answer this. The first way would be to take a 
company with similar production system weaknesses, but which 
pays more than Company A. Were workers at this company co­
operative with management, it could then be argued that it is 
possible to buy a reduction in "them and us" attitudes. The 
second way would be to take a company with four strong sets of 
production system characteristics, but which pays low wages. 
If "them and us" attitudes among workers were found to be 
affected then the influence of pay over workforce co-operation 
might be deniable.
Thirdly, the dummy variable of Stage 1 respondents versus 
those subsequently employed at the company did not appear in 
any regression model. It is acknowledged that this conflicts 
with t-tests identifying some significant variance between 
Stage 1 respondents and those subsequently employed. The 
regression results may therefore reflect the fact that Stage 1 
respondents' "them and us" attitudes were in line with the 
majority of negative responses to the work environment. Thus, 
even though Stage 1 respondents gave more negative responses 
to the company's attempts to reduce "them and us" attitudes and 
behaviour (because they had been exposed longest to the 
company's work environment), it would be unlikely that they
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would become a separate and a significant feature in any 
regression model.
5) SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Chapter 7 found that Company A had weaknesses in all four 
sets of its production system characteristics. Here it has 
been argued that in line with the research hypothesis, 
weaknesses in all four sets of its characteristics influenced 
"them and us" related attitudes at the company. This was 
confirmed by regression analysis which suggested that by Stage 
2 of the study not only personnel and industrial relations 
characteristics (NIR practices) in operation at the company 
influenced "them and us" attitudes, but also managerial and 
organizational characteristics. (See table 8.1 for a summary of 
these results.)
With regard to NIR practices, whether they were in 
operation or not was of little concern to employees. 
Regression analysis showed that it was the style in which 
local management operated them while trying to maintain control 
and discipline of the workplace that employees reacted to. 
This was a style that inhibited the union's ability to 
represent its members to their satisfaction and accounted for 
their poor perceptions of its performance.
Failures in the company's managerial and organizational 
characteristics were attributed to its dual management 
structure in two work areas. Japanese and local management were 
unable to communicate and interact leading to a disruption of
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production in the assembly area and, to a lesser extent, the
press weld area. It is suggested that this explains why
regression analysis demonstrated that those who worked in the
assembly area exhibited stronger "them and us" related
attitudes than workers elsewhere in the company.
Poor managerial and organizational characteristics in the 
assembly area also led to the development of a vicious circle. 
Workers showed cynicism and a lack of enthusiasm about NIR 
practices in operation at the company. They also believed that 
management's inability to make the production system perform 
effectively made their efforts pointless in respect of the 
superordinate goal of working hard to contribute to the 
company's success. Accordingly, they abandoned their commitment 
to the goal.
It also seems that the production system's inability to 
perform effectively had undermined workers' initial 
expectations of a favourable work environment at the company. 
For many workers, especially those employed at Stage 1 of the 
study, the company's continued inability to meet these 
expectations had by Stage 2 contributed to their poor 
perceptions of "them and us" related issues.
On the basis of these results the not only but also aspect 
of the hypothesis appears to be valid. We can say that 
managerial and organizational characteristics definitely act as 
an intervening variable where NIR practices attempt to secure 
reductions in "them and us" and this is an important finding. 
However, local management did not operate NIR practices in use
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at the company effectively. Thus, we can only suggest that NIR 
practices would have been more successful at reducing "them and 
us" attitudes to the benefit of the production system's 
performance had the company's production system performed 
better due to stronger managerial and organizational 
characteristics.
The results of the study at Company A do not therefore 
validate a further part of the hypothesis. They do not show 
that a two-way relationship exists between the performance of 
the production system (due to managerial and organizational 
characteristics), and the effectiveness of NIR practices at 
reducing "them and us" attitudes.
This inability to demonstrate the two-way relationship was 
the reason why a key link in the vicious circle apparent in the 
assembly area could not be proven. This was the link 
suggesting that workers perceived the poor performance of the 
production system owing to poor managerial and organizational 
characteristics and were therefore cynical and hostile to NIR 
practices designed to reduce "them and us". It has to be 
accepted that this cynicism and hostility may, at least in 
part, have been a result of the style in which management 
operated NIR practices.
A further important factor is how the results relate to 
the mechanisms of the UK model. (See figure 5.1) As explained 
in Chapter 3, managerial characteristics play a different role 
to the other three sets of characteristics in that their 
effectiveness will impact on the effectiveness of the other
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three in reducing "them and us" attitudes, but not vice versa. 
At Company A, weaknesses in its managerial characteristics due 
to problems with its dual management structure meant that 
management's initiating, decision making and operating role in 
relation to both organizational characteristics, and NIR 
practices was detrimental to their success and therefore their 
ability to influence "them and us" attitudes.
Finally, as has been pointed out in section four, where 
the research's hypothesis has been shown to be valid, there 
was strong evidence that "them and us" attitudes were also 
partially influenced by financial rewards, especially pay. If 
the company had operated its four sets of production system 
characteristics so that they successfully impacted on "them 
and us" attitudes, would pay have been a less influential 
factor?
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CHAPTER 9
WORKFORCE ATTITUDES CONCERNING "THEM AND US" AT COMPANY B 
INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 7 it was shown that when compared alongside the 
research's UK model, Company B's overall score was sixth 
highest out of the research's nine sample companies. The 
company was what Chapter 7 defined as a Group 1 company. 
Companies in this Group and in Group 3 achieved higher overall 
scores than those in Group 2.
Scores for Company B's individual sets of production 
system characteristics revealed a pattern of strengths and 
weaknesses. The company achieved high scores for its 
managerial and organizational characteristics, but when 
compared to other companies in the research's sample of nine 
its scores for personnel and industrial relations 
characteristics (NIR practices) were less impressive. It was 
these low scores for personnel and industrial relations 
characteristics that caused the company to obtain the lowest 
overall score of any Group 1 or 3 company.
As at Company A, the aim of this second case study was to 
test the second of the research's two hypotheses. The study 
was therefore looking to see whether it was not only 
strengths or weaknesses in Company B's personnel and industrial 
relations characteristics that affected "them and us" attitudes 
among its workforce, but also strengths and weaknesses in its 
managerial and organizational characteristics. If there was,
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could this be seen as evidence of what the hypothesis terms a 
two-way relationship between the performance of the company's 
production system and the effectiveness of its NIR practices? 
The study was also looking for any evidence of the emergence 
of either a vicious or virtuous circle.
The results of the case study at Company B are drawn from 
a questionnaire, interviews and observation. The study was 
cross-sectional, representing a snapshot of the company 
eighteen months after it had commenced production. It was at 
this point in its development that its production system was 
compared alongside the research's UK model.
1) COMPANY B: SOME GENERAL DETAILS
Company B falls into the research's category of consumer 
electrical supplier. As discussed in Chapter 7, it operates a 
"combined category" production system, producing
"standardized components in large batches to be subsequently 
assembled diversely." (Woodward, 1980, p.30)
The company produces a component essential to the 
manufacture of most electrical consumer goods. This product is 
fairly simple to assemble, and depends on a number of
standardized parts. The number of parts used in the 
manufacture of the product varies from batch to batch,
depending on what electrical consumer item it is designed to
fit. At the time of the study, some batches of the product 
comprised of three parts, other a hundred and fifty.
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Manufacture of the product was divided into three stages. 
In the first area, the preparation area, its most essential 
part was prepared and batched. Here, about 50% of specific 
job tasks identified by the company were automated. The 
preparation area then passed its work on to an assembly area 
where all remaining parts necessary for the completed 
manufacture of the product were added. None of the tasks in 
this area were automated. The product batches were finally 
passed on to a quality inspection area.
The production system at the company was labour intensive. 
Apart from the 50% of the tasks in the preparation area, the 
technology did not exist or was too costly to replace 
operators. At all three stages of manufacture the work carried 
out by most operators was highly repetitive and required 
considerable operator concentration to ensure quality.
The company had what has here been defined as a single 
management structure. It recognised a single union (the 
EETPU) and had negotiated a NSA which included a "no-strike" 
clause.
A total of 90 people including management were employed at 
Company B. 55 of the 84 workers classified as non-management 
completed the study's questionnaire. This represents a 
response rate of 65.4%. None of these respondents were 
clerical workers.
Non-managerial employees had not been subjected to a 
particularly intensive selection procedure (a personnel 
characteristic required under the research's UK model).
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Prospective employees were asked to fill in a short application 
form which determined whether or not they were called for a 
short interview.
For the personnel manager, selection of employees using 
this procedure was based on their having three key attributes. 
The first related to age. Few employees were older than 25 
years. The company was looking for workers who would remain 
with it long-term. It was hoped that as they matured with the 
company they would come to identify more strongly with its 
aims. The assumption was, that the younger employees were at 
the time of employment, the longer the process of maturation 
and the stronger the identification.
Secondly, despite their relative youth, employees at 
Company B had some experience of a manufacturing environment. 
78% of questionnaire respondents had worked elsewhere in 
manufacturing.
Thirdly, as the personnel manager put it: "We're looking 
for workers who show an interest in what's going on. 
Certainly, some of the work here is mundane and repetitive, but 
we want them to have pride in the quality of their work, and 
their team; a recognition that these aims are good for the 
company and good for them. It seems to me that those qualities 
display a potential for the development of a long-term 
commitment to staying with us. After all, quality work is an 
expression of commitment." As with Company A, the intention 
was to bind a core of employees to the company not simply on 
the basis of the level of financial reward but, as one Japanese
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manager remarked; "... because they will feel part of a 
community to which they have a responsibility."
The results of the study of Company B's attempts to 
influence "them and us" attitudes are presented in the 
following two sections. Section two uses the results of the 
questionnaire, interviews and observation carried out at 
Company B to identify attitudes and behaviour among employees. 
It presents their perceptions of issues related to British 
industrial relations in general, and of the work environment at 
the company. These results are used to identify key factors 
which may have influenced how successful the company was at 
creating a work environment that encouraged low levels of 
"them and us" attitudes among workers (tested in section 3). 
Some of these key factors are shown to be related to strengths 
and weaknesses in Company B’s four sets of production system 
characteristics.
In section three, regression analysis shows that strengths 
among Company B's managerial and organizational characteristics 
had a favourable impact on "them and us" attitudes among its 
workforce, while weaknesses among the company’s personnel and 
industrial relations characteristics had an unfavourable 
effect. This confirms the section of the research hypothesis 
which asserts that it is not only personnel and industrial 
relations characteristics (NIR practices) which influence "them 
and us" attitudes at a workplace, but also managerial and 
organizational characteristics. The regression also suggests 
that as at Company A the influences of financial reward on
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"them and us" attitudes cannot be ignored. A summary of the 
case study results obtained at Company B is shown in table 9.1.
2) WORKFORCE ATTITUDES AT COMPANY B
2.1) Workforce Perceptions of Issues Related to British 
Industrial Relations in General
A section of the questionnaire assessed employee 
perceptions of issues related to British industrial relations 
in general. Responses to these questions were measured on a 
five point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree. 
The means, standard deviations and percentage scores for 
these questions are shown in table 9.2.
Several beliefs similar to those identified at Company 
A, were recorded for responses to these questions. They 
suggested a belief that "them and us" related attitudes and 
behaviour were endemic within British industrial relations.
These beliefs were strongly and significantly correlated. 
For example, the belief that management and employees are on 
"different sides" was associated with a poor perception of 
management's ability to manage and the belief that they "always 
try and get the better of workers". These responses were also 
aligned with a belief in the traditional role of trade unions. 
Unions were seen as a "good thing" - for the protection of 
employee interests against employers.
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t a b l e  9.1
s jg p t ig ^ u a in ^  s t h e i ! c t i c _ m ! p  wEM B o a g g s . i« _  o o k p m y  b . - s  _ p _ s o f ie m o i i  
S X S i m  C X A R A C T E K iS T IŒ  ; T H E IH  W ITH  W QMTPRÇE
ATTITVB^a_REL*TEP_TQ_lTimi M D  P5*
Significant Strengths/WeaknesseB in AaKociation With
Production Systea CharacteriEtics 'The» and üs" Related AttitudeE
Managerial Çharaçterlstjl.cs
Single management structure ensured no Inter-management 
conflict and enabled the achievement of coherent vision, 
consistency of management style, consensual/groupist 
decision making and management circulation 
No special management selection procedures.
Effective co-ordination and co-operation of departments due 
to company size and/or single management structure.
Effective horizontal communications between all departments 
due to company size and/or single management structure.
Good vertical communication with employees regarding the 
management and organization of production.
Emphasis on leadership by supervisors, though not particularly 
skilled or highly paid.
Close relationship with suppliers.
UK Personnel manager did not occupy a senior management 
position and was somewhat excluded from the decision making 
process. The post .was advisory. Its influence over employee 
relations related policy was restricted.
PerBonnel ÇharaçteristtçE
Avoidance of a policy concentrating on the selection of school 
leavers. Attempts to recruit those with attitudes and values 
responsive to efforts to reduce "them and us".
Satisfaction among employees that the company offered secure 
employment Dissatisfaction with pay levels among many 
employees. Evidence of employee concern over allocation and 
explanations of promotion.
Elements of consensus 1ity and participation in connection 
with management and organization of production, but resentment 
of methods used by Japanese management to maintain discipline 
and control of the workplace.
todu»triaI Relation» Qiar«ctert»tic»
Evidence of beliefs among Japanese management that the EETPU 
was disruptive to production and would place its own interests 
before those of the company.
Adoption by Japanese management of a low trust relationship 
with the EETPU. contrary to the spirit of intent needed to 
make the company's NSA operate successfully.
Indications that having failed to satisfy some workers 
expectations the union lost members
Employees respected management's 
ability to manage and organize the 
company effectively. They reacted 
positively to interaction and 
communication with management 
where this concerned production 
related issues. This accounted for 
their positive reactions to 
'changes in attitudes and 
behaviour' and their willingness 
to pursue a ' superordinate goal".
Japanese managements' methods of 
maintaining control and discipline 
in the workplace and their low 
trust relationship with the EETPU 
contributed to a 'propensitT to 
leave the fir»'. There was also no 
evidence of weak "them and us" 
attitudes due to 'increased contact 
across group boundaries'
Evidence of dissatisfaction with 
pay influencing "propensity to leave 
the fir»' Evidence that 
dissatisfaction with promotion was 
not only linked to financial 
motivation, but also to making a 
long-term commitment to staying 
with the company.
Ineffective contact across group 
boundaries' influenced 'perceptions 
of 'the» and us' as a general 
feature of British Industrial 
relations'
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TMi^,a.2
wpiuq^RCE ATTITUDES AT CQHPAjry B
PercepxLoa^pX Issye# Related, to Bri tisA 
laduHtrial Relatigna in General Mean Std Dev
1
strongly
Agree
X
2
Agree
%
3
Ho view 
%
4
Disagree
%
5
Strongly
Disagree
X
1) Co-operation in firms is impossible 
because workers and management are 
really on different sides.
2.42 1.12 22 . 2 37.0 20 . 4 16.7 3.7
2) Managers always try and get the 
better of workers.
2. 35 1.11 25.9 61 . 1 18.5 18.5 1.9
3) Managers do not always know what is 
best for a firm.
1.60 1 .09 13.0 44 . 4 16. 7 22.2 3.7
4) It is not easy to be loyal to both 
your union and management.
1. 12 1 .06 11.1 25.9 40. 7 14 . 8 7.4
5) Workers must have some say in
management decisions that affect 
the work they do.
1. 68 0.90 50.0 40.7 1 . 9 5.6 1.9
6) Unions should always try and 
co-operate with management.
2.92 1.11 11.1 20 4 22.2 42.6 3.7
7) Unions are a good thing. 2. 35 1.16 27 . 3 32. 7 23 . 6 10.9 5.5
8) People need a union to protect 
their interests at work.
2 . 22 1 . 05 25.5 43.6 18.2 9. 1 3.6
9) Single unionism at a company does 
not weaken the workforce.
I .95 1 . 10 9 . 1 27. 3 30 . 9 25.5 7 . 3
10) There should be some other way to 
resolve disputes other than going 
on strike.
2.40 1.12 16.4 50.9 14.5 10.9 7.3
11) Striking can benefit workers. 1 . 50 1 . 27 21 .8 43.6 10.9 12.7 10.9
warklecss. imprew 1 SB» pf. ¥pr*çiog_.ai 
B
1
Agree
Very
Strongly
2
Agree
Fairly
Strongly
3
Agree
Little
4
Disagree
Little
5
Disagree
Fairly
Strongly
6
Disagree
Very
Strongly
12) This firm is good to its,workers. 3.38 1 . 35 9. 1 16.4 32.7 18. 2 18.2 5.5
13) I am ve-ry satisfied with my job. 3.40 1 . 39 9. 1 18. 2 32.7 16.4 14 .5 9.1
14) This is a friendly place to work. 3.07 1 . 61 16.4 27.3 23.6 14.5 3.6 14.5
15) There is a good team spirit in my 
work area.
3.09 1 .74 20.0 20.0 25.5 16.4 5.5 12.7
15) Getting promoted at Company B is 
important to me
2.60 1 . 46 18.2 14.5 14.5 21.8 10.9 20.0
17) I feel loyalty towards this firm. 2.42 1 . 57 10.9 12.7 34 . 5 21.8 7.3 12.7
18) 1 can influence management decisions 
that affect the work that I do.
2.12 1 . 28 5.5 9.1 10.9 18.2 14.5 41.8
19) Promotion at Company B is given on a 
fair basis.
3.21 1 . 32 0.00 10.9 38. 2 20.0 14 . 5 16.4
20) I frequently get ideas about how to 
improve the way I do my job.
4.11 1.51 20.0 20.0 38.2 14.5 0.00 7.3
21) Morale is good here. 3.05 1.84 5.5 10.9 18.2 20.0 23.6 21.8
22) It is worth complaining here. 2. 32 1.71 12.7 14.5 18.2 12.7 7.3 34.5
23) Management here are interested if I 
have an idea that might improve the 
way I do my job.
2.75 1 . 46 23.6 9.1 25.5 14.5 12.7 14 . 5
24) Communications between workers and 1 . 69 ; 76 3.6 20.0 23.6 18. 2 20 0 14 5
their line leaders and supervisors 
are good here.
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TABLE„?^2 Contld,
^tedsteCce^IiçreBsioruB of Working at 
CewpaOT. B Agree Agree Agree Disagree
Very Fairly a a
Strongly Strongly Little Little
Disagree Disagree 
Fairly Very
Strongly Strongly
25) The job I do has responsibility 
attached to it.
3.6 14 .5
If a problem comes up in my work 
area the workers there usually try 
and sort it our themselves.
Communications between workers and 
management are good here.
It would take a lot for 
this firm.
10.9 21.8
10.9 34.5
29) I am satisfied with management's 
explanations of other peoples 
promot ions.
30) 1 am not made to work too hard here
31) It bothers me if I do not do my job 
well .
2 82 
1 . 19
1 . 57 
1.54
9. 1 
49. 1
12.7
20.0
27 . 3 
14 5
16.4
5.5
9.1 14,5
12.7 21.8
3.6 7 3
32) The way I am supervised makes me 
like the work that 1 do.
33) There is variety in my job.
34) The way I am managed at Company B 
is different to other companies I 
have worked at.
2.97 
1 .07
1 .67 
1 . 59
12.7 
36. 4
5.5
15.9
25 . 5 
15.9
20.0
20.5
0.00 10.9
7.3 29.1
6.8 4.5
Company B gives its workers enough 
information about Its present and 
future plans.
The union here is good at taking up 
our individual grievances
The union here influences some of 
the management decisions that affect 
the work I do.
9.1 12.7
16.7 35.2
16.7 25.9
I feel loyalty towards the union 5.6 14.8 14.8 44.4
39) Having a "No Strike" agreement at
Company B does not weaken the union.
The union here is not co-operative 
enough with management.
7.4 42.6
7.4 22.2
To ease statistical analysis some of these questions and their scores are presented reversed 
e.g. Scores for question 33 were originally based on responses to the statement "There is ng 
variety in my job ".
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TABLE 9.3
CORROATigiB - PERCEPTIOWS OF I^UES RELATED TP BRITISH INDUSTRIAL RELATIOIK IN GENERAL
1 . 2 3 4 5 6 8 9 10 11
1
Co-operation in firms is impossible 
because workers and management are 
really on different sides
-
2 Managers always try and get the better 
better of workers
52**» -
3 Managers do not always know what is 
best for the firm
. 11 . 15 -
4 It is not easy to be loyal to both 
your union and management
.09 .02 . 37** -
5
Workers must have some say in 
management decisions that affect the 
work that they do
04 . 35** . 15 . 23* -
6 Unions should always try and co-operate 
with management
-.26* -.06 - . 16 -18 - . 04 -
7 Unions are a good thing 05 . 13 .09 02 10 02 -
8 People need a union to protect their 
interests at work
.01 .02 . 11 14 . 25* - .09 53*** -
9 Single unionsim at a company does not 
weaken the workforce
.11 .02 . 15 .13 . 18 00 . 32** . 31* -
10 There should be some other way to resolve 
disputes other than going on strike
. 27* .11 . 12 .07 . 12 .02 - . 06 .09 . 28* -
11 Striking can benefit workers . 19 . 17 .53*** 13 20 -.25* . 13 08 22 .39** -
.05 
. 01 
.001
NB: 5 point scale 1 • strongly agree 5 » strongly disagree 
Some of these questions and their scores are presented 
reversed. See table 9.2 for an explanation of this procedure.
These correlations suggest that management were seen as 
the instigators of conflict at the workplace, not unions or 
their members. Unions were perceived as reactive to 
provocative management actions. This is in line with responses 
to questions related to NSAs. Respondents were happy with the 
idea of single unionism and though they believed that there 
could be a good reason to strike, they agreed that such action 
should be avoided where at all possible.
2.2) Workforce Impressions of Working at Company B
A second set of questions asked respondents for their 
impressions of the work environment at Company B. This was a 
work environment which was supposed to be conducive to a
reduction in "them and us" attitudes. Responses to these
questions were measured on a six point scale, from agree very 
strongly to disagree very strongly. Means, standard deviations 
and percentage scores are shown in table 9.2.
Responses identified two distinct patterns of 
correlations. (See table 9.4.) The first, included
dissatisfaction with the way in which management communicated 
with and supervised employees. This was not in terms of 
communication and supervision about production related issues. 
Instead, it concerned management's style of maintaining
control and discipline of the workforce. Hence, poor
management/worker communications correlated with poor morale 
and agreement that it would not take much to leave the company. 
These items also associated with poor perceptions of
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TABLE
CORRELATIONS - W tUtFORÇE W R E S S I O W S  OK WOKK1HC AT ÇOMPAIfY B 12 13 14 15
12) ThiB firm is good to its workers.
13) I am very satisfied with my job.
14) This is a friendly place to wo.rk.
15) There is a good team spirit in my work area.
16) Getting promoted at Company B i s  important to me.
11) I feel loyalty towards this firm.
18) I can influence management decisions that affect the work I do.
19) Promotion at Company B is given on a fair basis.
20) I frequently get ideas about how to improve the way I do my Job
21 ) Morale is good here.
22) It is worth complaining here
23) Management here are interested if I have an idea that might improve the way I do my job.
24) Communications between workers and their line leaders and supervisors are good here.
25) The job I do has responsibility attached to it.
25) If a problem comes up in my work area the workers there usually 
themselves.
try and sort it out
27) Communications between workers and management are good here
28) It would take a lot for me to leave this firm.
29) I am satisfied with management's explanations of other people s promot ions
30) I am not made to work too hard here.
31 ) It bothers me if I do not do my job well.
32) The way I am supervised makes me like the work that I do.
33) There is variety in my job.
34) The way I am managed at Company B is different to other companies I have worked for
35) Company B gives its workers enough information about its present and future plans.
36) The union here is good at taking up our individual grievances.
37) The union here influences some of the management decisions that affect the work I do.
38) I feel loyalty towards the union here.
39) Having a "No Strike" agreement at Company B does not weaken the union.
40) The union here is not co-operative with management.
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supervision at the company, and beliefs that there was no point 
in complaining about anything.
This set of correlations also included generally negative 
responses about the union's performance at the company. Less 
than a quarter of respondents felt any loyalty to the union and 
this was associated with poor perceptions of its ability to 
represent individual and collective grievances, and the belief 
that it was too co-operative with management. Those that 
believed the union was too co-operative, were also likely to 
believe that the no-strike clause in the Company's NSA 
weakened the union.
Certainly, members' reasons for joining the union at the 
company suggested that they expected it to play a traditional 
role. This was a role in line with their views about trade 
unionism and British industrial relations in general. (See 
section 2.1)
54.5% of questionnaire respondents were members of the 
union and were presented with a list of six possible issues 
that they expected the union to concentrate on achieving at 
Company B. They were then asked to rank order the two most 
important issues. The two most commonly cited represent 
traditional expectations of protecting individual interests 
(e.g. the union will increase my wages). The next two most 
commonly cited concern traditional expectations of protecting 
workers' collective interests (e.g. the union will improve 
working conditions). The two least cited issues relate to 
less traditional expectations of "working with management to
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try and find solutions to problems" and giving individuals an 
"opportunity to participate in making some of the decisions 
that affect how the company is run". (See appendix 9.1.)
These reasons for joining the union help explain the 
workforce's negative perceptions of the union's performance 
at the company and correlations concerning this issue. Though 
members attached considerable importance to the union playing a 
traditional role of protecting their individual and collective 
interests against exploitative management, it was not able to 
perform it to their satisfaction. This was due to the way in 
which management maintained control and discipline of the 
workplace.
The second pattern of correlations to emerge from
responses to questions about the work environment at Company B 
concern perceptions of working at the company. They included 
agreement to some extent that the company was good to its
workers, that morale was good and indicated overall job
satisfaction. Many of these responses were also associated 
with positive perceptions of job related items, notably 
friendliness of the work environment, teamwork, job innovation 
and the belief that management were interested when workers had 
ideas to improve their jobs.
What is noticeable about this second pattern of
correlations is that they refer to production related issues 
concerning how production at the company was organized and the 
nature of the individual's work. They do not include any
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positive perceptions of management/worker communications or the 
trade union's performance.
2.3) Association of Attitudes About British Industrial 
Relations in General and About Working at Company B
Responses to the two sets of questions about "them and us" 
as a general feature of British industrial relations and about 
the work environment at Company B were examined for 
correlations. (See table 9.5.) It was apparent that one 
set of responses influenced the other. The direction of this 
link is examined in section 2.4.
Negative perceptions of "them and us" external to the 
company correlated strongly with negative perceptions of the 
work environment within it. At the same time, though support 
for trade unionism was high external to Company B ( e.g. unions 
are a good thing), these attitudes correlated with negative 
perceptions of the union's performance within the company. 
This again suggests that employees took their perceived 
traditional role of trade unions in Britain and used it as a 
benchmark against which to measure the performance of the EETPU 
at Company B. These correlations also give further credence to 
the suggestion that it was the way management had maintained 
control and discipline at Company B that had inhibited the 
union playing such a role.
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2.4) The Association of Workforce Attitudes at Company B With 
Factors Other Than the Research Hypothesis
Before applying the research hypothesis to the results 
obtained at Company B, this section briefly examines factors 
other than the hypothesis that might have influenced employee 
attitudes.
T-tests were carried out on a series of job related and 
personal characteristics. To check for any interactions these 
characteristics were subjected to anova tests. No significant 
interactions were revealed. The t-tests conducted on the 
influence of union membership/non-membership, age, and gender 
revealed that no significant variance in responses could be 
attributed to these characteristics. However, t-tests 
conducted on respondents' duration of employment at the company 
and satisfaction with pay did account for some variance.
37% of respondents had been employed with the company when 
it first commenced manufacturing eighteen months previously. 
T-tests revealed that compared to the responses of those 
employed subsequent to the company's commencing production, 
these respondents held some stronger negative perceptions about 
issues related to British industrial relations in general and 
of the work environment at Company B. They also showed that 
these respondents held more negative views about the union's 
performance at the company. (See appendix 9.2.)
The results of these particular t-tests have the same two 
implications as similar tests related to duration of employment 
at Company A. Firstly, they suggest that length of exposure
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Question Key;
1) Co-operation in firms is impossible 
because workers and management are 
really on different sides
2) Managers always try and get the 
better of workers.
3 1 .Managers do not always know what is 
best for a firm.
41 It is not easy to be loyal to both 
your union and management.
5) Workers must have some say in 
management decisions that affect 
the work they do.
6) Unions should always try and 
co-operate with management.
7 1 Unions are a good thing.
8) People need a union to protect their 
interests at work.
9 1 Single unionism at a company does 
not weaken the workforce.
10) There should be some other way to 
resolve disputes other than going 
on strike.
11) Striking can benefit workers.
12) This firm is good to its workers
13) I am very satisfied with my job.
14) This is a friendly place to work
15) There is a good team spirit in my 
work area
16) Getting promoted at Company B is 
important to me.
17) I feel loyalty towards this firm.
18) I can influence management 
decisions that affect the work I do
19) Promotion at Company B is given on 
a fair basis
21) Morale is good here.
22) It is worth complaining here
23) Management here are interested if I have 
an idea that might improve the way I do
24) Communications between workers and their 
line leaders and supervisors are good here
25) The job I do has responsibility 
attached to it.
26) If a problem comes up in my work area 
the workers there usually try and sort 
it out themselves
27) Communications between workers and 
management are good here.
28) It would take a lot for me to leave this 
f 1 rm
29) I am satisfied with management s explanations 
of other people s promotions.
30) I am not made to work too hard here.
31) It bothers me if I do not do my job well.
32) The way I am supervised makes me like the 
work that I do.
33) There is variety in my Job.
34) The way I am managed at Company B Is 
different to other companies 1 have worked
35) Company B gives it workers enough information 
about its present and future plans.
36) The union here is good at taking up our 
individual grievances.
37) The union here influences some of the manage­
ment decisions that affect the work I do.
38) 1 feel loyalty towards the union here.
39) Having a "No Strike" agreement at Company B 
does not weaken the union.
20) I frequently get ideas about how to 
improve the way I do my job.
40) The union here is not co-operative enough 
with management.
to the company's work environment might have influenced 
perceptions of "them and us" related issues external to the 
company and of the work environment within it. Secondly, and 
in relation to the first implication, they show the direction 
of the link between respondents' perceptions of issues related 
to British industrial relations in general and of the work 
environment at Company B (as described in section 2.3.). If 
length of employment at the company affected both perceptions 
of the work environment at the company and of British 
industrial relations in general, then it follows that it was 
the work environment at Company B that was affecting 
perceptions of British industrial relations in general.
A t-test was also conducted on the effect of satisfaction 
with pay on attitudes. 51% of respondents believed their pay 
t(? be pretty or very unfair. Their dissatisfaction with pay 
appeared to influence how they viewed the work environment at 
Company B and issues related to British industrial relations in 
general. Firstly, they were more hostile to management 
external to the company and were less likely to believe that 
loyalty could be given to one's union and management at the 
same time. Secondly, they believed, less strongly, that the 
company was good to its workers, and they held more negative 
perceptions of morale at the company and how friendly a place 
it was to work at. They were also more likely to leave, more 
likely to believe that they were made to work too hard, were 
less concerned about the quality of their work and gave more
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negative responses to items relating to job satisfaction and 
management/worker communications. (See appendix 9.3.)
The implication of these results is that satisfaction 
with pay influenced how employees responded to to the company's 
efforts to create a work environment conducive to a reduction 
in "them and us". Further, we should also remember that the 
49% of respondents who felt wages to be pretty fair or very 
fair held more positive perceptions of the same set of issues.
2.5) The Association of Workforce Attitudes at Company B With 
the Research Hypothesis
The research hypothesis under consideration posits that it 
is not only the use of personnel and industrial relations 
characteristics that may alter "them and us" attitudes, but 
also other managerial and organizational production system 
characteristics. The hypothesis goes on to argue that poor 
managerial and organizational characteristics may lead to the 
emergence of a vicious or virtuous circle.
a) The Hypothesis and NIR Practices at Company B
The influence of personnel and industrial relations
characteristics (NIR practices) on employee attitudes has been 
demonstrated by the questionnaire results so far discussed. 
Workers expressed considerable discontent over the way 
management communicated with the workforce. These responses 
were in relation to management's style of maintaining control 
and discipline and also correlated with workers' poor 
perceptions of the union's performance at the company. There 
was then, little employee concern about the extent to which the
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company used NIR practices such as welfare benefits, training 
or single status. Instead, and just like employees at Company 
A, their concerns focused on the style in which management 
operated many of the practices in use. Interviews and 
observation verified this finding, but identified two provisos 
related to the extent to which NIR practices regarding pay and 
promotion were in operation.
In the case of pay, we have already seen that the 51% of 
questionnaire respondents who were dissatisfied to some extent 
with their pay had more negative perceptions of the work 
environment at Company B. Contrary to the UK model's personnel 
characteristic of a market led pay level, the company did not 
pay above the local median for what was mundane and generally 
low skilled work. Though not cross-checked with the New 
Earnings Survey, interviews with local full-time union 
officials, lay officials and the company's management 
established that it paid the local median. Many workers' 
feelings about this issue was summed up by the response of one: 
"I'm grateful for a permanent job and its a good place to work, 
but that's as far as my loyalty goes. The pay here isn't very 
good. If I could get more money down the road I'd leave."
The UK personnel manager was concerned at what amounted to 
a firm adherence by workers to the cash nexus. Many workers 
were remaining with the company only because it was in an area 
of high unemployment and alternative work was not available. 
In anticipation of a possible improvement in job prospects in' 
the locality, was it worth making the effort to encourage
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workers to stay with the company on the basis that they might 
come to like its work environment and community values or would 
it be better to give in to the challenge of the cash nexus and 
pay higher wages?
For the Japanese managers there was no argument. Local 
labour market conditions made little difference to their goal 
of binding a core of employees to the company using a strategy 
that reduced "them and us". With regard to pay the company 
would only give what it could afford and not on the basis of 
increased labour costs threatening the basic aim of producing 
quality products at the cheapest price.
It is also worth remembering that 49% of the workforce 
accepted that pay at the company was pretty or very fair. An 
Anova test revealed that no significant link could be made with 
this satisfaction and the fact that 75% of employees were 
female, nor was there any male/female job segregation in 
operation at the company - so the ideas of females being 
cheaper to employ because: a) they have lower wage expectations 
than males, or b) that compared to males they do different 
more menial tasks requiring less pay does not apply in this 
instance. Similarly, there was no link between the relatively 
young age profile of the workforce and satisfaction with pay - 
so the fact that a number of employees might have lived with 
their parents and had fewer financial responsibilities and 
outgoings also had no relevance. One or both of two 
conclusions may be drawn - that these respondents agreed that 
the company did pay a fair wage in local terms for the level of
-371-
skills required and that satisfaction with aspects of the work 
environment at the company had indeed sapped financial
motivation.
Regarding promotion, three questions on the
questionnaire attempted to assess whether workers felt it was 
merit based, in line with the UK model's personnel
characteristic. In each case, respondents were divided roughly 
50:50 as to whether promotion mattered to them, whether it was 
given on a fair basis, and whether management's explanations of 
promotion were satisfactory.
These responses demonstrate concerns among operators about 
promotion. Unlike workers at Company A many workers at Company 
B expressed concerns about promotion that were not purely 
financial, but more about a chance to move away from the 
mundane operator tasks as a reward for their efforts and 
loyalty. Several interviewees hoped for promotion in the next 
couple of years which suggested that it was linked to a 
commitment to staying at the company. All interviewees believed 
that being Japanese, the company would emphasise promotion 
from within. For an operator this would be up to team leader 
and then into supervisory or technician grades.
Recent events had not corresponded with these 
expectations. This was for two reasons. Firstly, the turnover 
in the team leader, supervisor and technician grades was small 
and this, linked with the small size of the company, meant few 
vacancies arose. Secondly, of the vacancies that had arisen, 
several in the supervisory and technician grades had gone to
-372-
external candidates. On these occasions it had not been 
possible for Company B to identify internal candidates with 
the skills or experience necessary for the posts. The 
personnel manager was well aware of these problems: "We*re a 
small company, so when a vacancy does arise there's an awful 
lot of interest and if we have to go external it causes immense 
problems with morale. Employees feel there were people 
suitable for the positions here already, so why go outside?"
It has been suggested that with the exceptions of pay and 
promotion, workforce concerns about personnel and industrial 
relations characteristics (NIR practices) at the company were 
not based upon the extent to which they were in operation. 
Instead, they concerned the style in which Japanese management 
operated them. It was this factor that accounted for the 
pattern of correlations discussed in section 2.2. These were 
indicative of employee criticism of the way in which 
management maintained control and discipline of the workplace. 
This factor was linked with poor perceptions of the union's 
performance at Company B.
The reason why Japanese management's style was so 
influential over NIR practices at Company B and was detrimental 
to their success can be linked to two factors. Firstly, and in 
contrast to Company A, Company B had what can be termed as a 
single management structure in which only the personnel 
manager was British. The personnel manager's was not a senior 
post (contrary to the relevant organizational characteristic 
of the UK model) and therefore had little influence.
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Consequently the Japanese had a free rein to operate NIR 
practices as they saw fit. Secondly, Japanese management 
selected to manage the company had been through no clear 
selection procedure (contrary to the relevant managerial 
characteristic of the UK model). Their selection appeared to 
be linked only to production related skills, not attitudes 
useful to the successful operation of NIR practices based on a 
compromise of Japanese and local practice.
In the case of personnel related characteristics, most 
employee discontent focused on how management applied rules 
about the regimentation of the work environment. One rule 
which attracted considerable employee criticism concerned 
overtime.
For Japanese management, working overtime was a matter of 
course and an expression of operators' commitment to the 
success of the company. Operators' contracts of employment 
specified that the company could ask them to work up to three 
hours overtime a week. This was something mentioned in the 
selection interviews, but many operators claimed that they 
couldn't remember it being mentioned, that they had not 
questioned it because they wanted the job or that they had not 
believed the company would pursue the requirement so 
rigorously.
The company operated to tight customer lead times so that 
its ability to deliver its product on time often rested on the 
use of overtime. Many of the female operators complained 
that they could not work the amount of overtime required
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because of ; family commitments but that they were often 
pressurized to do it. This caused considerable resentment. 
Workers worried that Japanese management made a mental note of 
how often they worked overtime and regarded them as poor 
employees if they did not do so on a regular basis. They 
complained that Japanese management at the company failed to 
understand that they were not Japanese workers who put the 
company before all else. Line leaders and supervisors were 
generally sympathetic towards workers not interested in 
overtime, but because of the production deadlines set by 
Japanese management were often compelled to pressurize them to 
do it.
Employees at Company B also found it hard to relate to 
rules that forbade talking in work areas and required 
permission to leave the work area to go to the toilet. They 
seemed perplexed by such rules and often resisted them. For 
example, one commented: "I don't find the Japanese a problem to 
work for, but some of their rules are stupid. I spend eight 
hours a day next to the same person. You can't expect us not 
to speak."
Failure to adhere to these and other rules relating to 
absenteeism and quality and performance of work were grounds 
for management to invoke disciplinary procedures. During 
interviews and observation many operators argued that these 
rules were enforced unnecessarily harshly and with too much 
zeal. Supervisors who were generally given the task of
handing out disciplinary warnings tended to agree. They felt
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they were often pressurized by Japanese management to hand out 
warnings. "I would rather they trusted me to use my 
discretion", argued one.
To Japanese management, dissatisfaction and resistance to 
rules related to the regimentation of the work environment 
indicated that they had failed to create the community
atmosphere they sought and this was a grave threat to the
performance and success of the company. As one of them put it: 
"I find it hard to understand why some workers hate to be here. 
I worry about that. I can only think that it is cultural. I
would call it a problem of self-discipline that comes from the
home and school."
At the time of the study, Japanese management claimed
that they had compromised some of their attitudes regarding 
regimentation and discipline within the workplace. "Already," 
claimed one manager: "We have compromised over talking. We
allow it to some extent and often pretend we do not notice 
when it happens." There was however, no indication from 
employees that they had noticed this or any other attempt by 
Japanese management to compromise.
Japanese management also claimed to have compromised over 
the provision of music in the work area. Employees had wanted 
radio music piped into the workplace. The Japanese argued that 
workers could not work and listen to music at the same time 
and that it looked very bad when there were visitors in the 
factory. Eventually, after persuasion from the union a
compromise was reached. Radio music would be played, but not
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above a certain (unspecified) volume, not when the factory had 
visitors, and under no circumstances was it to be BBC Radio 1 . 
Radio 1 was judged by management to contain too much talking 
which was even more distracting than music.
The radio never ceased to be a bone of contention. 
Workers resented visits from customer or supplier 
representatives because the radio would be switched off. It 
was also treated as symbolising who was in control of the 
workplace. When the radio was on, a constant and informal 
battle raged between management and workers over its volume. 
Japanese management would turn it down and then whenever they 
were not looking it would incrementally be turned up until it 
reached or surpassed the original volume. On a day where a 
batch of the product was found to be faulty by a customer, 
management turned it off as a punishment. An operator just 
shook her head when I asked her about it: "They go from one
extreme to the other. One minute we're adults, treated 
equally, the next we're three year olds."
It was shown in section 2.2, that responses to the 
questionnaire indicating poor perceptions of the union's 
performance, were included in the pattern of correlations 
concerning employee dissatisfaction with management's control 
and discipline of the workplace. This finding was confirmed 
during interviews and observation at the company. Criticism 
of the union could be attributed to the style in which Japanese 
management operated NIR practices within the company.
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The UK personnel manager acknowledged that there was a 
problem with Japanese management's handling of industrial 
relations at the company and put it down to the following: 
"Japanese management find it difficult to accept that British 
unionism is autonomous. They find it hard to understand that 
people involved in the union feel loyalty to an organization 
that isn't part of the company."
For Japanese managers the recognition of a UK union had 
been a traumatic affair and one manager candidly admitted: 
"Unions in the UK are notorious and seen as too strong. Our 
biggest problem here is that the union's style is to take and 
take without giving back." There was then, a problem of trust 
between the two parties.
Shop stewards had little doubt that the poor perception of 
the union's performance at the company was due to the way 
Japanese management treated the union and the belief that the 
NSA in operation at the company restricted its effectiveness or 
made it too co-operative. For example, 74% of questionnaire 
respondents agreed to some extent that the no-strike clause in 
Company B's NSA weakened the union. As one steward
explained: "A lot of people on the floor believe that we don't 
have enough clout. They think that we should never have agreed 
to the no-strike part of our agreement here because it makes us 
weak. They're probably right. The agreement here is based on 
co-operation and trust. Because of the way it's supposed to 
work, if management choose not to co-operate, it works in their 
favour."
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Stewards also expressed concern that their relationship 
with management was not based on the type of trust that the 
agreement required. One put this down to the fact that: "They 
didn't really want to recognise a union here, but they'd have 
got into all sorts of problems if they hadn't because most 
people round here are pro-union. So management just see us 
something they've got to put up with. We can go about our 
daily business without much trouble, but it's rare that they 
actually give way to us where we disagree - say in a 
disciplinary hearing - and that's what the members pick up on."
When discussing the lack of trust between Japanese 
management and the union, stewards often cited examples of the 
way in which Japanese management used the company's advisory 
board. One explained: "I really don't think they trust us with 
any meaningful information. There's never any indication of 
what their future plans are because they think we'll be 
critical about how they will affect workers." Another noted: 
"They believe we make waves about the littlest things which 
perhaps in Japan workers wouldn't bother with. Two things 
happen. They either say no to our request, or stall and stall. 
At one point we wanted to change working hours so that we'd 
come in early all week, forfeit our afternoon break and then 
finish at lunch on a Friday. It took nearly a year to get 
agreement."
The result for the stewards was that they had to contend 
with employees' scepticism about the effectiveness of the 
company's advisory board and the union's effectiveness at
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representing workers' interests on it. One noted: "People are 
getting to the point of not being interested in the advisory 
board. They don't believe it can do anything for them. Now 
when we go around asking what they want us to raise we get 
hardly any response."
Most importantly for the union, levels of membership 
density among the 84 workers eligible to join at the plant had 
fallen from approximately 60% to 45% over the 18 months the 
company had been open. Japanese management attributed the 
decline in union membership to the company offering a 
successful alternative to the union, i.e. workers felt secure 
enough not to need one. However, the questionnaire offered 
evidence that this decline was due to other factors, the most 
important being that management's actions had made the union 
seem either too co-operative or ineffective.
Appendix 9.4 gives details of why 43.5% of respondents 
were not members of the union at the company. They represented 
a minority of questionnaire respondents, but were in fact in a 
majority at the company. Actual union density was 45% 
according to company records.
These non-members were presented with a list of possible 
reasons for their non-membership. The most commonly cited 
response did not relate to a specific issue but was for "some 
other reason". The majority of these respondents were from the 
quality inspection work area, and had resigned over what they 
saw as the union's inability to achieve any success in a 
dispute related to working conditions. The union was blamed for
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a failure to secure an improvement in their heating 
conditions. Those that had resigned from the union over the 
issue claimed that this was the last of several failures that 
had persuaded them to leave. They perceived the union as 
either too co-operative with management or ineffective. "I 
don't see the point in paying money for something that doesn't 
work. Whatever the union asks for the Japanese say no, the 
union accepts their answer and that's it." said one.
The second most commonly cited reason for not joining the 
union at Company B was simply the belief that "I would prefer 
to take care of myself." Interviews suggested that this was 
either based on a general dislike of unions or a lack of 
confidence in the EETPU's abilities at the company.
The third most commonly cited reason concerned the EETPU's 
non-membership of the TUG. Several respondents also answered 
that they wanted to join, or were members of, another union. 
Operators gave two possible explanations for these answers. 
Firstly, over half the questionnaire's respondents came from 
mining families and disapproved of the EETPU's controversial 
stance during the 1984/85 miners' strike. Secondly, it was 
thought that the union was too co-operative with employers (not 
just at Company B) and had weakened trade union collectivism 
which was to the detriment of all trade union members. 
"They're not a real union", said one operator.
The decline in union membership had significant 
implications. There was as yet no evidence of workers looking 
to join another union, but as the UK personnel manager
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explained: "It means the union doesn't speak for the majority 
of workers here and that could be divisive." The union's low 
density led to just such a situation. It balloted its members 
on the acceptance of a pay offer, as it was obliged to under 
the terms of the company's NSA. They rejected it, but workers 
not in the union requested that management held a second 
ballot including all non-union members and the offer was 
accepted. In effect, the drift away from membership, much of 
it attributable to Japanese management's actions, had 
undermined the union's representative credibility. To employees 
the union's lack of influence during the pay negotiations was a 
further demonstration of its limited power at the company.
This section of the chapter has demonstrated that as at 
Company A, many of the institutional processes that could be 
termed NIR practices were in place at Company B. Nevertheless, 
their ability to influence "them and us" attitudes was hindered 
by management's style of maintaining control and discipline 
of the workplace. Crucially, and unlike at Company A, 
deficiencies in this management style were not due to the 
operation of NIR practices by local management, but by Japanese 
management.
b) The Hypothesis and Managerial and Organizational
Characteristics
As was shown in section 2.2, the questionnaire results
included a pattern of correlations related to the way that 
production was organized and managed. These were perceptions 
of the work environment at the company. Workers were responding 
positively to interaction and communications with Japanese
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management in terms of production related issues, but not, as 
we have seen, in relation to the style in which they 
maintained control and discipline of the workplace.
These positive perceptions became highly apparent during 
interviews and observation. Workers praised the way in which 
Japanese management communicated and interacted with them about 
production related issues. A typical comment was:
"Management here are always around asking what's happening. You 
do actually feel that they're talking to you because they want 
to know what you think. It did use to terrify some of us to 
start with. You don't usually have a managing director looking 
over your shoulder and asking what you're doing. But all the 
Japanese here show respect for hard work and we respect them 
for getting out here (into the work area) and doing things 
alongside us."
Operators were also complimentary about the level of 
interest Japanese management showed when they encountered 
difficulties or had an idea concerning the way they did their 
job. They were believed to be highly approachable and very 
receptive. As one put it: "There's no stopping them. If you 
tell» them you're having some sort of problem, you can't get rid 
of them until they're sure its solved!"
Comment was frequently passed about Japanese management 
placing quality before quantity - in contrast to local 
management at Company A. For example, one worker, who
operated two identical machines explained how the Japanese had
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accepted, after he had shown them, that if he ran the machines 
above a certain speed the quality of the output would suffer.
Another operator explained that it was well known that on 
one job 4,000 tasks could be completed in an hour, but that the 
expected rate was an average of 2,000 per hour over the day. 
Again management were satisfied that if operators were to 
consistently achieve the higher figure, this would result in 
poor quality and they would not allow this to happen. As one 
supervisor explained: "We're trying to find a a happy medium. 
We expect 100% quality. If they can get 99 out of 100 actions 
correct then they can make it 100. But that's not going to 
happen if we push them too fast. I think we've got it about 
right. The main test of quality is what the companies we're 
supplying tell us. All our customers at the moment are 
Japanese and what they're telling us is very good."
Positive reactions to management's treatment of employees 
in connection with production related issues could be seen in 
two further respects, both related to employee performance. 
Firstly, a good team spirit had developed in most work areas 
(reflected in the responses to the questionnaire). The company 
attached considerable importance to this and publicly displayed 
performance in terms of quality and output and absenteeism 
rates for each team. Awards were issued to members of each 
team that achieved the best monthly results. These were in the 
form of gift vouchers. Operators frequently mentioned how well 
their team was performing in comparison to others and of who
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was letting their team down by their individual poor 
performance.
Secondly, some individuals were highly conscious of and 
proud of the amount of effort they put into their own work.
For example, about half a dozen employees who were not
supervisors or team leaders stayed late or started work early 
on a voluntary basis. These attitudes and behaviour were 
also apparent when looking at their response to the company's 
emphasis on continuous improvement under which operators were 
expected to try and achieve higher figures (while maintaining 
quality).
Each day the previous day's output figures for each 
supervisor's work area were delivered to them. In one work area 
it was noticeable that after they had been delivered operators 
would wait for the supervisor to leave his desk and then
casually wander over to look at the figures. These were in a
form that allowed them to compare their own performance with 
that of individual colleagues. Often operators talked with 
great pride about the figures they had achieved and were 
disparaging of those who could not reach the minimum targets or 
were too lazy to do so.
It seems then that good inter-action and communications 
between management and employees over production related 
issues at Company B had engendered positive employee reactions 
beneficial to production.
Positive employee reactions to production related issues 
could be attributed to the following beliefs: Unlike employees
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at Company A, employees at Company B exhibited considerable 
confidence in management's ability to manage and organize
production. That the company might be poorly managed and 
organized was an issue they never mentioned. This was because 
there was no evidence that this was the case. Unlike at 
Company A, production was not constantly disrupted and of a 
"stop - start" nature. Operators therefore typically talked of 
the Japanese and production related issues along the following 
lines: "The Japanese have got their faults, but you can't
argue about how they run this place. They know exactly what 
they want and how to get it." Perhaps most significantly, and 
unlike operators at Company A, the suggestion that the company 
might fail and that they would all lose their jobs never 
entered the minds of operators at Company B. These positive 
perceptions suggested that the company was going some way to 
fulfilling employee expectations of what it would be like to
work there. If this was the case it could be argued that the 
production system's perceived good performance was satisfying 
employee expectations of the company and this in turn was 
having a positive influence on the company's efforts to reduce 
"them and us".
These attitudes established a work atmosphere in which
employees appreciated that they should play their part in
achieving a superordinate goal. During interviews and
observation they talked happily of working hard to make the 
company successful on the grounds that the company's success 
was good for themselves. In this instance one might expect to
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see the emergence of a virtuous circle as proposed under the 
hypothesis. One could be identified (see figure 9.1), but an 
important link in the circle could not be proven. It could 
not be proved that the circle enhanced the effectiveness of 
NIR practices at the company in reducing "them and us" 
attitudes. This was because as we have seen, the effective 
operation of several NIR practices were impaired by the style 
in which Japanese management operated them when trying to 
maintain control and discipline of the workforce.
Why were management at Company B able to elicit positive 
attitudes and behaviour among their workforce where they 
concerned production related issues? There are three inter­
related reasons.
Firstly, the company's small size meant that horizontal 
communications between departmental managers, (an
organizational requirement) irrespective of their areas of
responsibility were easy to maintain. The same applied to
vertical communications with the workforce over production 
related issues.
Secondly, both the company's size and the nature of its
product meant that production was simpler to organize than at
Company A. Company B had no disruption due to poor quality or 
late delivery of components. The company was only reliant on a 
small number of components from a small number of suppliers. A 
compromise JIT system of component supply existed. Few were 
actually delivered on a JIT basis. In most cases the company 
maintained buffer stocks and made up kits of components to be
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FIGURE 9.1
How the Relationship Between The Production System's Performance 
and NIR Practices at Company B Led to the Emergence of a Virtuous Circle
Good performance 
of workforce
Good organization 
and management 
of the production 
system.
Good performance 
. of production ' system (Evidenced by 
uninterrupted production)
Workforce perceives 
good performance of 
production system.
Evidence of repudiation 
of "them and us" attitudes 
Belief in the validity of, 
and positive reaction to 
NIR practices. 
(Unproven)
Efforts 'devoted to 
pursuit of superordinate 
goal believed worthwhile 
due to managerial and 
organizational strengths. 
No fear of job loss.
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delivered into the work area as needed. As required under 
the organizational characteristics of the UK model, the 
Japanese managers maintained extremely close ties with their 
suppliers and were proud of the supportive role the company 
played where suppliers encountered problems (one spent two days 
in Germany assisting a supplier during the observation 
period). Quality components were delivered to the company by 
the time specified. This all aided the smooth operation of 
production.
The third inter-related reason for uninterrupted 
production was that because it was small the company only 
needed to employ Japanese managers (apart from the UK personnel 
manager). Consequently, and unlike at Company A, management 
operated as a cohesive unit. There was no scope for management 
conflict based on an elite of Japanese management shutting out 
local management from the decision making process and failing 
to communicate information to them. Nor could there be the 
negative influence of a local management style that might 
encourage departmental insularity. Compared to Company A,
the company exhibited a strong set of managerial
characteristics closer to those required by the UK model.
These three plant specific factors all combined to allow 
the company to operate strong sets of managerial and 
organizational characteristics compared alongside the UK 
model. The result was the effective performance of the 
production system. This in turn had an apparently beneficial 
effect on employee attitudes among their workforce.
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Section 2 of this chapter has shown that four key factors
may have influenced workforce attitudes at Company B. They
are broadly the same as the four factors identified at Company
A, though in some cases they have a different effect on
attitudes. Two of these factors do not form part of the
research hypothesis. Instead they co-exist with it. These 
are:
1 ) Length of employment at the company. ( Did the
respondent start work at the company when it first 
commenced production, or was he/she employed over the 
subsequent eighteen months?)
2) Financial reward based on satisfaction with pay and 
promotion.
The other two factors relate to the research hypothesis 
under investigation.
3) The style in which Japanese management maintained 
control and discipline of the workplace, thereby impeding 
the effectiveness of NIR practices supposedly in operation 
at the company.
4) The management and organization of production at the 
company and its effect on the production system's 
performance. (Production related issues.)
As at Company A, it is suggested that because the third
and fourth factors concern attitudes about the work
environment within Company B, they also influence attitudes 
about British industrial relations in general.
3) KEY EXPLANATIONS OF "THEM AND US" AT COMPANY B
So far the research has identified four factors which have
influenced attitudes regarding the work environment at Company
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B and perceptions of issues related to British industrial 
relations in general. This section assesses how far these 
factors influenced "them and us" related attitudes among the 
company’s employees.
To test their explanatory power regarding "them and us" 
attitudes at Company B, the four factors were introduced into 
five regression models. (See table 9.6.) The regression 
models were based on identical dependent variables to those 
used in Chapter 8. These dependent variables were based on 
the responses to five key questions on the questionnaire which 
were taken to indicate how successful the company had been in 
reducing "them and us" attitudes. (Chapter 6 explains why these 
questions were chosen.)
The first four of these questions concerned "them and us" 
related issues within Company B. In each case the regression 
models included dummy variables concerning the job related and 
and personal characteristics of union membership, age, gender, 
and perception of own class. Other relevant variables based on 
responses to specific questions were also used. Only those 
dummy or other variables showing a significant relationship 
with one or more dependent variables are displayed on table 9.6
Responses to the fifth question were taken to represent 
attitudes about "them and us" as a general feature of British 
industrial relations. As in Chapter 8, the model was 
constructed on the basis that attitudes concerning "them and 
us" within the company affected attitudes about "them and us" 
as a general feature of British industrial relations. Four
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TABLE 9^6
KEY EXPLAMATIOWS OP ' AM) US" AT COMPANY B j^  HEGMSSION ANALYSIS
(a)** (b)*«
Increased Creation
contact across of a
group superordinate
boundaries Goal
( c ) «  (d)*« (e)«
Changes in Propensity to "Thesi and Us*
attitude and leave the as a general
and behaviour firm feature of
British IR
Dissatisfaction with pay. -0.2310 
(-1 .8 8 )
Company B believed a friendly 
place to wor)<.
0.2088 
(1 .6 8 )
Promotion Important to 
respondent.
-0.2281 
( - 1 .86 )
Overall Job satlsfactlc 0.3248 
(2.7P)
0.6437
(5.72)
Good team spirit In work area. 0.3717 
(3.29)
0.1867 
(1.79)
Frequently gets ideas about how 
to Improve own job.
0.2505 
(2.30)
No point In complaining at 
Company B
-0.3652 
(-3 04)
-0.4079 
(-3.51)
Satisfied with Information 
given about Company B s 
present and future plans.
0 4 368 
(3.98)
No strike clause In NSA 
believed to weaken un 1 or
-0.3386 
(-2.82)
Management/worke r 
communications are poor
0.4910
(4.06)
3 .479 
(5.72)
2.918
(3.43)
1.114 
I 2.81)
1 . 588 
(1.17)
1.275 
(4.06)
Mean of D.V. 
Adjusted R*
3. 26 
0.2555 
10.09 
54
2. 15 
0.4417 
11 . 68 
54
3.38
0.4391
15.09
54
3.32
0.2724
7.73
54
2.42 
0.2264 
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independent variables put into the model were the four tested 
as dependent variables representing "them and us" related 
attitudes within Company B, The dummy variables concerning job 
related and personal characteristics were also inserted. Again, 
only those dummy or other variables showing a significant 
relationship with the dependent variable are displayed on table 
9.6.
3.1) Increased Contact Across Group Boundaries
58% of respondents disagreed to some extent that
management/worker communications at the company was good. Two 
items accounted for 25% of variance. (Column a, table 9.6.) 
Neither of these items relate to management/worker
communications in connection with the management and 
organization of production, but instead highlight anxiety about 
Japanese management’s control and discipline of the workplace.
Contact with management had led workers to believe that 
there was no point in taking up a grievance with them. 
Further, employee dissatisfaction with this particular facet of 
Japanese management style at the company was linked to employee 
criticisms of the EETPU’s performance. The regression model 
can be seen to reinforce the findings discussed in section 2. 
This was that a desire among employees to influence management 
actions via the union was not being satisfied. Many blamed 
the union’s inability to do this on the no-strike provision 
in the company's NSA - hence the inclusion of this item in the 
model.
3.2) The Creation of a Superordinate Goal
58% of employees agreed to some extent that management at
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Company B would be interested if they had an idea that might 
improve the way they did their job. Four items accounted for 
44% of variance. (Column b.)
The idea of both management and workers working together 
to make Company B successful seemed plausible to many of its 
workers because of the way they were managed and organized in 
relation to production, not because of Japanese management's 
style of maintaining control and discipline of the workplace. 
This regression model therefore included overall job 
satisfaction and positive perceptions of the team spirit in the 
respondent's work area.
Employees also linked the idea of the superordinate goal 
to the fact that they were satisfied with the amount of 
information management gave them about the company's present 
and future plans. In addition, positive responses about the 
frequency with which respondents got ideas about the way they 
did their job suggested that management's interest in these 
ideas encouraged the frequency with which workers came up with 
them.
3.3) Changes in Attitude and Behaviour
58% of respondents agreed to some extent that the company
was good to its workers. Three items contributed to 43% of 
variance. (Column c.) None of these three items concerned 
how management maintained control and discipline of the 
workforce. Two of the three items suggest that employees 
regarded their good treatment by the company in terms of the
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friendliness of the work environment and the team spirit in 
their work area.
It could be argued that the results from this regression 
model represent a straightforward declaration of satisfaction 
with co-workers. Given the results of the observation and 
interviews and the fact that the regression model concerns the 
company's treatment of its workers, it is posited that these 
items reflect satisfaction with managerial attitudes and 
behaviour in relation to how they managed and organized 
production. This appears to be verified by the third item in 
this regression model - positive perceptions of overall job 
satisfaction.
3.4) Propensity to Leave the Company
A substantial number (71%) of respondents disagreed that
it would take a lot for them to leave the Company. Three 
variables accounted for 27% of variance. (Column d.)
Promotion (or the lack of it) was a key factor in whether 
respondents expected to remain with the company. It must be 
remembered that interviews and observation indicated that this 
concerned many employees for two reasons. Firstly, and as at 
Company A, they were concerned that they were losing the 
opportunity to earn more money. Secondly, they were not only 
concerned about the financial implications of promotion but 
also that its allocation indicated how much the company valued 
them and that if achieved it was the chance to carry out a more 
interesting and satisfying job that was likely to encourage 
them to remain with the company long-term.
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A second item in this model was dissatisfaction with pay. 
This indicated that financial reward was still a crucial 
determinant of how attached to the company many respondents 
were.
The third item in the model was the belief that there was 
no point in taking up grievances with Japanese management. 
Dissatisfaction with the style in which they maintained 
control and discipline of the workforce appeared to contribute 
to any desire to leave its employ.
3.5) "Them and Us" as a General Feature of British Industrial 
Relations
59% of respondents agreed that "co-operation in firms is 
impossible because workers and management are really on 
different sides. Only one significant explanatory variable was 
identified. This accounted for 22% of variance. (Column e, 
table 9.6.)
The item identified was the poor perception of 
management/worker communications at Company B. Unlike the case 
of Company A, no linkage could be made with the dummy variable 
of pay. It therefore appears that experience of the style in 
which Japanese management maintained control and discipline at 
Company B (the cause of these poor perceptions) was the single 
most influential factor in shaping attitudes among the 
company's workers about "them and us" as a general feature of 
British industrial relations. As was argued when analysing 
this particular dependent variable at Company A, what happens 
to a person at their place of work appears to influence 
beliefs they brought with them to their current employer about
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management/employee relations at other workplaces. In short, 
employees believe that what they experience at their own place 
of work is indicative of what goes on elsewhere.
Three conclusions can be drawn from the results of the 
regression analysis. Firstly, positive and significant 
perceptions of "them and us" issues at the company featured in 
regression models concerning the creation of a superordinate 
goal, and changes in attitude and behaviour. This suggests 
that in these two cases the company's attempts to reduce "them
and us" related attitudes were more positively received in
relation to the way in which management managed and
organized production.
In contrast to this success, negative perceptions in
relation to increased contact across group boundaries, 
propensity to leave the company and "them and us" as a general 
feature of British industrial relations were all influenced by 
dissatisfaction with the ways in which Japanese management 
maintained control and discipline of the workplace. This was 
a reflection of Japanese management style not being conducive 
to the effective operation of NIR practices (personnel and 
industrial relations characteristics) in place at the company.
These results confirm the research hypothesis under 
examination. They show that not only personnel and industrial 
relations production system characteristics at Company B were 
affecting "them and us" attitudes, but also managerial and 
organizational characteristics. The results differ to those 
obtained at Company A, in that the managerial and
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organizational characteristics at Company B had a positive 
effect on "them and us" attitudes. At Company A they 
contributed to negative "them and us" attitudes.
The second conclusion is that it appears that where 
respondents were dissatisfied with financial rewards related 
to pay and promotion their dissatisfaction was influential in 
blocking the company's efforts to lock them in to its work 
environment. Promotion was also influential where some 
respondents regarded it as more than a purely financial 
motivator. Its impact was registered despite some promising 
indications that the company had actually reduced some "them 
and us" attitudes due to the way production was managed and 
organized.
These results raise the same question concerning financial 
rewards that was discussed in relation to Company A. If 
Company B had paid higher wages, would employees have responded 
more positively to its attempts to reduce "them and us"? Again, 
there appears to be two ways to answer this question. These 
are either to study a company with very weak production system 
characteristics which pays more than Company B, or to examine a 
company with very strong production system characteristics, but 
which pays low wages. In either event, low levels of workforce 
co-operation with management would indicate the influence of 
financial reward on "them and us" attitudes.
The final conclusion to be drawn from the regression 
analysis concerns the dummy variable of those initially 
employed at the company versus those employed in the subsequent
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eighteen months. This did not appear in any of the regression 
models. This was despite earlier t-tests in section 2 which 
had revealed several differences in attitudes. As with the 
failure of the Stage 1 respondents at Company A to feature in 
any regression models the same explanation may apply in this 
instance. The attitudes of those initially employed by Company 
B may well have been in line with those of the majority of 
questionnaire respondents. Consequently, even though they may 
have demonstrated stronger responses to the company's 
attempts to reduce "them and us" attitudes and behaviour 
(because they had been exposed longest to the company's work 
environment), they were unlikely to become a separate and 
significant item in a regression model.
4) SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
When compared alongside the research's UK model. Company 
B achieved poorer scores for its personnel and industrial 
relations production system characteristics (NIR practices) 
than for its managerial and organizational characteristics. 
These scores reflected weaknesses in its NIR practices and 
strengths in its managerial and organizational characteristics 
which had sharply contrasting influences on "them and us" 
attitudes among the company's workers. This was shown when 
testing the research hypothesis. Not only personnel and 
industrial relations characteristics in operation at the 
company had affected "them and us" attitudes, but also
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managerial and organizational characteristics. (See table 9.1 
for a summary of these results.)
The association of NIR practices with strong feelings of 
"them and us" among employees was not founded on the extent to 
which such practices were in operation at the company. The 
exceptions were pay and promotion. As at Company A, workers 
were not concerned about the institutional practices the 
company had put in place. Instead, observation, interviews and 
the results of the questionnaire identified employee 
dissatisfaction with the style in which Japanese management 
operated them. Regression analysis pointed to this
dissatisfaction as contributing to strong "them and us" related 
attitudes.
Japanese management's methods of maintaining discipline 
and control of the workplace were resented by many employees. 
They saw several rules used to enforce the regimentation of the 
workplace as petty and unnecessary, and felt the Japanese to be 
too harsh in their application of the disciplinary procedure. 
The style in which Japanese management operated NIR practices 
restricted the union's ability to represent its members and 
contributed to its loss of membership.
The poor operation of NIR practices could be attributed 
to problems with the company's single management structure. 
Firstly, though the only UK manager had responsibility for 
personnel issues, the post was not senior and this limited its 
influence. Secondly, the company was dominated by a Japanese 
management who had been selected on the basis of their
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technical knowledge rather than having shown any ability to 
manage in an overseas environment which sometimes called for 
them to compromise their attitudes and beliefs.
While its single management structure was a drawback in 
terms of the operation of NIR practices it was a benefit to its 
managerial and organizational characteristics. Unlike at 
Company A, there was limited potential for poor interaction 
and communications between Japanese and local management 
because apart from the UK personnel manager there was no local 
management presence. This factor allowed Japanese management 
to take advantage of the company's small size and its 
relatively simple to assemble product by operating highly 
effective managerial and organizational characteristics. These 
were to the benefit of the production system's performance 
which ran without any of the disruption seen at Company A.
Strengths in these managerial and organizational 
characteristics were shown to have led to positive employee 
perceptions of production related issues. As a consequence, 
there was no opportunity for the emergence of a vicious circle 
such as the one seen at Company A. Interviews, observation 
and the questionnaire results pointed to considerable respect 
among employees for management's ability to manage the company, 
satisfaction with the way in which management interacted and 
communicated with employees over production related issues, and 
the belief that the company was successful. Regression
analysis suggested that these positive perceptions of the
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company's production system accounted for the most promising 
attitudes in respect of "them and us".
It is also possible that workers' positive perceptions of 
Company B's production system's performance helped to meet 
their expectations of what working at the company would be 
like. Meeting these expectations might have had a favourable 
influence on workers' responses to the company's attempts to 
reduce "them and us" attitudes and behaviour among the 
workforce.
Had Japanese management operated NIR practices in use at 
the company more successfully, it would have been possible to 
examine a a further part of the hypothesis. This is that a 
two-way relationship can exist, between the effective 
performance of the production system (due to managerial and 
organizational characteristics), and the effectiveness of NIR 
practices at reducing "them and us" attitudes which is in 
itself to the benefit of the production system's performance.
Instead, as with the results from Company A, we can only 
say that the results of the study at Company B confirm only one 
aspect of the hypothesis. This is that not only personnel and 
industrial relations characteristics but also managerial and 
organizational characteristics determine "them and us" 
attitudes. Therefore, while it is clear that managerial and 
organizational characteristics definitely operate as an 
intervening variable where NIR practices attempt to secure 
reductions in "them and us" it is unclear whether in a 
different set of circumstances a two-way relationship based on
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the effective performance of the company's production system 
and the effectiveness of NIR practices would have been 
apparent.
The inability to identify a two-way relationship was 
reflected by the failure to confirm a key link in the virtuous 
circle that was apparent at the Company. This was the link 
suggesting that workers were aware of the successful 
performance of the company's production system (attributable to 
good managerial and organizational characteristics) and would 
therefore respond positively to NIR practices designed to 
reduce "them and us" attitudes with further benefit to the 
production system.
It is also important to note how the results of the study 
at Company B relate to the mechanisms of the research's UK 
model. This is particularly true in relation to the company's 
managerial characteristics. As with the managerial
characteristics at Company A, management's initiating and 
operating role was crucial to determining the strengths and 
weaknesses within the company's other three sets of production 
system characteristics.
Its single management structure allowed Company B to 
operate managerial characteristics that had a positive effect 
on its organizational characteristics. However, the single 
management structure was dominated by Japanese managers who, 
contrary to the requirement of the relevant managerial 
characteristic of the research's UK model, had been selected 
purely on the basis of technical knowledge, not their ability
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to manage personnel and industrial relations practices in an 
unfamiliar environment. As a result, managerial
characteristics at the company had a detrimental effect on the 
operation of its NIR practices.
A final conclusion concerns the influence of financial 
rewards - especially pay - on "them and us" attitudes. As 
was pointed out in section three, regression analysis suggested 
that this factor may have had some influence over "them and 
us" attitudes. This role was underlined by t-tests which 
revealed that those with the more negative perceptions of the 
work environment at Company B, were more likely to be 
dissatisfied with pay. Conversely those with more positive 
perceptions were more likely to be satisfied with their pay. 
The influence was therefore similar to that identified at 
Company A.
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PART 4
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS.

CHAPTER 10
THE RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
INTRODUCTION
This concluding chapter is divided into three sections. 
The first, reiterates the main issues concerning the research. 
It then summarises the research's two inter-related hypotheses 
and the methodology used to test them. The second section is 
divided into two parts, each corresponding to one of the 
hypotheses and the salient research results. The final 
section presents three sets of implications arising from the 
research results. These relate to Japanese transplants in the 
UK, UK companies attempting to emulate Japanese production 
methods, and to the wider debate surrounding the use of NIR 
practices in the UK.
1) THE ISSUES REITERATED
Chapters 1 and 2 of the research highlighted four key 
issues. Firstly, they noted the scale of Japanese inward 
investment in the UK and its increasing importance to the UK 
economy. Secondly, they demonstrated that a significant 
proportion of Japanese inward investment in the UK relates to 
the manufacture of consumer electronics. Accordingly, the 
research has focused on a sample of Japanese transplants in 
this sector of the UK economy. Thirdly, it was posited that
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in the hope of repelling competition from Japanese 
manufacturers in the UK, from elsewhere in the EC and from 
Japan, many British firms were attempting to adopt Japanese 
management methods, notably those concerning employment 
relations. Fourthly, it was argued that the ability of 
Japanese transplants in the UK to successfully operate 
innovative employment relations practices has attracted 
considerable attention. The grounds for this attention stem 
from their employment relations practices being discussed as 
part of the wider debate surrounding the use of NIR practices 
in the UK.
Chapters 1 and 2 also explained that NIR practices are 
believed to lead to a corresponding reduction in "them and us" 
attitudes among employees that is to the benefit of a 
company's performance in terms of the quality and quantity of 
output. The research has portrayed these practices as being 
an integral part of a Japanese transplant's production 
system. In doing so the research has defined a production 
system in a "broad" sense. It has not simply described it in a 
"narrow" technological sense, i.e. the technological processes 
used and their effects on production output. Instead, the 
broad definition acknowledges the important role of 
characteristics such as NIR practices, the company's 
organizational structure and its management's style and 
behaviour. These are included in the definition because they 
are believed to influence the production system's performance.
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A central aim of the research has been to explore the key 
dimensions of variability among the production systems of 
Japanese transplants and to show how this variance might 
influence "them and us" attitudes at one transplant compared to 
another. "Them and us" attitudes are defined as a perception 
among workers that there exists a clear division of interests 
at the workplace between them and management. To show 
variability of "them and us" attitudes from one company to 
another may have seemed to be pursuing the obvious, but the 
research argued that investigation of the matter was justified 
for two reasons.
Firstly, previous to this research, there was little 
evidence to confirm the existence of the variance. Earlier 
studies had tended to adopt case study approaches thereby 
limiting comparisons of one company with another and rarely 
incorporated employee attitude surveys. As a result, it was 
unclear whether any patterns of variance in "them and us" 
attitudes existed and it was uncertain what the main causes of 
the variance were. By aiming to highlight variability among 
its nine sample companies this research expected to help 
redress this deficiency.
Secondly, and crucially, the research has detached itself 
from existing thinking surrounding the wider debate about NIR 
in the UK. It believes that the variance in "them and us" 
attitudes is not just caused by the effectiveness of the NIR 
practices a Japanese company introduces.
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while acknowledging the importance of NIR practices, it 
has argued that other managerial and organizational 
characteristics within a Japanese company's production system, 
for example the decision making structure or buyer/supplier 
relations, are also important. These characteristics will also 
influence "them and us" attitudes. If they are inadequate then 
the performance of the production system suffers. Workers come 
to perceive this failure and give a poor response to the 
company's NIR practices. A vicious circle can evolve since a 
poor workforce response to NIR practices will in itself further 
contribute to the poor performance of the production system.
These then are the themes pursued by the research. Their 
investigation led to the formulation of two inter-related 
hypotheses. The first was that:
1 ) That a number of key dimensions of variability exist 
among the production systems of Japanese transplants in 
the UK consumer electronics sector.
The methodology used to demonstrate variability among 
transplants' production systems involved the construction of a 
benchmark which represents a model of a production system for 
operation by a Japanese transplant in the UK. (See figure 5.1.) 
The model incorporated four sets of production system 
characteristics - personnel and industrial relations 
characteristics (NIR practices) and managerial and 
organizational characteristics. Chapters 4 and 5 were devoted 
to the task of its construction.
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Using existing literature and interview data these 
chapters performed two roles. Firstly they identified a series 
of obstacles to reducing "them and us" attitudes using NIR 
practices. Secondly, they identified problems likely to be 
encountered by Japanese companies attempting to transplant 
their domestic production systems to the UK - problems which 
could also impact on efforts to reduce "them and us" attitudes. 
The research's UK model takes account of these obstacles and 
problems and incorporates a number of remedies to overcome 
their effects. It therefore contains several compromises and 
differences when compared to the domestic Japanese production 
system and could be described as a synthesis of both domestic 
Japanese and local production system characteristics.
The argument running throughout the research has been 
that the closer the fit with all four sets of production system 
characteristics contained in the research's UK model, the 
better the chances of a transplant reducing "them and us". The 
further away from the model, then the less likely it is to 
reduce "them and us" attitudes, and the more likely it is to 
exhibit the obstacles and problems of transference that inhibit 
such a reduction.
But simply proving variability among nine companies' 
production system characteristics would not show the influence 
of the variability on "them and us" attitudes. Interviews, 
observation and employee attitude surveys were therefore 
conducted at two case study companies. This methodology was 
used to show how the extent to which the model's production
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system characteristics were implemented and the manner in 
which such characteristics were operated impacted on "them and 
us" attitudes among workers. Adopting this particular
methodological approach enabled the following hypothesis to be 
tested:
2) That the closer a transplant is to displaying all four 
sets of production system characteristics as identified 
under the research's UK model, then the more likely it is 
that "them and us" attitudes will be reduced among its 
employees. This assumes that it is not only personnel 
and industrial relations characteristics (NIR practices) 
that impact on "them and us" attitudes but also managerial 
and organizational characteristics. It is posited that, 
though the performance of the production system is reliant 
on effective NIR practices reducing "them and us" 
attitudes, strengths and weaknesses in a transplant's 
managerial and organizational characteristics may also 
have a detrimental or beneficial affect on production 
performance. This in turn will impact on "them and us" 
attitudes. In short, the effectiveness of NIR practices 
and the effective performance of a transplant's production 
system enjoy a two way relationship.
Because of their intervening role, poor managerial and 
organizational characteristics can have a highly 
detrimental effect on "them and us" attitudes. They may 
impede the successful operation of a transplant's 
production system to the extent that workers perceive some 
personal cost to themselves. They come to believe that 
their working for the good of the company is a waste, 
perceiving that other managerial and organizational 
characteristics are undermining their own efforts. 
Consequently their level of morale drops, they lose 
confidence in management's abilities and they become 
cynical of NIR practices. A vicious circle emerges. 
Poor managerial and organizational characteristics impede 
the performance of the production system, and this stops 
NIR practices reducing "them and us". The failure of NIR 
practices in turn impairs the already poor performance of 
the production system.
Conversely, and given this intervening role, the effective 
performance of the production system owing to good 
managerial and organizational characteristics may lead to 
the emergence of a virtuous circle. In this situation 
workers feel that the effective performance of the 
production system is to their benefit. They react
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positively to NIR practices and "them and us" attitudes 
are therefore reduced. This, in turn, further improves the 
production system's performance.
2) THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESES IN LIGHT OF THE RESULTS
2.1) Key Dimensions of Variability Among Production Systems
Comparison pf the production system characteristics of 
nine Japanese companies in the UK consumer electronics sector 
alongside the research's UK model showed considerable 
variability among their production system characteristics. 
Often, the variability was not exclusive to one company. In 
effect, a number of key dimensions of variability were 
identifiable. These were described as common strengths and 
weaknesses.
There appeared to be a link between sample companies' size 
(based on number of employees) and strengths and weaknesses in 
their production system characteristics. Those in the sample 
who employed between 200 and 800 employees (Group 2) received 
the lowest overall scores when compared alongside the UK model 
and appeared to encounter difficulties in achieving effective 
managerial and organizational characteristics. Those companies 
employing 200 or less (Group 1) or 800 or more (Group 3) 
obtained the highest overall scores and consistently achieved 
higher scores for their managerial and organizational 
characteristics. It was suggested that one or any combination 
of three factors might account for these.
Firstly, it is clear that the size of a company may 
determine how successful it is in achieving high scores. At
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four of the six highest scoring companies, smallness clearly 
enabled good managerial and organizational characteristics to 
flourish. The case study of Company B (a group 1 company) 
showed that it simplifies horizontal communications between 
management, and enhances co-ordination and co-operation of 
departments. It also showed that it encourages effective 
intergroup contact between management and workers over 
production related issues. - a possible route to the reduction 
of "them and us" attitudes. (Kelly and Kelly, 1991)
Nonetheless, a close fit with the model was not only 
confined to the smallest companies in the sample. The two 
largest transplants achieved the two highest overall scores. 
Therefore a U shaped relationship existed between size and 
overall score. Identification of this relationship also led to 
the suggestion that the four highest scoring companies - two 
large and two small - might have achieved high scores because 
their Japanese parent companies have the human and financial 
resources to ensure that their transplant operations are 
successful.
The second factor relates to how complex a company product 
is to produce. The smallest. Group 1 companies in the sample 
were all either in the throws of moving their manufacturing 
processes away from "screwdriver" assembly operations to self 
sufficient manufacture or were components suppliers, (as was 
Company B). With regard to "screwdriver" versus self 
sufficient manufacturing, the former is generally simpler in 
certain respects to organize than the latter and the same
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applies to the manufacture of components. This enabled both 
"screwdriver" or component based manufacturers to attain many 
of the UK model's characteristics with greater ease.
The third factor concerns the management structures at 
companies in the sample. All of those in Group 2, with low 
overall scores and notably low managerial and organizational 
scores had a dual management structure. The size of these 
companies necessitated the employment of local as well as 
Japanese managers and led to additional stresses not found 
under a single management structure. (A single management 
structure was defined as one under which no local manager other 
than a personnel manager is employed.) The additional stresses 
found under the dual management structures appeared to restrict 
the effective management and organization of these companies' 
production systems.
The two case studies in this research provide stark 
evidence of problems related to a dual management structure. 
Company A's dual management structure led to poor Japanese and 
local management interaction and communications. Consequently, 
the company exhibited weak managerial and organizational 
characteristics and the production system's performance 
suffered accordingly. In contrast, Company B, with a single 
management structure had not encountered these problems, 
simply because there was no local management presence other 
than the UK Personnel Manager.
As a proviso, one must remember that where a dual 
management structure exists, it does not automatically follow
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that the company will be subject to additional stresses within 
its production system. Five other companies in Groups 1 and 3 
also had dual management structures, yet unlike those in Group 
2 they were able to exhibit strong managerial and 
organizational characteristics.
These three factors pose an interesting set of questions. 
What would we find if we returned to companies in Group 1 some 
years hence and they have either grown in size, (and in 
Company B's case been compelled to adopt a dual management 
structure) or moved to more self sufficient forms of 
manufacture? Would they, like the companies in Group 2, find 
that their increased size or more sophisticated forms of 
manufacture induced stresses within their dual management 
structures? Or would they have avoided these problems like the 
largest companies in Group 3?
Finally, it was noticeable that no clear pattern of scores 
existed for NIR practices. (Personnel and Industrial Relations 
characteristics.) For example, some companies in Group 2 
achieved better scores for their personnel or industrial 
relations characteristics than those in Group 1.
Several companies in the sample, achieved relatively weak 
scores for their NIR practices. There were two reasons for 
this. Firstly, they simply did not operate some of the 
personnel and industrial relations practices required by the 
research's UK model. Secondly, comparison alongside the model 
revealed problems with management's attitudes and behaviour 
that affected the way in which they operated some NIR
-416-
practices. Notably practices related to the control and 
discipline of the workplace and management/union relations. 
These weaknesses were apparent at both companies A and B.
Their effect on "them and us" attitudes at the companies is 
discussed in greater detail in section 2.2.
Certainly a comparison of the nine companies revealed
considerable variability among their production system 
characteristics. But the key issue was to identify how the 
strengths and weaknesses within companies' production system
characteristics impacted on "them and us" attitudes among 
employees. The issue was addressed using Companies A and B as 
case studies.
Analysis of overall workforce attitudes at both case study 
companies found that employees exhibited strong beliefs in the 
existence of "them and us". For the majority of workers at 
both companies, their experience of working in an environment 
incorporating NIR practices had done little to remove a basic 
belief that "co-operation in firms is impossible because
workers and managers are really on different sides". Indeed, 
those who had worked longest at the companies held the 
strongest "them and us" related attitudes.
What was it about the two case studies' production systems 
that had influenced these attitudes? The answers were made 
apparent by applying the research's remaining hypothesis to 
these results.
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2.2) Not Only NIR Practices But Also Managerial and 
Organizational Characteristics
The second hypothesis suggests that it is not only NIR 
practices (personnel and industrial relations characteristics) 
but also managerial and organizational characteristics that 
impact on "them and us" attitudes among employees. There are 
therefore two sets of results to consider.
The first set of results deals with weaknesses in the two
case study companies' NIR practices. These companies attempted 
to use NIR practices to create work environments that would 
contribute to a reduction in "them and us". Weaknesses in 
these practices at both companies hindered their attempts to 
achieve such a reduction. The second set of results looks at 
weaknesses and strengths in the two companies' managerial and 
organizational characteristics and the impact this also had on 
"them and us" attitudes among their employees. Within these 
results is evidence of the emergence of a vicious circle at 
Company A and a virtuous circle at Company B.
There are two points to be made about the effectiveness
of the NIR practices at both case study companies. The first
relates to the extent to which each company had adopted 
specific NIR practices. Like several other companies in Groups 
1; 2 and 3, their weak selection processes, poor training, lack 
of welfarism or failure to provide clear guarantees of secure 
employment could be expected to contribute to poor "them and 
us" attitudes among employees. In fact, neither case study 
indicated that any of these weaknesses exacerbated or
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sustained "them and us" attitudes. (Only the personnel 
characteristics relating to pay and promotion appeared to 
directly affect attitudes. The implications of this finding for 
the wider NIR debate are discussed later.) This brings us on 
to the second point. Instead of reacting to weak or missing 
NIR practices, employees focused their discontent on the 
attitudes and behaviour of management when operating those NIR 
practices supposed to be in use at the companies.
At Company A, local management operated a set of 
institutional processes best described as traditional, low 
trust and adversarial British employment relations. This 
influenced the way in which they maintained control and 
discipline in the workplace so that the operation of several 
industrial relations and personnel characteristics at the 
company did not create a work environment conducive to a 
reduction of "them and us" attitudes. This was especially 
true concerning the regimentation of the work environment, 
promotion, elements of consensuality and participation and the 
spirit of trust and co-operation supposed to underlie the 
company's NSA. At Company B, Japanese management found it 
difficult to accept that local employees would not respond to 
certain Japanese beliefs about control and discipline at work 
and felt unable to trust the union recognised at the company. 
They therefore operated several NIR practices in a style that 
workers often resented and sometimes resisted. Again, this 
damaged their attempts to influence "them and us" attitudes.
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The second set of results in connection with this 
hypothesis concern the effect of managerial and organizational 
characteristics on "them and us" attitudes at each case study 
company. Both companies provide evidence of this link.
Problems within Company A's dual management structure led 
to it having the weakest set of managerial characteristics of 
any of the research's nine sample companies. The company did 
not use selection or retention procedures that attracted and 
retained quality local management and it did not have a 
selection procedure geared to identifying Japanese management 
suitable to work in a UK transplant. This led to a failure of 
Japanese and local management to communicate and interact so 
that they did not exhibit coherent vision, consistency of 
style, and consensual or groupist decision making. Nor was 
there a policy of circulating local management. Managerial 
weaknesses caused by the company's dual management structure 
also contributed to its inability to achieve a set of 
effective organizational characteristics. These weaknesses 
meant that many of the production system's requirements were 
not met and its performance suffered. The company was unable 
to to sustain an uninterrupted flow of production.
Demonstrating the effect of weaknesses in managerial and 
organizational characteristics on "them and us" attitudes at 
Company A was possible by comparing attitudes among workers 
on the basis of how significant the disruption to production 
was in the department they worked in. In the main assembly 
area, where production was most interrupted and worst
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organised, observation, interviews and the questionnaire 
results at stage 2 of the study identified the strongest 
feelings of "them and us". In the sub-assembly area where 
production flowed uninterrupted and which was better organized, 
"them and us" feelings were weakest and workers were more 
receptive to NIR practices.
It is important to re-emphasise that the immediate middle 
management structure at the sub-assembly site did not 
incorporate any local management management, and so could be 
defined as a single management structure. The immediate 
management structure of the company's other two departments was 
dual. Thus, as at Company B with a single management 
structure, the managerial and organizational characteristics of 
the production system were easier achieved by virtue of the 
fact that there was no local management presence with its 
potential for conflict with Japanese management. This 
encouraged production to flow uninterrupted.
At Company B the successful performance of the company's 
production system was due to Japanese management's creation of 
strong sets of managerial and organizational characteristics. 
Workers had confidence in Japanese management's ability to 
manage production. They also expressed satisfaction with the 
way the Japanese interacted and communicated with employees 
over production related issues. When connected to these 
issues, attempts to reduce "them and us" were positively 
received by workers. However, promising "them and us" related 
attitudes due to effective managerial and organizational
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characteristics at Company B were offset by Japanese
management's poor operation of personnel and industrial 
relations (NIR) characteristics. Attempts to reduce "them and 
us" attitudes as a direct consequence of the company's NIR 
practices were impeded due to the attitudes and behaviour of 
its Japanese management.
Due to the intervening role of managerial and
organizational characteristics, a vicious circle as described 
within the second hypothesis was apparent at Company A. At 
Stage 1 of this case study, when the company had just commenced 
production, it was clear that workers had a set of expectations 
of their new employer. They expected, and had been led to 
believe by the company that its being Japanese would lead to it 
being successful and that management were going to attach great 
importance to the reduction of "them and us" at the company. 
These expectations were combined with an awareness of, and a 
willingness to strive for, the superordinate goal of everybody 
- management and workers alike - working to make the company 
successful. This was on the basis that such a goal was in 
workers' interests as much as management's.
By Stage 2 of the study those workers employed in
departments where production was disrupted expressed doubts and
cynicism about the "superordinate" goal. Their expectations 
of management (especially local management who they had the 
most contact with) had not been met. They had no confidence in 
management's ability to manage the company successfully. In
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this respect management were believed to have failed to keep 
their side of the bargain.
Employees now believed that it had been, and was, 
pointless to work hard to make the company successful since 
their efforts were negated by an inept management whose poor 
organization of production led to its disruption. Many felt 
that the poor performance of the company's production system 
had been despite some personal cost to themselves. This
personal cost could also be seen in terms of some workers 
believing that despite their efforts the company would close. 
In this situation NIR practices became ineffective. Workers 
dismissed their value. They believed that a reduction of their 
"them and us" attitudes so that they worked hard in the 
interests of the company was pointless since management were 
making the production system perform poorly anyway. This of 
course meant that workers performed poorly and further 
contributed to the company's poor performance - hence the 
emergence of a vicious circle. Chapter 8 gave an example of 
how this vicious circle had emerged by examining workers' 
attitudes towards the issue of quality at the company.
A key link in this vicious circle could not however be 
confirmed. This was that the poor performance of the 
production system due to weak managerial and organizational 
characteristics led to employee cynicism and hostility towards 
NIR practices designed to reduce "them and us". Such cynicism 
and hostility could already be accredited to the way in which 
management operated the NIR practices irrespective of the
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influence of managerial and organizational characteristics. In 
this respect, a key element of the research's second
hypothesis could not be demonstrated. Company A could not be 
said to show the existence of a two way relationship between 
the performance of managerial and organizational 
characteristics and the performance of NIR practices and the 
performance of the production system.
No vicious circle had emerged at Company B. Indeed, it 
was possible to identify the emergence of a virtuous circle 
since the company's strong managerial and organizational 
characteristics contributed to the effective performance of the 
production system. Employees demonstrated respect for and a 
belief in Japanese management's ability to manage the company 
effectively. They also responded well to Japanese 
management's enthusiasm for communications and interaction 
concerning production related issues. These beliefs along with 
a general sense of job security may have gone some way to 
fulfilling employee expectations of the work environment at the 
company. The result was that many employees were willing to 
work hard to contribute to the company's continuing success on 
the basis of what was good for the company was good for them.
As with the vicious circle at Company A, a key link within 
Company B's virtuous circle could not be confirmed. It could 
not be shown that the circle enhanced the effectiveness of NIR 
practices in reducing "them and us" attitudes among workers 
because their effectiveness was already unfavourably influenced 
by the way in which Japanese management maintained control and
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discipline of the workforce. Thus Company B, like Company A, 
could not be said to show a two way relationship between the 
performance of the production system due to managerial and 
organizational practices and the performance of NIR practices.
Using the case study results the research therefore 
concludes that not only personnel and industrial relations 
characteristics (NIR practices) but also managerial and
organizational characteristics affect "them and us" attitudes. 
Both Company A and Company B indicate that managerial and 
organizational characteristics operate as an intervening
variable where NIR practices attempt to reduce "them and us" 
attitudes. However, neither company confirmed that a two way 
relationship exists between the performance of the production 
system owing to managerial and organizational characteristics 
and NIR practices because neither operated their NIR practices 
effectively.
There is one further point to make concerning the case 
study results. This relates to employee expectations of what 
it would be like to work at either Company A or B. In this 
section reference has been made on a number of occasions to the 
influence of these expectations on "them and us" attitudes. At 
both Company A and B workers expected their Japanese employer 
to be successful and therefore able to offer job security, good 
pay and other attractive terms and conditions of employment. 
These expectations appeared to stem from three sources.
Firstly, they were, in part, bought with workers to each 
company, based on popular perceptions of Japanese companies
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that are gleaned through the media and local hearsay. The two 
case study companies discussed in this research had located in 
areas where Japanese companies were already established. These 
companies had reputations in their local communities for 
being successful and good employers. Secondly, the 
expectation of company success among workers was further 
fuelled during the selection and induction procedures at the 
companies. Thirdly, once employed at the companies, workers 
were told that if they delivered the quality, effort and 
loyalty required, the company would be successful and that the 
success of the company would be good for every one.
In Company A's case workers' expectations of a favourable 
work environment at the company might not have been satisfied 
because of their poor perceptions of production related issues 
(attributable to weaknesses in the company's managerial and 
organizational characteristics) and their poor perceptions of 
the style in which local management maintained control and 
discipline in the workplace (attributable to weaknesses in the 
company's NIR practices). These in turn fuelled workers' poor 
perceptions of "them and us" related issues.
Company B, though still the subject of poor employee 
perceptions of the style in which Japanese management 
maintained control and discipline in the workplace (attributed 
to weaknesses in the company's NIR practices) appeared to have 
been more successful than Company A at meeting employee 
expectations due to their positive perceptions of production 
related issues (attributable to strengths in the company's
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managerial and organizational characteristics. Further, 
regression analysis suggested that positive perceptions of 
production related issues accounted for the most promising 
attitudes in respect of "them and us" at Company B.
Given such results, one could argue that the influence of 
production system characteristics on "them and us" attitudes at 
the case study companies was in fact dependent on whether their 
production system characteristics were creating a work 
environment able to satisfy worker expectations. In short, 
the case studies provide evidence to suggest that the extent 
to which each company met employee expectations contributed to 
the extent to which each was successful at influencing "them 
and us" attitudes among their workforce.
3) RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS
3.1) The Research Implications for Japanese Transplants in the 
UK
Variability among the production systems of the 
research's nine sample companies indicated that Japanese 
companies, notably those in group 2, can encounter considerable 
difficulties transplanting their production systems. The case 
studies showed how these difficulties influence attempts to 
reduce "them and us" attitudes at Japanese transplants.
There are two reasons why it is important that these 
difficulties are exposed. Firstly, the results from the two 
case studies, particularly Company A, should not be used to
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argue that the Japanese production system when transplanted to 
the UK encounters insurmountable problems. They do however, 
dispel the underlying theme of some literature that Japanese 
transplants are automatically successful.
Secondly, the results should not be viewed as a reason to 
avoid locating a Japanese manufacturing transplant in the UK. 
Instead, they should be interpreted as showing what can go 
wrong within a Japanese transplant's production system and 
suggest that the closer it comes to achieving the UK model the 
better its chances of avoiding or overcoming these problems. 
The research shows that some Japanese companies enjoy a close 
fit with the research's UK model, suggesting that they have 
transplanted their production systems with considerable 
success.
The mechanics of the research's UK model emphasise that 
because of management's initiating, decision making and 
operating role, the effectiveness of managerial characteristics 
influences the effectiveness of the models other three sets of 
production system characteristics. Consequently, weaknesses 
exposed in the nine sample companies' managerial 
characteristics assume added importance. Central to these 
weaknesses is the question of their management structures. 
For Japanese transplants there are three problems to be aware 
of and find ways of avoiding.
First, a dual management structure may introduce elements 
of conflict and poor communications between Japanese and local 
management that have a detrimental effect on a company's
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managerial and organizational characteristics. The production 
system's output will be adversely affected and a vicious circle 
may emerge. This will lead to strong "them and us" attitudes 
among workers. These attitudes are themselves deemed 
detrimental to the performance of the production system.
Second, the research results also showed that the 
introduction of UK management into a transplant may lead to the 
operation of a set of personnel and industrial relations 
characteristics in a low trust and adversarial style, 
characterising traditional UK management attitudes and
behaviour towards employment relations. Again, this will
only serve to encourage strong "them and us" attitudes.
Third, while it is fair to say that the evidence from 
Company B and from the sub-assembly area at Company A shows 
that a single (Japanese) management structure is more conducive 
to effective managerial and organizational characteristics, 
Japanese management at Company B were not able to operate many 
NIR practices effectively. They exhibited a distrust of 
British trade unionism and though the style by which they 
maintained control and discipline in the workplace might have 
been acceptable and familiar in Japan, it was often resented 
and sometimes resisted by UK employees. Consequently, 
favourable worker perceptions of attempts to reduce "them and 
us" linked to the effective management and organization of 
production were negated.
There are two remedies to these problems. Firstly their 
avoidance is possible by the introduction of detailed
-429-
selection and retention procedures for local management and 
special selection procedures for Japanese management chosen to 
manage UK transplants. These remedies are a managerial
characteristic advocated by the UK model. Their adoption 
.under either a single or dual management structure should
result in a management team well suited to the operation of NIR 
practices and able to appreciate which of their company's 
production system characteristics need to incorporate elements 
of local practice and which should not. These selection 
procedures are therefore looking for a special quality of
either the UK or Japanese manager. They will have to show 
that, where necessary, they will be capable of compromising 
their own beliefs for what is in the interests of their
transplant's production system.
Management selection/retention procedures are clearly 
important to the effective operation of the production system's 
four sets of characteristics. Neither of these remedies was in 
use at companies A or B or at several other companies in the 
sample of nine. The four companies which exhibited at least 
some of the selection/retention procedures required by the UK 
model, also achieved the highest four overall scores when their 
production systems were compared alongside it.
A second remedy concerns the problems identified by the 
research in relation to single management structures. The 
single management structure at Company B did not have a UK 
personnel manager in place with a position of seniority or 
authority. This factor combined with a Japanese management who
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sometimes found it difficult to compromise their beliefs, meant 
that the post's influence over personnel and industrial 
relations policy was restricted. (An organizational requirement 
of the UK model.) Had this not been the case then perhaps some 
of the problems encountered by Japanese management when 
operating NIR practices at the company could have been avoided.
3.2) The Research Implications For UK Emulators of Japanese 
Transplants
The implications of the research for those companies
attempting to emulate Japanese transplants - what Ackroyd et al
describe as mediated Japanization - are considerable. (Ackroyd 
et al, 1988) Emulators have often been accused of simply
"bolting on" the personnel and industrial relations
characteristics of the UK model to their existing production 
systems in the expectation that production, as at their 
Japanese competitors, would undergo a corresponding
improvement in performance.
The accusation of "bolting on" suggests firstly that 
emulators are not actually considering what the requirements of 
their production system are. This is of crucial importance
since the characteristics of the research's UK model are all 
geared to meeting a set of very specific requirements.
Secondly, and in view of this research's results, even if 
an emulator's requirements are similar to those of a 
transplant, they would do well to be aware of the research's
findings with regard to the importance of managerial and
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organizational characteristics. Given their influence in 
determining the successful reduction of "them and us" attitudes 
emulators should take a close look at what sort of managerial 
and organizational characteristics are already in place at 
their company. Do they need to be altered so that they are 
closer to those identified under the research's UK model? 
This would enable the production system's requirements to be 
more easily met and therefore improve its performance. 
Furthermore, because of the assumed two-way relationship 
between the effective performance of the production system and 
the effectiveness of NIR practices at Japanese companies, NIR 
practices at UK emulators might stand a greater chance of 
successfully reducing "them and us" attitudes.
Essentially, there is one overarching implication of the 
research results for emulators. They need to be aware of the 
weaknesses displayed in not only the personnel and industrial 
relations characteristics but also the managerial and 
organizational characteristics of the production systems of 
some Japanese transplants. To ignore these weaknesses suggests 
that as emulators they will simply import many of the problems 
encountered by Japanese transplants into their own production 
systems with all that that entails for their production 
performance and attempts to reduce "them and us" attitudes 
among their workers.
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3,3) The Research Implications for the Wider Debate Surrounding 
NIR Practices in the UK
The research results have four implications for the wider 
debate surrounding the NIR practices in the UK. The term 
"wider debate" means discussion is not confined to the use of 
the practices at Japanese transplants and their emulators.
Firstly, the results confirm the argument put forward by 
those such as Kelly and Kelly, that a major obstacle to the 
successful reduction of "them and us" attitudes is when NIR 
practices fall foul of UK management, because they are not 
interested in the use of such practices and/or feel that they 
threaten their authority. (Kelly & Kelly, 1991. See also 
Bradley & Hill, 1983; Townley, 1989; Grant, 1988; Bassett, 
1987) In either event UK management prefer to adopt a low 
trust adversarial approach to employment relations at their 
company - an approach that to use Walton's (1985) definition 
is conducive to producing a control orientated rather than 
commitment orientated work environment. We should then 
remember that a reduction of "them and us" attitudes is as 
reliant on a change in attitude and behaviour among management 
as it is among workers. Otherwise "never the twain shall meet". 
Perhaps we ought to pay more attention to "them and us" 
attitudes among management.
The second implication of the results relates to the key 
question of whether instrumentalism in the guise of financial 
reward is a more successful employee motivator than the 
achievement of reductions in their "them and us" attitudes.
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The research's results do not provide a firm answer to this 
question. Instead, they point to a need to identify and examine 
a further case study company which either pays more than 
Company A or B and has poor production system characteristics, 
or pays less than Company A or B and has good production system 
characteristics. Analysis of such a company could be used to 
indicate the effect of financial reward on "them and us" 
attitude.
Nonetheless, there were strong indications at both of the 
research's case study companies that attempts to reduce "them 
and us" attitudes among employees were influenced by their 
level of satisfaction with financial reward. Dissatisfaction 
with pay figured in several regression models featuring indices 
of "them and us" attitudes at both companies. At Company A a 
linkage of promotion to financial reward also led to promotion 
having a similar influence. Any reduction in "them and us" 
attitudes was therefore in direct competition with the cash 
nexus, the latter of which appeared to be in the ascendency in 
the case of many workers. These findings could be used to 
validate the argument that UK workers often respond best to 
those NIR practices that tap their more instrumental work goals 
and are less interested in individual sacrifice for the good of 
the company overall than groupist orientated Japanese workers. 
(Kelly & Kelly, 1991; Komai, 1989; Reitsperger, 1986a; 
Matsuura, 1984)
It is possible to speculate that if NIR practices and the 
performance of the production system at Company A had been
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better, the resultant reduction of "them and us" attitudes 
might have led to lower levels of dissatisfaction with pay. At 
Company B evidence of whether low levels of "them and us" 
attitudes led to low levels of dissatisfaction with pay is 
also inconclusive but two points merit attention. Firstly, 
the company had achieved some favourable responses to its 
attempts to reduce "them and us" attitudes due to 
management/worker interaction over production related issues. 
It is interesting to note that these favourable responses were 
more likely to come from the 50% of the workforce who had
expressed a degree of satisfaction with pay. (Similarly, only 
39% of workers at Company A expressed some satisfaction with 
pay, but they too had the least pronounced "them and us" 
attitudes.)
Secondly, the issue of promotion at Company B, while it 
still influenced "them and us" attitudes, did so not simply on 
the basis of potential financial reward (as at Company A). It 
also reflected a desire to stay with the company and move away 
from the more mundane work it offered thereby obtaining
greater autonomy and responsibility. This is more in line with 
attempts to reduce "them and us" attitudes.
The third implication of the results for the NIR debate
concerns the role of trade unions. There was no clear evidence 
of dual loyalty to both management and the recognised trade 
union at the case studies. Nor was there any evidence of a 
strong belief among employees that dual loyalty was possible. 
This may have been because the co-operative and low conflict
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industrial relations that are required for it to flourish (what 
dual loyalty writers have defined as "ambient labour 
relations") did not exist at either company. (Angle & Perry, 
1986; Fukami & Larson, 1984)
The results also raise serious questions about what sort
of role there is for trade unions to play under NIR. They
appear to be caught in a very difficult situation. Their 
members have what can only be described as very traditional
expectations of the role they should play at a company with NIR 
practices. If under the provisions of a NSA based on co­
operation and trust they are able to meet these expectations 
then fine, but where management do not adhere to the "spirit of 
intent" behind the agreement then their members may become
dissatisfied with their union's performance. The research 
showed that members (and ex-members) often come to blame the
union's poor performance on the provisions of the NSA. For
example, they see the no-strike clause as weakening the union 
and believe that the co-operation a NSA is supposed to engender 
is one-way. That is to say co-operation is given by workers 
and is exploited by management to their own advantage.
This situation had evolved at both companies, but had 
resulted in different outcomes. At Company A workers had 
remained in membership of the union. They continued to expect
it to take an aggressive stance, so as to protect them from
what they saw as an adversarial and hostile management that was 
not to be trusted. In effect, the union was being forced to 
adopt a very traditional role in order to maintain support.
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One where it represented the sectional interests of the 
workforce with little regard for the superordinate goal that 
what was good for the company was good for both management and 
employees,
At Company B, many members though perceiving that much of 
the blame for the union's ineffectiveness lay with Japanese 
management, decided that it was pointless to remain in 
membership and left the union. This left its representative 
credibility weakened, since it ended up with less than 45% of 
the workforce who were eligible to join as members.
Critics of NSAs would argue that each of these situations 
shows the frailty and failings of unitarist goals and that it 
is further evidence of the weakness in any strategy of union 
incorporation. That may be so, but more importantly the 
experiences of Companies A and B with their recognised unions 
may lead other companies intending to adopt NIR practices to 
consider even more carefully whether there is any viable role 
for trade unionism.
For these companies, their answer, whether they are 
existing or potential greenfield manufacturers, may well be 
that they can see no viable role for trade unionism. 
Recognising a union is more trouble than it is worth. The 
experiences of the recognised union at both Company A and 
Company B raises questions as to the extent to which Keeney's 
neo-pluralistic HRM, which allows for the existence of trade 
unions under HRM, will be a significant feature at companies in 
the UK. (Keenoy, 1990) In effect, the research offers UK
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trade unions little comfort about their future. It gives gives 
credence to the argument that as the use of NIR, and more 
specifically HRM, practices increases it will be at their 
expense.
Fourthly and finally, the research has demonstrated that 
it is wrong to assume that a reduction of "them and us" 
attitudes can only be secured through the use of NIR 
practices.
Using regression the two case studies each examined five 
indices of "them and us" attitudes at among workers as 
dependent variables. Four of these indices concerned "them and 
us" attitudes within each company. They related to increased 
contact between management and employees, the creation of a 
"superordinate" goal, perceptions of changes in management 
behaviour and propensity to leave the company. (See Kelly and 
Kelly, 1991 for discussion of the first three of these 
indices.) A fifth indice concerned employee perceptions of 
"them and us" as a general feature of British industrial 
relations.
Examination of the four indices concerning "them and us" 
within each company showed that such attitudes can be 
influenced by what amounts to an intervening variable. This is 
how effectively the production system is performing due not 
only to NIR practices, but also to other managerial and 
organizational characteristics in operation at the company. 
The research also suggested that the fifth indice about 
perceptions of "them and us" as general feature of British
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industrial relations was influenced by attitudes concerning 
"them and us" within the case study companies.
These results therefore demonstrate a central theme of the 
research. This is that, wherever applied, NIR practices alone 
are unlikely to be the sole instigators of reductions in "them 
and us" attitudes - other managerial and organizational 
production system characteristics are also crucial to the 
successful attainment of such reductions. There are now a 
whole new set of issues to be considered in terms of what 
actually influences attempts to reduce "them and us" attitudes 
among employees.
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APPENDICES.

Appendix 6. 1
T H E  U K  M O D E L :  Q U E S T I O N N A I R E S  F O R  M A N A G E M E N T  
A N D  E M P L O Y E E  R E P R E S E N T A T I V E S
a ) P e r s o n n e l  M a n a g e m e n t  Q u e s t i o n n a i r e
1) E s t a b l i s h  w h a t ,  if any , d i s t i n c t i o n s  e x i s t  b e t w e e n  t h e  w e l f a r e  b e n e f i t s ,  
l e v e l  of p a y  a n d  l e a v e  g i v e n  t o  n o n  p e r m a n e n t  e m p l o y e e s  a n d  p e r m a n e n t  
e m p l o y e e s .
2) Is t h e r e  a n y  u n d e r t a k i n g  b y  t h e  c o m p a n y  to p r o v i d e  e m p l o y e e s  w i t h  s e c u r e  
e m p l o y m e n t ?  A r e  t h e  e m p l o y e e s  a w a r e  of t h i s  u n d e r t a k i n g ?  Is t h e  
u n d e r t a k i n g  w r i t t e n  o r  v e r b a l ?
3) E s t a b l i s h  w h e t h e r  t h e  c o m p a n y  p r o v i d e s  e i t h e r  of, b o t h  of, o r  in e x c e s s  
of, t h e  f o l l o w i n g  w e l f a r e  b e n e f i t s :
C o m p a n y  P e n s i o n  S c h e m e
C o m p a n y  S i c k  P a y  S c h e m e
4) E s t a b l i s h  w h e t h e r  t h e  c o m p a n y  o p e r a t e s  any, or all of t h e  f o l l o w i n g ;  
H a r m o n i s e d  m e t h o d s  of p a y m e n t
H a r m o n i s e d  h o l i d a y  e n t i t l e m e n t
A p o l i c y  of m i n i m i s i n g  t h e  n u m b e r  of c o m p a n y  j o b  g r a d e s
5) E s t a b l i s h  w h a t  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  p a y  l e v e l s  a r e  b a s e d  u p o n .  (If it is n o t  
t h e  l o c a l  m e d i a n  f o r  t h e  s k i l l s  r e q u i r e d ,  in c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  w h a t  t h e  
c o m p a n y  c a n  a f f o r d  t o pa y , n o t e  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e . )  E s t a b l i s h  h o w  t h e  
c o m p a n y ' s  p a y  r a t e s  c o m p a r e  t o t h e l o c a l  m e d i a n ,  i n d u s t r y ,  o r  c r a f t  e t c  
t h a t  t h e y  a r e  b a s e d  on.
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E s t a b l i s h  w h e t h e r  t h e  c o m p a n y  u s e s  a n y  of t h e  f o l l o w i n g
M e r i t  o r  p e r f o r m a n c e  b a s e d  p ay .  (If so, d o e s  t h e  s c h e m e  m a k e  u p  a l l  o r  a 
p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ' s  p a y  p a c k e t . )
A n y  f i n a n c i a l  r e w a r d s  s u c h  a s  p r o f i t  b o n u s e s ,  o r  a t t e n d a n c e  a l l o w a n c e s .
6) E s t a b l i s h  w h e t h e r  a n y  c l e a r  w r i t t e n  o r  i n f o r m a l  p r o c e d u r e  e x i s t s  
r e g a r d i n g  p r o m o t i o n  at t h e  c o m p a n y . A r e  e m p l o y e e s  a w a r e  o f a n y  s u c h  
p r o c e d u r e ?  Is p r o m o t i o n  b a s e d  o n  c r i t e r i a  s u c h  a s  a b i l i t y ,  c o m m i t m e n t  a n d  
p e r f o r m a n c e ,  a n d  is t h e  p o s t  f i r s t  a d v e r t i s e d  i n t e r n a l l y ?
7) E s t a b l i s h  w h e t h e r  t n e  c o m p a n y ' s  e m p l o y e e  s e l e c t i o n  p r o c e d u r e  
i n c o r p o r a t e s  a n y  o r  a l l  of t h e  f o l l o w i n g :
D e t a i l e d  a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r m s
I n t e n s i v e  i n t e r v i e w s  
A p t i t u d e  t e s t s
8* D o e s  t h e  c o m p a n y  u s e  a n y  of t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t r a i n i n g  p r o c e d u r e s  :
F o r m a l  t r a i n i n g  f o r  a l l o r  s o m e  e m p l o y e e s  a w a y  f r o m  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  a r e a ?
F o r m a l  O J T  a n d  i n d u c t i o n  f or  a l l  o r  s o m e  e m p l o y e e s  a n d  o r  i n d u c t i o n ^
I n f o r m a l  O J T  a n d  i n d u c t i o n  for a il  o r  s o m e  n e w  e m p l o y e e s .
9) E s t a b l i s h  w h e t h e r  t h e  c o m p a n y  o p e r a t e s  w h a t  it c o n s i d e r s  t o  b e  a 
s t r u c t u r e  a l l o w i n g  e m p l o y e e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n . C a n  a d e c i s i o n  o n l y  b e  m a d e  
b a s e d  o n  c o n s e n s u a l i s m ,  o r  d o  m a n a g e m e n t  h a v e  t h e  r i g h t  t o  u l t i m a t e l y  v e t o  
it? Is t h e  s t r u c t u r e  u n d e r  e x a m i n a t i o n  d e s c r i b e d  a s  b e i n g  c o n s u l t a t i v e  
r a t h e r  t h a n  p a r t i c i p a t i v e ?
— ^ ^ 8 —
10) E s t a b l i s h  w h e t h e r  t h e  c o m p a n y  o p e r a t e s  a n y  o r  all of t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
p r o c e d u r e s  o f  p o l i c i e s :
O p e n  d i s p l a y  o f  s o m e  f o r m  of c o l l e c t i v e  o r  i n d i v i d u a l  a b s e n t e e i s m  f i g u r e s
O p e n  d i s p l a y  o f s o m e  f o r m  of c o l l e c t i v e  o r  i n d i v i d u a l  p e r f o r m a n c e  f i g u r e s
A p p l i c a t i o n  o f  a f o r m a l  h o u s e k e e p i n g  p o l i c y
1') D o e s  t h e  c o m p a n y  h a v e  a s i n g l e  o r  n o n  u n i o n  r e c o g n i t i o n  p o l i c y ?  If n o  
u n i o n  IS r e c o g n i s e d  is t h e r e  a s t a f f  a s s o c i a t i o n  at t h e  c o m p a n y ?  D o e s  t h e  
c o m p a n y  a l l o w  s o m e  o t h e r  f o r m  of e l e c t e d  w o r k e r  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ^
E s t a b l i s h  t h e  l e v e l  o f  m e m b e r s h i p  of t h e  u n i o n  o r  s t a f f  a s s o c i a t i o n  
r e c o g n i s e d  in p e r c e n t a g e  t e r m s .
C h e c k  t h a t  a s i g n i f i c a n t  n u m b e r  of e m p l o y e e s  h a v e  n o t  j o i n e d  a n o n  
r e c o g n i s e d  u n i o n  o r  s t a f f  a s s o c i a t i o n .
12) E s t a b l i s h  w h e t h e r  a f o r m a l i s e d  b a r g a i n i n g  s t r u c t u r e  e x i s t s .  Is p a y  
b a r g a i n i n g  l i n k e d  t o  a n y  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :
E n t e r p r i s e  l e v e l  o n l y ?
A n o t h e r ,  s e p a r a t e  p a r t  of t h e  c o m p a n y ?
N a t i o n a l  i n d u s t r i a l  o r  c r a f t  l e v e l s  of p a y ?
1 4 ) IF A U N I O N  O R  S T A F F  A S S O C I A T I O N  IS R E C O G N I S E D  A T  T H E  C O M P A N Y  T H E N  
E S T A B L I S H  T H E  F O L L O W I N G :
D o e s  t h e  c o m p a n y  o p e r a t e  a ' n e w  s t y l e '  c o l l e c t i v e  a g r e e m e n t  ( N S A )  w h i c h  
i n c o r p o r a t e s  a n y  o r  a l l  of t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p r o v i s i o n s :
S i n g l e  u n i o n  r e c o g n i t i o n ?
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P a r t I C I p a  t i on ?
F l e x  1 0 1 1 1 ty?
A n o - s t n k e  p r o c e d u r e :
1 5 ) I F N O  U N I O N  O R  S T A F F  A S S O C I A T I O N  IS R E C O G N I S E D  A T  T H E  C O M P A N Y  T H E N  
E S T A B L I S H  T H E  F O L L O W I N G :
D o e s  t h e  c o m p a n y  h a v e  a w r i t t e n  s e t  of p r o c e d u r e s  t h a t  i n c l u d e  a n y  or all 
or t h e  f o l l o w i n g :
C o l l e c t i v e  G r i e v a n c e  P r o c e d u r e ?
P a r t  1 C 1 p a t  i o n ?
' l e x i b i l i t y ?
15) E s t a b l i s h  ( w i t h o u t  p r o m p t i n g )  w h e t h e r  t h e  c o m p a n y  p l a c e s  e m p h a s i s  o n  
s u p e r v i s o r s '  m a n a g e r i a l  a n d  l e a d e r s h i p  q u a l i t i e s .  w h a t  l e v e l  of
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  a r e  s u p e r v i s o r s  e x p e c t e d  to h a v e  o r  to a t t a i n ?  D o e s  t h e
c o m p a n y  p a y  in e x c e s s  of t h e  l o c a l  m e d i a n  f o r  s u p e r v i s o r y  s k i l l s ?
1 ?) E s t a b l i s h  w h e t h e r  a l l ,  s o m e  o r  n o  m a n a g e r s  a r e  e x p e c t e d  o r  e n c o u r a g e d  
to c a r r y  o u t  t a s k s  b e y o n d  t h e  n o r m a l  r e m i t  of t h e i r  j o b  t i t l e  o r  d e p a r t m e n t  
as p a r t  of t h e i r  c a r e e r  d e v e l o p m e n t .
18 ) D o e s  t h e  c o m p a n y  o f f e r  c o m p e t i t i v e  l e v e l s  of p a y  to i t s U K m a n a g e r s ' ’
19) E s t a b l i s h  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :
Is t n e r e  a s p e c i f i c  P e r s o n n e l  M a n a g e r  p o s t ?
Is t h e  P e r s o n n e l  M a n a g e r ' s  p o s t  h e l d  by a UK o r J a p a n e s e  e m p l o y e e ?
-'^0-
W h a t  l e v e l  o f  a u t h o r i t y  a n d  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  d o e s  t h e  P e r s o n n e l  M a n a g e r  
e n ] o y ?  D o e s  h e  o r  s h e  r e p o r t  t o a m o r e  s e n i o r  m a n a g e r ?
b) M a n a g e m e n t  Q u e s t i o n n a i r e  ( A p p l i e s  t o a l l  m a n a g e r s  u n l e s s  o t h e r w i s e  
s t a t e d . )
1) I n t e r v i e w e e s  a r e  a s k e d  t o  s t a t e  w h a t  t h e y  c o n s i d e r  t o  b e  t h e  k e y  c o m p a n y  
o b ] e c t 1 v e s .
2) T h e  c o m p a n y  o p e r a t e s  a k e y  p r o c e d u r e  o r  p o l i c y  w h i c h  is i d e n t i f i e d  
d u r i n g  t h e  P e r s o n n e l  M a n a g e m e n t  i n t e r v i e w .  T h e  i n t e r v i e w e e  is a s k e d  to 
i n d i c a t e  w h i c h  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  b e s t  s u m s  u p  h o w  h e  o r  s h e  b e l i e v e s  t h e  
p o l i c y  o r  p r o c e d u r e  is a p p l i e d  at t h e  c o m p a n y  :
a) It IS a w r i t t e n  p o l i c y  o r  p r o c e d u r e  w h i c h  is a p p l i e d  r i g i d l y .
b) It IS a n  u n w r i t t e n  p o l i c y  o r p r o c e d u r e  w h i c h  is a p p l i e d  
r i g i d l y .
c) It IS a w r i t t e n  p o l i c y  o r  p r o c e d u r e  w h i c h  is n e v e r  a p p l i e d  
o r IS a p p l i e d  o n  a d i s c r e t i o n a r y  b a s i s .
d) It IS a n  u n w r i t t e n  p o l i c y  o r  p r o c e d u r e  w h i c h  is n e v e r  a p p l i e d  
o r  IS a p p l i e d  o n  a d i s c r e t i o n a r y  b a s i s .
3) H o w  a r e  m a n a g e m e n t  d e c i s i o n s  r e a c h e d ?  D o e s  e a c h  m a n a g e r  i n t e r v i e w e d  s e e  
t h e . m a n a g e r : a l  d e c i s i o n  m a k i n g  p r o c e s s  a s  c o n s e n s u a l ,  o r  is it h i g h l y  
f o r m a l i s e d  a n d  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  r e l e v a n t  m a n a g e r s  o r  a n  e l i t e ?
4) U K m a n a g e m e n t  i n t e r v i e w e e s  o n  1 y a r e  a s k e d  to d e s c r i b e  t h e  p r o c e s s  b y 
w h i c h  t h e y  t h e y  w e r e  s e l e c t e d  t o  b e c o m e  m a n a g e r s  at t h e  c o m p a n y .  In
a d d i t i o n ,  t h e y  a r e  a s k e d  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :
w h a t  m a n a g e m e n t  s k i l l s  a n d  a t t i t u d e s  d i d  t h e  c o m p a n y  a p p e a r  to b e  s e e k i n g  
f r o m  ij^s p o t e n t i a l  U K m a n a g e r s ?
W o u l d  t h e y  c o n s i d e r  t h a t  t h e  c o m p a n y  o f f e r s  g o o d  p r o m o t i o n a l  p r o s p e c t s ?  If 
s o  - w h y ?  If n o t  - w h y  n o t ?
-461-
ii-
W?/:
What; a r e  t h e  p r o s p e c t s  of a U K  d o m i n a t e d  m a n a g e m e n t  t e a m ?  H a s  s u c h  a 
p l e d g e  b e e n  m a d e  b y  J a p a n e s e  m a n a g e m e n t ?
D o  t h e y  f e e l  t h a t  t n e  c o m p a n y  o f f e r s  t h e m  c o m p e t i t i v e  l e v e l s  of p a y ?
5) E s t a b l i s h  h o w  n e w  p r o p o s a l s  a r e  d e v e l o p e d  oy a s k i n g  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
Is a t e a m  a s s e m b l e d  t o  f o r m  a p o o l  of k n o w l e d g e ?
D o e s  t h e  t e a m  k e e p  relevant; d e p a r t m e n t s  i n f o r m e d  of t h e  p r o p o s a  ! ' s 
d e v e l o p m e n t  ?
Is t h e  t e a m  d o m i n a t e d  b y a n  e l i t e  g r o u p  of m a n a g e m e n t ?
If n o  t e a m  e x i s t s  is e x p l o r a t i o n  of t h e p r o p o s a l  a n d  a n y  o u t c o m e  d o m i n a t e d  
b y  a n  e l i t e  g r o u p  of m a n a g e m e n t  ?
A r e  n e w  p r o p o s a l s  s i m p l y  d e v e l o p e d  t h r o u g h  t h e  u s e  o f r e g u l a r  f o r m a l
m e e t i n g s  b e t w e e n  t h o s e  m a n a g e r s  m o s t  a f f e c t e d  b y  t h e m ?  D o e s  e a c h  m a n a g e r
t a k e  t h e  a s p e c t  o f e a c h  p r o p o s a l  t h a t  m o s t  a f f e c t s  t h e i r  d e p a r t m e n t  b a c k  to
an  i n d i v i d u a l  u n d e r  h i s  a u t h o r i t y  f o r  d e v e l o p m e n t ?
5) A ll  m a n a g e r s  i n t e r v i e w e d  a r e  a s k e d  to i d e n t i f y  w h i c h  of t h e  f o l l o w m q  
b e s t  s u m s  u p  i n t e r - d e p a r t m e n t a 1 c o m m u n i c a t i o n s :
a) E x c e l l e n t .  ( R e g u l a r  a n d  f l o w s  b e t w e e n  all d e p a r t m e n t s . )
b) G o o d .  ( R e g u l a r  a n d  f l o w s  b e t w e e n  a m a j o r i t y  of d e p a r t m e n t s . )
c) P o o r .  ( I r r e g u l a r ,  a n d  n o t  p r a c t i s e d  b y  a m a j o r i t y  of 
d e p a r t m e n t s .)
d) V e r y  p o o r ,  ( N o t  p r a c t i s e d  b y  a n y  d e p a r t m e n t . )
7) E s t a b l i s h  w h e t h e r  t h e  c o m p a n y  o p e r a t e s  a t l e a s t  o n e  f o r m a l  
m a n a g e m e n t / e m p l o y e e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  s t r u c t u r e . ( T h i s  d o e s  n o t  i n c l u d e  
a d v i s o r y  b o a r d s  o r  w o r k s  c o u n c i l s . )  E s t a b l i s h  h o w  o f t e n  t h e  p r o c e d u r e  is
u s e d  b y m a n a g e m e n t .
8) J a p a n e s e  m a n a g e m e n t  i n t e r v i e w e e s  o n l y a r e  a s k e d  to d e s c r i b e  t h e  p r o c e s s  
b y w h i c h  t h e y  w e r e  s e l e c t e d  t o  m a n a g e  t h e i r  c o m p a n y ' s  U K o p e r a t i o n .  In 
a d d i t i o n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  q u e s t i o n s  a r e  a s k e d :
W h a t  m a n a g e m e n t  s k i l l s  a n d  a t t i t u d e s  d i d  t h e  c o m p a n y  a p p e a r  to b e  s e e k i n g  
f r o m  p o t e n t i a l  o v e r s e a s  m a n a g e r s ?
D i d  t h e  i n t e r v i e w e e  r e c e i v e  a n y  f o r m  of i n d u c t i o n  p r i o r  t o  t h e i r  a r r i v a l  in 
t h e  U K ?
A r e  p o t e n t i a l  o v e r s e a s  m a n a g e r s  e x p e c t e d  t o  a t t a i n  o r a t t e m p t  to a t t a i n  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  s t a n d a r d  o f s p o k e n  E n g l i s h ?
c ) I n t e r v i e w s  w i t h  E m p l o y e e  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s
1) E s t a b l i s h  w h e t h e r  t h e  c o m p a n y  o p e r a t e s  at l e a s t  o n e  f o r m a l  
m a n a g e m e n t / e m p l o y e e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  s t r u c t u r e .  ( T h i s  d o e s  n o t  i n c l u d e  
a d v i s o r y  b o a r d s  o r  w o r k s  c o u n c i l s . )  E s t a b l i s h  h o w  o f t e n  t h e  p r o c e d u r e  is 
p e r c e i v e d  b y  e m p l o y e e s  t o  b e  u s e d  b y  m a n a g e m e n t .
2) E s t a b l i s h  w h e t h e r  t h e  c o m p a n y  o p e r a t e s  a f o r m - o f  e m p l o y e e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
( o t h e r  t h a n  a c o m p a n y  a d v i s o r y  b o a r d )  w h e r e  d e c i s i o n s  a r e  f o r m u l a t e d  o n  t h e  
b a s i s  o f c o n s e n s u s  b e t w e e n  m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  e m p l o y e e s .  E s t a b l i s h  h o w  o f t e n ,  
if e v e r ,  m a n a g e m e n t  v e t o  a d e c i s i o n .  W o u l d  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  b e  b e t t e r  
d e s c r i b e d  a s a f o r m  o f c o n s u l t a t i o n  r a t h e r  t h a n  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .
3; E s t a b l i s h  w h e t h e r  a f o r m a l i s e d  u n i o n  o r o t h e r  s t r u c t u r e  e x i s t s  to d e a l  
w i t h  c o l l e c t i v e  o r  i n d i v i d u a l  g r l e v a n c e s . If yes, e m p l o y e e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
a r e  a s k e d  to i d e n t i f y  w h i c h  of t h e  f o l l o w i n g  b e s t  s u m s  u p  h o w  m a n a g e m e n t  
s e e  a n d  u s e  t h i s  s t r u c t u r e :
a) M a n a g e m e n t  s e e  t h e  . . . . . ..  a s  n e c e s s a r y  a n d  u s e f u l .
b) S o m e  m a n a g e r s  s e e  t h e  . . . . . . .  a s  u n n e c e s s a r y  a n d  a h i n d r a n c e .
c) M a n a g e m e n t  a s  a w h o l e  s e e  t h e  . . . . . . . .  a s  u n n e c e s s a r y  a n d  a h i n d r a n c e .
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4 ) I F  A U N I O N  O R  S T A F F  A S S O C I A T I O N  IS R E C O G N I S E D  A T  T H E  C O M P A N Y  T H E N  
E S T A B L I S H  T H E  F O L L O W I N G :
E m p l o y e e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a r e  a s k e d  to i d e n t i f y  w h i c h  of t h e  f o l l o w i n g  b e s t  
s u m s  u p  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  a t t i t u d e  t o w a r d s  t h e  a g r e e m e n t  b e t w e e n  t h e  c o m p a n y  a n d  
t h e  u n i o n  o r  s t a f f  a s s o c i a t i o n  r e c o g n i s e d :
a) N o  m a t t e r  w h a t  t h e  i s s u e  a l l m a n a g e r s  a d h e r e  to t h e  
s p i r i t  o f t h e  a g r e e m e n t  a l l  of t h e  t im e.
b) D e p e n d i n g  o n  t h e  i s s u e  o r  m a n a g e r , , p a n a g e m e n t  a d h e r e  to 
t h e  s p i r i t  of t h e  a g r e e m e n t  m o s t  of th'e t im e .
c) D e p e n d i n g  o n  t h e  i s s u e  o r  m a n a g e r ,  m a n a g e m e n t  r a r e l y  
a d h e r e  to t h e  s p i r i t  of t h e  a g r e e m e n t .
dI M a n a g e m e n t  n e v e r  a d h e r e  to t h e  s p i r i t  of t h e  a g r e e m e n t .
5 I I F N O  U N I O N  O R  S T A F F  A S S O C I A T I O N  IS R E C O G N I S E D  A T  T H E  C O M P A N Y  T H E N  
E S T A B L I S H  T H E  F O L L O W I N G :
E m p l o y e e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a r e  a s k e d  to i d e n t i f y  w h i c h  of t h e  f o l l o w i n g  b e s t  
s u m s  u p  m a n a g e m e n t ' s  a t t i t u d e  t o w a r d s  e m p l o y e e  r e q u e s t s  a n d  g r i e v a n c e s '
a) . M a n a g e m e n t ,  a s  a w h o l e ,  a r e  p e r c e i v e d  a s  v e r y  fa i r.
o. D e p e n d i n g  o n  t h e  i s s u e  o r  m a n a g e r  m a n a g e m e n t  a r e  p e r c e i v e d  
as b e i n g  f a i r  m o s t  of t h e  t im e.
c) D e p e n d i n g  o n  t h e  i s s u e  o r  m a n a g e r ,  m a n a g e m e n t  a r e  p e r c e i v e d
as b e i n g  u n f a i r  m o s t  of t h e  t im e .
e) M a n a g e m e n t  a r e  p e r c e i v e d  a s b e i n g  u n f a i r  a ll  of t h e  t i m e .
6) E s t a b l i s h  w h e t h e r  t h e  c o m p a n y  o p e r a t e s  w h a t  e m p l o y e e  r e p r e s e n  ta 1.1 v e s  
c o n s i d e r  to b e  a s t r u c t u r e  a l l o w i n g  e m p l o y e e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  C a n  a d e c i s i o n  
o n l y  b e  m a d e  b a s e d  o n  c o n s e n s u a l  ism, o r  d o  m a n a g e m e n t  h a v e  t h e  r i g h t  to 
u l t i m a t e l y  v e t o  i t ? Is t h e  s t r u c t u r e  u n d e r  e x a m i n a t i o n  d e s c r i b e d  a s  b e i n g  
c o n s u l t a t i v e  r a t h e r  t h a n  p a r t i c i p a t i v e ?
7) E s t a b l i s h  w h i c h  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  e a c h  i n t e r v i e w e e  f e e l s  b e s t  d e s c r i b e s  
t h e w a y  in w h i c h  a n e w  r u l e  o r p r o c e d u r e  r e l a t e d  to t h e  d i s c i p l i n e  or 
r e g i m e n t a t i o n  of t h e  w o r k p l a c e  is i m p l e m e n t e d :
a) A n y  n e w  r u l e  o r  p r o c e d u r e  r e l a t e d  t o t h e  d i s c i p l i n e  o r  
r e g i m e n t a t i o n  of t h e  w o r k p l a c e  is a l w a y s  e x p l a i n e d  t o t h e  
w o r k f o r c e  v e r b a l l y  a n d / o r  in w r i t i n g .  T h i s  is d o n e  w i t h o u t  
p r o m p t i n g  b y  t h e  w o r k f o r c e  o r t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .
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b) A n y  n e w  r u l e  o r  p r o c e d u r e  r e l a t e d  to t h e  d i s c i p l i n e  o r  
r e g i m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  w o r k p l a c e  is u s u a l l y  e x p l a i n e d  to t h e  
w o r k f o r c e  v e r b a l l y  a n d / o r  in w r i t i n g .  T h i s  is d o n e  w i t h o u t  
p r o m p t i n g  b y  t h e  w o r k f o r c e  o r  t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .
c) A n y  n e w  r u l e  o r  p r o c e d u r e  r e l a t e d  to t h e  d i s c i p l i n e  o r 
r e g i m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  w o r k p l a c e  is o c c a s i o n a l l y  e x p l a i n e d  t o t h e  
w o r k f o r c e  v e r b a l l y  a n d / o r  in w r i t i n g .  T h i s  is d o n e  w i t h o u t  
p r o m p t i n g  b y  t h e  w o r k f o r c e  o r  t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .
d) A n y  n e w  r u l e  o r  p r o c e d u r e  r e l a t e d  to t h e  d i s c i p l i n e  o r  
r e g i m e n t a t i o n  o f t h e  w o r k p l a c e  is n e v e r  e x p l a i n e d  to t h e  
w o r k f o r c e  v e r b a l l y  a n d / o r  in w r i t i n g ,  u n l e s s  m a n a g e m e n t  a r e  
f i r s t  p r o m p t e d  b y  t h e  w o r k f o r c e  o r  t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .
d) P r o c u r e m e n t  M a n a g e r  I n t e r v i e w  (At s o m e  c o m p a n i e s  it m a y  b e  p o s s i b l e  to 
u s e  i n t e r v i e w s  w i t h  p r o d u c t i o n  m a n a g e m e n t  to i d e n t i f y  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h  i t s  s u p p l i e r s .  I n t e r v i e w i n g  t h e  p r o c u r e m e n t  m a n a g e r  m a y  
t h e r e f o r e  n o t  a l w a y s  b e  n e c e s s a r y . )
1) E s t a b l i s h  w h e t h e r  t h e  c o m p a n y  h a s  a w r i t t e n  o r  i n f o r m a l  s e t  of 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  f o r  e a c h  c o m p o n e n t  it is s u p p l i e d  w i t h .  T h e s e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  
c o n c e r n  q u a l i t y ,  d e l i v e r y  t i m e  a n d  p r i c e .
w h e r e  a w r i t t e n  o r  u n w r i t t e n  s e t  of s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  e x i s t s ,  e s t a b l i s h  
w h e t h e r  t h e y  a r e  a p p l i e d  o n  a d i s c r e t i o n a r y  b a s i s ,  o r  a r e  a p p l i e d  
r i g o r o u s l y .
2) T h r o u g h  t h e  u s e  of t h e  f o l l o w i n g  q u e s t i o n s  e s t a b l i s h  w h a t  o c c u r s  a f t e r  
t h e  ini tial' s t a g e s  of t h e  b u y e r / s u p p l  l e r r e l a t i o n s h i p  a t t h e  c o m p a n y :
Is c o n t a c t  w i t h  s u p p l i e r s  is m a i n t a i n e d  o n  a r e g u l a r  b a s i s ?  D o e s  t h i s  
c o n t a c t  o c c u r  e v e n  w h e n  t h e r e  is n o  p r o b l e m  w i t h  t h e  c o m p o n e n t  s u p p l i e d . ?
W h e r e  a p r o b l e m  o c c u r s ,  is t h e r e  e i t h e r  a n  u n d e r t a k i n g  o r  p r e c e d e n t  t h a t  
t h e  c o m p a n y  w i l l  l e n d  s u p p o r t  a n d  e x p e r t i s e  to t h e  s u p p l i e r  if n e e d e d ?
O n c e  n o t i f i e d  of a p r o b l e m  w i t h  t h e  c o m p o n e n t  s u p p l i e d ,  is t h e  s u p p l i e r  
s i m p l y  l e f t  to s o r t  it o u t  a l o n e ?
A d d i t i o n a l  N o t e s  a n d  C o m m e n t s
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Appendix 6.2
L E V E L S  A C H I E V A B L E  A N D  T H E I R  A S S O C I A T E D  S C O R E S  F O R  
C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S  O F  T H E  U K  M O D E L
M a n a g e r i a l  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
1) C o h e r e n t  V i s i o n  - A l l  m a n a g e r s  i n t e r v i e w e d  a r e  a s k e d  t o i d e n t i f y  w h a t  
t h e y  c o n s i d e r  t o b e  t h e  k e y  c o m p a n y  o b j e c t i v e s .
1.1 S a m e  t h r e e  o b j e c t i v e s  a p p e a r  a m o n g  t h e  r e p l i e s  of a l l
of t h o s e  i n t e r v i e w e d .  3
1.2 S a m e  t w o  o b j e c t i v e s  a p p e a r  a m o n g  t h e  r e p l i e s  of all
of t h o s e  i n t e r v i e w e d  2
1.3 S a m e  o n e  o b j e c t i v e  a p p e a r s  a m o n g  t he  r e p l i e s  of all
of t h o s e  i n t e r v i e w e d .  1
1.4 N o  c o m m o n  o b j e c t i v e  a p p e a r s  a m o n g  the r e p l i e s  of all
of t h o s e  i n t e r v i e w e d .  0
2 C o n s i s t e n c y  of S t y l e  - (a) All m a n a g e r s  i n t e r v i e w e d  a r e  a s k e d  to
i n d i c a t e  h o w  t h e y  b e l i e v e  t h e  s a m e  w r i t t e n  p r o c e d u r e  o r  p o l i c y  is
a p p l i e d  a t  t h e i r  c o m p a n y ,  (b) T h e i r  a n s w e r s  a r e  c o m p a r e d  a n d  a n  a v e r a g e  
s c o r e  c a l c u l a t e d .
2 .1 a  It is a w r i t t e n  p o l i c y  o r  p r o c e d u r e  w h i c h  is a p p l i e d  r i g i d l y .  3
2 . 2 a  It IS a n  u n w r i t t e n  p o l i c y  o r  p r o c e d u r e  w h i c h  is a p p l i e d
r i g i d l y .  2
2 .3 a  It is a w r i t t e n  p o l i c y  o r  p r o c e d u r e  w h i c h  is n e v e r  a p p l i e d
or IS a p p l i e d  o n  a d i s c r e t i o n a r y  b a s i s .  1
2 . 4 a It I S  a n  u n w r i t t e n  p o l i c y  o r  p r o c e d u r e  w h i c h  is n e v e r  a p p l i e d  
or IS a p p l i e d  o n  a d i s c r e t i o n a r y  b a s i s .  0
T h e  f o l l o w i n g  is t h e n  a p p l i e d .
All of t h o s e  i n t e r v i e w e d  s e l e c t e d  t he  s a m e  a n s w e r .  3
T h r e e  of t h o s e  i n t e r v i e w e d  s e l e c t e d  t h e  s a m e  a n s w e r .  2
T w o  of t h o s e  i n t e r v i e w e d  s e l e c t e d  t h e s a m e  a n s w e r .  i
N o n e  of t h o s e  i n t e r v i e w e d  s e l e c t e d  t h e  s a m e  a n s w e r .  0
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3) C o n s e n s u a I / G r o ’j p : s t  D e c i s i o n  M a k i n g  P r o c e d u r e s  - I n t e r v i e w s  w i t h  a : 
m a n a g e r s  a r e  u s e d  t o  i d e n t i f y  o n e  of t h e  f o l l o w i n g :
3.1 C o n s e n s u s 1 / G r o u pi S t  d e c i s i o n  m a k i n g  p r o c e d u r e s  e x i s t  in 
w h i c h  a l l  m a n a g e r s  r e g a r d  l e s s  of n a t i o n a l i t y  o r  l e v e l  h a v e  a
c h a n c e  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e .  3
3 . 2  D e c i s i o n s  a r e  r e a c h e d  e n t i r e l y  t h r o u g h  t h e  u s e  of f o r m a l  
m e e t i n g s  b e t w e e n  t h o s e  m a n a g e r s  o n l y  d i r e c t l y  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h
t h e  i s s u e  u n d e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  2
3.3 T h e r e  a r e  n o  c o n s i s t e n t l y  u s e d  d e c i s i o n  m a k i n g  p r o c e d u r e s  
M a n a g e r s  r e a c h  a d e c i s i o n  u s i n g  w h a r  t h e y  c o n s i d e r  to b e  tlie 
a p p r o p r i a t e  p r o c e d u r e  a n d  w h e r e  n e c e s s a r y  o b t a i n  r a t i f i c a t i o n
f r o m  s e n i o r  m a n a g e m e n t .  ’
3.4 C o n s e n s u a 1 / G r o u p i s t  d e c i s i o n  m a k i n g  p r o c e d u r e s  e x i s t  a m o n g  
an  e l i t e  of s e n i o r  o r  J a p a n e s e  m a n a g e m e n t .  O t h e r  m a n a g e r i a l  
g r o u p s  a r e  o n l y  i n c o r p o r a t e d  in t h e  d e c i s i o n  m a k i n g  p r o c e d u r e
a s a n d  w h e n  t h i s  e l i t e  d e e m s  it a p p r o p r i a t e .  0
■t ) T 1 r c u  1 a 1 1 o n  - A n  i n t e r v i e w  w i t h  t h e  r o m p a n y ' s  P e r s o n n e  1 M a n a g e ;  . s 
to i d e n t i f y  o n e  of t n e  f o l l o w i n g
■Î , ■ A s p a r t  of t h e i r  c a r e e r  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  a ll  m a n a g e r s  a r e  e x p e c t e d
to b e  a b l e  to c a r r y  o u t  a w i d e  r a n g e  of t a s k s  b e y o n d
t h o s e  w h i c h  n o r m a l l y  c o m e  u n d e r  t h e  r e m i t  o f t h e i r  ] o b
t i t l e  o r  d e p a r t m e n t .  1
4.2 A s p a r t  of t h e i r  c a r e e r  d e v e l o p m e n t ,  a l l  m a n a g e r s  a r e  o n l y  
e n c o u r a g e d  to b e  a b l e  to c a r r y  o u t  a w i d e  r a n g e  of t a s k s  b e y o n d  
t h o s e  w h i c n  n o r m a l l y  c o m e  u n d e r  t h e  r e m i t  of t h e i r  ] o o
t i t l e  o r  d e p a r t m e n t  f
4 .3  A s  p a r t  of t h e i r  c a r e e r  d e v e l o p m e n t  o n l y  s o m e  s e c t i o n s  of 
m a n a g e m e n t  a r e  e i t h e r  e x p e c t e d  o r  e n c o u r a g e d  to c a r r y  o u t  a w i d e  
r a n g e  of t a s k s  b e y o n d  t h o s e  w h i c h  n o r m a l l y  c o m e  u n d e r  t h e  r e m i t
of t h e i r  ] o b  t i t l e  o r  d e p a r t m e n t .  ^
4.4 M a n a g e r s  a r e  n o t  e x p e c t e d  o r  e n c o u r a g e d  to c a r r y  o u t  t a s k s
t h a t  a r e  b e y o n d  t h e  r e m i t  of t h e i r  j o b  t i t l e  o r d e p a r t m e n t .  0
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5) S p e c i a l  S e l e c t i o n / R e t e n : i o n  P r o c e d u r e s  - I n t e r v i e w s  w i t h  J a p a n e s e  
m a n a g e m e n t  a r e  u s e d  to i d e n t i f y  o n e  of t h e  f o l l o w i n g :
5. ia A l l  J a p a n e s e  m a n a g e r s  a r e  s u b j e c t  to a n  i n t e n s i v e  
s e l e c t i o n  p r o c e d u r e  w h i c h  a t t e m p t s  to m a t c h  t h e a t t i t u d e s  a n d  
c o m m u n i c a t i v e  s k i l l s  of t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  to t h e  s p e c i a l  n e e d s  
of a J a p a n e s e  c o m p a n y  o p e r a t i n g  in t h e  UK. T h e s e  p r o c e d u r e s  
i n c l u d e  i n d u c t i o n  p r i o r  to a r r i v a l  in t h e  U K I n d i v i d u a l s  a r e  
e x p e c t e d  t o  h a v e  a t t a i n e d ,  or to a t t e m p t  to a t t a i n  a r e a s o n a b l e  
s t a n d a r d  of s p o k e n  E n g l i s h .  3
5 . 2 a  S o m e  J a p a n e s e  m a n a g e r s  ( b a s e d  o n  s e n i o r i t y  o r  s k i l l )
a r e  s u b j e c t  t o  a n  i n t e n s i v e  s e l e c t i o n  p r o c e d u r e  w h i c h  a t t e m p t s
to m a t c h  t h e  a t t i t u d e s  a n d  c o m m u n i c a t i v e  s k i l l s  of t h e
i n d i v i d u a l  t o t h e  s p e c i a l  n e e d s  of a J a p a n e s e  c o m p a n y  o p e r a t i n g
in t h e  UK. T h e s e  p r o c e d u r e s  i n c l u d e  i n d u c t i o n  p r i o r  to a r r i v a l
in t h e  UK. A i l  J a p a n e s e  m a n a g e m e n t  a r e  e x p e c t e d  t o  h a v e
a t t a i n e d ,  o r  to g i v e  a n  u n d e r t a k i n g  t h a t  t h e y  w i l l  a t t e m p t
to a t t a i n ,  a r e a s o n a b l e  s t a n d a r d  of s p o k e n  E n g l i s h .  2
5 . 3 a  T h e  o n l y  r e q u i r e m e n t  for a l l  J a p a n e s e  m a n a g e m e n t  is to 
h a v e  a t t a i n e d  o r  t o g i v e  a n  u n d e r t a k i n g  t h a t  t h e y  w i l l  a t t e m p t  
to a t t a i n ,  a r e a s o n a b l e  s t a n d a r d  of s p o k e n  E n g l i s h .
5 . 4 a  J a p a n e s e  m a n a g e m e n t  a r e  n o t  s u b j e c t  to a n  i n t e n s i v e  s e l e c t i o n  
p r o c e d u r e .  T h e y  a r e  n o t  r e q u i r e d  to h a v e  a t t a i n e d  o r  to g i v e  
a n  u n d e r t a k i n g  to a t t e m p t  to a t t a i n ,  a r e a s o n a b l e  s t a n d a r d  of 
s p o k e n  E n g l i s h .  0
5 . 1 b  A l l  U K m a n a g e r s  a r e  s u b j e c t  to a s p e c i a l  s e l e c t  i o n / r e  t e n t  i o n  
p r o c e d u r e  w h i c h  a t t e m p t s  to m a t c h  a t t i t u d e s  to t h e  s p e c i a l  
n e e d s  o f  a J a p a n e s e  c o m p a n y  o p e r a t i n g  in t h e  UK. UK m a n a g e m e n t  
m o t i v a t i o n  is r e i n f o r c e d  b y  c o m p e t i t i v e  pay , a n d  g o o d  p r o m o t  i o n a  .1 
p r o s p e c t s .  (If a U K m a n a g e m e n t  p r e s e n c e  is c o n f i n e d  to m i d d l e  
m a n a g e m e n t  g r a d e s ,  g o o d  p r o m o t i o n a l  p r o s p e c t s  m a y  n e e d  t o b e  a f f i r m e d  
by a J a p a n e s e  m a n a g e m e n t  p l e d g e  t h a t  t h e  c o m p a n y  a i m s  to b u i l d  a 
m a n a g e m e n t  t e a m  c o m p r i s i n g  s o l e l y  of o r  at l e a s t  d o m i n a t e d  by 
UK m a n a g e m e n t  . ) 3
5 . 2 b  A l l  U K m a n a g e r s  a r e  s u b j e c t  to a s p e c i a l  s e l e c t  i o n / r e  t e n t  ion 
p r o c e d u r e  w h i c h  a t t e m p t s  to m a t c h  a t t i t u d e s  to t h e  s p e c i a l  
n e e d s  of a J a p a n e s e  c o m p a n y  o p e r a t i n g  in t h e  UK. P ay  l e v e l s  a r e  
c o m p e t i t i v e ,  b u t  p r o m o t i o n a l  p r o s p e c t s  a r e  p o o r .
5 , 3 b  S e l e c t i o n / r e t e n t i o n  of UK m a n a g e r s  is b a s e d  s o l e l y  u p o n  p a y i n g  
a c o m p e t i t i v e  s a l a r y  f o r  t h e  s k i l l s  r e q u i r e d .
5 . 4 b  S e l e c t  i o n / r e  t e n t  i o n  o f  U K m a n a g e r s  f o l l o w s  n o  c l e a r  p r o c e d u r e ,  
a n d  p r o v i d e s  n o  f i n a n c i a l  o r o t h e r  i n c e n t i v e s  for t h e m  to r e m a i n  
w i t h  t h e  c o m p a n y  l o n g  t e r m .
~^ k68—
N . B .  W h e r e  a d u a l  m a n a g e m e n t  s t r u c t u r e  e x i s t s  i n t e r v i e w s  w i l l  a t t e m p t  t o 
i d e n t i f y  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of a n  i n d i c e  f r o m  e a c h  of t h e  a b o v e  t w o  s e t s  o f 
i n d i c e s . T h e  t w o  s c o r e s  w i l l  t h e n  b e  a d d e d  t o g e t h e r  a n d  a n  a v e r a g e  s c o r e  
c a l c u l a t e d .
O r g a n  1 za 1 1 o n a 1 C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
1 ) C o - o r d i n a t i o n  a n d  C o - o p e r a t i o n  of a l l  D e p a r t m e n t s  - I n t e r v ;e w s  wi r.t 
m a n a g e r s  a r e  u s e d  to i d e n t i f y  o n e  of t h e  f o l l o w i n g :
1.' A t e a m  of p e r s o n n e l  is a s s e m b l e d  to f o r m  a p o o l  of k n o w l e d g e  
a b l e  t o  d e v e l o p  a n e w  p r o p o s a l .  All d e p a r t m e n t s  a f f e c t e d  b y  t h e  
o u t c o m e  of t h e  p r o p o s a l  a r e  r e g u l a r l y  i n f o r m e d  by t h e  t e a m  
of t h e p r o p o s a l ' s  p r o g r e s s .  3
1.2 A t e a m  is a s s e m b l e d  to f o r m  a p o o l  of k n o w l e d g e  a b l e  t o  d e v e l o p  
a n e w  p r o p o s a l .  D e p a r t m e n t s  a f f e c t e d  b y  t h e  o u t c o m e  of t h e  
p r o p o s a l  w i l l  r e c e i v e  p o o r  f e e d b a c k  o n  t h e  t e a m ' s  p r o g r e s s .
( T h i s  m a y  b e  b e c a u s e  t h e  t e a m  is J a p a n e s e  d o m i n a t e d  a n d  s o  t e n d s  
to r e p o r t  b a c k  t o  J a p a n e s e  m a n a g e m e n t  o r  it m a y  s i m p l y  b e  d u e  to 
p o o r  o r g a n i z a t i o n . )  2
1.3 T o  d e v e l o p  a n e w  p r o p o s a l  d e p a r t m e n t s  a r r a n g e  r e g u l a r  f o r m a l  
m e e t i n g s  b e t w e e n  t h o s e  m a n a g e r s  m o s t  d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t e d  b y  it. E a c h  
m a n a g e r  t a k e s  t h e  a s p e c t  o f t h e  p r o p o s a l  t h a t  a f f e c t s  h i s  d e p a r t m e n t  
b a c k  t o  a n  i n d i v i d u a l  u n d e r  h i s  a u t h o r i t y  f o r  d e v e l o p m e n t .  ( T h e  
i n d i v i d u a l  m i g h t  b e  e m p l o y e d  p u r e l y  a s  a s p e c i a l i s t . )  1
1.4 T h e r e  is n o  c o n s i s t e n t l y  u s e d  m e t h o d  of d e p a r t m e n t a l
c o - o p e r a t i o n  a n d  c o - o r d i n a t i o n ,  M a n a g e r s  u s e  w h a t e v e r  f r a m e w o r k
of d e v e l o p m e n t  t h e y  s e e  a s  r e l e v a n t  to e a c h  p r o p o s a l .  C o m m u n i c a t i o n s  
b e t w e e n  r e l e v a n t  d e p a r t m e n t s ,  r e g a r d i n g  n e w  p r o p o s a l s ,  a r e  p o o r  0
2) C o m p a n y  W i d e  C o m m u n i c a t i o n s  - All m a n a g e r s  a r e  i n t e r v i e w e d  r e g a r d i n g  2a 
a n d  a l l m a n a g e r s  a n d  e m p l o y e e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a r e  i n t e r v i e w e d  r e g a r d i n g  2b.
2 . a E a c h  m a n a g e r ' s  p e r c e p t i o n  of w r i t t e n  o r  v e r b a l  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  
d e p a r t m e n t s  is m e a s u r e d  a s  f o l l o w s :
2 . 1 a  E x c e l l e n t .  ( R e g u l a r  a n d  f l o w s  b e t w e e n  a l l  d e p a r t m e n t s . )  3
2 , 2 a  G o o d .  ( R e g u l a r  a n d  f l o w s  b e t w e e n  a m a j o r i t y  of d e p a r t m e n t s  ) 2
2 . 3 a  P o o r .  ( I r r e g u l a r ,  a n d  n o t  p r a c t i s e d  b y a m a j o r i t y  of
d e p a r t m e n t s . ) 1
2 . 4 a  V e r y  p o o r .  ( N o t  p r a c t i s e d  by a n y  d e p a r t m e n t . )  0
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2 b  E a c h  m a n a g e r ' s  a n d  e m p l o y e e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ' s  p e r c e p t i o n  of t h e
m a n a g e m e n  t / e m p l o y e e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  s t r u c t u r e  is m e a s u r e d  a s  f o l l o w s .
(C o m m u n  1 c a t i o n s  s t r u c t u r e  d o e s  n o t  i n c l u d e  a d v i s o r y  b o a r d s  o r  w o r k s
c o u n c i l s . )
2 . 1 b  At l e a s t  o n e  f o r m a l i s e d  p r o c e d u r e  of m a n a g e m e n t / w o r k e r  
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  e x i s t s .  It o p e r a t e s  o n  a d a i l y  b a s i s .  3
2 . 2 b  At l e a s t  o n e  f o r m a l i s e d  p r o c e d u r e  of m a n a g e m e n t / w o r k e r
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  e x i s t s .  It o p e r a t e s  w e e k l y  o r  m o r e , b u t  n o t
d a i l y .  2
2 . 3 b  At l e a s t  o n e  f o r m a l i s e d  p r o c e d u r e  of m a n a g e m e n t / w o r k e r
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  e x i s t s . It o p e r a t e s  o n c e  a m o n t h  o r  m o r e ,  b u t
n o t  w e e k  1 y . '
2 . 4 b  A f o r m a l i s e d  p r o c e d u r e  of m a n a g e m e n t / w o r k e r  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  
e x i s t s ,  b u t  o p e r a t e s  l e s s  t h a n  o n c e  a m o n t h .  O r n o  f o r m a l i s e d  
p r o c e d u r e  of m a n a g e m e n t / w o r k e r  c o m m u n i c a t i o n s  e x i s t s .  C
An  a v e r a g e  s c o r e  is c a l c u l a t e d  for 2a. T h i s  is a d d e d  to t h e  s c o r e  a l l o c a t e d  
to 2b. A s e c o n d ,  o v e r a l l  a v e r a g e  s c o r e  is t h e n  c a l c u l a t e d .
3) E m p h a s i s  o n  F i r s t  L i n e  S u p e r v i s i o n  - A n i n t e r v i e w  w i t h  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s
P e r s o n n e l  M a n a g e r  is u s e d  to i d e n t i f y  o n e  of t h e f o l l o w i n g ;
3.1 T h e r e  is a n  e m p h a s i s  o n  t h e  s u p e r v i s o r ' s  m a n a g e r i a l
a n d  l e a d e r s h i p  q u a l i t i e s .  T h e  c o m p a n y  e m p l o y s  s u p e r v i s o r s  w h o
a r e  e x p e c t e d  to a t t a i n  o r  h a v e  a t t a i n e d  a h i g h  l e v e l  of
q u a  1*1 f i c a t  i o n s  . T h e y  a r e  p a i d  in e x c e s s  of t h e  l oc a l m e d i a n .  3
3.2 T h e r e  is a n  e m p h a s i s  o n  t h e  s u p e r v i s o r ' s  m a n a g e r i a l
a n d  l e a d e r s h i p  q u a l i t i e s .  T h e  c o m p a n y  e m p l o y s  s u p e r v i s o r s  w h o  
a r e  e x p e c t e d  to a t t a i n  o r  to h a v e  a t t a i n e d  a h i g h  l e v e l  of 
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s .  T h e y  a r e  n o t  p a i d  in e x c e s s  of t h e l oc a l m e d i a n
3.3 T h e r e  is a n e m p h a s i s  o n  t h e  s u p e r v i s o r ' s  m a n a g e r i a l  
a n d  l e a d e r s h i p  q u a l i t i e s .  S u p e r v i s o r s  a r e  not e x p e c t e d  to 
a t t a i n  o r  to h a v e  a t t a i n e d  a h i g h  l ev e l  of q u a  1 1 f i c a t i o n s .
T h e y  a r e  n o t  p a i d  in e.xcess of t h e l oc a l  m e d i a n .
3.4 T h e r e  is n o  e m p h a s i s  o n  t h e  s u p e r v i s o r ' s  m a n a g e r i a l  
a n d  l e a d e r s h i p  q u a l i t i e s .  S u p e r v i s o r s  a r e  n o t  e x p e c t e d  to 
a t t a i n  o r  t o  h a v e  a t t a i n e d  a h i g h  l e v e l  of q u a l i f i c a t i o n s .
T h e y  a r e  n o t  p a i d  in e x c e s s  of t h e  l o c a l  m e d i a n .
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■î C l o s e  T i e s  W i t h  S u p p l i e r s  - I n t e r v i e w s  w i t h  . n a n a g e n e n t , i n c  i u d  i e g  a 
m a n a g e r  r e s p o n s a b l e  f o r  p r o c u r e m e n t ,  a r e  u s e d  to i d e n t i f y  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :
4 . 1 c  T h e  c o m p a n y  h a s  a w r i t t e n  s e t  of s p e c i f i c a t i o n s
c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  d e l i v e r y  t i m e ,  q u a l i t y  a n d  p r i c e  of e a c h
c o m p o n e n t  s u p p l i e d .  T h e y  a r e  r i g o r o u s l y  a p p l i e d .  3
4 . 2 a  T h e  c o m p a n y  h a s  a n  u n w r i t t e n  s e t  of s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  
c o n c e r n i n g  t h e  d e l i v e r y  t i m e ,  q u a l i t y  a n d  p r i c e  of e a c h  
c o m p o n e n t  s u p p l i e d .  T h e s e  a r e  r i g o r o u s l y  a p p l i e d .  2
4 . 3 a  T h e  c o m p a n y  h a s  e i t h e r  a w r i t t e n  o r  u n w r i t t e n  s e t  of 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  f o r e a c h  c o m p o n e n t  s u p p l i e d ,  b u t  t h e s e  a r e  
a p p l i e d  o n  a d i s c r e t i o n a r y  b a s i s .  i
4 . 4 a  T h e r e  a r e  n o  w r i t t e n  o r  u n w r i t t e n  s e t s  of s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  
f or c o m p o n e n t s  s u p p l i e d .  C o m p o n e n t s  a r e  b o u g h t  o n  a d i s c r e t i o n a r y  
b a s i s .  0
4 . ' c  A f t e r  t h e  i n i t i a l '  s t a g e s  of t h e  o u y e r / s u p p l i e r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
c o n t a c t  w i t h  s u p p l i e r s  is m a i n t a i n e d  o n  a r e g u l a r  b a s i s ,  e v e n  
w h e n  t h e r e  is n o  p r o b l e m  w i t h  t h e  c o m p o n e n t  s u p p l i e d .  W h e r e  a 
p r o b l e m  o c c u r s ,  t h e r e  is e i t h e r  a n  u n d e r t a k i n g  o r  p r e c e d e n t  
t h a t  t h e  c o m p a n y  w i l l  l e n d  s u p p o r t  a n d  e x p e r t i s e  to t h e  s u p p l i e r  
if n e e d e d .
4 . 2 b  A f t e r  t h e  i n i t i a l  s t a g e s  of t h e  b u y e r / s u p p l i e r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
c o n t a c t  w i t h  s u p p l i e r s  o c c u r s  o n l y  w h e n  a p r o b l e m  a r i s e s  
w i t h  t h e  c o m p o n e n t  s u p p l i e d .  T h e r e  is e i t h e r  a n  u n d e r t a k i n g  
o r  p r e c e d e n t  t h a t  t h e  c o m p a n y  w i l l  l e n d  s u p p o r t  a n d  e x p e r t i s e  
to t h e  s u p p l i e r  if n e e d e d .
4 . 3 b  A f t e r  t h e  i n i t i a l  s t a g e s  of t h e  b u y e r / s u p p l 1 er  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
r e g u l a r  c o n t a c t  w i t h  s u p p l i e r s  o c c u r s  o n l y  w h e n  a p r o b l e m  a r i s e s  
w i t h  t h e  c o m p o n e n t  s u p p l i e d .  T h e r e  is n e i t h e r  a n  u n d e r t a k i n g  o r  a n y  
p r e c e d e n t  t h a t  t h e  c o m p a n y  w i l l  l e n d  s u p p o r t  a n d  e x p e r t i s e  t o t h e  
s u p p l i e r  if n e e d e d .
4 . 4 b  A f t e r  t h e  i n i t i a l  s t a g e s  of t h e  b u y e r / s u p p l l e r  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  
c o n t a c t  w i t h  s u p p l i e r s  o c c u r s  o n l y  w h e n  a p r o b l e m  a r i s e s  w i t h  t h e  
c o m p o n e n t  s u p p l i e d .  In t h i s  i n s t a n c e ,  c o n t a c t  w i t h  t h e  s u p p l i e r  is 
m i n i m a l .  O n c e  n o t i f l e d  of t h e  p r o b l e m  t h e  s u p p l i e r  is l e f t  to s o r t  
It o u t  a l o n e .
S c o r e s  f o r 4a a n d  4 b  a r e  a d d e d  t o g e t h e r  a n d  a n  a v e r a g e  s c o r e  c a l c u l a t e d
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5) UK P e r s o n n e l  M a n a g e m e n t  - An i n t e r v i e w  w i t h  t he  c o m p a n y ' s  m a n a g e ;  
r e s p o n s i b l e  for p e r s o n n e l  i ss u e s ,  is u s e d  to i d e n t i f y  o n e  of t h e  f o l l o w i n g
5.1 T h e  P e r s o n n e l  M a n a g e r  is a UK c i t i z e n .  T h e  p o s t  is at a
lev el of i n f l u e n c e  t ha t  a s s u m e s  full r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  for p e r s o n n e l
a n d  i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s  i s s u e s.  3
5.2 T h e  P e r s o n n e l  M a n a g e r  is a UK c i t i z e n .  T h e  p o s t  is s e n i o r ,  
out r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  for p e r s o n n e l  a n d  i n d u s t r i a l  r e l a t i o n s  i s s u e s  
IS i n h i b i t e d  by t h e  n e e d  to r e p o r t  to a m o r e  s e n i o r  m a n a g e r .
( P r o b a b l y  J a p a n e s e . )  2
5.3 T h e  p e r s o n n e l  M a n a g e r  is a UK c i t i z e n .  it is an a d m i n i s t r â t ive
r a t h e r  t h a n  m a n a g e r i a l  p os t. T h e  i n c u m o e n t  r e p o r t s  to a m o r e
s e n i o r  m a n a g e r .  ( P r o b a b l y  J a p a n e s e . )  i
5.4 T h e r e  is n o  s p e c i f i c  p e r s o n n e l  m a n a g e m e n t  p o s t  or the
i n c u m b e n t  is J a p a n e s e  0
P e r s o n n e l  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
1) Core./Per 1 p h e r a  1 w o r k f o r c e  D i s t i n c t i o n s  - An i n t e r v i e w  w i t h  t h e  c o m p a n y  s 
P e r s o n n e l  M a n a g e r  is u s e d  to i d e n t i f y  o n e  of the f o l l o w i n g :
1.' \ o n  p e r m a n e n t  e m p l o y e e s  a r e  not e n t i t l e d  to t he  s a m e  w e l f a r e
b e n e f i t s ,  l e v e l  of p a y  or l e a v e  as p e r m a n e n t  e m p l o y e e s  3
1.2 N o n  p e r m a n e n t  e m p l o y e e s  a r e  not e n t i t l e d  to a n y  two of
the f o l l o w i n g  t h r e e  : - the s a m e  w e l f a r e  b e n e f i t s ,  level of
p a y  or l e a v e  a s p e r m a n e n t  e m p l o y e e s  2
1.3 N o n  p e r m a n e n t  e m p l o y e e s  a r e  not e n t i t l e d  to a n y  o n e  of 
the f o l l o w i n g  t h r e e  : - the s a m e  w e l f a r e  b e n e f i t s ,  l ev e l of p ay
or l e a v e  as p e r m a n e n t  e m p l o y e e s .  i
1.4 N o n  p e r m a n e n t  e m p l o y e e s  a r e  e n t i t l e d  to the s a m e  w e l f a r e  
b e n e f i t s ,  l ev e l of p a y  or l e a v e  as p e r m a n e n t  e m p l o y e e s .  0
2) G u a r a n t e e  of S e c u r e  E m p l o y m e n t  - An i n t e r v i e w  w i t h  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s
P e r s o n n e l  M a n a g e r  is u s e d  to i d e n t i f y  o n e  of the f o l l o w i n g :
2.1) T h e  c o m p a n y  h a s  a w r i t t e n  v o l u n t a r y  p o l i c y  of p r o v i d i n g
s e c u r e  e m p l o y m e n t  for c o r e  e m p l o y e e s .  3
2.2) T h e  c o m p a n y  h a s  a v e r b a l l y  e x p r e s s e d / i n f o r m a l  p o l i c y
of p r o v i d i n g  s e c u r e  e m p l o y m e n t  for c o r e  e m p l o y e e s .  2
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2 . 3 )  T h e  c o m p a n y ,  w o u l d  l a y  o f f  c o r e  e m p l o y e e s  last, b u t  n o  
w r i t t e n  o r  v e r b a  1 / i n f o r m a 1 u n d e r t a k i n g  to d o  t h i s  h a s  b e e n  
g i v e n  t o  e m p l o y e e s .
2 . 4 )  N O  f o r m  of a g u a r a n t e e  of s e c u r e  e m p l o y m e n t  f o r  c o r e  
e m p l o y e e s  is e x p r e s s e d  b y  t h e  c o m p a n y .
3) W e  1 f a r  i s m  - A n  i n t e r v i e w  w i t h  t h e  c om gaany ' s P e r s o n n e l  M a n a g e r  is u s e d  to 
i d e n t i f y  o n e  of t h e  f o l l o w i n g :
3.1 T h e  c o m p a n y  p r o v i d e s  in e x c e s s  of t h e  f o l l o w i n g
w e l f a r e  b e n e f i t s  f o r  i t s  e m p l o y e e s  c o m p a n y  p e n s i o n ,  a n d  c o m p a n y
s i c k  p a y .  ( E x c e s s  b e n e f i t s  m i g h t  i n c l u d e ,  f o r e x a m p l e ,
c o m p a n y  m a t e r n i t y  p a y  o r  h e a l t h  c a r e  s c h e m e s . )  3
3.2 T h e  c o m p a n y  p r o v i d e s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  w e l f a r e  b e n e f i t s  f or
Its e m p l o y e e s  : - c o m p a n y  p e n s i o n  a n d  c o m p a n y  s i c k  p a y  2
3.3 T h e  c o m p a n y  p r o v i d e s  o n e  of t h e  f o l l o w i n g  w e l f a r e  o e n e f i t s
for I t s  e m p l o y e e s : -  c o m p a n y  p e n s i o n  a n d  c o m p a n y  s i c k  p a y .  ^
2.4 T h e  c o m p a n y  p r o v i d e s  n e i t h e r  a c o m p a n y  s i c k  p a y  s c h e m e  n o r
a c o m p a n y  p e n s i o n  s c h e m e  f o r i t s e m p l o y e e s .  0
4) S i n g l e  S t a t u s  - A n  i n t e r v i e w  w i t h  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  P e r s o n n e l  M a n a g e r  is 
u s e d  to i d e n t i f y  o n e  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :
4.1 T h e  c o m p a n y  h a s  h a r m o n i s e d  m e t h o d s  of p a y m e n t ,  a n d  h o l i d a y  
e n t i t l e m e n t s  a n d  a p o l i c y  of m i n i m i s i n g  t h e  n u m b e r  of ] o b
g r a d e s . 3
4 .2  T h e  c o m p a n y  o p e r a t e s  a t  l e a s t  t w o  of t h e  f o l l o w i n g  : - 
h a r m o n i s e d  m e t h o d s  o f  p a y m e n t ,  a n d  h o l i d a y  e n t i t l e m e n t s
a n d  a p o l i c y  of m i n i m i s i n g  t h e  n u m b e r  of ] o b  g r a d e s .  2
4.3 T h e  c o m p a n y  o p e r a t e s  at l e a s t  o n e  o f t h e  f o l l o w i n g  : -
h a r m o n i s e d  m e t h o d s  o f p a y m e n t ,  a n d  h o l i d a y  e n t i t l e m e n t s
a n d  a p o l i c y  of m i n i m i s i n g  t h e  n u m b e r  of ] o b  g r a d e s .  )
4.4 T h e  c o m p a n y  o p e r a t e s  n o n e  of t h e  f o l l o w i n g  : - 
h a r m o n i s e d  m e t h o d s  of p a y m e n t ,  a n d  h o l i d a y  e n t i t l e m e n t s
a n d  a p o l i c y  o f  m i n i m i s i n g  t h e  n u m b e r  of j O b  g r a d e s .  C
5) M a r k e t  L e d  P a y  L e v e l s  - A n  i n t e r v i e w  w i t h  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  P e r s o n n e l  
M a n a g e r  in r e l a t i o n  to 5a a n d  5 b  is u s e d  t o i d e n t i f y  o n e  of t h e
f o l 1 o w i n g  :
5 . 1 a  C o m p a n y  p a y  l e v e l s  a r e  b a s e d  o n  t h e  l o c a l  m e d i a n  for
t h e  s k i l l s  r e q u i r e d .  ( C a l c u l a t e d  in c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  w h a t
t he  c o m p a n y  c a n  a f f o r d  t o  p a y . )  A n  e l e m e n t  of t h e  e m p l o y e e ’s
p a y  is a l s o  b a s e d  o n  a n  a p p r a i s a l  of h i s  o r  h e r  m e r i t  o r
p e r f o r m a n c e .  3
5 . 2 a  C o m p a n y  p a y  l e v e l s  a r e  b a s e d  s o l e l y  o n  t h e  l o c a l  m e d i a n  for
t h e  s k i l l s  r e q u i r e d .  ( C a l c u l a t e d  in c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  w h a t
t h e  c o m p a n y  c a n  a f f o r d  to pa y . 1 2
5 . 3 a  C o m p a n y  p a y  l e v e l s  a r e  b a s e d  o n  t h e  l o c a l  m e d i a n  for
t h e  s k i l l s  r e q u i r e d .  ( C a l c u l a t e d  in c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  w h a t
t h e  c o m p a n y  c a n  a f f o r d  t o p a y . )  P a y  l e v e l s  a l s o  i n c o r p o r a t e  t h e
u s e  of r e w a r d s  s u c h  a s  s e n i o r i t y ,  p r o d u c t i v i t y  b o n u s e s ,  a n d
a t t e n d a n c e  a l l o w a n c e s .  ■>
5 . 4 a  C o m p a n y  p a y  l e v e l s  a r e  not c a l c u l a t e d  u s i n g  t h e  l o c a l
m e d l a n  at a l l .  3
5 . ' b W h a t e v e r  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  p a y  r a t e s  a r e  b a s e d  on, ( i . e . ,  t h e  l o c a l  
m e d i a n ,  i n d u s t r y  o r  c r a f t )  t h e  c o m p a n y  is in t h e  t o p  q u a r t i le 
of p a y  r a t e s .
5 . 2 b  W h a t e v e r  t h e  c o m p a n y ’s p a y  r a t e s  a r e  b a s e d  on, ( i. e . ,  t h e  l o c a l
m e d i a n ,  i n d u s t r y  o r  c r a f t )  t n e  c o m p a n y  p a y s  j u s t  a b o v e  t h e  m e d i a n  
p a y  r a t e s .
5 . 3 b  W h a t e v e r  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  p a y  r a t e s  a r e  b a s e d  on, ( i . e . ,  t h e  l o c a l
m e d i a n ,  i n d u s t r y  o r  c r a f t )  t h e  c o m p a n y  p a y s  t h e  m e d i a n  p a y  r a t e
5 . 4 b  W h a t e v e r  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  p a y  r a t e s  a r e  b a s e d  on, ( i. e . ,  t h e  l o c a l
m é d i a n ,  i n d u s t r y  o r  c r a f t )  t h e  c o m p a n y  p a y s  b e l o w  t h e  m e d i a n  p a y  
r a t e
S c o r e s  f o r  5a a n d  5 b  a r e  a d d e d  t o g e t h e r  a n d  a n  a v e r a g e  s c o r e  is c a l c u l a t e d
6) M e r i t  B a s e d  P r o m o t i o n  - A n  i n t e r v i e w  w i t h  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  P e r s o n n e l  
M a n a g e r  is u s e d  t o i d e n t i f y  o n e  of t h e  f o l l o w i n g :
6.1 A w r i t t e n  p r o c e d u r e  e x i s t s  w h i c h  e n s u r e s ,  a) t h a t  p r o m o t i o n
w i l l  b e  b a s e d  o n  c r i t e r i a  s u c h  a s  a b i l i t y ,  c o m m i t m e n t  a n d
p e r f o r m a n c e  a n d  b) t h a t ,  w h e r e v e r  p o s s i b l e ,  in t h e  f i r s t  i n s t a n c e ,
i n t e r v i e w s  w i l l  b e  h e l d  t o f i n d  s u i t a b l e  i n t e r n a l
c a n d i d a t e s  f o r  p r o m o t i o n  to a v a c a n t  p o s t .  P r o m o t i o n s  a r e  n e v e r
b a s e d  p u r e l y  o n  s e n i o r i t y .  3
6 . 2  A n  i n f o r m a l  p r o c e d u r e  e x i s t s  w h i c h  e n s u r e s ,  a) t h a t  p r o m o t i o n  
w i l l  b e  b a s e d  o n  c r i t e r i a  s u c h  a s  a b i l i t y ,  c o m m i t m e n t  a n d  
p e r f o r m a n c e  a n d  b) t h a t  w h e r e v e r  p o s s i b l e ,  in t h e  f i r s t  i n s t a n c e ,  
i n t e r v i e w s  w i l l  b e  h e l d  to f i n d  s u i t a b l e  i n t e r n a l
c a n d i d a t e s  f o r  p r o m o t i o n  t o a v a c a n t  p o s t .  P r o m o t i o n s  a r e  n e v e r  
b a s e d  p u r e l y  o n  s e n i o r i t y .
6 . 3 A w r i t t e n  o r  i n f o r m a l  p r o c e d u r e  e x i s t s  w h i c h  e n s u r e s  o n l y  
t h a t  p r o m o t i o n  is b a s e d  o n  c r i t e r i a  s u c h  a s  a b i l i t y ,  c o m m i t m e n t ,  
a n d  p e r f o r m a n c e .  P r o m o t i o n s  a r e  n e v e r  b a s e d  p u r e l y  o n  s e n i o r i t y .
6 .4 N o  c l e a r  p r o c e d u r e  f o r  p r o m o t i o n  e x i s t s  at t h e  c o m p a n y .  
M a n a g e m e n t  p r o m o t e  u s i n g  t h e i r  d i s c r e t i o n ,  ( T h i s  m a y  r e s u l t  in 
s o m e  p r o m o t i o n s  b e i n g  b a s e d  p u r e l y  o n  s e n i o r i t y . )
7) I n t e n s i v e  S e l e c t i o n  P r o c e d u r e s  - A n  i n t e r v i e w  w i t h  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s
P e r s o n n e l  M a n a g e r  is u s e d  t o  i d e n t i f y  o n e  o f t h e  f o l l o w i n g ;
7.1 T h e  c o m p a n y  u s e s  a n  i n t e n s i v e  s e l e c t i o n  p r o c e d u r e  g e a r e d  to 
r e c r u i t i n g  t h e  r i g h t  e m p l o y e e s  for a J a p a n e s e  c o m p a n y  o p e r a t i n g  
in t h e  UK. T h i s  p r o c e d u r e  i n c l u d e s  a l l of t h e  f o l l o w i n g  : - 
d e t a i l e d  a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r m s ,  i n t e n s i v e  i n t e r v i e w s ,  a n d  t h e  u s e
of a p t i t u d e  t e s t s .  T h e  p r o c e d u r e  d o e s  n o t  i n c l u d e  a b i a s  t o w a r d s  
e m p l o y i n g  s c h o o l  l e a v e r s .  3
7 .2 T h e  c o m p a n y  u s e s  a n  i n t e n s i v e  s e l e c t i o n  p r o c e d u r e  g e a r e d  to 
r e c r u i t i n g  t h e  r i g h t  e m p l o y e e s  for a J a p a n e s e  c o m p a n y  o p e r a t i n g  
in t h e  UK. T h i s  p r o c e d u r e  i n c l u d e s  t w o  of t he  f o l l o w i n g  : - 
d e t a i l e d  a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r m s ,  i n t e n s i v e  i n t e r v i e w s ,  a n d  t h e  u s e
of a p t i t u d e  t e s t s .  T h e  p r o c e d u r e  d o e s  n o t  i n c l u d e  a b i a s  t o w a r d s  
e m p l o y i n g  s c h o o l  l e a v e r s .  2
7 .3  T h e  c o m p a n y  u s e s  a n  i n t e n s i v e  s e l e c t i o n  p r o c e d u r e  g e a r e d  to 
r e c r u i t i n g  t h e  r i g h t  e m p l o y e e s  f or  a J a p a n e s e  c o m p a n y  o p e r a t i n g  
in t h e  UK. T h i s  p r o c e d u r e  i n c l u d e s  o n e  of t h e  f o l l o w i n g  : - 
d e t a i l e d  a p p l i c a t i o n  f o r m s ,  i n t e n s i v e  i n t e r v i e w s ,  a n d  t h e  u s e  
of a p t i t u d e  t e s t s .  T h e  p r o c e d u r e  d o e s  n o t  i n c l u d e  a b i a s
t o w a r d s  e m p l o y i n g  s c h o o l  l e a v e r s . '
7.4 N o  i n t e n s i v e  s e l e c t i o n  p r o c e d u r e  is in u s e  at t h e  c o m p a n y .
T h e  s e l e c t i o n  p r o c e d u r e  is m i n i m a l . 0
8) T r a  m i n e ;  - A n  i n t e r v i e w  w i t h  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  P e r s o n n e l  M a n a g e r  in r e l a t i o n  
to 8 a a n d  8 b  is u s e d  to i d e n t i f y  o n e  of t h e  f o l l o w i n g :
8 . 1 a  A l l  e x i s t i n g  e m p l o y e e s  r e c e i v e  r e g u l a r  f o r m a l  t r a i n i n g
a w a y  f r o m  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  a r e a .  3
8 . 2 a  T h e  c o m p a n y  r e s t r i c t s  r e g u l a r  f o r m a l  t r a i n i n g  a w a y  f r o m  t h e  
p r o d u c t i o n  a r e a  to s e l e c t  e x i s t i n g  e m p l o y e e s .  . 2
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8 . 3 a  F o r m a l  t r a i n i n g  for e i t h e r  a ll  o r s e l e c t  e x i s t i n g  e m p l o y e e s  
o c c u r s  o n  a n  i r r e g u l a r  b a s i s  o n l y
8 . 4 a  T h e r e  is n o  f o r m a l  t r a i n i n g  a w a y  f r o m  t he  p r o d u c t i o n  a r e a  for 
a n y  e x i s t i n g  e m p l o y e e .
8 . 1 b  A l l n e w  e m p l o y e e s  g o  t n r o u g h  a p e r i o d  of f o r m a l  3JT.
8 . 2 b  S o m e  n e w  e m p l o y e e s  g o  t h r o u g h  a p e r i o d  of f o r m a l  O JT .
( O t h e r  n e w  e m p l o y e e s  g o  t h r o u g n  e i t h e r  i n f o r m a l  
O J T  o r n o n e  at a l l . )
8 . 3 b  A l l n e w  e m p l o y e e s  g o  t h r o u g h  a p e r i o d  of i n f o r m a l  O J T .
8 . 4 b  N e w  e m p l o y e e s  d o  n o t  g o  t h r o u g h  a p e r i o d  of e i t h e r  f o r m a l  o r  
i n f o r m a l  OJT .
8 . 1 c  A l l n e w  e m p l o y e e s  g o  t h r o u g h  a p e r i o d  of f o r m a l  i n d u c t i o n  3
8 . 2 c  S o m e  n e w  e m p l o y e e s  g o  t h r o u g n  a p e r i o d  of f o r m a l  i n d u c t i o n  
( O t h e r  n e w  e m p l o y e e s  g o  t h r o u g h  e i t h e r  i n f o r m a l
i n d u c t i o n  o r n o n e  at a l l . )  2
8 . 3 c  All n e w  e m p l o y e e s  g o  t h r o u g h  a p e r i o d  of i n f o r m a l  i n d u c t i o n .  i
8 . 4 b  N e w  e m p l o y e e s  d o  n o t  g o  t h r o u g h  a p e r i o d  of e i t h e r  f o r m a l  o r
i n f o r m a l  i n d u c t i o n . 0
"All e m p l o y e e s "  is d e f i n e d  a s t h o s e  e m p l o y e e s  u p  to b u t  n o t  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  
l e v e l  of s u p e r v i s o r .  T n e  s c o r e s  for 8 a , 8 b  a n d  8c a r e  a d d e d  t o g e t h e r  a n d  a n  
a v e r a g e  s c o r e  is c a l c u l a t e d .
9 1 E l e m e n t s  of C o n s e n s u a 1 1 tv a n d  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  - I n t e r v i e w s  a r e  h e l d  w i t h  
t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  P e r s o n n e l  M a n a g e r  a n d  t w o  s h o p  s t e w a r d s .  E a c h  i n t e r v i e w  is 
u s e d  t o i d e n t i f y  o n e  of t h e  f o l l o w i n g  i n d i c e s .  T h e  t h r e e  s c o r e s  a r e  a d d e d  
t o g e t h e r  a n d  a n  a v e r a g e  s c o r e  is c a l c u l a t e d ,
9.1 T h e  c o m p a n y  o p e r a t e s  a s t r u c t u r e  of e m p l o y e e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
w h e r e  a d e c i s i o n  is f o r m u l a t e d  o n  t h e  b a s i s  of c o n s e n s u s  b e t w e e n  
m a n a g e m e n t  a n d  e m p l o y e e s .  M a n a g e m e n t  r a r e l y  v e t o  a d e c i s i o n .  3
9 . 2  T h e  c o m p a n y  o p e r a t e s  a s t r u c t u r e  of e m p l o y e e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  w h e r e  
d e c i s i o n s  a r e  o f t e n  v e t o e d  b y  m a n a g e m e n t . 2
9 . 3  T h e  c o m p a n y  o p e r a t e s  a s t r u c t u r e  of c o n s u l t a t i o n  r a t h e r  t h a n  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n .  1
9 . 4  T h e  c o m p a n y  o p e r a t e s  n e i t h e r  a s t r u c t u r e  of p a r t i c i p a t i o n  n o r
o n e  of c o n s u l t a t i o n . 0
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10) R e g i m e n t e d  w o r k  E n v i r o n m e n t  - I n t e r v i e w s  a r e  h e l d  w i t h  t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  
P e r s o n n e l  M a n a g e r  f o r  iQa a n d  w i t h  t w o  s h o p  s t e w a r d s  f or  iQb. F o r  10b, t h e  
s c o r e s  f o r  t h e  t w o  i n t e r v i e w s  a r e  a d d e d  t o g e t h e r  a n d  a n  a v e r a g e  s c o r e  is 
c a l c u l a t e d .  T h i s  s c o r e  is t h e n  a d d e d  to t h a t  r e c o r d e d  f o r iQa a n d  a n  
o v e r a l l  a v e r a g e  s c o r e  is c a l c u l a t e d .
1 0 . 1 a  T h e  c o m p a n y  a t t e m p t s  to o p e r a t e  a r e g i m e n t e d
w o r k  e n v i r o n m e n t .  T h i s  i n c l u d e s  t h e  u s e  of all t h e
f o l l o w i n g  t h r e e  p r o c e d u r e s :  T h e  o p e n  d i s p l a y  of s o m e  f o r m  of
c o l l e c t i v e  o r  i n d i v i d u a l  a b s e n t e e i s m  f i g u r e s ,  t h e  o p e n  d i s p l a y
of s o m e  f o r m  of c o l l e c t i v e  or i nd ividt iaT p e r f o r m a n c e  f i g u r e s .
a n d  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of a f o r m a l  h o u s e k e e p i n g  p o l i c y .  3
1 0 . 2 a  T h e  c o m p a n y  a t t e m p t s  to o p e r a t e  a r e g i m e n t e d
w o r k  e n v i r o n m e n t .  T h i s  i n c l u d e s  t h e  u s e  of t w o  of t h e
f o l l o w i n g  t h r e e  p r o c e d u r e s :  T h e  o p e n  d i s p l a y  o f  s o m e  f o r m  of
c o l l e c t i v e  o r  i n d i v i d u a l  a b s e n t e e i s m  f i g u r e s ,  t h e  o p e n  d i s p l a y
of s o m e  f o r m  o f c o l l e c t i v e  o r i n d i v i d u a l  p e r f o r m a n c e  f i g u r e s .
a n d  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of a f o r m a l  h o u s e K e e p i n g  p o l i c y .  /
1 0 . 3 a  T h e  c o m p a n y  a t t e m p t s  to o p e r a t e  a r e g i m e n t e d
w o r k  e n v i r o n m e n t .  T h i s  i n c l u d e s  t h e  u s e  of o n e  of t h e
f o l l o w i n g  t h r e e  p r o c e d u r e s  : T h e  o p e n  d i s p l a y  of s o m e  f o r m  of
c o l l e c t i v e  o r  i n d i v i d u a l  a b s e n t e e i s m  f i g u r e s ,  t h e  o p e n  d i s p l a y
of s o m e  f o r m  of c o l l e c t i v e  o r i n d i v i d u a l  p e r f o r m a n c e  f i g u r e s ,
a n d  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of a f o r m a l  h o u s e k e e p i n g  p o l i c y .  i
1 0 . 4 a  T h e  c o m p a n y  d o e s  n o t  u s e  a n y  of t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t h r e e  
p r o c e d u r e s :  T h e  o p e n  d i s p l a y  of s o m e  f o r m  of
c o l l e c t i v e  o r  i n d i v i d u a l  a b s e n t e e i s m  f i g u r e s ,  t h e  o p e n  d i s p l a y
of s o m e  f o r m  o f c o l l e c t i v e  o r  i n d i v i d u a l  p e r f o r m a n c e  f i g u r e s ,
a n d  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of a f o r m a l  h o u s e k e e p i n g  p o l i c y .  0
1 0 . 1 b  A n y  n e w  r u l e  o r  p r o c e d u r e  r e l a t e d  to t he 
r e g i m e n t a t i o n  of t h e  w o r k p l a c e  is a l w a y s  e x p l a i n e d  to t h e  
w o r k f o r c e  v e r b a l l y  a n d / o r  in w r i t i n g .  T h i s  is d o n e  w i t h o u t  
p r o m p t i n g  b y t h e  w o r k f o r c e  o r  t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .
1 0 . 2 b  A n y  n e w  r u l e  o r  p r o c e d u r e  r e l a t e d  to t h e  d i s c i p l i n e  o r  
r e g i m e n t a t i o n  o f t h e  w o r k p l a c e  is u s u a l l y  e x p l a i n e d  to t h e  
w o r k f o r c e  v e r b a l l y  a n d / o r  in w r i t i n g .  T h i s  is d o n e  w i t h o u t  
p r o m p t i n g  b y t h e  w o r k f o r c e  or t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .
' 0 . 3 b  A n y  n e w  r u l e  o r  p r o c e d u r e  r e l a t e d  to t h e d i s c i p l i n e  o r  
r e g i m e n t a t i o n  of t h e  w o r k p l a c e  is o c c a s i o n a l l y  e x p l a i n e d  to t h e  
w o r k f o r c e  v e r b a l l y  a n d / o r  in w r i t i n g .  T h i s  is d o n e  w i t h o u t  
p r o m p t i n g  b y  t h e  w o r k f o r c e  o r  t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .
1 0 . 4 b  A n y  n e w  r u l e  o r  p r o c e d u r e  r e l a t e d  to t h e  d i s c i p l i n e  o r  
r e g i m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  w o r k p l a c e  is n e v e r  e x p l a i n e d  to t h e  
w o r k f o r c e  v e r b a l l y  a n d / o r  in w r i t i n g ,  u n l e s s  m a n a g e m e n t  a r e  
f i r s t  p r o m p t e d  b y  w o r k e r s  o r  t h e i r  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .
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industrial Relat ions  Ch a rac£ eristi es
i) N o  U n i o n  o r  S i n g l e  U n i o n  R é c o g n i t i o n  - An i n t e r v i e w  w i t h  t h e  c o m p a n y  
P e r s o n n e l  M a n a g e r  is u s e d  to i d e n t i f y  o n e  of t he  f o l l o w i n g :
1.1 O n l y  o n e  u n i o n  is r e c o g n i s e d  by t h e c o m p a n y ,  o r  t h e 
c o m p a n y  d o e s  n o t  r e c o g n i s e  a n y  u n i o n s  at all . w h e r e  a u n i o n  
IS r e c o g n i s e d  o v e r  6 0 %  of e m p l o y e e s  h a v e  j o i n e d . A s i g n i f i c a n t  
n u m b e r  of e m p l o y e e s  h a v e  n o t  j o i n e d  a n o n  r e c o g n i s e d  u n i o n  o r
n o n  r e c o g n i s e d  s t a f f  a s s o c i a t i o n .  ' 3
1.2 A s t a f f  a s s o c i a t i o n  w h i c h  e l e c t s  e m p l o y e e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s
is r e c o g n i s e d  b y t h e  c o m p a n y .  O v e r  6 0 %  of e m p l o y e e s  h a v e  j o i n e d .  2
1.3 L e s s  t h a n  5 0 %  of e m p l o y e e s  h a v e  j o i n e d  t h e  r e c o g n i s e d  u n i o n  o r
s t a f f  a s s o c i a t i o n .  i
1.4 T h e  c o m p a n y  r e c o g n i s e s  m o r e  t h a n  o n e  u n i o n ,  o r w h e r e  o n e  u n i o n  
or a s t a f f  a s s o c i a t i o n  is r e c o g n i s e d  by the
c o m p a n y ,  a s i g n i f i c a n t  n u m b e r  of e m p l o y e e s  h a v e  j o i n e d  a
n o n  r e c o g n i s e d  u n i o n  o r  n o n  r e c o g n i s e d  s t a f f  a s s o c i a t i o n ,  C
2) L n t e r o r i s e  L e v e l  B a r q a i n i n q  - A n  i n t e r v i e w  w i t h  t h e  c o m p a n y ’s P e r s o n n e :  
M a n a g e r  is u s e d  t o i d e n t i f y  o n e  of t h e  f o l l o w i n g :
2.1 A f o r m a l i s e d  b a r g a i n i n g  s t r u c t u r e  e x i s t s .  P a y  b a r g a i n i n g
IS at t h e  e n t e r p r i s e  l e v e l  o n l y .  3
2. 2 N o  f o r m a l i s e d  b a r g a i n i n g  s t r u c t u r e  e x i s t s .  L e v e l s  of p a y  at 
the e n t e r p r i s e  a r e  n o t  l i n k e d  to a n o t h e r ,  s e p a r a t e  p a r t  o f t h e  
cotfipany, o r  c a l c u l a t e d  o n  t h e  b a s i s  of n a t i o n a l  i n d u s t r i a l
or c r a f t  l e v e l s  2
2 . 3 A f o r m a l i s e d  b a r g a i n i n g  s t r u c t u r e  e x i s t s .  P a y  b a r g a i n i n g  
is l i n k e d  t o a n o t h e r ,  s e p a r a t e  p a r t  of t he  c o m p a n y  o x  is
l i n k e d  to n a t i o n a l  i n d u s t r i a l  o r c r a f t  l e v e l s .  ’
2.4 N o  f o r m a l i s e d  b a r g a i n i n g  s t r u c t u r e  e x i s t s .  P a y  is l i n k e d
to a n o t h e r ,  s e p a r a t e  p a r t  of t h e  c o m p a n y  o r is c a l c u l a t e d
o n  t h e  b a s i s  of n a t i o n a l  i n d u s t r i a l  o r  c r a f t  l e v e l s .  0
3) F o r m a l i s e d  U n i o n  o r O t h e r  S t r u c t u r e  - I n t e r v i e w s  w i t h  e m p l o y e e  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  a r e  u s e d  to i d e n t i f y  o n e  of t h e  f o l l o w i n g :
3.1 A f o r m a l i s e d  u n i o n  o r  o t h e r  s t r u c t u r e  e x i s t s  to
d e a l  w i t h  c o l l e c t i v e  o r  i n d i v i d u a l  g r i e v a n c e s .  L a y  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s
b e l i e v e  t h a t  m a n a g e m e n t ,  a s  a w h o l e ,  s e e  t h i s  s t r u c t u r e  a s
n e c e s s a r y  a n d  u s e f u l .  ?
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3.2 A f o r m a l i s e d  u n i o n  o r  o t h e r  s t r u c t u r e  e x i s t s  to
d e a l  w i t h  c o l l e c t i v e  o r i n d i v i d u a l  g r i e v a n c e s .  L a y  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  s o m e  m a n a g e r s  s e e  t h i s  s t r u c t u r e  a s u n n e c e s s a r y  a n d  a 
n i n d r a n c e .  2
3. 3 A f o r m a l i s e d  u n i o n  o r  o t h e r  s t r u c t u r e  e x i s t s  to
d e a l  w i t h  c o l l e c t i v e  o r  i n d i v i d u a l  g r i e v a n c e s .  L a y  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  m a n a g e m e n t ,  a s  a w h o l e ,  s e e  t h i s  s t r u c t u r e  a s 
u n n e c e s s a r y  a n d  a h i n d r a n c e .  i
3.4 N o  f o r m a l i s e d  u n i o n  o r  o t h e r  s t r u c t u r e  e x i s t s  to
d e a l  w i t h  c o l l e c t i v e  o r  i n d i v i d u a l  g r i e v a n c e s .  0
N.B. " O t h e r  s t r u c t u r e "  m a y  i n c l u d e  a s t a f f  a s s o c i a t i o n  o r  s o m e  s u c h  
s t r u c t u r e  t h a t  i n c o r p o r a t e s  t h e  u s e  of e l e c t e d  e m p l o y e e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .
4) " N e w  S t y l e "  A g r e e m e n c  in O p e r a t i o n  - i n t e r v i e w s  a r e  c o n d u c t e d  w i t h  t h e  
P e r s o n n e l  M a n a g e r  c o n c e r n i n g  4a a n d  c , a n d  lay r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  c o n c e r n i n g  
4b a n d  d . c a n d  d  a r e  u s e d  w h e r e  t h e  c o m p a n y  d o e s  n o t  r e c o g n i s e  a n y  t r a d e  
u n i o n  o r  s t a f f  a s s o c i a t i o n ,  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  d o e s  n o t  o p e r a t e  a n y  f o r m  o f 
c o l l e c t i v e  a g r e e m e n t . In t h e  c a s e  of 4 b a n d  d t h e  s c o r e s  f r o m  e a c h  lay 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  a r e  a d d e d  t o g e t h e r  a n d  a n  a v e r a g e  c a l c u l a t e d .  T h i s  is t h e n  
a d d e d  to t h e  s c o r e  a l l o c a t e d  to e i t h e r  4a o r  c a n d  a n  o v e r a l l  a v e r a g e  s c o r e  
IS c a l c u l a t e d .
4 . 1 a  T h e  c o m p a n y  h a s  a N S A  w h i c h  i n c o r p o r a t e s  f o u r  k e y  c o m p o n e n t s .
T h e s e  are , s i n g l e  u n i o n  r e c o g n i t i o n ,  p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,
f l e x i b i l i t y  a n d  a n o  s t r i k e  p r o c e d u r e .  3
4 . 2 a  T h e  c o m p a n y  h a s  a N S A  w h i c h  i n c o r p o r a t e s  t h r e e  k e y  c o m p o n e n t s .
T h e  c o m p o n e n t  m i s s i n g  is t h a t  of a n o - s t r i k e  p r o c e d u r e .  ( T h e  i d e a l  UK 
m o d e l  d o e s  n o t  r e g a r d  t h i s  c o m p o n e n t  as v i t a l ,  b u t  r a t h e r  a s  a 
f o r m  of e x t r a  i n s u r a n c e  f or  t h e  s m o o t h  o p e r a t i o n  of t h e  c o m p a n y ' s  
p r o d u c t  ion s y s t e m  . ) 2
4 . 3 a  T h e  c o m p a n y  h a s  a N S A  w h i c h  i n c o r p o r a t e s  l e s s  t h a n  t h r e e  k e y  
co m po n e n t s - .  i
4 . 4 a  T h e  c o m p a n y  d o e s  n o t  o p e r a t e  a NSA . 0
4 . 1 b  N o  m a t t e r  w h a t  t h e  i s s u e  all m a n a g e r s  a d h e r e  to t h e  
s p i r i t  of t h e  a g r e e m e n t  a l l  of t h e  t im e.
4 . 2 b  D e p e n d i n g  o n  t h e  i s s u e  o r  m a n a g e r , m a n a g e m e n t  a d h e r e  to 
t h e  s p i r i t  o f t h e  a g r e e m e n t  m o s t  of t h e  t im e.
4 . 3 b  D e p e n d i n g  o n  t h e  i s s u e  o r  m a n a g e r ,  m a n a g e m e n t  r a r e l y  
a d h e r e  to t h e  s p i r i t  of t h e  a g r e e m e n t .
4 . 4 b  M a n a g e m e n t  n e v e r  a d h e r e  to t he  s p i r i t  of t h e a g r e e m e n t .
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4 . 1 c  T h e  c o m p a n y  h a s  a w r i t t e n  s e t  of t h r e e  k e y  p r o c e d u r e s  a n d  
p o l i c i e s .  T h e s e  i n c o r p o r a t e  t h e  u s e  of s o m e  s o r t  of c o l l e c t i v e  
g r i e v a n c e  p r o c e d u r e ,  f l e x i b i l i t y ,  a n d  p a r t i c i p a t i o n .
4 . 2 c  T h e  c o m p a n y  h a s  a w r i t t e n  s e t  of t w o  k e y  p r o c e d u r e s  
a n d  p o l i c i e s .  ( T w o  o u t  o f  t h e  a b o v e  m e n t i o n e d  t h r e e . )
4 . 3 c  T h e  c o m p a n y  o p e r a t e s  o n e  k e y  p r o c e d u r e s  in w r i t t e n  f o r m
( O n e  o u t  of t h e  a b o v e  m e n t i o n e d  t h r e e
4 . 4 c  T h e  c o m p a n y  h a s  n o  w r i t t e n  k e y  p r o c e d u r e s  a n d  p o l i c i e s .
4 . Id M a n a g e m e n t ,  a s a w h o l e ,  a r e  p e r c e i v e d  as v e r y  f ai r.
4 . 2 d  D e p e n d i n g  o n  t n e  i s s u e  or m a n a g e r  m a n a g e m e n t  a r e  p e r c e i v e d  
as b e i n g  f a i r  m o s t  of t h e  tim e.
4 . 3 c  D e p e n d i n g  o n  t h e  i s s u e  or m a n a g e r , m a n a g e m e n t  a r e  p e r c e i v e d  
as b e i n g  u n f a i r  m o s t  or t h e  t i m e
4 . 4d M a n a g e m e n t  a r e  p e r c e i v e d  a s b e i n g  u n f a i r  a l l  o f t h e  t i m e .
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Appendix 6.3 
Questionnaire Implemented at 
Company A : Stage 1.
L O N D O N  S C H O O L  O F  ECONOMICS/ÈSRÇ 
W O R K  A T T I T U D E  S U R V E Y
E v e r y b o d y  h a s  a d i f f e r e n t  i d e a  of the t h i n g s  t h e y  l i k e  or 
d i s l i k e  a b o u t  w o r k .  T h i s  is a q u e s t i o n n a i r e  a b o u t  y o u  
a n d  y o u r  wor k .  T h e r e  a r e  n o  r i g h t  a n d  w r o n g  a n s w e r s ,  
j u s t  a n s w e r  w h a t  y o u  t h i n k .
Y o u  w i l l  n o t  be a s k e d  to g i v e  y o u r  n a m e  on thi s  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  
a n d  y o u r  a n s w e r s  w i l l  t h e r e f o r e  r e m a i n  c o m p l e t e l y  a n o n y m o u s .
T o  a n s w e r  the q u e s t i o n s  f o l l o w  the u n d e r l i n e d  i n s t r u c t i o n s .
D a v i d  G r a n t
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PART 1
P l e a s e  a n s w e r  a l l  the q u e s t i o n s  b e l o w ,  e i t h e r  b y  c i r c l i n g  
the n u m b e r  o p p o s i t e  the a n s w e r  w h i c h  a p p l i e s  to y o u  or, 
w h e r e  a s k e d ,  w r i t i n g  in y o u r  a n s w e r .
1) A r e  y o u  m a l e  or f e m a l e  ?
2 ) H o w  o l d  a r e  y o u  ?
3) A ^ e  y o u  m a r r i e d  or s i n g l e  ?
d) H o w  m a n y  c h i l d r e n  u n d e r  the a g e  of
s i x t e e n  h a v e  y o u  g o t  'r’ P l e a s e  p r i n t  
y o u r  a n s w e r  o p p o s i t e .
M a l e  1
F e m a l e  2
y e a r s
M a r r i e d
S i n g l e
5) P l e a s e  p r i n t  the n a m e  of the 
I d e p a r t m e n t  t h a t  y o u  w o r k  in
a t  o p p o s i t e .
6 ) D o e s  y o u r  job r e q u i r e  y o u  to s u p e r v i s e  
the w o r k  o f  a n y  o t h e r  w o r k e r s  ?
7) H a v e  y o u  w o r k e d  f o r  a n y  o t h e r  
',C o m p a n i e s  b e f o r e  ?
8 ) W h e r e  d o  y o u  e x p e c t  to be w o r k i n g  
in f i v e  y e a r s  t ime
9) W h a t  s o r t  o f  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  h a v e  
y o u  g o t  ( C i r c l e  m o r e  t han o n e  
a n s w e r  if y o u  n e e d  t o.)
Y e s
N o
Yes
N o
Wi t h  t h i s  f irm 1
W i t h  a n o t h e r  f i r m  2
R e t i r e d  3
D o n 't k n o w  d
An y  'A' L e v e l s  1
A n y  'O' L e v e l s  2
A n y  G C S E ' s  3
A n y  C S E ' s  d
A n y  i n d u s t r i a l  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  s u c h  as 
HNC H N D  ONC O N D  or 
Ci ty a n d  G u i l d s  5
No q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  6
Oth e r ,  plea s e  s a y  w h a t  .
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10) H o w fair d o  y o u  t hi n k y o u r  w a g e s  
a r e  for the job y o u  d o  ^
V er y  f ai r 
P r e t t y  fair 
P r e t t y  u n f a i r  
Very u n f a i r
11) S u p p o s e  s o m e o n e  a s k e d  y o u  to say 
w h i c h  c la s s  y o u  b e l o n g  to. W h a t  
wo u ld  you say P l e a s e  p ri nt 
vou r a n s w e r  o p p o s i t e .
12) W'hat sor t of j o b  does, or did, 
yoiur F at h e r  d o P l e a s e  p r i n t  
the nam e or t it l e  o f  the job 
o p p o s i t e ■
1 3 ) Are, or were, e i t h e r  of yo'ur 
p a r e n t s  m e m b e r s  of a u n i o n F a t he r Yes
No
M o t h e r Yes
No
P A P T  2
For e a c h  q u e s t i o n  b e l o w  p l e a s e  c i r c l e  the n u m b e r  tha t bes t s h o w s  
w h a t  Y O U t hi nk
Id) C o - o p e r a t i o n  in F i r m s  is
i m p o s s i b l e  b e c a u s e  w o r k e r s  
a nd  m a n a g e m e n t  a r e  r e a l l y  
on d i f f e r e n t  s i d e s
1 3 ) M a n a g e r s  a l w a y s  try a n d
get the b e t t e r  of w o r k e r s
S t r o n g l y  A g r e e  No D i s a g r e e
A g r e e  V i e w
S t r o n g l y
D i s a g r e e
1 6 ) M a n a g e r s  a l w a y s  k n o w  w h a t  
IS bes t for a firm.
1 7 ) It is easy to be loyal to 
both y ou r Un i on  a nd  
M a n a g e m e n t .
1 8 ) W o r k e r s  m u s t  h a v e  s om e  say in 
M a n a g e m e n t  d e c i s i o n s  that 
a f f e c t  the w or k  t ha t  they do.
1 9 ) U n i o n s  sho ul d a l w a y s  try and 
c o - o p e r a t e  w i t h  M a n a g e m e n t
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S t r o n g l y  A g r e e 
A£ree
No D i s a g r e e  
Vi e w
S t r o n g l y
D i s a g r e e
20) U n i o n s  a r e a goo d thing
21) You c a n ' t  be a U ni o n m em b e r  
a n d  s u p p o r t  M a n a g e m e n t  a t 
the s am e  time
22) P e o p l e  need a U ni o n  to p r o t e c t  
th e ir  i n t e r e s t s  a t  work
2 3 ) T r a d e  U n i o n s  in B r i t a i n  a re 
too p o w e r f u l
2d) W h e n  t he r e is o n l y  one U n i o n  
a t  a C o m p a n y  it wil l mak e the 
w o r k f o r c e  w e a k e r  and M a n a g e m e n t  
s t r o n g e r
2 5 ) T h e r e  s ho u l d  be some o th e r  
w a y  to r e s o l v e  d i s p u t e s
■ . o t h e r  than g o i n g  on s tr i ke
2 6 ) N o t h i n g  is e ve r g a i n e d  by 
w o r k e r s  g o i n g  on str ik e
P le a s e  go on to the n e x t  page
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PART 3
How do you feel a b o u t  w o r k i n g  at For each q u e s t i o n
b el o w  p le ase c ir c l e  the n um b e r  that b es t  s ho w s wha t you think
A g r e e
Verv
A gr e e
F a i r l y
Z l )  Th i s Firm :s good to its 
W or ke rs
I am very s at i s f i e d  with 
my job
T g )  Thi s is a f r i e n d l y  place 
to work
. JO)  I feel l oy a lt y tow ards 
t hi s Firm
3.1 ) M or a le  is goo d here
3 2 ) If a p r o b l e m  c o m e s  up at 
work I can get it sorted 
out e as i l y
3 3 ) The re is no p oi nt in 
c o m p l a i n i n g  a b o u t  a n y t h i n g  
here
>u) My job g i v e s  me no f r e e d o m  at 
a l l  to g et  on w i t h  my work in 
my own way
3 3 ) The job I d o has no
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  a t t a c h e d  to it
36) C o m m u n i c a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  w or k er s 
and M a n a g e m e n t  a r e  poor here
3?) It would not take muc h for me 
to leave thi s Firm
38) I a m  made to work too hard here
39) It d o e s n ' t  b o t h e r  me if I d on ' t 
do  m y  job well
d o )  The way I a m  s up e r v i s e d  makes 
me d i s l i k e  the work I do
dl ) The re is no v a r i e t y  in my job
d2 ) The way I a m  m an a ge d at 
is no d i f f e r e n t  to o th e r 
C o m p a n i e s  I have w or k ed  at
St r o n g l y  S t r o n g l y  
2
A g r e e  a D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e 
L it t le  A L it t l e  F ai r l y  Very
S t r o n g l y  S t r o n g l y
PART k
P l e a s e  a n s w e r  the q u e s t i o n s  below by f o l l o w i n g  the u n d e r l i n e d  
i n s t r ’jctior.s
O )  Have y o u j oi n ed  the U ni o n  ( E E TP U)  at 
P l e a s e  c i r c l e  the n u m b e r  
o p p o s i t e  the a n s w e r  w h i c h  a p p l i e s
to YOU
Yes
No
IP YOUP A N S W E R  T O  Q U E S T I O N  WAS NO P L E A S E  GO ON T O Q U E S T I O N  4 6
B e l o w  a r e  a l i s t  of r e a s o n s  w hy  people join Unions.
Pl ease r a n k  o r d e r  the T H R E E  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  r e a s o n s  w hy  you 
joined the U n i o n  ( E E T P U ) at
I joi ne d the U ni o n  a t  b e c au se
It will i n c r e a s e  my w ag e s
It will gi v e me job s e c u r i t y
It w il l h e l p  i m p r o v e  w o r k i n g  c o n d i t i o n s
I b e l i e v e  w o r k e r s  n e e d  trade U ni o n s  to p r o t e c t  them
B e i n g  a m e m b e r  of the Un i on  w il l give me an 
o p p o r t u n i t y  to p a r t i c i p a t e  in m ak i n g  some of the 
d e c i s i o n s  that e f f e c t  how the C o m p a n y  is run
E v e r y b o d y  else joi ne d
P e o p l e  in my f a m i l y  h av e a l w a y s  joined U n i o n s
I was p r e s s u r i z e d  by my w o r k m a t e s
The U ni o n  g iv e s  g oo d f ri n ge  b e n e f i t s  s u c h  as 
c h e a p  i n s u r a n c e  and o th e r  d i s c o u n t s
T h e  E E T P U  is not a m e m b e r  of the TUG
S om e o t h e r  r e a s o n  - P le a s e  s av  what . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
□
u3) A s  a m e m b e r  of the U n i o n  ( E E T P U ) at
h ow  a c t i v e  d o  y ou  t hi nk y o u wi l l b ec ome in 
the U n i o n ' s  a f f a i r s  P le a s e  c i r c l e  the 
n u m b e r  o p p o s i t e  the a n s w e r  w h i c h  a p p l i e s  
to Y O U .
V e r y  A c t i v e  1
F a i r l y  A c t i v e  2
A c t i v e
O c c a s i o n a l l y  3
N o t  very a c t i v e  4
N e v e r  a c t i v e  5
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i i
IF Y OU  A B E  A M E M B E R  O F  T H E  U N I O N  (E E T P U ) A T  
A N S W E R  QUESTION ^6 B E L O W .  C O  ON T O Q U E S T I O N
P L E A S E  D O  N O T
L 6 )  B e l o w  a re a l is t o f  r e a s o n s  w hy  p e o p l e  d o n ' t  join U ni ons, 
P le a se  ra n k o r d e r  the T H R E E  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  r e a s o n s  w hy  you 
h a v e n ' t  ioined the U ni o n  a t
I h a v e n ' t  j oi n ed  the U n i o n  a t  b e c a u s e
I have j us t n e v e r  g o t  a r o u n d  to j o i n i n g
I w o u l d  p r e f e r  to take c a r e  o f  m y s e l f
It m i g h t  d a m a g e  my c a r e e r  p r o s p e c t s
I'm a l r e a d y  a m e m b e r  o f  a n o t h e r  U ni o n
I d i s a g r e e  w it h  the i de a of U n i o n s
I d o n ' t  like the E E T P U  a n d  I w a n t e d  to join 
a n o t h e r  U ni o n
If M a n a g e m e n t  a r e  d o i n g  t he ir job c o r r e c t l y  
t h e r e ' s  no n ee d  for a U ni o n
The E E T P U  is n o t  a m e m b e r  of the TUG
S om e o t h e r  r e a s o n  - P l e a s e  s a v  w h a t  ......
□
□
U
U
□
□
□
□
47) H a v e  y o u  b ee n  a m e m b e r  of the E E T P U  or_ 
a n y  o t h e r  U ni o n  b e f o r e  ? P l e a s e  c i r c l e  
the n u m b e r  o p p o s i t e  the a n s w e r  w hi c h  
a p p l i e s  to you
Yes
No
IF YOUR AN.S'WER TO  Q U E S T I O N  4 ?  W A S  NO P L E A S E  G O O N TO Q U E S T I O N  50
48) If y o u r  a n s w e r  to q u e s t i o n  4 ?  was yes, can 
you r e m e m b e r  the n a m e  of y o u r  old U n i o n  a n d  
how long you w er e  a m e m b e r , P l e a s e  p ri nt 
vour a n s w e r s  o p p o s i t e
N a m e  of U n i o n  .. 
How L o n g  a Membei
4 9 )  H o w  a c t i v e  a m e m b e r  were y o u in y ou r  old 
U n i o n ' s  a f f a i r s  ? P le a s e  c i r c l e  the 
n u m b e r  o p p o s i t e  the a n s w e r  w h i c h  a p p l i e s  
to vou .
Ver y a c t i v e  
F ai r l y  a c t i v e  
A c t i v e
O c c a s i o n a l l y  
No t v er y  A c t i v e  
N e v e r  A c t i v e
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5 0 ) T he  p u r p o s e  of this q u e s t i o n n a i r e  has b e e n  to a s k  w h a t  y ou  think 
a b o u t  wor k in g e n e r a l  and, mor e s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  w o r k i n g  at 
W i t h  these q u e s t i o n s  in mind, do you hav e a ny  c o m m e n t s  or add it io n al 
i n f o r m a t i o n  that you wis h to a dd  to y ou r  a n s w e r s  If sc, please
W r i t e  them in the s oa c e below.
5 1 ) As a f o l l o w  on to the q u e s t i o n n a i r e  it m ay  be n e c e s s a r y  to i n t e r v i e w  
some of you ( M a n a g e m e n t  w o u l d  not be p r e s e n t  a t t he s e i n t e rv ie w s) .
We w ou l d  like y ou  to n o m i n a t e  one or two peo pl e that you wor k wit h who 
y ou t hi n k r e s p r e s e n t  y o u r  v i e w s  a n d who you w ou ld like to n o m i n a t e  
to talk on y o u r  b e h a l f  ? You may n o m i n a t e  y o u r s e l f  if y o u wish. 
P l e a s e  o r i n t  t h e i r  nam e or n a m e s  bel ow.
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Appendix 6.4 
Questionnaire Implemented at 
Company A: Stage 2 .
L O N D O N  S C H O O L  O F  E C O N O M I C S / E S R C
WORK A T T I T U D E  S U R V E Y
1. Th<c a c c a c h e c  q u e s t  : o n n a  i re w h i c h  y o u  h a v e  b e e n  a s k e o  to f i l l  in is 
p art of a L o n d o n  S c h o o l  o f  E c o n o m i c s  s t u o y  o f  ' w o r k f o r c e  a t t i t u d e s  at 
J a p a n e s e  C o m p a n i e s  in B r i t a i n .
2. I w o u l d  s t r e s s  t h a t y o u  a r e  not a s k e c  t o  g i v e  y o u r  n a m e  a n y w h e r e  o n  
t h i s  q u e s t i o n n a i r e .  Y o u r  a n s w e r s  w i l l  b e  c o m b i n e d  w i t h  e v e r y b o d y  e l s e ' s  
w h o  c o m p l e t e  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  a n c  n o  i n d i v i d u a l  d e t a i l s  w i l l  be r e p o r t e d  
at a n y  t i m e .  Y o u r  a n s w e r s  w i l l  t h e r e f o r e  r e m a i n  c o m p l e t e l y  a n o n y m o u s .
3. T o  a n s w e r  t h e  q u e s t i o n s  f o l l o w  c h e  u n d e r  1 1 n e e  i n s t r u c t i o n s .  Y o u  w i l l  
f i n d  c h a t  m o s t  o f  t h e  q u e s t i o n s  o n l y  r e q u i r e  y o u  to c i r c l e  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  
a n s w e r , s o  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  s h o u l d  n ot t a k e  v e r y  l o n g  t o  f i l l  out_. If
yo u  a r e  u n a b l e  to a n s w e r  a q u e s t i o n ,  g o  o n  t o  t h e  n e x t  o n e .  P l e a s e  b e a r  ir 
m i n e  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  n o  r i g h t  o r  w r o n g  a n s w e r s ,  j u s t  a n s w e r  w h a t  y o u  
p e r s o n a l l y  t h i n k .
T h a n k  y o u  in a d v a n c e  f o r  y o u r  t i m e  a n d  c o o p e r a t i o n .
D A V I D  G R A N T
—4 8 ^ —
TO ANSWER THE QUESTIONS PLEASE FOLLOW THE UNDERLINED INSTRUCTIONS
PA RT
Please an swer all the Q u e s t i o n s  below, either bv ci r c l i n g  che 
number o p p o s i t e  Che answ er wh ic h a p p l i e s  :o vou or, wher e 
asked, wr i t i n g  in vour a n s w e r .
1) D i d  y o u  f i l l  in c h e  f i r s t  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  in 
D e c e m b e r  1 9 8 8  ?
2) A r e  y o u  m a l e  o r  f e m a l e
3) H o l d  o l d  a r e  y o u  
L ) A r e  y o u  m a r r i e d  or s i n g l e
5) H o w  m a n y  c h i l d r e n  u n d e r  t h e  a g e  o f  s i x t e e n  
h a v e  y o u  g ot P l e a s e  p r i n t  v o u r  a n s w e r
• o p p o s i t e .
6) W h e n  o i d  y o u  f i r s t  s t a r t  w o r k  a f
P l e a s e  p r i n t  v o u r  a n s w e r  o p p o s i t e .
7) P l e a s e  p r i n t  t h e  n a m e  of t h e  d e p a r t m e n t
t h a t  y o u  w o r k  in at o p p o s i t e .
8 )  D o e s  y o u r  j o b  r e q u i r e  y o u  t o  s u p e r v i s e  t h e  
w o r k  o f  a n y  o.cher w o r k e r s
9) H a v e  y o u  w o r k e d  fo r  a n y  o t h e r  C o m p a n i e s  b e f o r e  'i’
10) W h e r e  d o  y o u  e x p e c t  t o be w o r k i n g  in f i v e  
y e a r s  t i m e
11) W h a t  s o r t  of q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  h a v e  y o u  got
( C i r c l e  m o r e  t h a n  o n e  a n s w e r  if y o u  n e e o  to. )
Y e s
N o
M a l e
F e m a l e
M a r r i e o  
S i n g l e
1
2
y e a r s
1
2
Y e s  1
No 2
Y e s  I
N o  2
Wi th t h i s  f 1 r m  1
W i t h  a n o t h e r  f i r m  2
R e t i r e e  3
D o n 't k n o w  d
A n y  'A' L e v e l s  
A n y  'O' L e v e l s  
A n y  G C S E ' s  
A n y  C S E ' s  
A n y  i n d u s t r i a l  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  s u c h  
a s  H N C  H N D  O N C  O N D  
or  C i t y  a n d  G u i I d s  
N o  q u a  1 i f i c a t i o n s  
O t h e r ,  p 1 e a s e  s a y  
w h a t  . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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2) H o w  f a i r  o o  y o u  c h i n k  y o u r  w a g e s  a r e  
for t h e  j o b  y o u  o o
13) S u p p o s e  s o m e o n e  a s k e o  y o u  t o  s a y  w h i c h  .
c l a s s  y o u  b e l o n g  to. W h a t  w o u l d  y o u  s a y  ’’
P l e a s e  p r i n t  y o u r  a n s w e r  o p p o s i t e .
U )  W h a t  s o r t  o f  j o b  d o e s ,  o r  d i o ,  y o u r  f a t h e r  o o
P l e a s e  p r i n t  t h e  n a m e  o r  t i t l e  o f  t h e  I'ob
o p p o s i t e .
15) A r e ,  o r  w e r e ,  e i t h e r  o f  y o u r  p a r e n t s  
m e m b e r s  o f  a u n i o n
V e r y  f a i r  1 
P r e t t y  f a i r  2 
P r e t t y  u n f a i r  3 
V e r y  u n f a i r  6
r a t h e r Y e s
N o
M o t h e r Y e s
No
PA RT 2
F o r  e a c h  q u e s t i o n  b e l o w  p l e a s e  c i r c l e  t h e  n u m b e r  t h a t  b e s t  s h o w s  
w h a  t v o u  t h i n k .
S t r o n g l y
A g re e
Agre e No
1 6) C o - o p e r a t i o n  in F i r m s  is 
• i m p o s s i b l e  b e c a u s e
w o r k e r s  a n d  m a n a g e m e n t  
a r e  r e a l l y  o n  d i f f e r e n t  
s i d e s
17) M a n a g e r s  a l w a y s  t r y  a n d  
g e t  t h e  b e t t e r  o f  w o r k e r s
18) M a n a g e r s  a l w a y s  k n o w  w h a t  
*13 b e s t  f or a f i r m .
19) It is e a s y  t o  be l o y a l  to 
b o t h  y o u r  U n i o n  a n o  
M a n a g e m e n t .
2 0 )  W o r k e r s  m u s t  h a v e  s o m e  s a y  
in M a n a g e m e n t  d e c i s i o n s  
t h a t  a f f e c t  t h e  w o r k  t h a t  
t h e y  do.
21 )  U n i o n s  s h o u l o  a l w a y s  t r y  
a n o  c o - o p e r a t e  w i t h  
M a n a g e m e n t  .
22 )  U n i o n s  a r e  a g o o o  t h i n g
2 3 ) P e o p l e  n e e o  a U n i o n  to 
p r o t e c t  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  
at w o r k .
V i e w
D i s a g r e e  S t r o n g l y  
D i s a g r e e
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S c r o n g l y 
Agree
A g r e e  N^ o 
V i ew
D i s a g r e e  Sc r o n g l v  
D i s a g r e e
2i) W h e n  c h o r e  is o n l y  o n e  
U n i o n  ac a C o m p a n y  it 
u i l l  m a k e  c h e  w o r k ­
f o r c e  w e a k e r  a n o  
M a n a g e m e n t  s t r o n g e r
25 )  T h e r e  s h o u l d  b e  s o m e  
o c h e r  w a y s  c o  r e s o l v e  
d i s p u t e s  o t h e r  t h a n  
g o i n g  o n  s t r i k e
2 6) N o t h i n g  is e v e r  g a i n e d  
by w o r k e r s  g o i n g  on 
s t r i k e
P l e a s e  g o  o n  to t h e  n e x t  p a g e
■
if
I
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PART 3
H o L  0 0  v Q u  fe el  a b o u t  w o r k i n g  a t_ _ _ _ _ _ _
For each q u e s t i o n  be low  pl eas e c i r c l e  he number ihni besi shows 
wha c vou chink.
A g r e e  A g r e e  D i s a g r e e  Di s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e
Y f H  F a i r l y  a a F a i r l y  V e r y
r Sc r o n g l  V L i c c l e  Lie l i e  Sc r o n g l  y S t r o n g l y
27) T h i s  f 1 r.x is g o o o  
to I t s  w o r k e r s
28 )  I a m  v e r y  s a t i s f i e d  
w i t h  m y  j o b .
29) T h i s  is a f r i e n a l y  
p l a c e  to w o r k .
30 )  T h e r e  is a g o o o  tenin 
s p i r i t  in m y  w o r k  a r e a
31) G e t t i n g  p r o m o t e d  at
I S not  i m p o r t a n t
C 0 me
32 )  I . f e e l  l o y a l t y  t o w a r o s  
t h i s  f i r m .
33 ) I 0 0  n ot h a v e  a n y  
I n f l u e n c e  o v e r  m a n a g e ­
m e n t  o e c i s i o n s  t h a t  
a f f e c t  t h e  w o r k  I do .
3A ) P r o m o t i o n  at is
g i v e n  o n  a f a i r  b a s i s .
35) I f r e q u e n t l y  g e t  l o e a s  
a b o u t  h o w  to i m p r o v e  
the w a y  I o o  m y  jo b.
36) M o r a l e  is g o o o  h e r e .
37) T h e r e  is n o  p o i n t  in 
c o m p l a i n i n g  a b o u t  
a n y t h i n g  h e r e .
38) M a n a g e m e n t  h e r e  
w o u l d  no t  be 
i n t e r e s t e d  if I h a o  a n  
l o e a  t h a t  m i g h t  i m p r o v e  
th e  w a y  I o o  m y j o b
39) M y  j o b  g i v e s  m e  no  
f r e e o o m  at a l l  t o  g e t  
on w i t h  m y  w o r k  in m y  
o w n  w a y
w O ' Tne job I oo has no 
r e s p o n s i b ! I it y 
at tacheo to it.
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A g r e e  A g r e e  A g r e e  D i s a g  r e e  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e
V e r y  F a i r ] y a a F a i r l v  V e r v
St r o n g l  V Sc r o n g  1 v' L i t t l e  L i t t l e  St r o n g  1 y St r o n g l  y
i l )  I t  a p r o b l e m  c o m e s  
up  1 n m y  w o r k  a r e a  
t h e  w o r k e r s  t h e r e  
u s u a l l y  t r y  a n o  s o r t  
1 t o u t  o n  t h e i r  o w n
i 2) C o m m u n i c a t i o n s
b e t w e e n  w o r k e r s  a n c  
m a n a g a e m e n t  a r e  
p o o r  h e r e .
■fC'jf
ÿxÿ L 3 )  It w o u l o  n o t  t a k e
m u c h  f o r  m e  to l e a v e  
t h i s  f i r m
ÿ"
i i )  I a m  s a t i s f i e d  w i t h
' m a n a g e m e n t s  e x p l a n -
a t i o n s  of o t h e r  
p e o p l e s  p r o m o t i o n s
i 5) I a m  m a c e  to w o r k  
t o o  h a r e
i o )  It d o e s n ' t  b o t h e r  m e  
if I o o n ' t  d o  m y  
j o b  w e l l .
i 7) T h e  w a y  I a m  s u p e r ­
v i s e e  m a k e s  m e  
c i s l i k e  t h e  w o r k  I o o
i 3 )  T n e r e  is n o  v a r i e t y  
in my job
i 9 )  T h e  w a y  I a m  m a n a g e c  
at IS no
di f f e r e n t  t o o t h e r  
c o m p a n i e s  I h a v e  
w o r k e d  at
50) c o e s  n ot g i v e
Its w o r k e r s  e n o u g h  
i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  it s  
p r e s e n t  a n o  f u t u r e  p l a n s
5! )  T h e  U n i o n  h e r e  is g o o c  
at t a k i n g  u p  o u r  
i n o i v i c u a l  g r i e v a n c e s
52 )  T h e  U n i o n  h e r e
i n f l u e n c e s  s o m e  o f t h e  
m a n a g e m e n t  o e c i s i o n s  
t h a t  a f f e c t  t h e  w o r k
A e r e e A g r e e
V e r y  F a i r l y  
St r o n g l y S t r o n g lv
A g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e
a a F a i r l y  V e r y
L i t t l e  L i t t l e  S t r o n g l y  St r o n g l y
53) I reel loyalty
to waros t he Union 
here
) H a v i n g  a " n o  S t r i k e '  
a g r e e m e n t  at 
m a k e s  t h e  U n i o n  
w e a  K
5 5 )  T h e  U n i o n  h e r e  is 
t o o  c o - o p e r a t i v e  
w i t h  m a n a g e m e n t
P A R T  L
PI e a s e  a n s w e r  t h e  q u e s t i o n s  b e l o w  bv f o l l o w i n g  t h e  u n o e r l i n e o  
i n s t r u c t i o n s .  - - - - - - - - - -
5 6; H a v e  y o u  j o i n e c  
t h e  U n i o n  ( E E T P U )  
at ' P l e a s e
c i r c l e  t h e  
a n s w e r  w h i c h  
a p p l i e s  to y ou.
Y e s
No
IF Y O U P  a NSUT R t o  q u e s t i o n  56 W A S  N O  P L E A S E  G O  O N  T O  Q U E S T I O N  59
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5 7 )  O n  t h e  l i s t  b e l o w  a r e  a n u m b e r  o f t h i n g s  t h a t  U n i o n  m e m b e r s  
o f t e n  e x p e c t  t h e i r  u n i o n  to t r y  a n o  a c h i e v e .
P l e a s e  r a n k  o r d e r  t h e  t w o  t h i n g s  t h a t  v o u  m o s t  e x p e c t  v o u r  
linino f p F T P U )  ro r o n r p n r  r a t e  o n  a c h i e v i n g  ar
: e x p e c t  t h e  U n i o n  t o  c o n c e n t r a t e  on :-
I n c r e a s i n g  m y  w a g e s
G i v i n g  m e  j o b  s e c u r i t y
I m p r o v i n g  w o r k i n g  c o n d i t i o n s □
G i v i n g  m e  a n  o p p o r t u n i t y  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  
in m a k i n g  s o m e  of t h e  d e c i s i o n s  t h a t  
a f f e c t  h o w  t h e  c o m p a n y  is r u n
f o r k i n g  w i t h  m a n a g e m e n t  to t r y  a n o  f i n d  
s o l u t i o n s  to p r o b l e m s .
No t  l e t t i n g  m a n a g e m e n t  g a i n  a n y  
. a o v a n t a g e  o v e r  t h e  w o r k f o r c e .
S o m e t h i n g  e l s e  - P l e a s e  s a y  w h a t
5S) A s  a m e m b e r  o f  t h e  U n i o n  ( E E T P U )
at h o w  a c t i v e  a r e  y o u  m  t h e
U n i o n ' s  a f f a i r s ’ P l e a s e  c i r c l e  t h e  
n u m b e r  o p p o s i t e  t h e  a n s w e r  w h i c h  
a p p l i e s  to v o u .
V e r y  a c t i v e  
Fa 1 r ! y ac t i v c  
A c t i v e  o c c a s i o n a l l y  
Not v e r y  a c t i v e  
N e v e r  a c t i v e
-4q6-
I F  Y O U  A R E  A M E M B E R  O F  T H E  U N I O N  ( E E T P U )  A T _ _ _ _ _ _ _ P L E A S E  D O  N O T
a n s w e r  q u e s t i o n  59 B E L O W .  G O  O N  T O  Q U E S T I O N  60.
I d o n ' t  l i k e  t h e  E E T P U  a n d  I w a n t e d  t o  j o i n  
a n o t h e r  U n i o n
□
59) B e l o w  a r e  a l i s t  of r e a s o n s  why p e o p l e  d o n ' t  j o i n  U n i o n s .  
P l e a s e  r a n k  o r o e r  t h e  T H R E E  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  r e a s o n s  why v o u  
h a v e n ' t  j o i n e d  t h e  U n i o n  at_ _ _ _ _ _  ,
I h a v e n ' t  j o i n e o  t h e  U n i o n  at b e c a u s e  : -
I h a v e  j u s t  n e v e r  g o t  a r o u n d  to j o i n i n g
I w o u l o  p r e f e r  t o  c a k e  c a r e  o f  m y s e l f
It m i g h t  d a m a g e  m y  c a r e e r  p r o s p e c t s
I ' m  a l r e a d y  a m e m b e r  o f  a n o t h e r  U n i o n  
I 0 1 s a g r e e  w i t h  c h e  i o e a  o f  U n i o n s
If M a n a g e m e n t  a r e  d o i n g  t h e i r  j o b  c o r r e c t l y  
t h e r e ' s  n o  n e e d  f o r  a U n i o n
T h e  E E T P U  is n o t  a m e m b e r  o f  t h e  T U G  
S o m e  o t h e r  r e a s o n  - P l e a s e  s a v  w h a t  .
□
6 0 )  H a v e  y o u  b e e n  a m e m b e r  o f  t h e  E E T P U  0 £  
a n y  o t h e r  U n i o n  b e f o r e  P l e a s e  c i r c l e  
t h e  n u m b e r  o p p o s i t e  t h e  a n s w e r  w h i c h  
a p p l i e s  to v o u
Y e s
No
IF Y O U R  A N S W E R  T O  Q U E S T I O N  6 0  W A S  N O  P L E A S E  G O  O N  T O  Q U E S T I O N  6 3
6 1 )  If y o u r  a n s w e r  t o  q u e s t i o n  6 0  w a s  y e s ,  c a n
y o u  r e m e m b e r  t h e  n a m e  o f  y o u r  o l d  U n i o n  a n o  N a m e  o f  U n i o n
h o w  l o n g  y o u  w e r e  a m e m b e r .  P l e a s e  p r i n t  
v o u r  a n s w e r s  o p p o s i t e
6 2 )  How a c t i v e  a m e m b e r  w e r e  y o u  in y o u r  o l o  
U n i o n ' s  a f f a i r s  P l e a s e  c i r c l e  t h e  
n u m b e r  o p p o s i t e  t h e  a n s w e r  w h i c h  a p p l i e s  
to v o u
H o w  l o n g  a m e m b e r
V e r y  a c t i v e  
F a i r l y  a c t i v e  
A c t i v e
o c c a s i o n a l l y  
N o t v e r y  a c t i v e  
N e v e r  A c t i v e
-i+97-
6 3 )  A s  a f o l l o w  on"'co c h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  ic m a y  b e  n e c e s s a r y  t o  i n t e r v i e w
s o m e  of y o u  ( M a n a g e m e n t  w o u l o  no t  be p r e s e n t  at t h e s e  i n t e r v i e w s ) .  W'e 
w o u l d  l i k e  y o u  to n o m i n a t e  o n e  o r  t w o  p e o p l e  t h a t  y o u  w o r k  ^ i c h  w h o  y o u  
t h i n k  r e p r e s e n t  y o u r  v i e w s  a n c  w h o  y o u  w o u l o  l i k e  t o  n o m i n a t e  to t a l k  
o n  y o u r  b e h a l f  Y o u  m a y  n o m i n a t e  y o u r s e l f  if y o u  w i s h .
P l e a s e  o r i n t  t h e i r  n a m e  o r  n a m e s  b e l o w
6d  ) T h e  p u r p o s e  o f  t h i s  q u e s t i o n n a i r e  h a s  b e e n  to a s k  w h a t  y o u  t h i n k  a b o u t  
w o r k  in g e n e r a l  a n d ,  m o r e  s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  w o r k i n g  at W i t h  t h e s e
q u e s t i o n s  in m i n d ,  d o  y o u  h a v e  a n y  c o m m e n t s  o r  a d d i t i o n a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  
t h a t  yo u  w i s h  to a o d  to y o u r  a n s w e r s  If so, p l e a s e  w r i t e  t h e m  in 
th e  s o a c e  b e l o w .
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Appendix 6.3 
Questionnaire Implemented at 
Company B .
L O N D O N  S O ^ œ t  O F  ECONCMnCS/ELSRC
LOR.K A T T i r æ E  SU RV EY
I The a c c a c h e d  q u e s c l o n n a i r e  w h i c h  you have been as ked co f i 11 m
IS pare of a L o n d o n  School of E c o n o T i c s  scudy of w o r k f o r c e  a c c i c u d e s  
ac J a p a n e s e  fJompanies m  B r i c a m .  Bocti'cnanaeemenc and che un i o n  ac 
are a g r e e d  chac che r'esuTcs of che quesc lonna i re 
will be of be nefic co all ac che c o m p a n y  since chey may idencify any 
p r o b l e m s  chac chey need co ca ckle co h e l p  e n su re g o o d  induscriai 
re lac ions
2 I w o u l d  sc r e s s  chac you are noc as ked co g i v e  your name a n y w h e r e  or 
chis q u e s c l o n n a 1 r e . Your a n s w e r s  will be c o m b i n e d  wi c h  e v e r y b o d y  else's 
wnc c o m p l e c e  che q u e s c l o n n a i r e  and no individual d e r a i l s  will be re porcec 
ac any cime. Your an s w e r s  will c h e r e f o r e  remain c o m p l e c e ) y an o n y m o u s
3 W h e n  you ha ve c o m p i e c e d  cne ques: lor.na i re p l ea se seal ic m  :ne 
e n v e l o p e  p r o v i d e d  and pu: ic in che c o l l e c c i o n  b o x . The un o p e n e d  
e n v e l o p e s  will chen be f o r w ard ed co me. A l c e r n a c i v e ! y you ca n ask fdr
a scamiped a d d r e s s e d  e n v e l o p e  and pose your q u e s t i o n n a i r e  d i r e c t l y  co me
c . To answer che q u e s t i o n s  follow che under 1 ined instructions. You 
will f i n d 'ch ac most of che q u e s t i o n s  on l y  require you to c i r c l e  che 
a p p r o p r i a t e  an swer, so the q u e s t i o n n a i r e  sh ould not cake very long to 
fill out. If you are u n a b l e  co answer a qu estion, g o  on to the next one
Pl ease bear in m i nd that there are no right or w r o n g  a n s w ers jusc 
answer what you p e r s o n a l l y  thinv
T n a n k  v'Oj  in .jcvj-'ce , o: , .-e jnr. c r x p e r a c
D A V I D  aO\,NT
“ ^ 9 9 “
TO ANSU-ER THE QUESTIONS PLEASE FOLLOW THE UNDERLINED INSTRUCTIONS
P l e a s e  a n s w e r  all Che q u e s c i o n s  below, eit h e r  by c i r c l i n g  
the n u m b e r  o p p o s i t e  Che a n s w e r  w h i c h  a p p l i e s  to y o u  or, 
w h e r e  a s k e d /  wr i t ing in yo u r  ans w e r
1) Are yo u m a l e  or female M a l e  1
Fe m a l e  2
2) H o w  ol d are yo u "? . . . . . .  years
3) A r e  yo u m a r r i e d  or s i n g l e  ' M a r r i e d  1
S i n g l e  2
L) H o w  m a n y  c h i l d r e n  un der the ag e of
. s i x t e e n  h a v e  y o u  got  ^ P l e a s e  pr int . . . . . . . . . . .
your answer o p p o s i t e
3) W h e n  did vou first start work at
P l e a s e  print
your answer o p p o s i t e  . . . . . . . . . . .
6) Pl ea se print the na me of the d e p a r t m e n t  
that you work in at
op po sI t e . Yo u need not a n sw er this . . . . . . . . . . .
q u e s t i o n  if you feel that naming the d e p a r t m e n t  
you work in m i gh t i d e n t i f y  y o u ^
7) Does your job re q u i r e  yo u to s u p e r v i s e
the wo r k  of any o t he r w o r k e r s  Yes 1
No 2
8) Ha ve you w o r k e d  for any ot ner Yes 1
c o m p a n i e s  be f o r e  No 2
9) W h e r e  d o  you expect to be w o r k i n g  m  W i t h  this firm 1
five years time W i t h  an other firm 2
Re t i r e d  3
Don't k n o w  ^
10) !f yo u ever left whaT
do you think wo u l d  be your most likely . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
re as on for l e av ing the c o m p a n y ^  Pl ea se print 
your answer oppo sit e.
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11) W h a c  sore of q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  ha ve
y o u  got ? (C ir cle m o r e  than on e onsutr IF 
y o u  ne ed t o T T
A n y  'A' Le ve ls 1
A n y 'O' Le vels 2
An y G C S E ' s  3
A n y  C S E ' s  6
An y indu str ia l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  
su ch as H N C  H N D  O N C  O N D  or 
C i t y  &  G u i l d s  5
No q u al i f icat ions 6
Ot he r, p l e a s e  say what . . . . .
12) H o w  fair d o  yo u think yo u r  wa g e s  
are for the jo b yo u d o  ?
13) S u p p o s e  s o m e o n e  a s k e d  y o u  to say 
w h i c h  c l a s s  you b e l o n g  to. iVhat 
w o u l d  yo u say? P l e a s e  p r in t 
your an s w e r  o p p o s i t e
16) W n a t  sort of job does, or did
your father do? P l e a s e  p r in t the na m e  
or ti tle of the job o p p o s i t e
15) A r e  or were, ei th er of yo ur pa r e n t s  
m e m b e r s  of a un i o n  ?
V e r y  fair 
P r e t t y  fair 
P r e t r y  un fa ir 
V e r y  un f a i r
Father
M o t h e r
Yes
No
Yes
No
PA R T  2
For e a c h  q u e s t i o n  b e l o w  p l e a s e  c i r c l e  the n u m b e r  that best 
sh o w s  w h at you think
16) C o - o p e r a t i o n  in Firm s is 
i m p o s s i b l e  b e c a u s e  w o r k e r s  
and m a n a g e m e n t  are r e a l l y  on 
d i f f e r e n t  sides
S t r o n g l y  Ag ree 
Ag r e e
1 2
No
V i e w
D i s a g r e e S t r o n g l y
Di sa gre e
5
17) M a n a g e r s  a l w a y s  try and get 
the b e tt er of w o r k e r s
18) M a n a g e r s  a l w a y s  k n o w  w h at is
be st for a firm ^
19) It is e a sy to be loyal to b o t h  
your U n i o n  and m a n a g e m e n t  '
20) W o r k e r s  must ha ve so me say in 
m a n a g e m e n t  d e c i s i o n s  that af f e c t  ' 
the work that they do
21) U n i o n s  s h o u l d  al wa ys try and 
c o - o p e r a t e  w i t h  m a n a g e m e n t  '
2 3
2 3
2 3
2 3
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S t r o n ^ l v  Az r e e  
Agree
No Di s a g r e e  SCrongly 
V i e w  Disagree
:ÿ.
22) U n i o n s  are a g o od t h in g
23) P e o p l e  n e ed a U n i o n  to 
pr o t e c t  their in te res ts  
at work
2A) W h e n  there is o n l y  o n e  U n i o n  
at a C o m p a n y  it wi ll m a k e  
Che w o r k f o r c e  s t r o n g e r
25) T h e r e  s h o u l d  be so me o c h e r  
wa y CO re s o l v e  d i s p u t e s  
oc her chan g o i n g  o n  s t r i k e
26) N o t h i n g  is ever g a i n e d  by 
w o r k e r s  g o i n g  on s t r i k e
2 3
'2 3
2 3
2 3
P A R T  3
How do you feel about working at
For each q u e s t i o n  b e l o w  p l e a s e  c i r c l e  the number that best sh ows what you think
Ag r e e  ve ry A g r e e  A g r e e  a D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D i sa gre e
S t r o n g l y  F a i r l y  L i tt le a little fairly very
S t r o n g l y  s t r o n g l y  S t ro ngl y
27) Th is firm is go o d  to its 
w o r k e r s
28) I am very s a t i s f i e d  wi t h  
my job
29) This is a frie ndl y pl ace 
to work
30) T h e r e  is a g o od team, 
spirit in my work area
31) G e t t i n g  p r o m o t e d  at
is not important
to me
32) I feel lo yalty co wards this 
firm
33) I do not ha ve any infl uen ce  
over m a n a g e m e n t  d e c i s i o n s  
that affect the work I do
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A g r e e  A g r e e  A g r e e  a D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  
V e r y  F a i r l y  Li c t l e  a L i c c l e  F a i r l y  V e ry
S t r o n g l y  S t r o n g l y  S t r o n g l y  S t r o n g l y
3A) P r o m o t i o n  at .
.-j is g i v e n  o n  a 
fair b a s i s
35) I f r e q u e n t l y  get ideas 
ab out the w a y  I d o  my 
job
36) M o r a l e  is g o o d  h e r e
37) Th e r e  is no p o in c in 
c o m p l a i n i n g  a'oout a n y t h i n g  
here
38) M a n a g e m e n t  h e r e  w o u l d  not 
be i n t e r e s t e d  if I ha d an 
idea chat m i g h t  im p r o v e  the 
way I d o  my job.
39) C o m m u n i c a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  
w o r k e r s  and their line leaders 
and s u p e r v i s o r s  ar e poor he re
AO) The jo b I d o  ha s n o
responsibility attached to it
A 1) If a p r o b l e m  c o m e s  up in my 
work a r e a  the w o r k e r s  there 
u s u a l l y  cry and so rt it out 
on their ow n
A2) C o m m u n i c a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  
w o rk ers and m a n a g e m e n t  are 
poor he r e
A3) It w o u l d  not take m u c h  for 
me to leave this firm
AA) I am s a t i s f i e d  w i c h
M a n a g e m e n t ' s  e x p l a n a t i o n s  
of other peoples' 
promot ions
A3) I am m a d e  to w o rk too hard 
here
A6) It d o e s n ' t  bo th er me if 
I d o n 'c d o  my jo b w e l 1
A7) The wa y I am, s u p e r v i s e d  
makes me d i s l i k e  the work 
I do
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A g r e e  A g r e e  A g r e e  a D i s a g r e e  D i s a g r e e  D i sa gre e
Ve r y  F a i r l y  1 iccle a liccle fairly Very
S c r o n g l y  S c r o n g l y  s c r o n g l y  s t ro ngl y
68) Th e r e  is no v a r i e t y  in my 
job.
69) The wa y I am m a n a g e d  at
; is no
di f f e r e n t  to ot h e r  c o m p a n i e s  
I have w o r k e d  at
50) d o e s  not
g i ve its w o r k e r s  e n o u g h  
in f o r ma ti on ab out its 
present and future pl ans
51) Th e un io n h e r e  is g o o d  at 
taking up ou r in di vid ua l 
gr ievances
52) Th e un i o n  h e r e  in f l u e n c e s 
some of the m a n a g e m e n t  
d e c i s i o n s  that a f f e c t  the 
work I do
53) I feel l o y a l t y  to w a r d s  the 
u n ion h e r e
56) H a v i n g  a "no s t r i k e "  
a g r e e m e n t  at
has not m a d e  the
Un i o n  we ak
55) T h e  u n io n h e re is not 
c o - o p e r a t i v e  e n o u g h  wi t h  
m a n a g e m e n t
PART Ü
P l ea se a n sw er the q u e s t i o n s  b e l o w  by fo l l o w i n g  the u n d e r l i n e d 
in s t r u c t i o n s
56) H a v e  you joined Che Un i o n  (EETPU) 
at . f P l ea se
c i r c l e  the nu mb er o p p o s i t e  the 
an sw er w h i c h  a p p l i e s  to you
Yes 1 
No 2
IF Y O U R  A N S W E R  T O  QUESTION 56 WAS NO  P L E A S E  CO ON TO QUESTION 59
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57) O n  Che list b e l o w  ar e a n u m b e r  of chings chat U n i o n  m e m b e r s  
o f c e n  e x p e c c  cheir u n i o n  co cry an d a c h i e v e .
P l e a s e  rank or d e r  Che two c h i n g s  chac yo u mo sc e x p e c C  your 
U n i o n  (EETPU) to c o n c e n t r a t e  o n  a c h i e v i n g  ac
I ex p e c c  Che U n i o n  co c o n c e n c r n c e  on
I n c r e a s i n g  my wa g e s
G i v i n g  me job s e c u r i t y
I m p r o v i n g  w o r k i n g  c o n d i t i o n s
G i v i n g  me an o p p o r t u n i t y  co p a r t i c i p a t e  
in m a k i n g  so me of the d e c i s i o n s  chac 
a f f e c t  h o w  the c o m p a n y  is run.
W o r k i n g  w i t h  m a n a g e m e n t  co cry and 
find s o l u t i o n s  co p r o b l e m s
Not l e t t i n g  m a n a g e m e n t  g a i n  any 
a d v a n t a g e  over the w o r k f o r c e
S o m e t h i n g  el se - P l e a s e  say wh at
58) As a m e m b e r  of the U n io n (EETPU) 
at h o w  a c t i v e
ar e y o u  in the U n i o n ' s  a f f a i r s  ? 
P l e a s e  c i r c l e  the nu mber o p p o s i t e  
the a n s w e r  w h i c h  a p p l i e s  to you.
Ve r y  a c t i v e  
F a ir ly a c t i v e 
A c t i v e
O c c a s i o n a l l y  
Not ve ry a c t i v e  
Never a c t i v e
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I
I.
IF YOU A R E  A MEMQER O F  T T Œ  U N I O N  (EETPU) A T
PL£aSE~DO" no t a n s w e r  q u e s t i o n  b9 BELOW. CC O N  T O  Q U E S T I O T I T U
59) B e l o w  is a list of re a s o n s  wh y p e o p l e  d o n' t join Unions.
P l e a s e  rank order the T H R E E  mo sc important r e a s ons wh y you 
h a v e n ' t  joined the U n i o n  at _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  _ _ _
I have not joined the Union at 
because ; -
1 h a v e  just ne ver got a r o u n d  to j o i n i n g
I w o u l d  prefer to cake c a r e  of m y s e l f
It migh t d a m a g e  my ca re er p r o s p e c t s
I'm a l r e a d y  a m e m b e r  of a n o t h e r  U n i o n
I d i s a g r e e  w i t h  the idea of U n i o n s
i
I’
I
r - . '
>h
I w a n t e d  to join an ot her U n i o n
If Management are doing Cheir job 
correctly there's no need for a Union
The EZ TPU is not a me mber of C h eT UC
Some ot her reason, pl ea se say what
I
&
A.
P l e a s e  g o  o n  to t h e  n e x t  c a g e
60) H a v e  y o a  be e n  a m e m b e r  of Che E E T P U  or 
a n y oc h e r  U n i o n  b e f o r e  ? P l e a s e  c i r c l e  
Che n u m b e r  o p p o s i c e  che an s w e r  w h i c h  
a p p l i e s  Co you
Yes
No
IF YOUR A N S W E R  TO Q U ESTION 60 WAS NO PLEASE GO ON TO QUESTION 63
61) If your an sw er co q u e s c i o n  60 wa s yes, 
ca n y o u  re m e m b e r  che na me of your old 
U n i o n  and h o w  lo ng y o u  w e r e  a me mber. 
P l e a s e  princ your a n s w e r s  o p p o s i c e
Na m e  of U n i o n
H o w  long a m e mb er
H o w
old
Che
a c c i v e
U n i o n
n u mb er
a m e m b e r  w e r e  y o u  in your 
's a f f a i r s  ? P l e a s e  c i r c l e  
o p p o s i c e  che a n sw er w h i c h
Ve ry A c c i v e  
F a i r l y  A c c i v e  
Ac c i v e
1
2
3
a p o l i e s  co you Oc c a s  io nally
Noc ve ry a c c i v e I,
Ne ver a c c i v e 5
63) As a f o l l o w  o n  co che q u e s c i o n n a i r e  ic m a y  be n e c e s s a r y  co i n C e r v i e w  
s o m e  of y o u  (Managernenc w o u l d  noc be p r e s e n c  ac ch e s e  i n c e r v i e w s ) .  We w o u l d  
l i ke y o u  co n o m i n a c e  o n e  or cwo p e o p l e  chac you w o rk w i c h  w h o  y o u  chink 
r e p r e s e n c  your v i e w s  and w h o  y o u  w o u l d  like co n o m i n a c e  Co Calk o n  your 
b e h a l f  . Y o u  m a y  n o m i n a c e  y o u r s e l f  if y o u  wish.
Please orinc cheir name or names below.
6 4 )  T h e  p u r p o s e  of chis q u e s c i o n n a i r e  has be en co ask wh ac y o u  chink 
ab ou c wo r k  in g e n e r a l  and , m o r e  s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  w o r k i n g  ac
W i c h  c h es e q u e s c i o n s  in mi nd, d o  you h a v e  an y c o m m e n c s  
or a d d i c i o n a l  info rma c ion chac you w i s h  co add co your a n s w e r s  '!
If so ,please wrice Chem in che space below.
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ATPEKDLX 8, 1
EXPECTATIONS OF THE UNION AT COMPANY A ; STAGE 1
n-99)
Overal1 
Rank 
Orde red 
Posi c ion
Percentage 
of Respondents 
Express:ng I tern 
As One Reason 
For .Joining 
Union
1 joined che union at Company A because
Ic will increase my wages 61 . 8 4 38 . 8
Ic will give roe job security 57.8 3 42.9
It will help improve working conditions 36. 4 2 65. 3
I believe workers need trade unions co protect them 30. 5 1 714
Being a member of che union will give me an opportunity 
to participate in making some of the decisions that 
effect how the company is run 64 0 5 36 7
Everybody else joined 81 6 7 18 4
People in my family have always joined unions 9 1 2 9 8 2
I was pressurized by my workmates 99 0 11 0
The union gives good fringe benefits such as cheap 
insurance and other discounts 81.5 6 13 4
The EETPU is not a member of the TUC 83.8 8 16.3
Some other reason (please say what) 93 . 1 10 6. 1
N . 49
To : a I cu 1 a ; e che mean score che rank scores a 1 1 oca ced by each respondenc Co each i cem were added cogeiher 
These were Chen divided by che number of respondencs (Where a respondenc identified one or more reasons 
for joining, but did noc rank order them, and average rank score was calculated for each reason cited)
^ P Q T O L X  8.2
EgKTATIONS OF T1Œ UWIQN_AT Ç O M P ^  A : STAGE 2
(1-99) Ordered 
Posi t ion
Expressed As 
An Expectation 
Of The Union 
$
Item Expressed 
As A First Or 
Second Rank 
Ordered Choice 
% %
I expect the union to concentrate on: 1 2
Increasing my wages 25.0 1 71 . 3 34.6 26. 7
Giving me job security 38 . 7 2 56.9 27.4 17.6
Improving work conditions 53 . 3 3 40.2 2.9 26.5
Giving me an opportunity to 
participate in making some of the 
decisions that affect how the company
73 5 6 16.7 1 . 0 6.9
Working with management to try and 
find solutions to problems 72 ■’ 5 17 . 6 2.9 5.8
Not letting management gain any 
advantage over the workforce 71.0 4 19.6 3.9 7 . 8
Something else 99.0 7 0 0 0
N = 102
To calculate the mean score the rank scores allocated by each respondent to each item were added together. 
These were then divided by the number of respondents. (Where a respondent identified one or more reasons 
for joining, but did not rank order them, and average rank score was calculated for each reason cited).
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APPOCDIA 6, 3
T -TESTS - STAGE. 1 RESPONDEfTrS Vs THOSE SUBSEQUENTLY EMPLOYED AT COMPANY A: STAGE 2
Flwe Point Scale
KImp 1 oyed Kmp 1 Kmployed KMployed
At Stage Sul>Keguent At Stage Subseguent
1 To Stage 1 1
N =. 33 N = 117 ■ = 33
To Stage 1 
N = 117
T - SCORE
1) Co-operation In firms is impossible 
because workers and management are 
really on different sides.
21 Managers always try and get the 
better of workers.
3) Managers do not always know what is 
best for a firm.
4) It is not easy to be loyal to both 
your union and management.
51 Workers must have some say in
management decisions that affect 
the work they do.
5) Unions should always try and 
co-operate with management.
7) Unions are a good thing.
8) People need a union to protect 
their interests at work.
7) Single unionism at a company does 
not weaken the workforce
2.57 
2 45
2 36 
2 . 09
1 . 48 
I . 25
1 . 19 
0. 92
0.74
0.51
10) There should be some other way to 
resolve disputes other than going
on strike 1.69
11) Striking can benefit workers. 2.07 
Sis Point Scale
12) This firm is good to its workers. 4.42
13) I am very satisfied with my job. 4.45
14) This is a friendly place to work. 2.18
15) There is a good team spirit in my
work area 3.03
2.01 
1 .99
3.82 
3 35 
2.75
2.89
0. 58 
1 . 29
1 . 20 
1 . 12  
1.42
1 . 68
0.91 
1 . 19
1 . 39 
1 . 38 
1 . 23
1 . 58
-2.40* 
-0.31
2 4 3* 
4 . 65* 
- 2 .10 *
0.42
16) Getting promoted at Company A is 
important to me.
17) I felt loyalty towards this firm.
18) I can influence management decisions 
that affect the work I do.
2 . 49 
3. 63
2.07 
3 . 26
1 . 66 
1 57
1.58 
1 .51
1 . 36 
1.21
19) Promotion at Company A is give 
a fair basis. 4 85 3.98 1 . 2 2 1 .45 3.40*
20) I frequently get ideas about how to 
improve the way I do my job.
21) Morale is good here.
22) It is worth complaining here.
23) Management here are interested if 
I have an idea that might improve 
the way I do my job.
24) My job gives me freedom to get on
with my work in my own way.
25) The job I do has responsibility
attached to it.
2.90
5.12
3.76
2.55 
4.52 
3. 30
1.46 
1 . 34 
1.88
1.06 
1 .48 
1.71
1 . 28 
2 . 20 * 
1 . 26
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six To i n t Sca11
Eaplored Ex^ployed Employed Employed
At Stage Subsequent At Stage Subsequent
To Stage 1 1
M » 117 A - 33
To Stage 1 
A = 117
T - SCORE
26) If a problem comes up in my work 
area the workers there usually try 
and sort it out themselves.
27) Communications between workers and 
management are good here.
28) It would take a lot for me to 
leave this firm.
29) 1 am satisfied with management's 
explanations of other people s
promotions. 4.42 4.02 1.27 1.31
30) 1 am not made to work too hard here 2 4 0 2.15 1.51 1.43
1 . 56 
-0.84
31) It bothers me if I do not do my job
well. 1.37 1.57 0.96 1.07 1.04
32) The way I am supervised makes me
like the work that I do. 3.28 2.28 1.55 1.85 3.06*
33) There is variety in my job. 2.64 2.54 1.71 1.74 0.31
34) The way I am managed at Company A 
is different to other companies I
have worked at. 1.31 1.45 1.48 1.61 0.46
35) Company A gives its workers enough 
information about its present and
future plans. 3.61 2.93 1.54 1.58 2.21*
36) The union here is good at taking
up our individual grievances 4.24 3.74 1.54 1.44 1.64
37) The union here influences some of 
the management decisions that
affect the work I do. 4.21 3.97 1.45 1.31 0.85
38) I fee 1 loyalty towards the union
here. 4.21 3.79 1.64 1.54 1.29
39) Having a "No Strike" agreement at 
Company A does not weaken the
union. 3.28 3.00 1.62 1.59 0.85
40) The union here is not too co­
operative with management. 3.64 3.04 1.02 1.55 2.59*
To ease statistical analysis some of these questions and their scores are presented reversed. 
See Table 8.5 for an explanation of this procedure.
* P = .05
** P =  ^ .01
*** P = .001
Five point scale 1 « Strongly Agree 5 • Strongly Disagree
Six point scale 1 » Agree Very Strongly 6 ■= Disagree Very Strongly
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T -TESTS - RESPONDENTS. CONSIDER WAGES. FAIR/UNFAIR AT COMPANY A: STAGE 2
T - SCORE
Five Point Scale
1) Co-operation in firms is impossible 
because workers and management are 
really on different sides.
2) Managers always try and get the 
better of workers.
3) Managers do not always know what is 
best for a firm.
4) It is not easy to be loyal to both 
your union and management.
51 Workers must have some say in
management decisions that affect 
the work they do
6) Unions should always try and 
co-operate with management.
7) Unions are a good thing, 
on to protect
Fal r 
4 = 57
Fair
R ■= 57
Unfair 
N = 87
3) People need a i 
their interests 3 rk .
19) Promotion at Company A is given on 
a fair basi s
20) I frequently get ideas about how to 
improve the way I do my job.
21) Morale is good here.
22) It is worth complaining here.
23) Management here are interested if 
I have an idea that might improve 
the way I do my job.
24) My job gives me freedom to get on
with my work in my own way.
25) The job I do has responsibility
attached to it.
2. 29 
I . 78
9) Single unionism at a company does
not weaken the workforce. 1.57
10) There should be some other way to 
resolve disputes other than going
on St rike, 1 80
11) Striking can benefit workers. 2.13
Six Point Scale
12) This firm is good to its workers. 3.52
13) I am very satisfied with my job. 3.21
14) This is a friendly place to work. 2.56
15) There is a good team spirit in in y
work area 2.57
16) Getting promoted at Company A is 
important to me. 2.23
17) I felt loyalty towards this firm. 2.98
18) I can influence management decisions
that affect the work I do. 3.16
4.01
2.59 
4 . 24 
2.97
2.51
2.45
2,03
1.91
4 . 29 
3.90 
2.68
3. 17
2. 14 
3.61
4 . 32
2.68 
4 .97 
3.71
I . 14 
0. 54
0. 74 
1 .07
1 . 24 
1 . 30 
1 .00
1 . 36
1 .48 
1.44
1 . 38
1 .05 
1 . 51 
1.78
1 . 24 
1 . 1 2
0 92 
: . 30
1 27 
1 . 38 
; 45
1 7 0
1 .63 
1 53
1.45
1 . 24 
1 . 29 
1 .68
-1 .05
-4.47*
-1 . 63 
-I 08
-3.57*
-3.05*
-0.61
-2.31"
0. 33 
-2 50*
-1 . 28
-0 46 
-2.99* 
-2 49*
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Mean SD T - SOOKE
Pair Unfair Fair Unfair
Six Point Scale H • 57 X » 87 ■ = 57 X = 87
26) If a problem comes up In my wor)< 
area tlie workers there usually try
and sort it out themselves. 2.29 2.41 1.06 1.28 -0.61
27) Communications between workers and
management are good here. 3 27 4,10 1.55 1.28 -3.55***
28) It would take a lot for me to
leave this firm. 2.51 3 78 1.91 1.38 4.31***
29) 1 am satisfied with management's 
explanations of other people's
promotions. 3.87 4 31 1.26 1.28 -2.00*
30) 1 am not made to work too hard here 1.72 2.54 1.14 1.56 -3.64***
31) It bothers me if 1 do not do my Job
well. 1.43 1.60 0.96 I.11 0.98
32) The way 1 am supervised makes me
like the work that 1 do. 2.06 2.84 1.63 1.77 -2.54*
33) There is variety in my job. 2.08 2 91 1.63 1 71 -2 94**
34) The way 1 am managed at Company A 
is different to other companies 1
have worked at. 1.53 1.32 1.67 1.52 0.77
35) Company A gives its workers enough 
information about its present and
future plans. 2.79 3.28 1.64 1.55 -1.78
36) The union here is good at taking
up our individual grievances. 3.29 4.24 1.26 1.49 -4.07***
37) The union here influences some of 
the management decisions that
affett the work 1 do. 3.87 4 12 1.21 1.43 -1.12
38) 1 feel loyalty towards the union
here. 3.27 4 25 1.26 1.62 -3.50***
39) Having a "No Strike" agreement at 
Company A does not weaken the
union. 2.55 3.42 1.53 1.56 3.28**
40) The union here is not too co­
operative with management. 2 . 5 7  3.58 1.47 1.33 -4.18***
To ease statistical analysis some of these questions and their scores are presented reversed 
See Table 8.5 for an explanation of this procedure
p . .05
p . .01
p . ,< .001
Five point scale 1 • Strongly Agree 5 » Strongly Disagree
Six point scale 1 * Agree Very Strongly 6 » Disagree Very Strongly
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APPOfDlJÇ 8.5
VARIABILITY BY DEPARTMENT AT COMPANY A ; STAGE 2
Five Point Scale A&sembly Vs Press/Weld 
and Sub-Assembly 
Mean SD T Score
Ass Other Ass Other 
N»74 R = 70 11*74 N=70
Press/Weld Vs Assembly 
and Sub-Assembly 
Mean SD T Score
FW Other PW Other 
11=49 11=95 M = 49 11=95
Sub-Assembly Vs Assembly 
and Press/Wcld 
Mean SD T Score
Sub Other Sub Other 
11*21 11=123 11=21 N = 123
1) Co-operation in Firms is impossible 
because workers and management are 
really on different sides 1 . 82 2.55 1 .06 1.31 -3.66"» 2 38 2 07 :. 32 1 . 19 1 40 2.95 2.04 1 . 24 1 . 20 3.09»»
21 Managers always try and get the 
better of workers. 2.09 2 . 25 1 , 25 1.21 -0 79 2 . 26 2 12 ! . 28 1 20 0 63 2.23 2 16 1 .04 1 . 26 0. 30
3) Managers do not always know what is 
best for a firm. 1 .63 1 . 28 0 . 94 1 . 20 - 2 4 7 » 1 .21 1.96 ; 20 1.03 1.22 1.43 1.98 1 . 20 1 .06 1.62
4 1 It is not easy to be loyal to both 
your union and management. 1.55 1.93 1 . 10 0,99 -2 22» 1 .96 1.62 0 . 99 1 .08 1 .93 1 86 1 .71 1 01 1 .07 0.62
5) Workers must have some say in 
management decisions that affect 
the work they do. 1 . 55 1.44 0. 33 0 . 62 0 91 1 . 36 1 .56 0 60 0 79 - 1 70 1 . 61 1.47 0.66 0. 75 0. 67
6) Unions should always try and 
co-operate with management. 2.60 2.21 1 . 30 1 07 1 .96» 2.12 2 . 56 0. 99 1 . 26 -2.30» 2.42 2.41 1 . 24 1 . 20 0. 05
71 Unions are a good thing.
2 . 35 2.00 1 .05 0. 94 2.11» 2 14 2. 20 1 .02 1 .01 -0. 32 1.66 2. 26 0. 65 1.04 -3.51»»»
8) People need a union to protect their 
interests at work 1 . 82 1 .74 0.83 0.82 0.59 1 81 1 .76 0 . 88 0.80 0 . 32 1.57 1 .82 0.67 0 . 85 -1.50
9) Single unionism at a company does 
not weaken the workforce. 2 . 18 2.68 1 . 24 1.16 2.51 1 . 38 1 .96 1 . 20 1 . 24 -0.38 1.20 2.06 0.92 1.23 -3.75»»*
10) There should be some other way to 
resolve disputes other than going 
on strike 1 90 1.98 0.81 0. 90 -0.56 2.00 1.91 0.81 0.88 0.57 1.95 1.94 1. 11 0.81 0.04
11) Striking can benefit workers.
2 . 35 1 . 85 1 . 22 1 . 19 1.51 1.70 2.16 1.19 1.20 -2.20» 2.20 1.97 1 .16 1. 22 0.80
Sii Point Scale
12) This firm is good to its workers.
4 . 36 3.54 1 . 34 1 . 18 3.90»»» 3.67 4 11 1.26 1 . 34 -1.95 3 . 23 4 .08 0.94 1. 34 3.56*»»
13) I am very satisfied with my job.
4 .00 3.20 1 . 31 1 . 38 3 55»»» 3.24 3.80 1 36 1.39 -2 30 3.09 3.69 1.48 1.37 -1.75
«ppraoii 8. s^çpn t : d . 
six Point Scale AxEcmbly V b PreBB/Weld 
and Sub-Aasembly 
Mean SD T Score
PreBs/Weld Vs flBBembly 
and Sub-ABseably 
Mean SD T Score
Sub-Asseablf Vs Asseably 
and PreBs/Weld 
Mean SD T Score
Ass Other Ass Other PW Other PW Other Sub Sub
14) This is a friendly place to vork.
2.40 2.85 1. 20 1.35 -2.11» 2.81 2.52 1. 49 1 . 17 1 . 18 2.95 2.56 0.97 1.33 1.57
15) There is a good team spirit in my 
wor)< area. 3. 12 2.71 1 . 59 1.58 1.53 2.61 3.08 1. 63 1.56 -1 .67 2.95 2.91 1.49 1 .62 0.09
16) Getting promoted at Company A is 
important to me 2 . 32 2.00 1 .58 1 .57 1 . 18 2.13 2.18 1 ,53 1 .61 -0.21 1.72 2.24 1.69 1.56 -1. 32
17) I feel loyalty towards this firm.
3. 86 2.80 1.41 1.47 4.42*** 2.71 3.67 144 1 .48 -3.74»»» 3.00 3. 40 1.54 1.83 -1.11
18) I can influence management 
decisions that affect the vork I do. 3. 37 3. 76 1 . 70 1.39 -1 .52 3 70 3 49 1.50 1.60 0.76 3.91 3.50 1. 13 1.62 1.42
19) Promotion at Company A is given on 
a fair basis. 4,27 4 .08 1 . 40 1.50 0. 76 4 .08 4 23 1 . 49 1.43 -0.58 4 .09 4 . 19 1.54 1.44 -0. 28
20) I frequently get ideas about how to 
improve the way 1 do my job. 2.77 2.50 1 . 33 0.97 1 . 40 2 53 2 69 0.93 1 . 28 -0.87 2.42 2. 67 1 ,07 1 . 19 -0.95
21 ) Morale is good here
5 . 27 4 . 01 119 1 42 5.70»»» 4.18 4 90 143 ! . 40 -2.87** 3.61 4 .83 1 . 35 1. 39 -3.78»*»
22) It is worth complaining here.
3,96 2.82 1 . 60 1.73 4.11»»» 2.96 3 63 1 76 1 . 72 -2.08» 2.43 3.57 1.66 1.72 -2.89»»
23) Management here are interested if 
I have an idea that might Improve 
the way I do my job. 3.44 2.22 1.68 1.67 4.34»»» 1 .98 3. 29 1 .67 1. 66 -4.42»»» 2. 77 2.86 1.57 1.82 -0. 24
24) My job gives me freedom to get on 
with my vork in my own way. 3.02 2.44 1 . 34 1.66 2.09 2.74 2.77 1 . 64 1 , 46 -0. 12 1.91 2.91 1 .60 1.46 -2.66»»
25) The job I do has responsibility 
attached to it. 2.00 1 . 50 1. 64 1.78 1.75 1 .37 1 . 96 1 .70 1.71 -1 .97 1 .81 1.75 1.96 1.69 0. 14
26) If a problem comes up in my work 
area the workers there usually try 
and sort it out themselves. 2.46 2. 22 1. 21 1 . 18 1 . 29 2.04 2.52 1 .09 1 . 22 -2 41» 2.66 2.30 1. 27 1 . 18 1.20
27) Communications between workers and 
management are good here. 4 .22 3.25 1 . 26 1.56 -4.09»»» 3.45 3 89 1 . 55 1.42 -1.64 2. 77 3.91 1.41 1.42 -3.42»»»
28) It would take a lot for me to 
leave this firm 3.95 2.52 1. 39 1.79 5.35»»» 2.60 3.59 1 . 32 1.60 -3.23»»» 2. 34 3.41 1.71 1.70 -2.65»»
APPEJTPUC 8 , ^  Cont Id, 
Six Point Scale
29) I am satisfied with management s 
explanations of other people s 
promot ions.
30) I am not made to work too hard here
31) It bothers me if I do not do my job 
wel 1,
32) The way I am supervised makes me 
like the work that I do.
33) There is variety in my job.
34) The way I am managed at Company A 
is different to other companies I 
have worked for.
35) Company A gives its workers enough 
information about its present and 
future plans
36) The union here is good at taking up 
our individual grievances.
37) The union here influences some of 
the management decisions that 
affect the work I do.
38) I fee 1 loyalty towards the union
39) Having a "No Strike" agreement at 
Company A does not weaken the union.
40) The union here is not too co­
operative with management.
Assembly Vs Press/Weld 
and Sub-Assembly 
Mean SD T Score
Ass Other Ass Other
4.28 3.94 1.23 1.38 1.56
2.49 1.90 1.50 1.34 2.47*
1.44 1.62 0.82 1.24 -1.03
3.27 3.72 1.77 1.88 -1.50
2.75 2.36 1.64 1.81 1.34
1.88 1.98 1.31 1.65 -4.32"
3 80 2.33 143 1.41 6.19*
4.13 3.57 1.50 1.39 2.33*
4.28 3.75 1.45 1.17 2.40*
4.09 3.71 1.52 1.60 1.4 1
3.36 2.76 1.42 1.71 2.27*
3.57 2.78 1 28 1.55 3.31"
Press/Weld Vs Assembly 
and Sub-Assembly 
Mean SD T Score
PW Otlier PW Other
3.95 4.20 1.44 1 24 -0.99
1.88 2.37 1.33 1.48 -2.01*
1.35 1.62 0.80 1.15 -1.60
3.61 3.43 1.94 1.79 0.54
2.37 2.66 1.77 1.71 -0.92
2 03 1.10 1.60 1.48 -3.37*
2.52 3 88 1.34 1 64 -3.40*
3.95 3.81 1 35 1.53 0.60
3.81 4.13 1.33 1.44 -1.46
3.95 3.86 1.67 1.51 0.33
2 90 3 15 1.66 1.56 -0.87
3.11 3.22 153 144 -0 42
Sub-Assesmbly Vs Assembly 
and Press/Weld 
Mean SD T Score
Sub Other Sub Other
3.90 4.15 1.26 1.32 -0.83
1.96 2.25 1.39 1.46 -0.88
1.24 1.40 1.78 0.81 2.12*
4.00 3.40 1.76 1.84 1.42
2.34 2.60 1.93 1.70 -0.58
1.86 1.34 1.82 1.53 1.24
1.91 3.29 1.51 1.52 -3.86*
2.66 4.08 1.06 1.44 -5.25*
3.61 4.09 1.28 1.35 -1.57
3.14 4 03 1.27 1.58 -2.83*
2.43 3.18 1.83 1.53 -1.76
2.00 3.38 1.34 1.39 -4.32*
N = 144
P • ,< .05
P - .01
P = .001
Five point scale 1 » Strongly Agree 5 • Strongly Disagree
Six point scale 1 • Agree Very Strongly 6 « Disagree Very Strongly
XPPEHpjtK 9^1
KXPECTATIOIIS OK THE OHIOH AT OOHPAJTf B
Score
Ordered 
Posi t ion
Number of 
Respondents 
Expressing 
Item as an 
Expectation 
of the Union 
%
Item Expressed as a First 
or Second Rank Ordered 
Choice
% %
I e.xpect the Union to concentrate on:
1 2
Intcreasing my wages 18.8 1 82.8 24 . 4 24.4
Giving roe job security 35. 3 2 65.5 20.9 24 . 4
tmiproving working conditions 65.7 3 34 . 5 10.3 0.0
Giving me an opportunity to participate 
in making some of the decisions that 
af feet how the company is run 92.4 6 6.9 0.0 0.0
Working with management to try and 
find solutions to problems 92.3 5 6.9 0.0 3 4
No't letting management gain any 
advantage over the workforce 72 . 4 4 27.6 3 4 3 4
Something else 95. 7 3.4 0.0 0.0
To calculate the mean scores the rank scores allocated by each respondent to each Item were added together 
These were then divided by the number of respondents. (Where a respondent identified one or more reasons 
for joining, but did not rank order them, an average rank score was calculated for each reason cited).
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T -TESTS_.L_TH0SE e mployed at c o mp a n y B when it PIRST COMMENCED PRODUCTION 
Vs THOSE SUBSEQUENTLY EMPt/DYED
Pl»e Point Scale
Original Subseguent Original Subsequent
Employees Employees Employees Employees
N - 18 N ■= 31 N = 18 N = 31
1) Co-operation in firms is impossible 
because workers and management are 
really on different sides.
2) Managers always try and get the 
better of workers.
3) Managers do not always know what is 
best for a firm.
4) It is not easy to be loyal to both 
your union and management.
5) Workers must have some say in 
management decisions that affect 
the work they do.
5) Unions should always try and 
co-operate with management.
71 Unions are a good thing.
8) People need a union to protect 
their interests at work.
9) Single unionism at a company does 
not weaken the workforce.
2 . 88 
2.22
3.13
2.38
1.02
1.14
1.13
1 . 1 1
0. 77 
0. 50
10) There should be some other way to 
resolve disputes other than going
on strike. 2.77
11) Striking can benefit workers. 1.39 
Six Point Scale
12) This firm is good to its workers. 3.55
13) I am very satisfied with my job. 3.50
14) This is a friendly place to work. 2.77
15) There is a good team spirit in my
work area 2.61
2.32 
1 . 49
3.19 
3. 29 
3. 29
3.29
1 . 30 
1 . 33
1.50 
1 . 50 
1 . 62
1 .57
1 . 0 1  
1.23
1 . 30 
1.41 
1 .63
1.71
-1 . 27 
0. 25
-0.85' 
-0.48 
1 .06
1.41
16) Getting promoted at Company B is 
important to me.
17) 1 felt loyalty towards this firm.
18) 1 can influence management decisions 
that affect the work I do.
2 89 
3.50
2.33 
3 . 35
1 .57 
1 . 79
1 71 
1 . 30
I 41 
-0. 30
19) Promotion at Company B is given on 
a fair basis. 4.42 3.58 1 . 62 1 . 0 2 -1.51
20) I frequently get ideas about how to 
improve the way 1 do my job.
21) Morale is good here.
22) It is worth complaining here.
23) Management here are interested if 
I have an idea that might improve 
the way I do my job.
24) Communications between workers and 
their line leaders and supervisors 
are good here.
25) The job I do has responsibility 
at tached to it.
2.55 
4 . 27 
3.06
2.58
3.80
2.97
1.14
1 .83 
1 . 66
1 . 23 
1.43 
1 .92
0.07 
- 1 . 0 1  
-0. 17
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Six Point Scale
Mean SD T - SCORE
Original Subaeguent Original Subneguent
Kmp 1 oyees Employees Employees Employees
H « 18 W ' 31 N « 18 N » 31
26) If a problem cornes up in my worl< 
area tlie workers there usually try 
and sort it out themselves.
27) Communications between workers 
and management are good here.
28) It would take a lot for me to 
leave this firm.
29) I am satisfied with management's 
explanations of other people s 
promot ions.
30) I am not made to work too hard here
31) It bothers me if I do not do my job 
we 11 .
3 , 61 
2.89
3. 74 
2 71
1 . 63 
1 .67
1 . 23 
1.71
0.31 
-0 36
32) The way I am supervised makes roe
like the work that I do. 2.28 1.39 1.67 1.28 -1 95"
33) There is variety in my job. 3.00 2.71 1.67 1.71 0.62
34) The way I am managed at Company B 
is different to other companies I
have worked at. 1.76 1.17 1.44 1.60 0.36
35) Company B gives its workers enough 
information about its present and
future plans. 2.62 1.94 1.91 1.43 -1.30
36) The union here is good at taking
up our individual grievances. 4,72 4.23 1.27 1.71 -1.13
37) The union here influences some of 
the management decisions that
affect the work 1 do. 4,38 4,23 1.24 1.16 -0.43
38) I feel loyalty towards the union
here. 4.55 4.83 1.58 1.31 0.63
391 Having a "No Strike" agreement at 
Company B does not weaken the
union. 4.94 4.06 1.30 1.87 1.91*
40) The union here is not too co­
operative with management. 4.05 3.10 1.76 1.95 -1.74*
To ease statistical analysis some of these questions and their scores are presented reversed 
See Table 9.2 for an explanation of this procedure.
* P - ( .05
** P • < .01
*** P = < .001
Five point scale 1 « Strongly Agree 5 • Strongly Disagree
Six point scale 1 • Agree Very Strongly 6 » Disagree Very Strongly
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T -TESTS : RESPONDENTS CONSIDER WAGES FAIR/UNFAIR AT COMI'ANY B
Five Point Scale
1) Co-operation in firms is impossible 
because workers and management are 
really on different sides.
2) Managers always try and get the 
better of workers.
3) Managers do not always know what is 
best for a firm.
4) It is not easy to be loyal to both 
your union and management.
5) Workers must have some say in 
management decisions that affect 
the work they do.
6) Unions should always try and 
co-operate with management
7) Unions are a good thing.
Fai r
N = 27
Unfair Fair
M » 28 N = 27
Unfal r 
N = 28
5) People need a v 
their interests
lion to protect 
at work.
9 1 Single unionism at a company does 
not weaken the workforce
10) There should be some other way to 
resolve disputes other than going 
on strike.
11) Striking can benefit workers
Six Point Scale
12) This firm is good to its workers
13) I am very satisfied with my job
14) This is a friendly place to work
151 There is a good team spirit in my 
work area
16) Getting promoted at Company B is 
important to me.
17) I felt loyalty towards this firm.
18) I can influence management decisio 
that affect the work I do.
2.56
2.22
2. 29
1 63
2 92 
3.03 
2 . 59
2 81
1 .97 
3.11
3.18 
2 46
2.53
1.33
3 - 7.8
3.67 
3.50
3.28
3 .08
3.67
1 .03 
1 . 0 1
1.13 
1 . 27
I . 10 
1 . 28 
1.27
1 .57
1.67 
1 . 28
1 14 
1 . 29
1 . 10 
1 . 27
1.44 
1 . 49 
1 . 77
1 . 63
1.69 
1 . 56
1 74 
0.78
0 79 
-0 89
2 48" 
1.7) 
2. 18"
1 .09
2.44*
1 .47
19) Promotion at Company B is given on 
a fair basis.
20) I frequently get ideas about how to 
improve the way I do my job.
21) Morale is good here.
22) It is worth complaining here.
23) Management here are interested if 
I have an idea that might improve 
the way I do my job.
24) Communications between workers and 
their line leaders and supervisors 
are good here.
25) The job I do has responsibility 
attached to it.
3.66
2.66 
2.56 
2.86
4 .07
2.85 
1. 25 
2.97
1 . 30
1. 29 
1.42 
1. 13
1 . 24
1.38 
1 . 29 
1.30
1 . 18
0.53 
-3.55* 
0. 19
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APPEKDLX 9. 3^Çont et.
Hean SD T - SCORK
Pair Unfair Pair Unfair
SI» Point Scale R = 27 R = 28 R = 27 R = 28
26) If a problem comes up in my work 
area the workers there usually try
and sort It out themselves. 3.26 3,33 1.13 1.30 0.19
27) Communications between workers
and management are good here. 2 52 3.33 1.45 1.38 2.09*
28) It would take a lot for me to
leave this firm. 2.82 3.79 1.57 1.39 2 42*
29) I am satisfied with management s 
explanations of other people's
promotions. 3.51 3.89 0.84 1.59 1.09
30) I am not made to work too hard here ^2.26 3.25 1.48 1.60 2.38*
31) It bothers me if I do not do my Job
well 1.67 1.65 1.10 1.74 -2.48*
32) The way I am supervised makes me
like the work that I do. 1.79 1.75 1.50 1.52 0.11
33) There is variety in my job. 2.7] .3.11 1.75 1.66 0.88
34) The way I am managed at Company B 
is different to other companies I
have worked at. 2.17 0.90 1.34 1 51 -2.90*
35) Company B gives its workers enough 
information about its present and
future plans 1.56 2.38 1.34 1.67 2.75*
36) The union here is good at taking
up our individual grievances. 4.73 4 25 1.21 1.73 - 1 19
37; The union here influences some of 
the management decisions that
affect the work I do. 4 46 4.28 I 40 1.27 -0.54
38) I feel loyalty towards the union
here. 4.80 4.64 1.35 1.47 -0.43
39) Having a “No Strike" agreement at 
Company B does not weaken the
union 4.11 4 75 1.65 1 62 1.42
40) The union here is not too co­
operative with management. 3.57 3.39 1.79 2.02 -0,35
To ease statistical analysis some of these questions and their scores are presented reversed. 
See Table 9.2 for an explanation of this procedure.
* P ■ ( .05
** P = < .01
* * P » < .001
Five point scale 1 « Strongly Agree 5 • Strongly Disagree
Six point scale 1 » Agree Very Strongly 6 » Disagree Very Strongly
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APPeroWÎ. 9^1
REASOHS FOR HOK-MKMBERSHIP OF THE UNION AT O O M ’ANY B
(1-99) Ordered 
Pos i t ion
Expressed as 
a Reason for 
not Joining 
the Union 
%
Item Expressed as a 
First. Second or Third 
Rank Ordered Choice
t. % %
I have not joined the Union at Company 
B because:
1 2 3
I have just never got around to joining 91,1 8 8 8 0 0
I would prefer to take care of myself 68, 4 2 32 0 8 1 2
It might damage my career prospects 95. 1 9 < 0 4 0
I'm already a member of another Union 87.4 6 12 4 4 0
1 disagree with the ideas of Unions 76, 3 4 24 4 0 4
I wanted to join another Union 79.9 5 20 0 1 2 0
If management are doing their job 
correct 1 y there's no need for a Union 87 . 7 7 16 4 0 4
The EETPU is not a member of the TUC 76, 1 3 24 12 0 0
Some other reason 37.6 1 62 33.3 0 8,3
To calculate the mean scores the rank scores allocated by each respondent to each Item were added together 
These were then divided by the number of respondents. (Where a respondent identified one or more reasons 
for joining, but did not rank order them. an average rank score was calculated for each reason cited).
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